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THE U.S. POLICY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA - A STUDY OF 
CO-OPERATION AND CONFLICT (1908 - 1982) 
The outcomes of the second world war so changed the 
entire international power scenario that the U.S. policy 
towards Latin America entered into a new era which opened 
new doors of co-operation and conflicts as well with Latin 
American States, 
Historically, the declaration by the U.S. President 
Wonroe in 1823, that interference by any European power in 
the affairs of the newly emerging Latin American republics 
would be considered an unfriendly act toward the United 
States itself, established the right for the U.S. to protect 
Latin America. The Monroe Dectrine and later, Pan-American 
Movement and Roosevelt Corollary gradually promoted the 
idea that the nations of the Americas formed a political 
system distinctive from Europe. 
The second world war proved to be a turning-point 
in the relations between the United States and Latin America 
as a whole.The war not only once again restored the UoS, 
hegemony over the region bet it's outcomes shifted the U.S. 
policy towards worldwide commitments. 
Initially, the U.S. considered Latin America as 
relatively secure in cold war and therefore, showed modest 
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concern for the regional development. The Latin American 
States, consequently, began to feel themselves as a second 
class states within the U.S. policy framework. While, the 
rise of nationalism in Latin American States, rich in raw 
materials heightened their concern towards their own overall 
development, however, certainly not at the cost of jcelation 
with the United States, They argued, significantly, that 
Soviet Influence in the region could best be contained by 
eliminating social and economic disparities providing U.S, 
assistence and thus, creating independent strong nations. 
The present study is confined to the case study of the 
distinctive political turmoil which emerged in Cuba, Chile, 
Argentina, El Salvador, and Nicaragua within a specific time 
span, 1958 to 1982, following the Cuban revolution. The 
main focus of the study is on the political and motivational 
bases of the U.S, policy towards Latin America, 
The emergence of Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1958-59 
demanded a fundamental change in U,S, policy in Latin America-
Castro attempted to make Cuba entirely indepenaent of the 
United States and doing so, initiated deals with Soviet 
Union and other communist countries. The U.S, Administration 
feared thut Cuba would become a fountain head of Communism 
in the Americas, The U.S, policy severely responded. But 
its outcome i.e. Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, sponsored by 
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the CIA, further shifted to Cuba under Soviet umbrella. With 
Soviet support, Castro defied the whole idea of hemispheric 
security, as espoused by the U.S. and embodied in the inter-
American system. It was well exposed during the Cuban Missile 
crisis of October 1962, the most frightening international 
crisis since the end of the second world war. Consequently, 
the succeeding U,S, policy-makers seemed to be determined 
to allow *no more Cubas' and suffocated any Marxist movement 
in the region. 
However, the U,S, decision-makers unsuccessfully 
designed a plan, the Alliance for Progress, to contain Cuban 
influence in the region. But, it's failure further created 
strong tide of nationalism in Latin America in the early 
1970s, Chile firstly reflected these sentiments more strongly 
where Allende came to power in 1970 as the first democratically 
elected Marxist Presiaent in Latin America, of course, in 
spite of anti-Allende U.S. manoeurres, 
Allende viewed Chile as *a dependency of imperialism' 
and propounded providing substitute for the present economic 
structure, putting an end to the power of monopolistic capital 
so as to begin with the construction of socialism in Chile. 
The U.S. government did fear that Chile would serve as 
a base for South Africa's revolutionary left, as well,as, 
convenient outpost of the Soviet Union. The U.S. Administratior 
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ascertained, in response, to cease vulnerable financial 
resources detrimental to chile's dependent economy. The 
U.S. policy also aimed at to promote civil war through channe* 
Using massive financial assistance to the opposition and 
the military brass which could create political instability 
for fomenting a military putsch in Chile. 
General Pinochet ultimately overthrew Allende 
government by a sensational and bloody coup, clandestinely 
supported by the CIA, a significant institution in pursuit of 
the U.S. policy goals. The new military regime, obviously, 
received massive economic and military aid from Washington. 
The U.S. policy-makers have emphasized the significance 
of maintaining channels of influence and direction with the 
Latin American military as one of the major instruments of 
social control and preservation of the dominant political 
elites and economic ruling classes in the region. 
The United States' affection for the military regimes 
in order to create a depenaency syndrome by a process of 
development through foreign aid and multilateral collaboratior 
with the help of vested interests in the form of pro-U.S. 
elite may be aptly exemplified by discussing economic and 
political instability in Argentina during the first half of 
70s and in El Salvador during the second half of 70s. 
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Buenos Aires witnessed four governmental changes 
during this five year period, including the short-lived 
re-emergence of Juan Peron, once regarded as the *Bismark» 
of Argentina, who encouraged the nationalistic . and anti-
U.S, sentiments in his country. 
The military rulers, except Peron, who usually deter-
mined the fate of Argentina, gradually sold out Argentina's 
rich natural wealth to big U.S. business. The U.S. companies 
provided highly paid executive posts to Argentine military 
officials. The Argentine military magnets also remained 
responsive to foreign and U.S. capital infiltration into 
Argentine economy. 
The military regimes of Qngania and Lanusse in 
Argentina provided fruitful economic collaborations to the 
U.S. But Camporo's pro-Peron regime which designed its policy 
to strengthen State participation in the planning of inter-
national trade and finance and established contacts with the 
socialist states, was immediately regarded hostile to U.S. 
interests. The U.S. Administration did count Argentina, 
during Campora and Peron's rule, one more Latin American 
State ambitious to erase the U.S. super-power influence in the 
region besides Cuba and Chile. 
Thus, the U.S. Administration and the U.S. influenced 
international financial agencies had strong economic domi-
nance in Latin America that provided an influential black 
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mailing power to them which could push these nations to 
the brink of an economic disaster. While the natloallst 
ambitious of Latin American states sought a self sufficient 
and Independent economic system. But, the U,S, status-quo 
and fear of Soviet penetration behind every rhetoric of 
nationalistic policy thrust In Latin /^merlca have been prlmarll 
responsible for conflicts between the Interests of United 
States and the Interests of Latin America, In addition, 
the general deterioration of the International position 
of U,S, monopoly capital In 70s by the Increased competition 
for markets from its imperialist rivals, particularly. West 
Germany and Japan, and the weakening of the dollar greatly 
magnified the Importance of Latin America for the U.S. 
These have been the few basic reasons which compelled 
the U.S. policy to co-operate with military regime while 
to prefer conflicts with the democratic regimes in the 
Western Hemisphere. It supported the revolutions and opposed 
them as well only in order to establish sattelite governments 
in the region. 
It is well exposed in Nicaragua and El Salvador, 
The objective of the study is also to review and analyse 
current developments in United States policy in the light 
of increasing levels of ongoing internal and Inter-state 
conflicts in Central America, 
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The U.S. Administration, during the last years of 
the 70s, believed that there was a marginal diminution in 
American security created by the existence of a socialist 
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, an emerging threat of 
•second Cuba', that was hostile to U.S. long standing 
interests in the region. President Reagan particularly had 
the belief that the Soviet Union had outstripped the United 
States in military capacity and was actively engaged world-
wide in subverting the west. 
Central America and the Caribbean, a strife torn 
and bitterly impoverished region, is studbornly aboil witih 
insurrections. New cold war' era has reached at the doorstep 
of Central America where the U.S. Administration feels that 
vital U.S. interests are at stake. The United States views 
the events in Central America and the Caribbean as a Soviet 
intrigue through their Cuban proxies. 
In Reagan Administration eyes, the Sandinista in 
Nicaragua and the Marxist guerillas in tiny, embattled 
El Salvador, had close links with Moscow, The U.S, presumption 
led her to military involvement in El Salvador, The U,S, 
Administration neglected the fact that the rule of the 
game in a democracy is that change must be through ballot 
and not by bullet. Consequently, El Salvador lives under 
an unbearable dictatorship oligarchy and largescale human 
rights abuses. 
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The U.S. administration claims that Sandinista 
regime in Nicaragua is helping the communist guerrillas in 
the neighbouring El Salvador, The U.S. policy-makers 
assumed that if they had not been helping the regime the 
communists would have taken over El Salvador, 
The U.S. Administration always certified that the 
Duarte government had made a concerted, significant and 
good faith to deal with the complex political, social, 
and human rights problems, it was confronting. While, infact. 
El Salvador's long-smoldering guerrilla war have been greatly 
responsible for appelling human rights record in the country 
where more than 40,000 civilians have been killed. 
The political scenario in El Salvador underlined 
the fact that the armed forces will have a bearing on the 
country's political stability. 
The U.S. hardline strategy, therefore, in Central 
America has served two goals, the first. El Salvador will 
be 'saved' at any cost, and the second, the Sandinista 
government in Nicaragua can not be allltjwed to remain in 
existence. The U.S. has, consequently, concentrated a vast 
quantity of arms in El Salvador and Honduras possibly with 
a view to direct intervention in Nicaragua. 
Thus, Central American banana republics are in 
the throes of the military civilian struggle for power. 
9) 
The future of Central America as a whole may be largely 
determined by the duration and outcome of this struggle. 
The study believes that the projection of the East-West 
conflicts pattern on the region by the U.S. Administration, 
particularly the presentation of El Salvador a text book 
case of indirect armed aggression by the communist powers 
has jeopar(iised the common interests of the western hemi-
sphere. However, the study also come to the conclusion that 
the conflict in Central America have developed gradually 
from a mixture of several elements, for example, economic 
and political system conflicts, the arms race, border dis-
putes, historical animosities and the influence of super 
power rivalry. There can be, therefore, no solutions imposed 
on Central America and the Caribbean from the outside. 
The problems of Latin America as a whole are not 
susceptible to military solutions, especially where such 
solutions, are promoted by outside interests. The supply 
of military material end the rhetoric of intervention and 
threats of destabilisation by the U.S. policy do nothing 
but lead to great tension and instability in the region. 
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INTRODUCTIOt^ 
The significance of Latin American politics after 
the overthrow of the U.S. - backed Batista dictatorship in 
Cuba by a communist revolution in 1959, had acquired a global 
importance and gradually involved the interests of the Super 
Powers. Beside, during the 70s Latin American States, which 
initially accepted the big brotherly position of the United 
States, began to challenge U.S. status in the region and 
asserted their own individual national position. Obviously, the 
changing pattern of political balance in Latin America threatened 
to undermine the U.S. hegemony and posed a threat to its so-
called "security interests." 
In the history of Latin America, the United States 
rarely hesitated to intervene, overtly or covertly, in Latin 
American affairs. Specifically, the first cold war exposed 
that the major concezn of the U.S. in Latin America has been 
to prevent Soviet Union from gaining foothold in the region. 
The U.S. policy-makers, therefore, always sought pro-Washington 
governments in the Western Hemisphere. They seemed determined 
to go to any extent in assisting such regimes which, obviously, 
might involve the greatest risks, i.e., Cuban Missile Crisis 
in 1962. The Latin American affairs after the 1960s have 
signalled that the opposition to the U.S. "big-stick policy" 
would get intensified and the co\intries of the region would 
get more and more radicalised. 
In the cold war, V/ashington was to be especially 
sensitive to the Communist influence in the hemisphere, and 
receptive to the complaints of private U.S. interests affected 
by socialist reforms. U.S. Administrations had been anxious 
to prevent consolidation of an "unreliable" government in 
Latin America, having the belief that it could roll babk 
communism somewhere and, therefore, helped bring about its 
overthrow with all necessary means. 
The successive U.S. Administrations used to rely 
in this perspective, two much on the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) which used to bring out assassinations, 
destabilisations, propaganda and proxy wars in pursuance of the 
camouflaged U.S. "gunboat policy." CIA covert action is being 
practised with deadly efficiency and cold ruthlessness, i.e. 
in Chile during 1970-73, to thwart the nationalist aspirations 
of the regimes. Allende's bold moves such as the proposed 
land reform measure, and nationalisation of the copper mines 
faced a political battle with the US. 
Between 1945 and 1958,the year, the time span of the 
present study iegins, the U.S. Administration 
saw no threat serious enough to demand fundamental change in 
its Latin American policy. From the U.S. point of view,events 
in Latin America were under control. However, the political 
radicalisation in Guatemala/ which the U.S. government branded 
as a stalking horse for Soviet penetration, could be easily 
eliminated in 1954 by an expensive CIA-engineered coup. 
The scene changed in 1959. The Cuban Revolution loomed 
as a dangerous threat to -American policy-makers. By the end 
of 1960 another CIA sponsored intervention in Cuba was in 
preparation. The Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, and Castro's 
turn toward Soviet protection, accelerated a fundamental 
rethinking of the U.S. Latin American policy which had begun 
in the final months of Eisenhower's presidency. 
The end of the 1950s had seen the emergency of new 
regimes in Cuba, Argentina, Peru and Venezuela, while the 
beginning of 1970s witnessed the emergence of a democratically 
elected Salvador Allende government in Chile. These regimes 
wanted to show that representative governments could achieve 
economic growth and fundamental social reforms, and thereby 
make democracy seem legitimate to their masses. But, U.S. 
policy of the 1960s and early 1970s dealt harshly with 
democracy in Latin America. In fact, its calculations were 
severely influenced by political development in Cuba. 
The year 1978 is regarded for the outbreak of the 
second Cold War. This was the year in which variegated and 
stirring political events happened. The deployment of Cuban 
troops, for instance, in Ethiopia in 1978, and introduction 
of Soviet troops in Afghanistan strained the super-power 
relations. The year 1978 also intaessed the artful total 
exclusion of Soviet Union by the United States from the 
camp David agreement. The cancellation of talks between 
the Big-fwo on the Indian ocean issues, and on conventional 
arms transfers initiated by President Carter also signalled 
the future challenges that the whole world could face. 
The Soviet Union by 1974-75 was expected in the White 
House not to challenge the US status-quo. The People's 
Republic of China had moved away from its communist counterpart, 
The Pentagon was assuming a Sino-Soviet Conflict. The Camp 
David accord was considered the US victory. The US rich 
assistance had been proved conducive to good health for 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two oil giants with the Soviet 
''Sphere of influence". The United States still had technological 
superiority in nuclear arsenals. The US was anxious and 
ambitious to preserve the status quo in international system. 
This was the period, torecall, Salvador Allende was eliminated 
by CIA - backed putsch. 
Thus, the turbulence in the developing world including 
Latin American continent, can not be or should not be 
considered always of Soviet making. The US hostile actions 
towards the leftist and nationalist regimes in Latin America 
had been responsible enough to open up opportunity for the 
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Soviet Union to extend its reach in the hamisphere. The 
Latin American governments had been indicating this fact 
to the U.S. Administrations. The U.S. policy in Central 
America appeared to be proving the same opportunity. However 
developments in the Caribbean in the early 1960, nad left 
the U.S. with a deteacmination to have'no more Cubas' . 
The traditional view of US interests in Central 
America and the Caribbean emphasizes a litany of security 
economic and political interests. Historically, primacy 
had always been given to U.S. security interests, inhibiting 
direct military threats to the U.S., its military assetsih 
the. X region as well, safeguarding vital maritime routes 
and ensuring U.S. access to strategic raw materials. The 
Caribbean is a part of the southern border of the United 
States, whose involvement in the Basin, in fact, is perceived 
not as a matter of choice but of necessity. This, new cold 
was era has reached at the doorstep of Central American region. 
The Current U.S. obsession in Central America and the 
Caribbean is to defeat all challenges to the American hegemony 
that particularly emerged with the second cold war, in Nicaragua 
and El Salvador in 1979. The Central American politics has 
been simmering for a long time but now it seems to be coming 
to a boil. Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador 
which geographically form the heart of Central America have 
become the centre of a political turbulence. The Administra* 
tion feels that vital U.S. interests are at stake in the 
region. 
Central America is in the U.S. "front-yard" and its 
torn by civil wars, revolutions/ military dictatorships/ and 
pronunciamento's, Reagan believing his predecessor's policies 
"soft" toward" Soiiriet expansionism" and Cuba's support for 
"terrorism" which allegedly threatens the vital interests 
and security of the United States, embarked on a "tough policy" 
and thus once again emphasised more subtle methods toward 
interventionist direction. The Reagan Administration is carrying 
on an undeclared and clandestine war to throwout the leftwing 
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, El Salvador is also in turmoil 
because of a running feud between the right and the left. 
The US insisted on presenting Central American problems like 
an East-West conflicts, whereas Nicaragua consider it North-
South one. There is a temptation in Washington to pin the 
blame for the widespread opposition to the U.S. policies on 
leftist groups and organisation a part of their cold war 
strategy. The Americans are standing on some rather shaky 
political ground in El Salvador, Domestic violence is already 
at a level unprecedented in the country's history . More 
violence, there6ore seem on the cards. More than 30,000 
civilians have been killed in country's long-smoldering 
guerilla war between El Salvador's civilian-military government 
backed by the U.S. and about 6,000 Marxist led guerillas. 
Washington, however charges the guerillas are being supplied 
with arms from nearly Nicaragua and from Cuba. Any guerilla 
victory, the Administration fears, would accelerate Soviet 
sponsored subversion throughout Central America, But, it 
looked as if the Reagan Administration was going to have a 
fight a war of its own. Indeed, in Washington the most extreme 
Critics of the Administration's policy are likening the 
growing US role in El Salvador to the early stages of U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam. 
It seems that the Soviet Trojan horse theory is invented 
by Reagan Administration to lend intellectual credibility 
to the game the name of which is power. The bet is that ^r. 
George Bush, Republican presidential candidate, will win the 
American presidency. If it happens, one should not expect any 
major transfomation in U.S. policy from the present course. 
Factually, an objective analyses of the events shows 
that Latin Americans were flowing with their own nationalist 
ideals and ideas following the worldwide rapid industrialisa-
tion which gradually intensified more in the preceding years 
of the post second world war. The interests of Latin America 
were initially believed to be the interests of the United 
States. But later, in the consequence of growing nationalism, 
speedy industrialisation outside the western hemisphere and 
inventions of scientific utilisation of raw materials to 
bring internal development created tidal wave of desire and 
s 
ambitions in the entire region, to gain national control 
over economy and to innovate greater technological know-how * 
in order to accelerate overall national development. 
The U.S. policy-makers could not morally recognise 
nor adjust themselves with these nationalist sentiments 
which were forcefully dissolved in the Latin American mainst-
ream. The U.S. itself, therefore, involved responsibility 
somewhere, in compatible conflicts which had taken place 
between her and Latin Americans with different shapes and 
colours. Basically, U.S. obstinacy and persistent attempts 
to carry on her hegemony and dominance in Latin America in 
trade and foreign investment making all possible efforts to 
suppress nationalist resentment in the region stood behind 
all these vaxations. The rhetoric of nationalist passions 
in Latin America and U.S. tuff postures in response to these 
may be disclosed more explicitly if we see the Latin American 
affairs since the Cuban Revolution in 1959. 
In addition, economic development is promoted by the 
United States as a means for anxiously seeking outlets for 
its economic surplus. The U.S. has exploited growing inter-
dependence of U.S. and the Latin American nations in economic 
and technical fields according to its own national and 
corporate interests. But, economic nationalism, diversification 
and regional co-operation, and demands for a new international 
economic order, reflected resentment of U.S. economic 
policy in Latin America, the global upsurge in "North-
South" demands and increasing external economic problems. 
All aimed at, obviously, changing the level or nature of 
U.S. economic influence. Panama's demands for sovereignty 
over the Canal were the best example of a rising Latin 
American nationalism. 
The present work is confined to the case study of 
the following distinctive political upheavals which took 
place in Cuba, Chile, Peru, Argentina, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua within a specific time span-1958 to 1982, following 
the Cuban revolution and directly affects the U.S. Latin 
American policy: 
(1) -In 1970, a socialist and Marxist President emerged in 
Chile for the first time through the ballot box in the 
Latin american history. The same was forced only to die 
just after three years by a military putsch assisted and 
instigated by the CIA. 
The new military regime led by General Pinochet, was 
not only quickly recogniseed by the United States but 
provided massive financial and military aid by the U.S. 
(2) The U.S. Administration designed its policy towards 
Chile regional perspective too. Becuase, at that time, 
Ecudorion, and Guyanese regines also nationalised some 
U.S. owned multilateral corporations. Both the regimes 
started resisting U.S. imposed free-enterprise system. 
Like Chile, there was a consistent pattern in the U.S. 
attitude of active involvement, in support of Ur. 
economic and political interests, utilising loans, credits, 
subsidies, and military programmes, in Ecuador and Guyana. 
The U.S. had effective power in all of the international 
financial institutions upon which Ecuador and Guyana were 
dependent for credits and long-term financing. The U,S. 
government fully exploited its influence in these institu-
tions in order to safeguard its super-power interests in 
Ecuador and Guyana, similarly as it did in Chile. 
(3) Argentina, a biggest neighbout of Chile and one of the 
most industrialised nations of the region, experienced a 
wave of military coup and subsequently faced great political 
instability during first half of the 1970s. Consequently, 
the country witnessed the re-emergence of Juan Peron, an 
exceptionally wise military General, a nationalist with 
his own unique characteristics and an open opponent of US 
leadership in the region. 
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(4) In 1972, U.S. backed Jose Napoleon Duarto was elected 
President of El Salvador by a narrow margin against the 
leftist candidate. In 1979, a coup occurred in El Salvador 
which pushed the traditional rightist rulers of El Salvador out 
of office, and established a coalition of army officers and 
members of the Centrist Christian Democratic Party. Duarte was 
installed as the President of the civilian-military government. 
The United States quickly and actively supported Duarte regime 
through massive arms shipments and rich economic assistance. 
As a result, the civil war in El Salvador began badly between 
leftist guerillas and the ^nited states supported armed 
forces of the rightist regime. 
(5) After the 46 years of suffering inflicted by the corrupt 
Somoza dynasty, socialist oriented Sandinistas captured power 
in Nicaragua in 1979. Cuba is a perpetual embarrassment for the 
t^nited States, and Nicaragua, if it consolidates itself, would 
Clearly be another, the U.S. decision makers assume. Cuba's 
alleged arms supply to the Sandinistas and the leftist Salva-
dorean insurgents heightened U.S. concern in Central America 
and the Caribbean region. 
The main focus of present study is on the political 
and motivational bases of the US policy toward Latin America. 
It has been the purpose of this study to bring out : 
(i) immediate as well as permanent political and economic 
U.S. interests in Latin America, and to point out, (ii) the 
particular internal system of economy with strong political 
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ideas in Latin American nations which led to the establishment 
of their ftiendly and fruitful relations with the U.S., as 
well as, turned hostile to the U.S. eventually leading to an 
antagonism in bilateral relations. 
The present work is organised around three hypotheses : 
(1) The US Administration always attempted to check the 
expansion of the area under the dominance of leftist 
or communist regimes by various means, including the 
maintenance of the military and economic strength of 
the United States and its allies. 
(2) The United States policy which claims and attempts to create 
and maintain a community of interests between itself and 
the developing nations of the Latin America has proved 
a failure, 
(3) Latin American's nationalist challenge to U.S. dominance 
in their sicio-economic structure has always been catego-
rised by the United States as pro-communist and subsequently 
conceived as a threat to U.S. security. Such pre-conceived 
perceptions have also been responsible for the emergence 
and expansion of communism in the Western Hemisphere. 
In other words, the more the U.S. identified itself with 
reactionary or the rightist regimes in Latin America the more 
it contributed to emergence of socialist influence in the 
popular nationalist movements. 
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The turns and twists of international affairs are 
difficult to analyse. The present study believes that foreign 
policy, in practice, rarely corresponds fully to broad statements 
of aim and principle, for it must be based also on calculations 
of national interest in the specific circumstances in which 
decisions are made and actions taken. 
It has been emphasised in this work that the combination 
of great power and expansionist ambitions represent by the 
United States and the Soviet Union pose the threat that this 
massive agglomeration of power wbuld continue to expand in 
international politics and threaten the security of developing 
nations. 
The study covers two and a one fourth decades of the 
history of U.S. policy toward Latin America to find out the 
consistent dimensions of U.S. policy vis-a-vis with Latin 
America, It carefully selected at least one major political 
happening from each decade which not only encircled the United 
States and Latin America as a whole but deeply touched the 
process of U.S. policy formulations in Latin America, For inst?-
ance, the 1960s begins with the sensational emergence of 
Marxist Cuba under the leadership of Fidel Castro, the 1970s 
with exj^citing emergence of Socialist regime in Chile led by 
Allende, and the 1980s with alarming Central American tangle 
which severely gripped El Salvador and Nicaragua. 
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The study begins with a brief description of the histo-
rical background of U.S. policy toward Latin America. Chapter 
I examines the Castro's seizure of power in Cuba in 1959 
which brought the country in Soviet orbit and its implications 
on U.S.policy considerations in Latin America, The discussion 
highlights Latin American's dtetermination to shape the course 
of its own world which began to gather during the 1960s. The 
chapter also introduces the US policy response to the emergence 
of democratically elected socialist regime in Chile and unstable 
political environment in Argentina during the first half of 
1970s. 
Chapter II inquires the U.S. interest and involvement 
in Chilies presidential elections in 1964 and in 1970. The 
US policy had been prompted to prefer an anti-leftist govern-
ment in Latin America and to prevent a subsequent socialist 
regime in the region. The Chilean affairs (later in El 
Salvador) exposes this fact. The political situationxH in 
Chile after the emergence of socialist regime in Chile was of 
strategic significance for the United States. Allende success-
fully overcame the initial threats and created a new wave 
of nationalism in Chile by expropriating foreign assests. The 
Chapter briefly indicates the trouble which the US policy 
could create in Chile. 
Chapter III deals with the main features of U.S. policy 
toward socialist Chile under Allende presidency which deter-
mined the economic relationship between Chile and the United 
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States and provided a definite shape to American strategy 
against Allende regime. The US policy was a ruthless warfare 
against the nationalist measures taken by Allende regime in 
order to maintain U.S. hegemony over Latin America. The 
U.S. policy makers drove bilateral economic relations toward 
deep depressions in Chile and maintained as well close links 
with Chilean military. 
Chapter IV further analyses US policy which successfully 
destablised Allende regime through massive military aid to 
Chilean armed forces and financial assistance to the opponents 
of the socialist regime. CIA played an active and subversive 
role. Finally, Chilean armed forces took over Chilean political 
system in their hands. The US policy reversed entirely. 
The U.S. policy-makers affection for the military 
regime in order to create a dependency syndrome by a process 
of development through foreign aid and multij:ateral collabora-
tion is disucssed with Argentina and El Salvador. 
The United States gradually penetrated its capital 
9. into Argentine economic structure through client military 
regime. Chapter V deals with the US policy postures in 
Argentina which did face few setbacks during the Campora and 
Peron regimes. However, frequent revolution could'not pose 
any serious threat to US interest in Argentina. 
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A separate chapter has been devoted to the economic, 
political and social factors in Central American politics. 
Central America and the Caribbean is the region of vital 
concern to the United States. The U.S. policy-maker assume 
that America's long-range interests would be harmed by 
continuing indifference to the mounting desire in Central 
America for greater social justice/ as our indifference 
will only make it easier for Castro's Cuba to exploit that 
desire. The US policy, therefore, is concerned to avert 
immediate external destabilisation by strengthening the internal 
security of reliable regime in the area, i.e. El Salvador. 
It, thus, recognises the role of army in domestic affairs. 
The chapter deals with the long standing policy thrusts 
of the United States in Central America especially under Carter 
and Reagan Administratioo. 
Chapter VII deals with the U.S. policy in El Salvador 
which is based on domino theory. El Salvador lives under an 
unbearable dictatorial US-backed oligarchy which is at war 
with Marxist insurgents. 
The United States believes that socialist-oriented 
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua who overthrew the 4 6-year old 
entrenched Somoza dynasty in 1979, is assisting militarily the 
Salvadorean insurgents. However, the U.S. backed Contra rebels 
also are fighting with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, chapter VIII 
attempts to explain the US goals in Central America in General 
and in Nicaragua in particular which is aimed at overthrowing 
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the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. 
The last chapter is devoted to drawing the conclusion. 
A prologue is inserted after that which denotes the political 
happenings which have taken place in Latin America after 
1982 and must be relevant to the present field of study. The 
study closes with a Bibliography. 
In fact, immense wealth, power, and policies predicted 
on national self-interest established U.S. hegemony in Latin 
America. However, a consensus is yet to be achieved in the 
region that the right of all the Latin American countries 
to live in peace and to decide their own future, free from 
outside interference may be universally recogihised. The 
rallying of Latin America around the Cantadora group was 
an evidence of the growing political consciousness among 
the regional states to settle the disputes independent of 
the United States. In fact, the desire of the Latin Americans 
to deal on their°^ith the situation in Central America was 
engendered by the crisis of the ^nter-American system which 
was eloquently corroborated during the conflict between 
Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands. 
The United States has endeavoured sometimes with success, 
to stifle the revolution in Cuba and legitimate .Allende 
government in Chile; to pressurise Perurian solidarity 
campaign, to quash the revolutionary movement in El Salvador, 
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to suffocate socialist movement in Nicaragua; and to 
fortify its military springboard in the region. But, the 
study believes that the regional or international stability 
must rest on mutual respect and co-operation, respect for 
every nations' right to shape its destiny as it thinks 
fit. 
* * * * * * * 
* * * * * 
* * * 
* 
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CHAPTER - I 
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AI^ .ERICA; ASSUMPTIONS 
AND OPTIONS 
(With brief historical sketch and especial reference to 
Cuba, Chile and Argentina) 
The theorists of foreign policy and international 
relations have dimensional visions of the International 
System. Bipolar visions tend to stress the existence of a 
:fairly static division of international power, centering 
on the United States and the Soviet Union. Some describe 
an inter - imperial system in which United states and Soviet 
"empires" are in equilibrium. Latin America and East Europe 
are considered secure core areas for each power. Few see a 
socialist Camp whose objective is expansion under Soviet 
hegemony and a capitalist camp engaged in 'imperialism' to 
assure markets and supplies of raw materials. 
What matters for Latin America is the hegemony of the 
United States. United States policy toward Latin America is 
widely believed to be both more rigorous and more extensive 
then it is toward other parts of the Tr.ird World. Adherents 
of this belief claim that there is a special tutelary relation-
ship between the United States and Latin America, and this 
results in a much tougher stance toward its hemispheric 
neighbours than toward other areas. In addition, it is also 
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believed that a tough corporate policy of the U.S. giants 
of industry toward Latin America exist. In other words, 
it is assumed that the '-'nited States emerged in the post-war 
world as the strongest of foreign investors in the private 
sector after years of struggle against foreign especially 
European corporate interests. 
However, from the beginning of this century until 
World War II, Latin American dij>lomacy has been mostly'prebandry", 
worked for the sale of raw products to the United States. 
World War II changed this situation. The perception of the 
world as divided into two irreconcilably antagonistic blocs 
which permeated the cold war line of thought, considerably 
tightened the inter-American alliance system which was 
primarily built under the leadership of the United States. The 
Soviet Union on the other side tightened its own pact in 
Eastern Europe. Consequently, the area open for international 
negotiations jeopardized. Before this constriction, Latin 
American's regional comprehension had served to introduce 
extensive trade with the '^nited States. Americans gradually 
gripped Latin American economy. They began to believe their 
"birthnight" to exploit and explore regional economy according 
to United States terms. But, the world power arena deviated 
from its original course after second world war. Equally 
competent and advance trade markets emerged in the world as a 
consequence of intensive industrialisation in Europe and Japan, 
21 
Latin American States would have benefited their economy by 
establishing trade with the new emerging industrial states 
in the world but the U.S. superiority technological and economic 
always discouraged nationalist ambitious of the Latin American 
States. 
An analysis of the formulation of U.S. policy towards 
Latin America as a whole in new post-war political environment 
requires brief acquaintance of historical background which 
U.S. decision makers inherited from the period prior to the 
war. 
MONROE DOCTRINE : FOUNDATION STONE OF THE U.S. LATIN AMERICAN 
POLICY : 
Monroe Doctrine is, in a sense, biblieal for the White 
House officials in formulating U.S. Latin American policy. 
The U.S. policy toward the region stems out of the attempt of 
^resident Monroe in 1823 to separate regional affairs from 
vicissitudes of European politics. Monroe assumed that two 
distinctive and implacably hostile systems existed in the 
Atlantic region. One existed in Europe and the other in Latin 
America. Monroe perceived that in Europe, legitimate, monarchical 
regimes, having Napoleonic experience, would no longer tolerate 
revolution and democratic republican governments in their 
continent, while the Latin Americans, under the guardianship; 
of the United States had ultimately gained independence 
!2 
and established republican regimes in almost all the 
countries of Latin America ttij^ ugh revolutions against 
European monarchies. Monroe portended any European endea-
vour of expansion towards Latin America would be undesirable. 
He justified America's claim over the Western ^'^emisphere, on 
the basis of geographical proximity and similarity of 
systems for which Americans themselves have shed their 
blood, ^e unilaterally declared in 1823 that the U.S. gover-
nment would consider any attempt on the part of the European 
powers" to extend their system to any portion of the hemi-
sphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.^ He added that 
"the American continent by the free and independent condition 
which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth 
not to be considered as subjects for further colonisation by 
2 
any European powers. Significantly, the Monroe Doctrine 
is being reinterpreted and reinforced by the actions of 
succeeding U.S. administrations. 
PAN-AMERICANISM IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY : 
Monroe Doctrine was first reflected in the U.S. policy 
in late nineteenth century when the Pan-American movement 
See, Arthur Schlensinger, Jr., Dynamics of World 
Power, A Documentary, History of Latin America, 1945-1972, 
Vol. Ill, Latin America, New York, 1973, pp. XX. 
Ibid. 
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was initiated by the United States.^ The movement emphasized 
the "special" relationship between the United States and 
the Latin American nations and promoted the idea that the 
nations of the Americas formed a political system distinctive 
from Europe. In fact U.S. dominated Pan-Americanism was 
another instrument for e>i;tending United States political 
influence in the region. In other words. Pan Americanism laid 
the more strpng foundation of U.S. hegemony in Latin America. 
ROOSEVELT COROLLARY AND U.S. INTERVENTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA : 
In addition, in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century, the United States envisaged the danger of 
establishment of naval bases by the European powers specifically 
in the Caribbean region. The turbulent tiny islands of the 
Caribbean might invite European powers, specially Britain, 
to protect their citizens and their internal systems. The 
U.S. fear reflected in the formulation of Roosevelt Corollary 
in 1905 whose provisions allowed the United States to intervene 
in the affairs of any Latin American nation unable to face 
its own problems and which might unintentionally attract 
or encourage European intervention. Dominican Republic, 
Nicaragua and Haiti were 'assisted' by the Linited States 
in this respect, turning them as the U.S. protectorates. 
3. Pan Americanism has inspired a considerable literature. See, 
J.L. Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 
1889-1960, Austin, 1961, Gordon Connell Smith, The Inter-
American system. New York 1966; J.B. Lockey, Pan-Americanism. 
It's Beginnings, New York, 1920; Samuel Guy Inman. Inter-
American Conferences 1826-1954. History and Problems, 
Washington, 1965. 
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In Consequence of Roosevelt Corollary, the^nited 
States had been successful upto 1920s in minimizing European 
influence in Latin America and maximizing its own influence 
in the region. The U.S. position enhanced by the rapid 
expansion of its economic relations with Latin Americans 
in result of gradual withdrawl by the Great Britain which 
had preeminent economic hold over the region. But the 
early two decades of the twentieth century, in which U.S. 
made many Caribbean nations her protectorates in the implemen-
tation of Roosevelt Corollary created suspicious and fears 
among the Latin American nations about U.S.intentions. 
Denouncing U.S. move in the Caribbean region as "Yanqui 
Imperialism", they began to pressurize in order to amend 
the structure of Pan-American movement, to provide equal 
voice to all members in the affairs of Latin America. 
GOOD-NEIGHBOUR POLICY - AN ATTEMPT OF RECONCILIATION OF 
US INTERESTS WITH THE LATIN'S : 
The U.S. policy-makers predicting coming difficulties 
with Latin Americans, during the following decade formulated 
"Good-Neighbour Policy," in substitution of Pan-Americanism. 
This policy was committed to the doctrine of non-intervention. 
As a proof of the same U.S. government freed the Cubans from 
Piatt Amendment provisions and also withdrew U.S. marines 
from Haiti. Good-Neighbour policy apperently aimed at reconciling 
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U.S. interests with the interests of Latin American nations 
and factually exploiting Latin Americans in a different way. 
Apart from this, gradually declining influence of the League 
of Nations especially in the event of Japanese attack on 
Manchuria in 1932, and the rising aspirations of Fascist and 
Nazi forces, were signalling an imment world conflict. The 
"Good Neighbour Policy" was also the reflection of U.S. 
desire to keep away the whole Latin America from any external 
war. Under the banner of this policy, Washington sought the 
co-operation of all Latin American in order to create peaceful 
atmosphere in the entire region so that the region could 
isolate itself from any future external conflict. The United 
States seemed during this period to abandon its traditional 
dominant position, accepting the Latin American States morally 
and legally "equals". But, the outcomes of the second world 
war changed the entire international power scenario and the 
U.S. policy in Latin America started a new chapter in the 
history of the United States policy. 
GLOBAL OUTCOMES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
FORMULATION OF U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA : 
The U.S. interests in Latin America waned after the 
second world war. Initially, the United States showed a modest 
concern for Latin American development. But, the U.S. and 
Latin American relations came under growing strains after 
the war. There were mainly two factors which intensified 
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tensions between them immediately after 1945 :(1) The 
United states attained Super Power status in the world after 
the war. Her invincible and unassailable strength subsequently 
expanded her aspirations and her commitments throughout the 
globe. Notably, prior to the second world war, Latin America 
had remained a main subterranean passage through which varied 
United states interests were served. But the United States 
new status-quo tremendously increased her area of interests 
which required a wider region for their satisfaction, almost 
the whole world. 
President Truman observed "Whether we like it or not, 
we must recognise that the victory which we have won has 
placed upon the American people the continuing burden of 
4 responsibility of world leadership. 
The Americans did'nt see the past, they saw the future. 
It became evident when the U.S. foreign policy touched global 
reach in its calculations. While, poor and developing Latin 
American states began to feel themselves as a second class 
states within the U.S. policy framework. They considered that 
the U.S. decision makers dashed their hopes. 
4. President Truman in 1945. Cit in William Z. Foster, Outline 
Political Piistory of the Americas, International Publishers, 
New York, 1951, p. 483. 
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(2) The rise of nationalism in the region added new 
dimensions and introduced new aspirations among Latin 
American states i.e. the desire for modernisation, reasonably 
good standard of living, and to become strongly based, 
independent nations. They sought all sorts of assistance from 
the United States in order to achieve these objectives. They 
justified their expectations on the basis of historic-
geographical proximity with the United States. But the U.S. 
in her power conflict with the Soviet Union embarked An 
Europe and Asia during the initial post-war years. The 
conflicting worldwide interests of the super powers, their 
every possible attempt to expand and to strengthened their 
respective sphere of influence in Europe and Asia. In addition, 
the U.S. policy-makers q ickly perceived urgency to up-grade 
the desperate European economy and they focussed their 
attention on Europe in particular and Asia in general. Latin 
America had already been regarded well within the U.S. 
sphere of influence, two oceans as barrUrs buttressed its 
defences and, therefore, the U.S. policy-makers had no ground 
to perceive any iminewt danger from outside or within the 
region. 
The Latin American states were regarded as satellites 
moving around VJashington. The whole region was considered 
comparatively more sect red in the U.S. strategic perspective. 
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For this reason, during first decade^ after 1945, Washington 
could not pay attention to Latin America as much as they 
legitimately deserved, 
Thus/ the second world war proved to be a turning 
point in the relations between the United States and Latin 
America. In the beginning, however, the U.S. did avoid any 
participation in the war. 
LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT TO THE U.S. IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR : 
The United States was alarmed by the continuous 
victories of German "blitzkrieg" in Europe and perceived 
an iw»\>\e>.t danger of German intervention in the Caribbean. 
Consultative Meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers in 
Havana authorised United states to intervene in the Caribbean 
to prevent outside intervention and also promised all sort 
of support if the united states was attacked. The Second 
World War once again restored the U.S. hegemony over the 
region and provided a justification to the U.S. right to 
intervene in the region if necessary. 
Pearl ^^arbour attack forced the United States into 
the war. In response Latin Arrerican nations formultaed new 
policies in order to support their Big Brother. Rio de 
Janeiro Conference in January 1942 extended financial, 
technical, and military assistance to the United States. They 
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permitted U.S. tropps on their land and establishment of 
strategic bases within their territories. However, the 
role of Chile and Argentina remained slightly different during 
the war, Chile and Argentina did not follow Rio meeting 
recommendations to severe relations with the Axis powers. 
Chile was nervous for his 2300 mile long undefended coast, 
which was quite open to Japanese assault, ^iowever, chile 
overcomed the fear later and its nominal relations with Axis 
powers came to an end in early 1943. While Argentina for quite 
the same reason, could severe her relations with the Axis 
powers in 1944, although she did not participate in the war. 
The outcomes of the II World War shifted U.S. foreign 
policy towards worldwide commitments. The preceding years after 
the war evolved a bi-polar system of power politics. Engaged in 
Cold War, the "^nited States and the Soviet Union seemed pre-
occupied and threatened with each other. The United States 
considered Latin America as x relatively secure, therefore, 
assigned it a second priority. Vfhile, Latin American nations 
were more concerned with their overall development but perhaps 
not at the cost of relations with the ^nited States. Signi-
ficantly, they argued with the United States that Soviet 
influence in this region could best be contained by eliminating 
social and economic disparities and thus creating independent 
strong nations. 
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LATIN AMERICAN STRIVE IN THE POST WAR WORLD AGAINST U.S. 
ECONOMIC DOMINANCE : 
Almost all Latin American countries have a vast 
variety of raw materials but they lacked production capacity, 
technical skills and most significantly investment capital. 
For the foreign monopolies, Latin America serves as a 
reservoir of cheap raw-materials and agricultural products 
oil/ coffee, bananas, sugar copper and iron ores, tin, 
5 
bauxite etc. Consequently foreign investors had gained 
quite control of important segments of Latin America's export 
industries, as well as, of its public utilities. In 1970, 
U.S. direct private investments in Latin America were 
approximately $ 12.2 billion, compared to a total of $ 9.2 
billion for all other developing countries throughout the 
world. Significantly, U.S. holdings constitute 80 percent of 
all foreign investment in Latin America. This dependence 
on one hand helped them in their development but on the other, 
helped the foreign investors, mainly U.S. and U.S. influenced 
international financial agencies, in acquiring an influential 
blackmailing power, which could bring these nations to the 
brick of an economic disaster. This power had been frequently 
used by the United States in its relations with Latin 
5. Hynan Lxamer, "U.S. Economic Exploitation of Latin 
America," in Political Affair, October 1972. 
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America. Latin American nations and their nationalist 
leaders, therefore, had been always ambitious to turn their 
economic systems more self-sufficient and independent, 
and to develop their own industries, to exploit hitherto 
untapped resources and thus to reduce foreign influence over 
their economies. In this way Latin American nations started 
resisting U.S. imposed "free-enterprise" system whenever 
they could. 3ut the super po\/cr interest of the United 
States and her fear-psychosis of Soviet penetration behind 
every marked change in Latin America always judged these 
nationalist feelings as the sign of disloyalty and, an attempt 
to join Soviet camp. That's why, US Administration supported 
the revolutions, and opposed the revolutions as well to set 
up the "dear government in the region. They favoured military 
regin.es in the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Venezuela, 
Significantly, the aspirations of the Latin American nations 
to be self-dependent were regaided by the US vested interests 
as being inspired by the socialist or communist influence. 
They supported, therefore, the Batista dictatorship in Cuba 
but stronrly ofiposed Castro's growing emergence in Cuban 
affair in 1S58. 
Cuba was the first country in the Western ll^ eiaisphere 
that raised the triumphant banner of socia''ism, when ?idel 
Castro seized power in Cuba in 1959. 
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Cuban-American relations reached t':.eir tangled state 
of the early 1960s. However, C stro did not come to power 
only because of anti-Americanism, but also because of the 
revulsive dictatorships of his two principal predecessors, 
Gerardo Machado and Fulgencio Batista, whose names together 
were synonymous with Cuban politics from the mid - 1920s 
through the 1950s. 
THE DICTATCRSIIIP OF KACHADO : 
Wachado entered the prediency in 1925. His dictatorship 
became oppressive when the world wide Great Depression 
descended upon Cuba after 1930, At last he promised genuinely 
free elect/ions for the year 1934, but in August 1933 a 
violent general strike paralysed the island and Machado was 
forced to retire.^ The maker of governments for most of the 
years thereafter, until the appearance of Castro, was Colonel 
n Batista , whose rule, like that of Machado, ± become ever • 
g 
:>iore oppressive until he too was forced from office. 
6. See, Luis E. Aguilar, Cuba, 1933, Ithaca, New York,1972. 
a . See, Irwin F. Gellman, Roosevelt and Batista; Good 
Neighbour Diplomacy in Cuba, 1933-1945, Albuquerque, 1973. 
7. Batista rule in Cuba lasted from 1<:^ 34 to 1944 and iam from 
1952 to 1959. 
33 
BATISTA'S LAST DAY AI'CD US ASSUMPTIONS : 
As Batista's mandate began to run out in the 1950s, 
the American government made some efforts to persuade him to 
step down. There did not seem to be great danger vtether 
Batista stayed or left. The State Department assumed that the 
US equipped Cuban army would prevent too far a swing to the 
left. Secretary of State Dulles paid little attention to 
Latin America. President Eisenhower likewise was more concerned 
q with European and Asian problems. 
Oa 
Finally, Batista departed by plane on Nauary 1,1959, 
for the Dominican Republic, and Cuba suddenly belonged to 
Fidel Castro, a young lawyer who for five years had been 
carrying on an insurrection from the Sierra Maestra Mountains. 
The growing strength of the movement placed considerable 
strain on the Eisenhewer Administration, especially since it 
was obvious that millions of US dollars in military aid to 
Batista were being used to defeat castro.^*^ In March 1958 
an embargo was ordered against further shipments of arms to 
Cuba, and in November 1958 news conference, Eisenhower announced 
that the United States would pursue a policy of nonintervention, 
unless the lives of Americans in Cuba were endengered. But 
by this time, CIA had become convinced that US interests 
9. Robert H Ferrell, American Diplomacy ; A History, Norton, 
New York, 1975, p. 775. 
10. Ronald J. Caridi, 2 0th Century American Foreign Policy; 
Security and Self Interest, Prentice Hallj: New Jersy, 
1979, p. 320. 
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would , not be served by a Castro victory. The US policy 
makers presumed that communists and other extreme radicals 
had penetrated the Castro movement.^^ However, Eisenhower 
was not fully convinced by the CIA reports. 
There were those in the Department of State who were 
sympathetic to Castro and argued that his greatest support 
came from the middle class doctors, lawyers,teachers, and 
other disillusioned and disgusted by the dictatorship and that 
it was the support of this group which made his victory 
possible.^^ 
EISENHOWER RECOGNISED CASTRO : 
The Eisenhower administration, therefore, recognised 
the Castro regime six days after the fall of Batista, and 
American firms in Cuba hastened to pay their taxes in 
advance to show their approval. 
President Eisenhower was however understandably 
displeased when, in that spring of 1959, the American society 
of i^ewspaper Editors invited Castro to ^.Nashlngton to give 
a speech. President Eisenhower did not invite him to the 
White House. Castro nonetheless went Washington, the 
earstwhile colossus of the north, and made the speech. He 
denied, notably, in his speech, any communist influence 
in his government. 
11. Ibid., p. 380, 
12. See, Earl Smith, The Fourth Floor; An Account of the 
Castro Communist Revolution, Random House, New York, 
1962; also see. Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution; 
Myths and Realities, Praeger, New York, 1962. 
13. Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy; A History, W.W. 
Norton Company,New York, 1975, p. 776. 
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DETERIORATED RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE US : 
After Castro's American visit the relations between 
Caba and the United States rapidly deteriorated. Shortly 
after his return to Cuba the revolution began to pick up 
speed and become not merely a Cuban affair but one for all 
of Latin American, even the world. In 1959, the Castro-
styled Year of the Revolution, Cuban propaganda began to 
spread leaflets in spanish and English in the American South 
and in New Yorks Harlem urging Puerto Ricans and American 
blacks to rise against oppression. The Cubans made contact 
with the native Americans too, and in July 1959, Castro 
received Mad Bear, an Iroquois nationalist, as a guest in 
Havana. Castro introduced the Agrarian Reforms in 1960, and 
before the year ended Castro had seized the approximately one 
14 billion dollars of US owned property in Cuba. 
Fidel Castro again came to the United States in 1960, 
to attend the Assembly of the United Nations. When he spoke 
at the UN, Castro took four and one half hours to present 
his case.^^ At this UN Assembly session he met Khruschchev 
and physically embraced him. 
The US, however, promptly recognised Castro regime, 
but within two years American feelings toward Castro changed 
from sympathy, to patience, to exaspercition, and then to 
14. Ibid. 
15. His most memorable remark was that the two American 
presidential contenders of that year, John F. Kennedy and 
Richard K. Nixon, lacked 'political brains," for which 
comment he w-is reprimanded by the chair. 
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anger. It soon became obvious that Castio intended to 
carry out a far-reaching social revolution. He particularly 
struck out against the United States as a symbol of past 
oppression and evinced a determination to free Cuba of 
its economic dependence on the United States. In adaition 
to resenting Castro's expropriation of American property 
in Cuba on the basis of inadequate compensation, many 
Americans were alarmed by his tirades against the United 
States. They were also shocked by his summary "war crimes" 
trials and firing squads that killed hundreds of former 
Batista henchman. However, Castro became a symbol of protest 
to many Latin Americans against the past of right wing 
dictatorship/ injustices, and low living standards, 
SUGAR DEAL : 
Castro's drift toward the Soviet BlocXbecame 
especially alarming in February, 1960, when Soviet Deputy 
Premier Anostas I. Mikoyan visited Cuba, He signed an 
economic pact with Castro regime in which the Soviet 
Union agreed to purchase Cuban sugar at a price lower than 
that being paid by the United States and extended $ 100 
1 f\ million in credit at 2 1/2 percent interest. The US 
16. Nicolas Rivero, Castro's Cuba ; An American Dilemma, 
Washington, D. C. 1962. 
37 
policy-makers feared that Cuba would become a fountainhead 
of Communism in the Americas and that Castro would 
export his revolution to other parts of Latin America. 
ThuS/ for the first time since the Second World war, 
Latin American affairs became of premost concern to United 
States foreign policy. 
Alarmed by Havana's threat to the anti-communist 
tradition of the Western Hemisphere, Eisenhower embarked 
on a good will tour of South America in February of 1960. 
He attempted in this way to counteract the old feeling that 
the United States had been neglecting Latin America while 
courting other parts of the world. 
EMBARGO AGAINST CUBAN SUGAR : 
In June 1960, the state Department asked Congress 
to approve an embargo against Cuban sugar, which the 
President imposed in the following month. In response, 
Castro regime expropriated most of the remaining American 
property in Cuba. Khrushche also threatened to rain rockets 
1 7 
on the United States if it intervened in Cuba, However, 
later Khrushcher said the rocket threat was merely symbolic, 
but he had made clear his view that the Monroe Doctrine 
was finished. 
17. Alexander Deconde, A History of American Foreign Policy 
Vol. II, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1978, 
p. 733. 
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CASTRO DRIFT TOWARD COKKUNIST BLOC : 
Significantly/ Castro announced acceptance of Soviet 
protection, and established diplomatic relations with China 
The foreign Minister Gromyke notably, claimed that the 
Soviet Union had the sarre right of intervention in t .e 
Americas as had the United States in Europe and Asia. 
V/ith Soviet support, Castro had thus defied the whole 
idea of hemispheric security, as espoused by the United 
States and embodied in the Inter-American system. He had 
brought Cuba, in fact, directly into the cold war and 
contributed to making Latin America a new weight in the 
world balance of power politics. 
Castro, thus, in his attempt of making Cuba completely 
independent of the United States, initiated deals with 
Communist Countries, and accepted Communist arms and 
technicians. The United States feared that Castro would 
use his soviet arms to bolster 'Fidelista' regimes in 
neighbouring states. The US, in response, imposed an embargo 
in "--ctober 1960, on all exports to Cuba except foodstuffs 
18 and medica] supplies. 
18. Cuba had become a main issue in the presidential 
campaign between Nixon and Kennedy. Vice President 
Nixon, the Republican candidate, presented himself as 
the man best qualified to handle foreign Affairs in 
perilous times, while Kennedy accused the Republicans 
and said that Cuba had become a "Communist satellite" 
and the Republicans had failed to associate the US 
with the aspirations of the Cuban masses and dissipated 
the good-wiil built-up by Roosevelt's Good neighbour 
policy. 
Gulf of Mexico 
THE ATTACK ON CASTRO'S CUBA 
33 
THE BAY OF PIGS FIASCO : 
Early in I960, notably, the CIA surreptitiously began 
to move against Castro. It led to the idl-fated Bay of Pigs 
invasion on April 11, 1961 by 1,500 CIA-trained Cuban 
exiles against Cuba. This expeditionary force, trained and 
19 
equipped by the US , arrived at the Bay of Pigs in 
American ships. It had been expected that the invasion 
on the southern coast would encourage the island's pre-
sumably suffering millions to rise up and overthrow 
the Castro regime. These expectations were cruelly dashed 
when the anticipated uprising did'nt occur, within three 
day the invadors were either killed or captured by Castro's 
still loyal militia. The plans for invasion were approved 
by the US joint chief of staff. Their execution was, however, 
delayed until after the inauguration of the kennedy admin-
istration President Kennedy approved the invasion project 
because it seemed so far along and because it had such 
august backing, not merely by Director Dulles but by the 
joint chiefs. He, however, did put a condition on the 
invasion, that the US forces must not be directly involved 
and there would be no air cover, that mainly turn the 
invasion a failure. 
19. Owight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years; Waging 
Peace, 1956-1961, Doubleday, New York, 1965, pp. 613-65. 
Also, Richard Nixon, Six Crises, Doubleday, 1962, pp. 
352-55. 
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The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion was a total 
20 disaster, a great embarrassment to the United States and 
a useful piece of propaganda for the Soviet Union. However, 
21 Kennedy took full responsibility for American involvement. 
The Cubans brought the matter to the United Nations 
on the very day of the invasion, charging that the United 
States had violated two fundamental principles of the Inter-
American system, political sovereignity and economic security. 
Castro, On May 1, 1961, proclaimed cuba a socialist state 
and took other measures to tighten his left wing dictatorship. 
THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS : 
Castro's announcement reinforced Kennedy's belief 
in the necessity of strengthening the social and economic 
structures of the other Latin American governments. Kennedy 
turned his attention to shoring up his Alliance for Progress 
through economic aid. Following the Bay of Pigs fisco, an 
meeting of finance ministers and economic experts from all 
the American republics was scheduled on August 5,1961 at 
Punte del Este, uruguay, where the charter of the Alliance 
20. See Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy, Doubleday, New York, 
1966, p. 154. 
21. Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, Houghton Mifflin, 
Boston, 1965, p. 259. 
22. See Karl E. Meyer and Tad Szule, 3?he cuban Invasion. 
Praeger, New York, 1962. 
22 
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was formalised. It offered Latin America a minimum of 
2 -a 
$ 20 billion for economic developnent spread over a decade. 
More than help would come from the United States and the rem.ainder was to be supplied by international agencies. 
Western Europe, and priva-
not included in the plan. 
24 ate capital. Notably, Cuba was 
AIMS OF THE ALLIANCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCE : 
There was hope that the Alliance for progress, 
designed to promote social reforms and correct economic 
inequalities, would help to solve the perennial problems 
of Latin America. In fact, the Alliance raised high hopes 
among Latin Americans that Washington could'nt possibly 
fulfil. In the late 1960s, these hopes gradually expired 
due to lack of funds as well as nutual trust. 
Significantly, gradual disillusion of Alliance for 
progress has been responsible enough to create strong 
tide of nationdlism in Latin America in the early 1970s. 
Chile, Perx!, Bolina first reflected these sentiments. 
Allende in Chile came to power in 1970 as first freely 
elected Marxist President in Latin America. Army regimes 
with nationalist tones emerged in Peru and Bolina. These 
three Andean Nations proceeded to break the way of 
23. Latin America received $ 9,450 million under the 
Alliance for ^regress Programme. 
24. Ronald J. Caridi^ op. cit., p. 324. 
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American large financial interests by expropriating us 
assets, and consequently increased serious strain in 
US - Latin American relations. 
Castro's exclusion from the Alliance and his 
sensational December 1961 speech in which his covers ion 
to a Marxist - Leniv»ist philosophy moved the island 
nation closer to the Soviet Union and, correspondingly, 
increased the fears of those in power in the United 
25 
States. This polarisation continued in 1962, for in 
January 1962, Castro signed a far-reaching trade agreement 
with the Soviet Union. It was also announced that the 2 6 
Cuban army had grown to 250,000 Later, Cuba received its 
expiklsion even from the organisation of American States. 
The Bay of Pigs fiasco and following Castro's 
drift toward the left later led directly into the most 
frightening international crisis since the end of the 
25. The US policy had failed to deal effectively with 
Cuba's revolutionary nationalism led to Castro's 
drift toward Communism. The view is elaborated in 
V/illiam Anpleman Williams, The United States, Cuba 
and Castro; An Essay in the Dynamics of Revolution 
_and the Dissolution of Empire, Monthly Review Press, 
New York, 1962. 
26. Ronald J. Caridi, op. cit., p.324. 
43 
second World War t the Cuban Missile crisis of '-'ctober 
1962.^'^ 
27. For the missile crisis 1962, a large group of books and 
titles are available:Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. A. Thousand 
Days, New York 1965, Theodore C. Sorenson, KennedyT New 
York, 1965, Daniel James, and John G. Hubbell, Strike 
in the West, New York, 1963; Alexander L. Geogge, 
David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of 
Coercive Diplomacy, Bosten, 1971; Roger Hilsman, To 
Move a Nation, Doubleday, New York, 1967; Dand Horowitz, 
The Free World Colossus, New York, 1965; William Hyland 
and Richard W, Shryock, The Fall of Khrushcher, New York, 
1968, William Kaufmann, The Mc Namara Strategy, Harper 
& Row, N.Y. 1964; Rober Kennedy, Thirteen Days Norton, 
N.Y., 1969; Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the 
Communist Party, Princeton, 1967; Carl A. Linder, Khcu-
shcher and the Soviet Leadership. 1957-1964, Batimore, 
1966, Henry M. Pachter, Collison Course, Praeger, N.Y. 
1963; George H. Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy. The First 
Twenty Five Years, Dunellan, N.Y., 1970; Pierre Salinge, 
.With Kennedy, Doubleday, N.Y., 1966; Thomas C. Schelling, 
Arms and Influence, New Haven 1966; Hugh Sidey, John F. 
Kennedy, President, Atheneum, N.Y., 1963; Theodore, 
'Sorenson, The Kennedy Legacy, Harper & Row-N.Y. 1965; 
Michael Tatu, Power in the Kremlin, Viking N.Y., 1969; 
Adam Ulam, Expansion and Co-existence, Praeger, N.Y. 
1968; Edward Weintal and Charles W. Bartlett, Facing the 
Brink, N.Y., 1967; Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the 
Cttrosspoads, Cambridge, 1964; Oran R. Young, The Politics 
of Force, Princeton,1968; Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis, 
Philadelphia, 1966;Robert, A. Dinne, ed.. The Cuban 
Missile Crisis, Chicago, 1971; Richard J. Walton, Cold VJar 
_and counterrevolution. New York, 1972; Graham T. Allison, 
'Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
Boston, 1971; Department of State Bulletin, November 19, 
1973; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "How the Cold VJar Was Played," 
Foreign Affairs, 51, No. 1., October 1972, pp. 181-209, 
'WcGeorge Bundy," The Presidency and the ^eace, "Foreign 
Rffairs, XLII, April 1964; Rober D. Crane, "The Sino-Soviet 
• Dispute on War and the Cuban Crisis," Orbis, VIII, Fall 
1964, pp. 537-49; A. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis. 
An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behaviour, 'jWorld 
Politics, XVI, April 1964, "Interview with President 
Kennedy", Washington ^ost, December IB, 1Q62; Jerome H. 
Kahan and Anne K. Long," The Cuban Missile crisis: A 
Study of Its Strategic Context, "Political Science Guarterl^ 
LXXXVII, No. 4, December 1972, Klaus Knorr, "Failures in 
National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban 
Contd.... 
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A major crisis loomed as evidence mounted that 
Russian - built missiles were being installed on the island. 
At firrt, U-2 surveillance flights revealed the construction 
of so-called surface to air missile sites, but their impor-
tance was discounted because of their relatively short 
range. But, in raid-'^ctober 1962 these U-2 photos disclosed 
construction of sites for medium range missiles capable 
of traveling approximately 1,000 miles. The threat to the 
United States was now apparent, and the Administration's 
anxiety was increased ivhen intermediate-range missiles 
(over 2,000 miles) were sighted. The Soviets had never 
before stationed such strategic war material beyond their 
own borders, and even though the United States had missile 
2 8 installation in Turkey, nonehad been placed in East Europe. 
The US congress authorised kennedy by joint, resolutiori 
on Oct. 3, 1962, to take measures to prevent in Cuba, the 
creation or use of an externally supported military 
Ronald J. Caridi, ...op. cit, pp. 324-325.Also see, 
H. Ferrell. op. cit. P. 782. 
Contd.... 
Missiles, "World Politics, XVI, April 1964, pp. 455-67; 
W.E. Knox, "Close up of Khrushchev During a crisis," 
New York Times Magaxine, November 18, 1962; Roy E. Licklide 
er.The Missile Gap controversy, " .•Political Science 
Quarterly, LXXXV, No. 4, December 1970, pp. 600-13; Thomas 
M. Wongar, "Personality and Decision-making. John F. 
Kennedy-in FoQr Crisis Decisions, "Canadian Journal 
of t>olitical Science, II, 1969, pp. 200-25; C.L. Sulzberger 
Articles in New York Times, ctober 20, 22, and 24,1962, 
February 25, 1963; Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl 
Harbor". Foreign Affairs, «-'uly 1965; US Congress, House 
Committee on Appropriations, •'^earings On Department of 
Defense Appropriations for 1964, 88th Congress, 1st 
sessiori. Part 1, 1963, US Congress, House Committee on 
Armed Services, Hearings On Military Posture, 88th 
Congress/ 1 session, 1963, and U.S. Congress, Senate 
Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness -'-nvestigating 
sub-committee. Interim Report on Cuban Military Build-up 
S8th Congress,1st session, 1963. 
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creation or use of an externally supported military capability 
29 
endangering the security of the United States." 
On October 22, Kennedy in a television speech announced 
his policy about the missiles in a tuff manner, it shall 
be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile 
lanunched from Cuba against any nation in the Western hemis-
phere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States 
requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union. 
Thus/ kennedy raised up the national interest of the United 
States in a public showdown with the Russains. There always 
is danger that the extreme publicity in such a move will 
produce equal intransigence on the other side. In October 
1962 there then could have been no recourse except Armageddon. 
31 
On October 24, 1962, the US government, with unanimous 
support of the organisation of American states, inaugurated 
a blockade of Cuban waters. The crisis wore on for several 
days as messages went back and forth between kennedy and 
Khrushchev. Finally Khrushchev backed down and agreed to take 
the missiles out of Cuba. The Soviets dismentled their bases 
and hoisted their missiles into the holds of waiting ships. 
After the Cuban Crisis, American prestige, so hurt by 
the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961, was not only restored but 
mightily increased. 
29. Robert H. Ferrell, .... op. cit. p. 779. 
30. Ibid. Also see, Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, Noston, 
New York, 1969, p. 31. 
31. Ibid., p. 780. 
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On thing became certain aftur the Cuban missile 
crisis that the US Administration would not like in future 
to repeat the kind of diplomatic deal between Kennedy and 
Khruschev by which the Soviet Union removed the deadly 
missiles in return for the expectation that the US would 
not invade Cuba. The succeeding US policy makers seemed 
determined to allow "no more Cubas" and suffocate any 
Marxist movement in the region, as led by Fidel Castro. 
The US administration had been more anxious to see regional 
developnents in this particular perspective. 
But after the Vietnam's bitter experience, public 
support to the militaritic moves had been considerably reduced 
in the United States. There were, therefor?/ not merely 
to be "no more Cubas" but there were to be " no more Vietnar's 
either. 
CHANGES IN THE SOVIET MILITARY PROFILE IN CENTRAL AMERICA : 
Even after the missile crisis, the relations between 
Cuba and the Soviet Union gradually strengthened. It also led 
to chanoes in the Soviet military profile in Central America 
and the Caribbean. The Soviet ^nion acquired a new and 
signifcant naval presence, made possible by its expanding 
global capabilities and by the existence of the Castro 
ij regime. Nineteen naval and naval air deplc^ents to Cuba 
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took place between 1969 and 1978, of which eleven also 
entered the Gulf of '^^ exico, with the quality of the ships 
3 2 
being upgraded on each occasion. The Soviet naval presence 
grew from nothing to an annual average inthe 1970s of well 
over 1000-s..ins-days in the region. This represented no 
more than an average of 35 ships on station, of especial 
sensitivity to the US. The region has also now the presence 
of Soviet submarines. Between 1958 to 1963, Soviet hydro-
graphic research and acoustic survey ships had sailed 
extensively in the Caribbean. Two diesel submarines and a 
submarine tender were included in the first naval squadron 
to visit Cuba in 1959. The US also reacted strongly in 
1970 to Soviet attempts to construct a permanent base for 
nuclear submarines in Cienfuego Bay. Submarine tenders and 
ballistic missile submarines continued to be deployed in 
Cuban waters until 1974, when a brief attempt at "rapproachment" 
began between Washington and ^avana.^^ In 1978, the year 
of the largest Soviet naval deployment to date and the first 
Soviet naval deployment to date and the first patrols 
flown by Soviet pilots from Cuba, tb.e Castro government 
received its first submarine fromi the Soviet ^nion. In 
addition, Cuba's overall forces were substantially strength-
ened by the Soviet Union in the early and late 1970s to 
include, by 1979, three fighter-bomber and eight inter-
32. Edward Best, U.S. Policy and Regional Security in 
Central America,. IISS, 1987, p. 12. 
33. Ibid, p. 13. 
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ceptor quadrons also including 20 MIG-23s, 2 submarines, 18 
34 large patrol craft, and 62 first attack Craft, 
However, neither the Soviet presence, nor the C^ban 
inventory posed any inimediate threat to the US, but the 
time when the US could militarily take the Caribbean for 
granted was understandably gone. 
ENHANCED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REGION : 
In addition to Cuban tangle, the general deterioration 
of the international position of US monopoly capital in 
70s by the increased competition for markets from its 
imperialist rivals, particularly West Germany and Japan, 
and the weakening of the dollar greatly magnified the impor-
tance of Latin America in the eyes of Washington. It was 
visibly reflected when Secretary of State William Rogers 
declared at the First Special session of the General Assembly 
of the OAS in 1969 that no other region in the world had 
greater significance for the United States than Latin 
America. 
Chile, a country of diversified and progressive intere-
sts, is one of the best examples of the victims of US 
s^arp edged pre-dominance in Latin America and her thrust 
34. The Military Balance 1979/1980, llSS, London,1979. 
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for economic exploitatit>n to protect her own national and 
super-power interest. 
SOCIALIST CHALLENGE TO US DOMINANCE IN CHILE : 
The electoral defeat of US supported rightist regime 
of Eduardo Frei and the victory of Marxist and Socialist 
popular unity Coalition headed by Salvador Allende,^^ in the 
presidential elections of Chile in September 1970 brought 
serious strains in US-Chilean relations. Allende was a 
product of the Chilean middle class and an active politicna 
since thirties. His experiment to develop socialist system 
in Chile, popularly known as "Marxism in liberty", his 
successful attempts to expropriate foreign assets including 
American, without "adequate" compensation created threatening 
sound, in Washington, of an emerging second Cuba in Latin 
America.^^ Rise of a socialist government in Chile attracted 
35. Socialism in Argentina, in comparison to Chile, was to 
a very large extent on imported product which took root: 
mainly through the activities of immigrant European 
workers while in Chile, a generation before the Soviet 
Rcvoli'' • 'U and many years before the Mexican revolution, 
a number of political parties and other groups with 
distinct socialist outlook were already operating. The 
Radical t'arty in Chile was founded over a century ago; 
the social Democratic Party lEan trace its origins to th( 
Democratic Party founded in 1P87, while the Socialist 
VIorkers Party, a precursor of the later Socialist Party 
was founded in 1898. See, Claudio Vehiz,"Centra]ism and 
Nationalism in Latin America," in Foreign Affairs 
Vol. 49, No. 2, January 1971, "Fundamentals of Marxist-
Leninist Theory and Tactics of Revolvitionary Parties, 
Institute of Social Sciences, Progress Publishers, Mosci 
1985,pp.296-304. 
36. See, Robert Kuttner, Chile is not Cuba or is it? in 
Commonweal, Vol. XCIA, K? 17, August 6, 1971. 
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worldwide attentmon, for, Latin America has been too much 
under the shadow of the colossus to the North to afford a 
fair chance of survival to any form of socialist rule. 
Eventually, the U.S. Unassailable hegemony in the region, her 
influence over international financial institutions, and 
her tight grip over financial investments in chile stifled 
Allende's s^^cialist government to death by a military coup 
only after three years of its birth. 
As Allende assumed power, the U.S. policy makers framed 
an aggressive policy towards Chile. U.S. government efficiently 
utilized two major instruments in its offense,(l) impelling 
firm pressure for debt payments on Chilean govt, and (2) 
designing strategy of interception and interruption of new 
credits and loans to Chile. 
Significantly, Chile was breathing under heavy debts 
when Allende came to power. Most of the Chilean debts were 
entered into Chilean economy prior to Allende regime, speci-
fically by U.S. infuenced public, private and international 
banks, i'ayments of most of these debts ought to be rendered 
during the Allende term and proved unfortunate for him at 
last. The U.S. administration exploited the dependency of 
Chilean economy in the pursuit of U.S. objectives in Chile. 
They imposed economic embargo on Chile which proved disastrous 
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Table : A - 2 
CHILE 
COMPOSITION OF U.S. DIRECT INVESTIEENTS (CUMULATIVE) 
(Book value in U.S.^$ millions) 
Mining and 
Smelting 
Manufacturing Commerce Other 
and Trade 
Total 
1929 $331 $f 7 $ 13 $ 72* $423 
1936 383 5 12 84 484 
1943 215 28 15 76 329 
1957 483 22 9 52 666 
1960 517 22 12 188 739 
1964 500 30 20 * * * 239 789 
1968 * * 586 66 39 271 962 
1969 452 65 41 288 846 
* of which utilities and transportation were $ 67 million, 
** of which an estimated $ 320 million book value in copper. 
*** of which utilities were $115 million. 
SOURCE : Ian Roxborough op. cit, p.52. 
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for the Allende government. The fact remained that the 
Chilean economic structure was well vulnerable to the 
U.S. assault, as the Chilean economy, in fact, had been 
growing on borrowed money. The foreign debt had entered 
into Chile throughout the sixties, and new credits and 
loans pursued old debts in a spiralling sequence and thus 
restricted the scope of any further investment for industrial 
expansion or agricultural development in the country. 
The chart of Chilean economy in 1970 pointed out that 
total foreign investment in Chile was $ 1.672 billion, 
in which direct U.S. private investment constituted $ 1.1 
b i l l i o n . B y the end of 1970, U.S. and other foreign 
corporations dominated almost all of the critical and dynamic 
sectors of Chilean economy: 
a) iron, steel and metal products 60 percent 
b) machinery and equipment 50 " 
c) petroleum products over 50 " 
d) industrial and other chemicals 60 " 
e) rubber products 45 " 
f) automotive asseir.bly 100 
g) radio and television almost 100 
h) pha rmaceut i ca1 nearly 100 
i) office equipment nearly 100 
37. Figures are cited in Kyle Steenland, "Two ^ears of 
Popular Unity in Chile: A Balance Sheet," in New Left 
Review, March-April 1973, p. 14. Also see, Lajpat Rai, 
"Allendism and Its ^rospects in Latin America," in 
India Quarterly, Vol. 30, January-March 1974, p. 17. 
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Table A-1 (ii) 
CHILE 
DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT ($M) 
Sector 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 Total 
Agriculture 0 . 1 1 - - - - - 0.11 
Mining 2.25 - 0.57 73.23 10.83 56.54 143.42 
Industry 9.24 5.07 9.27 30.02 42.29 45.05 141.54 
Service and 0.35 0.01 0.02 0.57 2.47 - 3.42 
other 
Total 11.95 5.08 9.86 103.82 55.59 102.19 288.49 
SOURCE : Ian Roxborouge, Phil O'Brien & Jackie Roddich, 
"Chile : The state and Revolution", The MacMillan 
Press Ltd., London 1977, p. 51. 
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j) Copper fabricating 100 percent 
k) tobacco 100 " 
1) advertising 90 " 
Apart from the above statistics, the larger part of U.S. 
private investment in chile remained in the mining and 
smelting sector. Notably, Chile was earning her foreign 
exchange primarily from Copper mining which was well 
controlled by the U.S. Corporations. Thus Allende's 
chile was pathetically under external control over 
Copper production, necessary technology and spare parts, 
and of course, also in the manufacturing field. Obviously, 
Chilean econom^- was dangerously exposed to any attack 
sabotage. 
U.S. government adopted reckless and stringent 
measures against Allende regine. In consequence of that, 
Chile's imports from the U.S. declined from 40 during Frei 
government, to approximately 13 percent in 1972 during 
Allende presidency. The continunace of Chilean need and 
depenaency on the import of the essential spareparts from 
the Lnited States dangerously affected the economy through 
a steep slope in short-term U.S. commercial credits. It 
declined fror,i ir.A percent oF the total credits in 1970 to 
approximately 6.6 percent in 197?. It v/as due to this 
precioitous decline, that Allende government tea could not 
purchase spare-parts and machinery for the most vital 
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areaj of the econpmy i.e. copper, steel, petroleum, 
electricity and transportation. Notably, C lile has been 
importing over 90 percent spare parts for the copper 
industry from the l^ 'nited States. Besides, U.S. multinational 
corporations had almost complete control over Chilean 
exports, most specifically, the copper, whose worth was 
estimated at between $500 million and $800 million after 
its exploitation by the Allende regine. Thus, the m.ajor 
source of Chile's foreign exchange earnings was unJer 
the heavy pressure of U.S. Corporations. As the production 
planning, marketing and sales were also considerably 
dependent on U.S. firms and the Chilean pattern of 
development, indubitably, was evolved by external source 
of finance, technology and machinery, the U.S. money 
was the soule of the Chilean economic structure. Under 
these very aoverse circumstances, Chile's productive 
capacity, consequently, failed to s atisfy its debt 
obligations v/hile remained increasingly needful t- new 
debts for further invest^ment. In the mean time, 
international price of Conper also declined which 
aeeply damaged the Chilean situation. U.S. hostility 
at this stage cruelly prersurized Chilean economy, fv.lly 
utilizing CIA's subversive capacity, skilfully exploiting 
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opposition's hatred towards Allende, instigating and 
promoting massive strikes in Chile which took place 
4 
in mines and commercial sectors mainly during first 
half of 1973 and ultimately disruptea the Chilean 
economy to a total debacle. Thus, Allende's experimental 
and sincere efforts to substitute the monopoly of capitatism 
by the monopoly of Chileanism immediately weakened the 
string of U.S. Chilean relations. Allende's socialist 
dreams in Chile received U.S. aggressive shocks in return 
to protect her political and economic interests in Chile 
U.S. responded with vehement economic pressures in order 
to create internal economic chaos in Chile while U.S. 
retained close links with Chilean military wings with a f 
view to disaggregate Chile. The covect and overt U.S. 
involvement in Chilean affairs greatly intensified when 
internal disturbances in Chile were cropping up and a 
sensational military coup on September 11, 1973 led by 
General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte overthrew Allende 
government. 
The new military junta in Chile was prompty 
recognised by VJashington with nssew hope and enthusiam. 
U.S./ the most powerful democracy of the world, was in 
jubiliant mood and was more satisfied with undemocratic 
military regime in place of the Allende government which 
came to power through democratic process. Military 
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government once again opened the door of Chilean 
econom/ for foreign investments and returned expropriate 
assets to their pre1?ious private holders. In response, U.S. 
policy once again favourably turned to Chilean economy 
with nassive financial aid. 
Apart from Chile, the beginning of the 70s was 
also reflecting new nationalist challenges to the United 
States coming out in other parts of Latin America. However, 
these nationalist feelings among themselves were different 
in shapes and colours. For instance. General Torres in 
Bolivia like Allende was ambitious to nationalise foreign 
assets but without socialist dreams, Peru's nationalist 
junta was reluctant to design its economic strategy to 
confine the access of foreign capital within the structure 
of mixed economy, and Argentina was moving with the 
burgeoning nationalist movements which were led by anti 
Marxism of Peron tocVush the nationalist left. 
THE UKI'^ 'UD STATESSAND THE MILITARY REGI ES IN ARGENTINA : 
Juan Domingo ^ercn considered to be the most significant 
man in Arnentine politics, was President of Argentina from 
1944 to 1955 and again, after 18 years exile, in 1973 until 
his death in 1974. Before Peron Came to power. General 
Alejandro Aqustin Lanusse was the president who assumed 
the power through a coup overthrowing General Jaan Carlos 
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Ongania's military regime in June 1970. It was hardly-
astonishing because Ongania was also former coup maker 
himself. After Peron's death in July 1974 Isabel, his 
tbrid wife and then Vice •'^resident, succeeded Peron in 
Office. 
Factually, the military haHbean the real power in 
Argentina. However, the destinies of most South American 
nations have traditionally rested in the hands of their 
military. Although there were differences of personalities, 
traditions and political orientations among the various 
military regimes of Latin America, they all have at least 
one thing in common • a strongly held conviction that, 
by and large, civilian politicians were inept, corruptible 
demagogues and unsuited to direct the affairs of their 
nations. They had presumed that the military officers 
genuinely do have the national interest at heart.Argentina 
is the best case in this respect. Coups d© «tat in Argentina 
have become as normal a procedure for changing the •'^residency, 
that during 60s and 70s, no fewer than seven coups had taken 
plp.ce in Argentina, an average of one nearly every four 
years. 
Argentina, hov/ever, has held eloguently the pre-
eminent economic situation in the South American continent 
38. See, Newsweek, January 5, 1970. Also see, Newsweek, 
June 22, 1970. 
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and has immeasurable potentialities. Argentina a border 
country of Chile, had made rapid strides in its industriali-
zation process. Outstanding development in this nation 
occurred in the production of food, textiles, building 
materials, paper,tires and other rubber products, shoes 
and leather goods. In Argentina, there are various local 
industries, a number of branch factories and assembly-
plants of world-known industrial concerns. Unfortunately, 
during 70s the country had fallen so badly, prinarily due to 
the long domination by the United States that Argentina's 
natural wealth was sold out to the United States big 
business by military regimes having inherent interest, one 
by one. U.S. petroleum and oil companies had firmly establi-
shed in Argentina. In order to facilitate their penetration 
into the industry the military rulers of Argentina, except 
^eron, gradually liquidated the State-owned petroleum 
company Vacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales. Besides oil, the 
foreign monopolies also obtained control of Argentina's 
deposits of minerals. High- ranking Aroentine officers, 
significantly, assumed well-paid posts in the local subsi-
diaries of the foreign monopolies during 60s and 70s. 
The foreign corporations siphoned off no less than $ 6,000 
million from Argentina around 1970. Argentina's cement, 
rubber, motor car and chemical industries were also very 
eo 
much controlled by the foreign specifically U.S. companies. 
U.S. Corporations, thus, had mass penetration into the 
Argentine economy. Military regitres/ behaved with the United 
States with open loyalty. However, it gradually caused 
opposition and hatred towards the United States among 
the Argentine people and, therefore, accelerated the Peron 
movement. Peron had been always alergic to such U.S. pene-
tration and significantly he pursued an open-door policy 
with respect to the socialist countries. After military 
coup in Chile, he accepted 70,000 Chilean refugees and thus 
helped them escape Pinochet's tortures. Therefore, U.^. 
Argentine relations during his period were the worst. But 
Peron could'nt continue more due to his ill-health. Weak 
administration of Isabel also could not shift Argentina's 
dependence on the United States and in March 1976.the 
miiitcry once again uBvrped power in the country. 
In sur , it is an undeniable fact that the United 
Strites h.is always been accused for neglecting Latiny-Ameri ca» 
aftt'r the sccond World VJar and for oppressing and exploiting 
its developing nations at the same time. The International 
in lortance of Latin-America steadily declined after the 
second VJor] d war wtien the ^nited States developed interests 
in regions of Africa, Asia and the Middle East, formerly 
conceded to the British, the French, or the Dutch. But 
after Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963, when a fearful and 
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tense v/orld waited to see if the two g£-eat powers would 
collide,the strategic situation of the hemispheres has 
become unprecedented. Two super pov/ers realised that they 
with awesoiae nuclear arsenal cGn not go to war with each 
other at hope to win. Latin America in 60s, therefore, 
became very important in world affairs, and also in the 
calculations of U.S. policy as well more so than at any time 
in the past. 
It is a known fact that coups were common in 
Latin America. Many journalists and academicians frequently 
referred to Latin America as the grave-yard of democratic 
experiments. With regard to coups, it can be safely said 
that authoritarian regimes of the Right in Latin America 
were less critical of the United States than were those 
of the ^eft, however, resentment against Washington has 
roots everywhere. In the 1960s and 1970s, this resentment 
frequently expressed itself in econot ic issues. There was 
no doubt that U.S. policy also rajn with co-operation and 
several aid programmes v;ere finalised for the develop, lent 
of Latin Americas states but the problem of under-development 
always remained in the agenda of Latin America. As a 
consequence of that, Latin American society wns becoming increa-
singly polarized by its inability to relieve the growing 
tensions arising from its conditions of dependent under-
development. In fact, an underdeveloped country in the post-
war capitalist system tended to become econorr ical ly dependent. 
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while, a dependent economy tended to remain under-
developed. Dependent economies are particularly prone to 
suffer from continuing underdeveloped, or to undergo a 
distorted process of growth. 
In addition, economics growth in the nations of the 
region could'nt reduce the internal socio-economic dispari-
ties that characterized their vrnderdevelopeiient. Notably 
external dependence of the region had been aggravated 
by the growth of foreign capital in the last years of the 
60s. The region's annual payment of profits and interest 
alone amounted to $2623 million in 1970. The Latin 
Americas external indebtness rose from $7 billion in 
1969 to $19 billion in 1970. Only four Latin American 
regines Cuba, Peru, and Chile in Westerr, hemisphrie and 
Kicar^ya,sincerely, in C.A. had so far committed themselces 
to confronting U.S. hegemony in the hem isphre and to 
breaking the dependent structures that perpetuated their 
state of underdevelopment. 
Thus, there should be no doubt in the fact that 
the agendas of the United States and the Latin Americans 
had become quite different after 60s. The countries of 
the whole region could easily identify themselves with 
poorer, developing nations everywhere in the world and 
even more than in the past viewed the United States as 
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a rich and highly developed country concerned mainly 
with exploiting them for their resources. Even various 
aid policies, conceived in Washington ostensibly for the 
benefit of the Latin people, invariably linked assistance 
to B)enefits for North American businesses. Economic 
concern, therefore mainly lay at the bottom of a number 
of clashes with the southern regines. U.S. policy,in fact, 
has been dominated by the considerations of the expansion 
39 
of enterprises abroad and maintaining military and 
economic superiority in the region. These considerations 
have revealed, more than once, in U.S. determination to 
contain the interference of extra hemispheric powers in 
the affairs of the region and to frustrate any socialist 
or nationalist attempt to nationalise U.S. assets. It 
has been a permanent objective of the White House in 
Latin America to protect U.S. investments, markets, and 
sources of supply in the region. 
Tne present decade began with the renewd cold war. 
There are two significant factors distinguish the position 
S9. "The Expansion of United States Enterprises Abroad 
And Its Irrplications For Latin America", Kcononic 
Survey of Latin America, 1970, United Nations 
Pub "i icat ions. New York, 1972. 
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of the developing state in the first and second cold wars. 
During the first cold war, the , , Soviet Union did not 
have a seven-ocean blue water navy. Consequently, the reach 
of its influence was not perceived by the U.S. to be as 
extensive as it is during the second cold war. The Soviet 
support to the Marxist regime in Ethiopia, the coup in South 
Yemen and the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan following 
the Saur revolution in 1978 assured the US assumptions. The 
political development in Central America are seen as enlargement 
of a Soviet bridgehead in Latin America. The second factor 
is that in the past colonial period, the developing nations 
have acquired legitimate political control over the natural 
resources, within their territories. However, mostly they 
rely on multinational Corporations of major powers for explo-
ration and exploitation of these resources. Simultaneously, 
some of them are ambitious to assert their control over the 
resources and few are in a position to do so. The Soviet led 
socialist bloc of^'ers an alternative source of technology for 
this purpose. This has led to a -fear in Washington that the 
Americans may Le denied access to various mineral resources. 
The developing world, therefore, has more threats of super 
power intervention. That's why. Central America is boiling 
today. The US policy balance has co-operation in one pan 
and 'Conflict' in the another. It exposed simultaneously in two 
neighbouring states Chile and Argentina during first half of the 
1970s. Chile made a radical effort to eliminate distortions and 
resuscitate the market between 1970-73, while Argentina remained 
a carpet-bed of U.S. multinational corporations particii^arly 
during 1970 to 1975. 
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aiAPTl.R - II 
THE U.S. POLICY THRUSTS IN CHILL: : ECCNCllIC 
POLITICAL LAViriAGL 
For an objective explanation of the dynan.ics of U.S. 
policy towards Chile after the victory of a socialist candidate 
in 1970 Presidential elections, it is imperative to enquire 
into American interest and involvement in Chile's residential 
elections in 1964. For, the United States threatening instance 
with a "big-brotherly" attitude in financially supporting 
Frei regime and finally its impact on subsequent Chilean 
affairs well expose the U.S. policy considerations in Latin 
America. 
THE U.S. SUPPORT TO EDUARDO FREI : 
There were three main contestents in the fray in 
Chilean Presidential election in 1964. Apart from Salvader 
Allende, the candidate of Populat Action Front; the candidates 
of the Right-'-.'ing Democratic Front-Julio Duran, and the leader 
of Christian .ycmocratic Party-Zduardo Frei I^ .ontalva were the 
tv/o altcrn^ tive candidates attracting support of the ICennedy 
administration. Traoitionally, the Americans l-iad supported 
the conservative segment of Chilean upper class - the coinr.>t-r-
cial middle class ?nd the industrialists cum-landowners 
like Jorge Allcssandri Rodrigv.z, the President of Chile 
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prior to 19 64, But the Americans turned to Eduardo Frei, 
a strong talented man who support to be managing the Chilean 
political affairs cleverly. The U.S. policy-maters conceived 
a more capable atternative in a minority Party-the Christian 
Etemocrats to meet the leftist threat according to their own 
terms. However, after the Curico debacle,^ the Efemocratic 
Jtont had little hope of winning, and, therefore, they 
extended their support to the Christian Etemocrats to prevent 
the Socialists from coming to power. The Efemocratic Front 
disbanded later, Daran withdrew his candidature and the Chilean 
Right moved to support Frei, the only logical alternative 
against the leftists. Thus Frei's major opponent was the 
candidate of the FRAP (Popular Action Front) coalition, 
Salvador Allende. Frei won the election in 19 54 with a 
thumping majority (56 percent of the votes polled), 
AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT : 
The U.S. government and the U.S. multinational 
Corporations penetrated their influence in various forms 
in the 19 64 election in support of Frei, Approximately a sum 
1, In a by-election in Curico in March 19 64, before the 
Presidential election, a candidate of Marxists Popular 
Action Front Captured the seat. Christian Democrats came 
second. 
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of ^ 20 million was funnelled into the election campaign 
of Pre! >^ile at least 100 "special personnel" were 
posted to Chile from Washington and other ^atin American 
2 
countries to engage in complementary activities. The 
Washington Post quoted an important intelligence officer, 
saying "U.S. government's intervention in CJiile in 19 64 
Presidential elections was blatant and almost obscene. We 
were shipping people off right and left, mainly State 
Itepartment but also C.I. A, with all sorts of covers."^ 
C.I.A. operations took the form of subsidising via conduits 
such as the International Etevelopment Foundation, peasant 
organisations, or financing pro-Frei media operations, Philip 
B. F. Agee, a former C.I. A. intelligence officer with respon -
sibility for Latin America, has stated that be personally 
acted as a conduit for the channelling of $ 200, 000 in 
Chilean currency from a major New York City Bank into covert 4 electoral activities in support of Frei. 
The top Washington offxcials admitted in private, that 
Frei's election was calculatedly supported by the 'serious 
efforts' of U.S. copper interests and the U.S. Information 
2. The Washington Post> April 6, 1973, pp. Al, Al2. 
3. Ibid. 
4. The Washington Post. July 11, 1974, p. A3. 
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Agency.^ Executives of the U.S. Copper Companies in ChSle 
confidentially played an active role in the pre-election 
period. They indirectly provided fictitious support to 
Frei's position by accepting his programme of "Chileani-
sation" for the copper industry and other foreign dominated 
industrial sectors as the mere viable alternative to nationa-
lisation. 
"Chileanisation programme"^ was the Christian Efemocrats 
proposed alternative to the full nationalisation of the Copper 
Companies, advocated by the Popular Action Front in their 
election campaign. With the agreement of the Copper Companies, 
the Prei government bought out 51 percent of the shares in 
the Chilean mines. The Companies retained control of management 
and gained new concessions from the government over taxation, 
and proportion of their profits which could be sent out of 
the country, and, therefore, che agreement was very profitable 
7 to the foreign interests, specially American, involved. 
5. David J, Morris, Vfe Must Make Haste Slowly : The Process 
of Revolution in Chile^ Vintage Books, New York, 197 3, 
p. 56. 
6. More details about the performance of "Chileanisation" 
programme have been given in Chapter Third. 
7. See, Ian Roxborough, Philip 0' Brien & Jackie Roddick, 
Chilet The State and Revolution, The Mac Millan Press 
Ltd., london, 1977, pp. 44-45, 
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The unusual entrance of the United States military-
personnel into Chile in the period prior to 1964 elections, 
also Caught an significance. Aaring 1963, forty five U.S. 
g 
military officers were specifically posted to Chile and 
assigned for various U.S. military missions around the 
country. In addition, thirty five officers of the U. S, armed 
forces arrived in Chile just two or three months before the 
election Incidentally, at the time of the election, the 
Chilean armed forces were engaged in "antisuiversive exercises. " 
Actually, these joint Arrny-Navy exercises were contrived and 
projected during the election on the presumption that the 
Chilean Congress would be forced to vote for a new President Q 
of their choice if no candidate procured an absolute majority 
as required under the Chilean Constitution. 
AMERICAN AID DISBURSEMENTS AND ITS OUTCOME : 
The Frei administration was warmly welcomed in the 
United States as offering the chances of a radical yet 
democratic solution to Chile's deep-seated social and econo-
mic problems i.e. rural poverty, chronic inflation, and 
foreign control of crucial raw materials. During Frei 
8. There were more than sixteen military attaches at the 
U.S. Embassy in Santiago. 
9. Miles D, Wolpin. Cuban Foreign Policy and Chilean Politics, 
lexington, Masss D.C. Heach & Co., 1972, p. 92. 
70 
administration, as a consequence, Chile received largest 
share of the Alliance for Progress loans as compared to 
any country in Latin America, on a per capita basis, approxi-
mately amounting to ^ 1.3 to 1.4 billion. The U.S. Agency 
for International Itevelopmeit (AID) justified substantial 
economic assisance to Chile on the basis of the country's 
ten year development plan sponsored by the Chilean government 
AID funds to Chile continued to increase from $ 41.3 million 
in 1963 to H 78.5 million in 19 64.^^ 
The massive aid disbursements for 1963, 1964, and 
1965 were all essentially based on Chilean acceptance of 
fiscal and monetary stabilisation policies arranged with 
yearly IMF "standby" agreements. Factually, this process of 
money expansion proved misleading and did'nt succeeed in 
attainment of stabilisation and development as evident from 
the relevant facts. The "Revolution in Liberty," as Frei's 
programme was called, did'nt or could'nt achieve v^ iat had 
12 been hoped. rj^ ^ annual rate of inflation during 1963 and 
10. U.S. Congress Senate, Cora ittee on Foreign Relations, 
Subcommittee on Multiritional Corporations, "Multinational 
Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, " Part 1, 
p. 113. 
11. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Efevelopment Assistant to Latin America 1961-1970, April 
14, 1971, Committee Print-Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1971, pp. 9-10. Also see Table - 1. 
12. The Economic Times, September 17, 1973, p.8. 
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71 1964 was 40 percent, the trade deficit increased, and 
the economic growth rate de-tillned. The cost of living index 
fell from 38 percent in 1964 to 17 percent in 1966,^^ In 
1968 and 1969, Chile's economy slipped back into stagnation, 
A Congressional study in this respect concluded that the 
logic behind the programme was political. The basic rationale 
behind the programme was to countenance the position of the 
rightest forces in the 19 64 presidential elections. In 19 64 
Chile received ^ 55 million programme loan, ^ 15 million 
Export-Import Bank line of credit, ^ 1 5 million through the 
Treasury exchange agreement, and $ 40 million general 
economic development grant. The 1964 assistance package 
was based solely on political considerations, 
1) to maintain chile's current levels of economic activity 
and investment, and 
2) to support the balance of payments , so that financial 
deterioi^ion and unemployment would not occur in the 
election year,^^ A former AID official remembered, "Vfe 
did not want to have a condition of vast unemployment 
as Chile was going into the election. Notably, the 
13, James ^etras and Morris f^orj^ ey, _The United States and 
Chile; Imperialism a-^ d the Overthrow of the Allende 
Government, Monthly %new Press, New York, 197 5, p, 23. 
14, Ian Psoxborougb, Philip C Erien, end JacHe Roc rick, 
Chile: The State and Revolution,, The Macmillan Press, 
M:d., london, 1977, p. 44, 
15. U, S,, Congress, Senate, "United Stfees Foreign Aid in 
Action: A case Study, " p. 103, 
16. The Washington Post. April 6, 1973, p. A12, 
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overall aid to Chile increased dramatically from $ 97.7 
million in 1963 to $ 260.4 million in 1964, and then 
17 
decreased to $ 92.5 million in 1965. The AID also came 
to know in a post election audit that between $ 60,000 and 
$ 70,000 worth of U.S. food supplies donated to the C A R I T A S 
(the major social welfare agency of the Catholic Church in 
Chile) had been "diverted to Christian Efemocratic campaigners 
18 during the campaign." 
In short, chile remained a recipient of constantly 
increasing and disproportionate economic assistance by AID 
throughout the sixties. Between 19 61 and 1970, AID grafted 
19 
loans to chile of about $ 1, 400 million. AID ajso issued 
without anyrstified bilateral agreement between the United 
States and Chile, $ 1.8 billion in political risk insurance 
in Chile during 1965 to 1970. This insurance was also a 
part of the U.S. policy to help the government of Frei's 
Christian E^mocratic Party. ^ ^ 
17. Harvey S. Perloff, Alliance for Progress, Batimore, 
Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969, p. 210. 
18. David J. Morris, We Must Make ^aste Slowlyt Ihe 
Process of Revolution in Chile, New York: Vintage Books, 
197 3, p. 56. 
19. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on banking and 
Currency, Latin American Economist Study, 91st Congress, 
1st session, October 1969, Washington: US Government 
Printing Office, 19 69, p. 19. 
20. U. S., Congress House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "The 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation" 9 3rd Congress, 
1st session. Committee Print, September 4, 1973, Washingtons 
U.S. GovFnment Printing office, 197 3, p. 9 5. 
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The Pt^i government also recieved considerable 
amounts in the form of loans and grants from the li./, S, 
government, the banks and the U.S. influenced international 
financial institutions. The U.S. Export-Import Bank provided 
loans of 41 254.4 million to Chile between 1967 and 1969. 
Between 19 65 and 1970, the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Envelopment Bank made loans to Chile amounted to $98 million 
21 
and $ 19 2.1 million respectively. Chile had obtained by-
December 1970, a public and private debt totalling to ^^  3.83 
billion, most of it owed to the U.S. government agencies 22 
and private lenders. During 1964-1970, Inter-American 
Etevelopment Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Envelopment, and the Export-Import Bank provided credits 23 to Chile of an average of $ 150 million a year. 
The structure of Chilean import and Chile's indebted-
ness offered the United States a powerful leverage to disrupt 
the Chilean economy if it so desired. In 1968, the United 
State supplied 39 p«?rcent of Chile's imports. About 70 
percent of all capital goods imported by Chile came from the 
United Stfees.^ "^  Thus, Chile's industrial structure was 
21. See Agency for International Efevelopment, "U.S. Overseas 
loans and Grants and Assistance from International 
Organizations, " July 1, 19 45-June 30, 197 2, Washington: 
office ,'of ij'inancial ^"inagement, Statisties and Reports 
ly-vision, AID, May 1973, pp. 42,181. 
22. Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review 
of Chile, Annual Supplement, 1973, p. 15, quoted in 
James Petras & Morris Morley, ....op. cit. p. 
23. New Times, 15 April, 1973, pp. 12, 13. See Table 1. 
24. Ian Roxborough, Philip 0' Brien & Roddick,op. cit,p. 53. 
75 
entirely dependent on the United States, 
Just prior to 1970 Chilean presidential election, 
AID requested the U.S. Congress to make a 9. 3 million 
increase in aid to Chile. However, AID' S presentation before 
the U.S. Congress recognised that the 'Alliance for Progress' 
had failed dismally in its objectives in Chile.^^ In 1969, 
inflation rate was the highest since Prei took office. 
Government policies in the agriculture sector including 
land reforms, per capita production etc.had failed apparently, 
and the growth rate of the Gross National Product for the 
period 19 65-19 69 was not propitious in comparison of the 
period 1961-1965. Since 1967. Chilean economy became 
stagnated as in evident from the following table : 
Per Capita GNP Growth 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 19 67 1968 1969 1970 
3.6 2.4 2.1 1. 6 2.4 4.6 0.0 0.6 0.7 1.0 
(Source i Ian Roxborough, Philip 0* Brown & Jackie Roddick, 
"Chiles The State and Revolution, " Ihe Mac Millan Press Ltd, 
London, 1977, p. 56.) 
The U.S. politico-economic involvement in Chile was soon 
traversed, U.S. aid disburf'^ments successfully influenced 
25. Inter-American Economic Affairs. Winter 1970, No. 3, 
Vol. 24, 8 5. 
26. Ibid. 
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the Frei election in 19 54 bat the success was short-lived. 
The U.S. policies proved to be deficient in foresight. She 
failed in its subsequent efforts to promote socio-economic 
27 
development of Chile. Ihe defeat of the U, S. strategic 
perceptions was manifested in the success of Socialist 
Allende in 1970* s Chilean presidential election. ^ ^ 
@nly in its first three years, the Christian Efemocrats 
Programme was satisfactory. In this period the industrialists 
encouraged by the growth in government expenditure and 
the consequent stimulas to consumer demand^ put back into 
a oper^iion the industrial capacity. Production of manufactures 
also increased. Inflation was reduced to 20 percent by 
1966, while production rose 5 percent in 19 65 and 7 percent 
29 
in 19 66. New productive enterprises such as, car inxiustry 
an electronics industry and a petro-chemicals industry were 
put into production. These were generally established by the 
foreign multinationals. At fche same time, U.S. businessmen 
began to buy industries which had previously been owned by 
Chileans. Once again, the government in power was able to 
give the Chilean economy a temporary boost, at the cost of 
increasing its long-term dependence on the United States. ^ ^ 
27. See, Alan Angell, "Christian Etemocracy in Chile, "Current 
History, February 1930, p 79. 
28. Se^, Alan Angell, "Chile; From Christian Efemocracy to 
Marxism, " Current History. Vol. 60, No. 3 54, February 
1971, p. 84. 
29. Ian Roxborough, Philip 0' Brien & Jackie Roddick, op. cit., 
p. 60. 
30. Ibid., p. 44. 
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But since 1967 onwards the inflationary pressures over Chile 
began to rise. 
In fact, the dominent Chilean economic interests, have 
always accomodated themselves to foreign economic interests. 
The dominent foreign interest in Chile was obviously the 
United States. The most important U.S. interest in Chile was 
in-golved in Copper mining. The United States participated in 
all the main mining ventures in Chile such as copper, nitrates, 
iron, coal etc. Copper was the most consequential among them. 
Tt consisted 78.5 percent of the total value of Chile's 
commodity exports in 1970. Anaconda, and Kennecott, the two 
prominent U.S. Copper Companies in Chile made huge profits. 
Between 19 55 and 1971. Anaconda and J^nnecott enjoyed 
$ 426 million and $ 178 million profits respectively in 
Chile.^^ 
In 1970, Chile's per capita«foreign debt stood 
approximately 300 per head of Chilean population. Chiles 
debt increased from $ 598 million in I960 to $ 3,127 million 
3 ? 
in 1970. The costs of the U.S. economic^ involvement in 
Chilean politics in the form of a huge foreign debt, 
incurred by Alessandri and Frei governments in sixties. 
31. Ibid., p. 53. 
32. Ibid., p. 54. 
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were shifted to the shoulders of the Chilean people after 
33 
Allende was elected in 1970. Huge debt put chile in a 
weak position over internal and external policies vis-a vis 
the United States, This offered a powerful lever to the U.S. 
for disrupting the Chilean economy as and when desired by 
ceasing the supply of aid and credits to chile. 
THE U. S. POLICY INDICATIONS^ : 
In fact, the U.S. economic policy had always been 
guided by its inherent political interests. It had been 
prompted to prefer an anti-leftist president, and government 
in western hemisphere and to prevent a subsequent socialist 
regime in the region. Ihe heavy covert and overt financial 
subsidies of the Frei candidacy and later presidency against 
Allende and the Left Front by the U.S. government and the 
Corporations, and the joint military manoeuvres were early 
indications of the policies that the United States would 
3 4 adopt during the coming Allende presidency. 
Both during the 50s and 70s there was a consistent 
pattern in the U.S. attitude of active involvement in support 
of U.S. economic and political interests, utilizing loans. 
33. James Petras & Morris Morley, ...op. cit., p. 19. 
34. Ibid., p. 25. 
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credits, subsidies, and military programmers. Direct 
investment by the U.S. private corporations in the Chilean 
economy amounted to $ 1,100 million in 1970 out of the 
total foreign investment of $ 1, 67 2 million. By the 
end of 1970, the United States and other foreign corporations 
acquired firm hold on all important sectors of the Chilean 
economys manufacturing equipment - 50 percent; pig iron 
and steel, and metal working - 60 percent, petroleum products, 
over 50 percent/ Chemicals - 60 percent; rubber goods -
45 percent; engine assembly - 100 percent; radio and television 
-approximately 100 percent; pharmaceutical goods - nearly 
37 100 percent; tobacco - 100 percent; advertising - 90 percent. 
The U,S, economic involvement shared the victory 
of Eduardo Frei in 19 64 but could not prevent Allende's 
takeover in 1970, and was to a great extent responsible for 
the ruin of the Allende government in September 1973, when 
Allende was killed in a military coup. The United States 
should be regarded as an active partisan participant in 
the major internal political struggles in Chile,, utilizing 
35. Ibid, 
36. F, Serge ye v, Chile: CIA Big Business, Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, 1981, p, 38, 
37. D, Johnson, Ihe Chilean Road to Socialism, Anchor 
Press, Ebubleday, Garden City, New York, 1973, p, 13. 
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its economic leverage in an effort to push its political 
and class allies through electoral contests Whenever possible 
and through military means '^/i^en necessary. 
Obviously, economic conditions in Chile in 1970 had 
worsened. It was encompassed by various long-existing 
problems of inflation, stagnation, and severe unemployment. 
In such political and economic circumstances, Salvador 
Allende emerged as a President of Chile in 1970 in his anti 
U.S. hegemonistic policy announcements in spite of strong 
opposite anti-Allende manoeuvres of the U.S. government 
and the U.S. multinational Corporations. 
1970 PRESIDENTIAL E L E C T I O N S : 
The U.S. Administration quickly reviewed its policy 
toward ' Latin America after the outcomes of the Chilean 
Presidential elections in 1970. The main contest in 1970 
was between three candidates. The National Party, a sight-
wing party composed of old conservatives and the liberals, 
supported the former Chilean President Jorge Allessandri. 
Mr. Rodomiro Tomic was nominated by the Christian Efemocrfeic 
Barty. Salvador Allende Gossens, a Marxist and earlier 
defeated in 19 58 and 1964 as a candidate of the Popular 
81 
Unity Coalition. 38 
During the election on the 4th September 1970, the 
agents of the U.S. government and the multinational Corpora-
tions secretly got involved in Chilean politics to prevent 
election of Salvador Allende as the next President, The 
Americans miserably failed in manupul^ting to victory of 
a non-social!St candidate. 'Ibe financial support to 
ensure the defeat of Salvador Allende proved to be fertile. 
The enormous expenditure incurred by the CIA notwithstanding, 
Allende*s life long political career proved to be more 
39 40 enduring and won him success though not absolute majority 
38. The Popular Unity Coalition came into being in 1969. 
The Coalition consisted of five parties: Communist 
(moderate, Moscow, line, highly centralised and discip-
lined); Socialist (divided into a little extra moderate 
pro-Allende faction and another more militant revolution-
ary faction headed by Party Chief, Carlos Altamirano-
more radical than Allende); the Radical Party (rightwing 
faction of the party had broken off to support Aiessandri); 
the ex-Christian Itemocrat MAPU (Popular Action Movement) 
of self-proclaimed Christian Marxist inspiration; and 
API-a small independent social democrat ^arty. 
39. A product of Chilean middle class, Allende has actively 
participated in the politics since the thirties. He 
embraced Marxism, when he served as Minister of Health 
in the Popular Unity government in 19 52 and 19 58. For a 
detMed life history of Allende, see. New Times, a Soviet 
Weekly of World Affairs, 11, March 1973, p. 5. 
40. 1970 Presidential Election 
Allende (Popular Unity) 
Aiessandri(National Party) 
Tomic (Christian Itemocrat) 
Votes cast 
1,070, 334 
1,031, 159 
821,801 
Percentage 
36. 2 
34.9 
27.8 
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as required under the constitution, A joint session, 
therefore, of the Congress, a 200-man body, had to decide 
41 between the first and second position holders. 
THE U. S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE ELECTION OF ALLENDE : 
Ihe U.S. government was seriously concerned with 
intense aversion following Allende's victory in the election. 
Their initial reaction to leftist success in Santiago 
was instantaneous and one of ^ock and disgust. President 
Nixon raised an alarm and anticipated that Allende's 
presidency would eventually culminate in a communist 
government and Argentina, Peru, and Boliiria, which already 
had unsavoury relations with the ^nited States, might 
experience similar developments, Mr» Henry Kissinger, the 
Secretary of State and National Security Adviser of the 
President, warned in Chicago on September 16, 1970 that 
the United States should not nurture the illusion that 
Allende's coming to power in Chile would pose no serious 
problems for it and for pro-U.S, forces in Latin America 
A ^ 
and virtually for the entire Vfestern Hemisphere, In a 
White House briefing, he described Allende as "probably 
a Communist", who represented " a non-democratic party, 
which tends to make his election pretty irreversible. 
41, Allende's leftist Coalition Controlled about 80 votes, 
Alessandri about 45, while Tomic was backed with 7 5 votes 
in the Congress. 
42, New York Times. September 23, 1970, p. 13. 
43, Quoted in James Petras & Morris Morley, The United States 
and Chile: Imperialism and the overthrow of the Allende 
Government, Monthly Review Press, New^ York, 1975, p. 29. 
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Kissinger expressed the notion tiiat open electoral politics 
in Chile would be scuttled under Allende regime. The Chilean 
dilemma in his opinion had global, strategic and hemispheric 
significance, Kissinger prciounced, "I do not see why we need 
to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the 
44 irresponsibility of its own people. 
Thus, the U. S. reaction was basically hostile towards 
Allende government. A congressional study explained that 
" it is clear that both the U,S, embassy in Santiago 
and high levels of the U.S. government in Washington viewed 
with hostility the prospects of an Allende government. 
White House was df'eply concerned with the happenings in 
Chile and believed that the whole region would inextricably 
experience its implications and regarded it as a direct 
challenge to the U.S. hegemony in Latin America. In his 
1970 foreign oolicy report to the Congress, President Nixon 
tteated in length the imperative demand for presence of a 
specific decision-making body to deal with foreign policy 
issues relating to crisis or involving risk and to inte-
grate them into the wider c:)ntext of prolonged U.S. global, 
political, and strategic interests. He explained that 
44. New York Times, September H , 1974, p. 14. 
45. U.S. Congress, Senate, "The International Telephone and 
Telegraph Company and Chile, " 19T0-71, p.9. 
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"American foreign policy must not be merely the result 
of a series of piecemeal tactical decisions forced by the 
pressure of events. If our policy is to embody a coherent 
vision of the world and a rational conception of America's 
interests, our specific actions must be the products of 
rational and deliberate choice. We need a system v^ nich 
forces consideration of problems before they became emer-
gencies, which enable us to make our basic determinations 
of purpose before passed by events, and to mesh policies. 
THE ROLB OF NSC AND COMMITTEE OF FORTY : 
In the outcome of President Nixon's views, referred 
to above, the National Security Council emerged as the 
crucial policy making body. The power of the NSC was 
revived so that it might "set forth the major foreign policy 
problems p. facing the President, discuss the options available 
to him, and recommend courses of actions. Hence, the 
"responsibility for co-ordinating foreign policy planning" 
shifted from Secretary of State William Rogers to the 
President's National Security adviser and head of the NSC, 
48 Henry Kissinger. In late 1969, Kissinger was appointed 
46. "United States Foreign Policy in the 1970s", A Report 
to the Congress, February 18, 1970, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 19. Also see, 
"New Nixon Line, Link, November 16, 19 69, p. 33. 
47. New York Times, January 1, 19 69, pp. 1-10. 
48. New York Times. February, 5, 1969, p.l. 
85 
was appointed Chairman of the newly Created Eefence 
Programmes Review Committee whose responsibility was to 
keep balance between annual defence budget and foreign 
policy objectives. Thus, Henry Kissinger was "placed in 
the key post of deciding which issues must be resolved 
49 
by President himself," Kissinger was also appointed 
Chairman of the Committee of Forty^^ which supervises 
covert U.S, intelligence operations in other countries. 
It is significant to note that in June 19 68, the 
Committee of Forty authori^^jd $ 350,000 to CIA for its 
operations in the Chilean congressional elections held 
in March 19 69, approximately one and half years before the 
Presidential elections in September 1970. In congressional 
elections, ten of the twelve CIA-supported candidates were 
elected, ^ ^ In 1970 elections too, the Committee of Forty 
funnelled huge money approximately $ 500,000 to prevent 
a possible victory of the leftist Allende, In March 1970 
$ 135,000, and in June 1970 additional $ 300,000 were 
52 authorised to CIA for this purpose. In fact, the CIA 
49, New York Times. November 29, 19 69, p. 16, 
50, The Forty Committee had no forty members, it was called 
so because that was the number of the executive order by 
which it was constituted. 
51, Covert Action in Chile op,, cit, p. 167, 
52, F, Sergeyey, "Chile: CIA Big Business," op, cit,, 
p. 56, Also see, New York Times. September 8, 197 4, 
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had relationships wit±i various groups in Chile and provided 
53 
assisianos to the NSC certainly authorised by the Committee 
of -Forty, The NSC and the committee of Forty, co-ordinating the 
activities of the CIA, the Pentagon and the State Department, 
were directly involved in devising and implementing the 54 
policy directed against the Popular Unity Programmes. In 
addition, Kissinger chaired the NSC "Washington Special 
Action Group" which was the top level operations centre 
for sudden crises and emergencies,^^ In 1971, President 
Nixon formed a special intelligence committee under the 
direct supervision of NSC to review and evaluate global 
intelligence reports, ^ ^ Hence, Kissinger and National 
Security Council became a pivot of U,S, worldwide military 
and intelligence policy and utilized the CIA to proceed 
in compliance with the demand of U,S, interests which were 
considered to be threatened by Aiiende's victory in 1970 
elections. To study overall America* s covert attempts to 
prevent Aiiende's election in 1970, we can divide this 
U.S. involvement broadly into two phases: (1) U.S. admini-
stration's sincere efforts specifically carried out through 
53. The Washington Post. October 21, 1973, p. C5. 
54. World Marxist Review, --^ ugust 1977, Vol.20, No. 8, p. 39. 
55. John P. Leacacos, "Kissinger's Apparant", Foreign Policy, 
Winter 1971-7 2, p. 7. 
56. New York Times. Nomvebmer 6, 1971, p. 14. 
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the clandestine activities of the CIA during the elections 
to prevent Allende's accession to power and (2) their 
similar efforts to keep the Chilean Congress abstaining 
from ratifying the Allende's election. 
CIA'S SURREPTITIOUS INVOLVEMENT : 
The political situation in Chile in 1970 was of 
strategic significance for the United States. The U.S. 
administration envisaged that whole Latin America could 
twinkle with new Chilean situation, if a Marxist came 
to power in Chile and that would determine the relations 
between United States and Latin America as a whole according 
to prospective conditions. The U.S. government, therefore, 
covertly tried to influence the outcome of 1970 Chilean 
presidential elections. The main instrument of secret 
operations of the United States was, of course, the Central 
intelligence Agency (CIA) which spent huge amounts of 
money and employed wide range of techniques to gain its 
desired propitious results in the elections. 
The C.I. A indulged, though unsuccessfully, in 
surreptitious activities, codified as "Spoiling operation, " 
to prevent the election of Aiiende. Ihe CIA "Spoiling 
operation" was motivated with two broad objectivess (l) 
wearing out insidiously communist efforts to bring about 
S8 
a coalition of leftist forces in the election, and (2) 
strengthening the rightist forces in order to develop 
and present an influential subsequent alternative to the 
leftist Popular Unity Coalition. It is reported that in all, 
57 
the CIA spent from $ 800,000 to 1 million on covert 
actions to affect the result of the Chilean presidential 
elections. 
Ihus, the CIA played a vital role in order to satisfy 
sensitive American aspirations associated with the outcomes 
of the Chilean election. A CIA team was posted to Chile with 
orders from the National Security Council to keep the 
Chilean presidential elections "fair". The CIA agents 
interpreted these instructions to mean-stop Allende, and 
they asked for a whopping ^ 20 million to do the job. Ihey 
were given $ 5 million and ultimately spent less than 
58 
^ 1 million. The CIA "spoiling operation" was conducted 
under some actions-projects, mainly through intensive 
propaganda campaign. For Instance, a scare campaign treated 
an Allende victory as equivalent with violence and Stalinist 
57. Covert Action in Chile: 1963-1973, U.S. Senate, 
Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Government 
operations with respect to Intelligence Activities,.... 
op. cit., pp. 19-23. Also see. The Hindustan Times, 
26 July, 197 5; The Patriot. 25 July 197 5. 
58. Chile: A Case Study," Time. September 30, 1974 p. 25 
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repression. ^ ^ Allende's victory was projected as an end 
of religious and family traditions in Chile. 'Black 
propaganda' tactics were also extensively used to generate 
discord between the Socialists and the Communists^the 
two Marxist groups in Chile. The organisational and 
propaganda machinery of the CI. A worked to spread the 
anti-communist campaign in Chile before the election, the 
propaganda material supplied through CI.A channels was 
vast and varied. For example, weekly news roundups were 
mailed to some two thousand journalists, scientists politi-
cians and other influential individual; and pamphlets were 
published to show "what life will be like if Allende wins 
the election", anti-Soviet literature was published and 
distributed; there were direct mailings, posters and wall 
paintings. Teams of "wall-painters" were called on to draw 
two thousand posters per day with communist firing squads 
as their main subject. 
The CIA agents were also connected with the rightest 
newspaper 'El Mercurio' to publish articles written under 
guidance and direction of U,S. intelligence on every issue. 
These articles were broadcast through national radio network, 
59. Covert Action in Chile op. cit., pp, 19-23. 
60. P. Sergeyev, Chile: CIA Big Business , Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, 1981, p. 57. 
•El Mercurio' was one of the most popular and Influential 
newspapers on, Latin American continent, and was owned by 
Edward Kerry's family, ^ ^ the U.S. Ambassador in Chile, 
According to a CIA estimate, in 1970 the propaganda materials 
reached on audience of well over five million reader and 
listeners. 
In spite of these intensive exertions of the CIA, 
AlLende secured highest percentage of votes polled but to 
recall, could'nt gain absolute majority, therefore, he still 
needed. Congressional confirmation. 
THE CIA A L L E N D E ' S C O N G R E S S I O N A L C O N F I R M A T I O N : 
The White House irritantly reacted to Allende's 
initial victory and seemed to be determined to prevent 
Allende's Congressional confirmation scheduled to be on 
24 october, 1970. President Richard Nixon, on September 
15, 1970 conveyed a message to Richard Helms, the CIA 
Director, that an Aliende confirmation would be intolerable 
to the United States and allowed the CIA to play a direct 
61. ^gelo Colleoni, U.S. Interventions-A Brief History , 
Sterling Publishers Private ^td.. New Eelhi, 1984, p. 180. 
For more study the role of El Mercurio in 1970 election 
The Statesman. 6 Efecember, 197 5; Ihe Patriot. 6 Efecember, 
197 5; and The Times of India. 6 Itecember, 1975. 
62. "Covert Action in Chile." 19 63-197 3, .... op. cit,, 
p. 169. 
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role in organising a military coup in Chile to prevent 
Allende's takeover the presidency. ^ ^ 
The CIA established contacts with international 
banking and corporations expecting to precipitate an 
economic crisis which would compellthe Christian Efemocrats 
to repudiate Allende's presidency. The CIA also continued 
to develop fruitful contacts with the Chilean military 
hoping military insurrection in future. The Chilean army 
was not politically and organisationally prepared or willing 
for a coup. ^ ^ Initially, Allende appointed a Radical Rios 
Valdivia^ as a Minister of Efefence who clearly stated that 
"I will not permit party politics to be introduced into 
the ranks of the armed forces under any circumstances 
whatsoever. However, the CIA intended to formulate 
a pSlicy of creating more propitious political conditions 
for a military coup. 
Thus, the CIA played a direct role in organising 
a military coup in Chile to prevent Allende's accession 
to the presidency. Ihe CIA actively promoted and encouraged 
the Chilean military to move against Allende. But CIA efforts 
63. Ibid., pp. 19-26. 
64. James Petras and Morris Morley, op, cit., p, 28, 
65. Ian Roxborough, Philip 0' Brien & Jackie Roddick, 
Chile: The Statue and Revolution, Ihe ^acMillan Press 
Ltd., London, 1971, p. 8 4. 
92 
failed, no organised coup could come in the way of Aiiende's 
confirmation. 
ITT'S ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT ALLENDS : 
The U.S. owned multinational Corporation-Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph Company had substantial 
economic possession in Chile^^ and was equally worried at 
Aiiende's rise in Chilean politics. The responses of almost 
all U.S. Corporation against Aiiende's policy declaration 
of "transaction to socialism" in the election campaign 
were also in the same tune. They nervously perceived, 
"the serious implications of Aiiende's ascension to power 
for the United States and the U.S. business. 
The ITT was keenly desired to follow a concerted 
policy to form designs of preventing Aiiende's take over as 
president. They desired and expected U.S. government's 
co-operation to reinstate a government vhich could stipulate 
to secure U.S. investor interests in Chile, ITT conveyed to 
Charles Meyer, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs that ITT "was prepared to put as much 
66, ITT had S 150 million investment in Chile's telephone 
system. Also see, Anthony Sampson, The Sovereign 
State of ITT Stein and Eay Publishers, New York, 197 3, 
pp. 125, 250. 
67. "Business Latin America, "September 10, 1970, p. 290, cited 
in James Petras & ^brris Morley, ....'op. cit., p.
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as a million dollars in support of any plan that was 
adopted by the government for the purpose of bringing 
about a coalition of the opposition to Allende, so that 
when congressional confirmation was up, which was some 
month later, this coalition would be united and deprive 
6R Allende of his position." 
Just after the September 1970 elections, an ITT 
official met Mr. Viron Vaky, Kissingers senior advisor 
on Latin America, and informed him that "Mr. Geneen (ITT 
Chairman) is willing to come to Washington to discuss ITT's 
interest and that we are prepared to assist financially 
in sums up to seven figures we have feared the Allende 
victory and have been trying unsuccessfully to get other 
American Companies aroused over the fate of their investments 
69 
and join us in pre-election efforts." Significantly, ITT 
officials established and rr.aintained contacts within the 
National Securety Council, the State Itepartment, the United 
States Information Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
the Overseas Private Investment Bank, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
68. U.S., Congress, Senate "Multinational Cprpo^felons and 
United States Foreign Policy, " Part 1, p. 10 2. 
69. Ibid., Part 2, pp. 599-600. Also see, Washington Post, 
March 21 and 22, 197 2. 
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and effectively pursued them to achieve the desired results. 
^feanwhile, on September 15^  1970, U.S. Ambassador 
Edward Korry "finally received a message from State Efepartment 
giving him the green signal to move in the name of President 
Nixon. The message gave him maximum authority to do all 
possible, short of a Dominican Republic type action, to 
keep Allende from taking power 
In the same month, CIA Director Richard Helms 
instructed the head of the Clandestine Sevices Western 
Hemisphere Division of the CIA, William V. Broe, to arrnage 
a meeting with ITT Vice-President Edward Gerrity. L^ter, 
disclosing the details of the talks, Mr. Broe revealed 
later that at that time, the Christian Itemocrat Ambers 
of the Congress were showing indications of swinging their 
full support to Allende in the belief that they couid make 
a political bargain with him. At the same time, the economic 
situation had worsened because of the reaction to the 
Allende election, and there were indications that this 
was worrying the christian Eemocrat Congressmen. There was 
a thesis that additional deterioration in the economic 
situation could influence a number of christian Etemocratic 
70. Ibid., pp. 608-609. 
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71 Congressmen vAio were planning to vote for Allende, " Mr. Broe 
also discussed with Edisard Gerrlty the feasibility of companies 
dragging their feet in spending money and making deliveries, 
and in shipping snare parts; creating pressure on savings 
and loan institutions in Chile, vjithdrawing all technical 
assistance and not promising any such help in the years to come, 
^ny way, tlie Christian Efemocratic Congressmen could'nt 
prepare themselves to vote against Allende's Confirmation. 
In fact, the whole Chile was favourably responding to Allende's 
nationalist policies. His declaration that Chilean copper should 
only to belong to Chilean^, swept new waves of nationalism in 
all over the country. To recall, Chilean economy was heavily 
dependent on the copper which accounted about 80 percent of 
total Chilean exports earnings. In addition his assurances 
to provide employment and adequate wages to Chilean labour, 
and to bring back possession of Chilean wealth in the hands 
of Chileans themselves from outside dominance through nationa-
lisation, created hopes which never existe<? before in Chile, 
The Christian Efemocratic Party and Aiessandri's Nationalist 
Party as well, echoed with Allende's nationalist intonation. 
As a result, Salvador Allende was confirmed unanimously as 
71, Ibid., Part 1, pp. 250-251, Also see. Time. April 9,1973. 
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President by Chilean Congress on 24 October 1970. 
Thus, shrewd tactics and skillful plans of the CIA 
and the ITT, ultimately, failed to gain favourable results. 
U.S. pretentions display* extravagent dealing and furtive 
political measures could'nt prevent Allende takeover. Allende, 
after securing the Congressional confirmation, inaugurated 
7 2 
the presidency on November 4, 1970 and became the first 
freely elected Marxist head of government in the western 
hemisphere. 
INITIATION O F POPULAR U N I T Y : 
In his inaugural address on November 5, 1970 at the 
National Stadium in Santiago, President Allende stated : 
"This is a triumph for the workers, for our long 
suffering people who, for a century and a half, in the name of 
independence, have been exploited by a ruling class incapable 
of ensuring progress. The Truth, as we all know, is that the 
backwardness, the ignorance, the hunger of our people.... 
exist and persist because they are profitable for a few 
priveleged groups. 
7 2. See, Thomas Balogh, "Esmocratic Takeover in Chile?" 
New Statesman. 23 October, 1970. 
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The people at least become the government. 
7 3 It is they who now take control of the destiny of the nation." 
Allende viewed chile as "a dependency of imperialism" 
and propounded providing substitute for the present economic 
structure, putting an end to the power of monopolistic capital, 
both Chilean and foreign, and also to big landowners, so as 
7 4 
to begin the construction of socialism in Chile. According 
to Allende, a sum of 6 1.3 million was leaving Chile everyday 
in result of foreign investments in Chile, the equivalent of 7 5 the daily salary of one million Chileans. 
Allende declared in his first message to Chilean 
Congress that Chile had to construct a socialist society 
in a revolutionary way, the pluralist way, anticipated by 
the Marxist classics, but never before put into practice 
Chile is today the first nation to conform to the ,second model 
1 of transition to a socialist society," 
As expected, as a first step towards socialism the 
Allende government nationalised the copper companies in Chile 
73. Extracts from the text of the Allende's statement published 
in the New York Times. 25 January, 1971. 
7 4. See, News week. September 21, 1070 
7 5. New World Review. Vol. 39, No. 1, Winter 1971. 
7 6. See, Etebray, Regis, The Chilean Revolution; Conversations 
with Allende, New York, 1971, p. 168. 
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without compensation by a constitutional amendment. In July, 
1971, Chilean Congress, initiated by Allende, unanimously 
passed a constitutional amendment nationalising the copper 
mines including U.S.-owned Anaconda, Kennecott and Cerro 
Copper Companies. The whole chile went on an emotional tear. 
Newspapers and walls blossomed with the slogans - "Chile has 
77 
put on its long pantsl Finally the copper is ours." Allende 
created a new wage of nationalism in Chile and tried to take 
advantage of it by nationalising various foreign assets well 
established in Chile, 
A M E R I C A N STRATEGY A N D I N I T I A L U . S, _ C H I L E A N R E L A T I O N S : 
U.S. Policy and strategy against Chile after Allende's 
confirmation was reversed, Ihe U.S. and U.S. influenced loans 
to the Chilean government began to be intercepted and inte-
rrupted, v;hile, significanctly, enough aid was continuously 
channelled to the Chilean military, followed by covert 
financial assistance to rightist opposition groups. 
Quite clearly, Chile was the first priority in 
American eyes. The U,S. government insinuated that a short-
term or long-term hostility between the U.S. and a leftist 
77. See, Time> July 26, 1971, p, 26, 
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Chile was sure to happen. The U.S. policy makers assessed and 
assumed socialist victory in Chile as a immediate and straight 
invitation to contest vjith U.S. regional economic and political 
interests in Latin-America. The Chilean effort to break its 
ties with the capitalist United states and search of a 
subsequent, nationalisation of foreign assets and demand 
of compensation in return were the issues vriiich had to be 
followed Aiiende's success, ^t became apparent that the U.S. 
would select a policy of political confrontation Erosion 
of U.S.-Chilean relations in coming years was expected to be 
certain. In short, political vicissitudes in new Chile compelled 
the United States for prolonging the application of economic 
pressures over Chilean economy on the one side and to politicize 
military activities in Chile through the CIA and ITT operational 
activities on the other. For instance, an ITT memorandum 
from field operatives in Chile presented an alternative in 
respect of Aiiende's takeoverl 
"A more realistic hope among those who want to block 
Allende is that a swiftly deteriorating economy will touch 
7 8 off a wave of violence resulting in a military coup." 
78. U.S., Congress, Senate, "Multinational Corporations and 
United States Foreign Policy," Part 2. p. 622. 
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After faili^ in sabotaging Allende's formal confir-
mation, the CIA deligencies were directed towards more viable 
alternative encouraging a Chilean military control over Chile. 
Notably, Chilean military had traditionally avoided any 
involvement in politics. 
In addition, ITT officials like U. S. policy-makers 
anticipated socialist stops in immediate future after Allende's 
confirmation. They began to eleborate a strategy of external 
economic coercion designed to lead to internal economic 
79 
chaos in Chile and the ultimate demise of the new government. 
An ITT analysis of contours of the U.S. policy towards Latin 
America submitted to Kissinger in October 1970, described 
in outline the strategy against Allende: 
"Inform President Allende that, if his policy requires 
expropriation of American property, the United States expects 
speedy compensation in U.S. dollars or convertible foreign 
currency as required by international law. 
Inform him that in the event speedy compensation is 
not forthcoming, .... This could mean a stoppage of all loans 
by international banks and U. S, private banks. Without infor-
ming President Allende, All U.S. aid funds already committed 
79. James Petras & Morris Morley, op. cit., p. 3 4. 
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to chile should be placed in the "under review" status in 
order that entry of money into Chile is temporarily stopped 
80 with a view to a permanent cut off if necessary." 
This strategy was ultimately incorporated into the 
U.S. government policy and became central to the attainment 
of U.S. policy goals in Chile. Obviously^ U.S. government 
reacted sharply against Allende's moves of nationalising 
81 
U.S. property and emphasized the payment of adequate 
compensation for its expropriated assets. In its first 
reaction the U.S. canceled a proposed visit of the U.S. 
nuclear aircraft carrier "Enterprise" to Chile because the 
visit might be regarded as a U.S. intention of friendship with p o Marxist government of Chile. 
Significantly, the right wing opposition in Chile 
was irritated to the cancellation of U.S. aircraft carrier. 
They were expecting a close link between United States and 
Chilean armed forces as an essential ingredient in the 
formulae to topple the Allende government. Subsequently, 
80, U.S., Congress, Senate, "Multinational Corporations 
op. cit,, Part 2, pp. 7 20-7 21. 
81. The total investment of U.S. mining and other private 
corporations in Chile was estimated at more than S 1 
billion. The government ccitrolled Chilean State Copper 
Corporations had set the figure at S 7 24 million. See, 
New York Times, February 25, 1971, p. 11, also see. 
Time. July 26, 1971, p. 26. 
8 2. New York Times. March 7, 1971, p. 3. 
11 f 
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the U.S. government rectified this tactical error and 
encouraged military aid, joint military exercises, and a 
8 3 considerable increase in U.S. military missions in Chile, 
FUTURE I N D I C A T I O N S O P U. S. FOREIGN P O L I C Y 
We can easily conclude that in Washington, a consensus 
emerged in a co-ordinative manner among the White House, the 
CIA and ITT, of intensifying external economic fusillade 
specifically on the vulnerable sectors of the Chilean economy, 
and gradually creating tuneless p6litical instability for 
fomenting a military putsch in Chile, 
Having these considerati6ns, Nixon, in February 1971, 
asserted main ingredients of U.S. foreign policy regarding 
U,S, Chilean relations in future in his report to the Congress: 
"Vfe deal with governments as they are our relations 
depend not on their internal structures or social systems, 
but on actions which affect us and the Inter-American system. 
The new government in Chile is a clear case in point. 
The 1970 election of a socialist president may have profound 
implications not only for its people but for the inter-
American system as well. The government's legitimacy is not 
83, See, Irter-American Economic Affairs, Nq, 2, Vo1,xxv, 
Autumn • 1971, p, 76. 
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in question, but its ideology is likely to influence its 
actions. Chile's decision to establish ties with Communist 
Cuba, contrary to the collective policy of the OAS was a 
challenge to inter-American system 
In short, we are prepared to have the kind 
of relationship with the Chilean government that it is prepared 
8 4 to have with us. " 
In response to the Nixon's statement, Allende made clear 
that "the interests, of the United States and the interests 
of Latin America fundamentally have nothing in common." How-
ever, he shrewdly added that Chile "wants to maintain cordial 
co-operative relations with all nations in the world and 
8 5 
most particularly with the United States." Significantly, 
he clarified again and again that chile would never provide 
a military or naval base to other Super Power that might be 
used against the United States. 
Allende's transparent policies and his continuous 
clarifications of socialistic and nationalistic dreams could 
not shift coming U.S. policy of economic aggression, Ihe 
United States government ascertained to cease vulnerable 
84. "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, "A Report to the 
Congress, February 25, 1971, Washington, D,C,:U,S, 
Government Printing Office, 1971, pp. 53-54. 
8 5. Salvador Allende, Chile's Road to Socialism. Baltimore: 
Penguin Books, 1973, pp. 105-106. 
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financial resources detrimental to Chile's dependent economy. 
One should not neglect the fact that the U. S, government 
and the U.S. multinational Corporations had always possessed 
common, inherent interests. In other words, the U.S. policy-
makers association with the corporate community and their 
ability to shape a common policy was not a fortuitous 
coincidence but largely reflects the common interests that 
both share in maintaining Chile within the U.S. sphere of 
influence. Keeping this fact in mind, further U.S. - Chilean 
relations throughout the Allende years can be more closely 
analysed. 
* * * * * * 
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CHAPTSR _ III 
THE DBPREDATTONS OF U. S. MONOPOLY CAPITAL IN LATIN 
AMERICAN STATES AND ITS LSVBRAGS TO INFIXJENCE THEIR 
CEPSVPSNT ECONOMY - A CASE STUDY OF CHILEAN ECONOMY 
UNDER ALLENDE ADMINISTRATION. 
Latin America is one of the world's potentially 
wealthiest regions - extremely in natural resources. Chile 
could be ranked, during the 70s, the first among Latin 
American countries in the production of minerals other 
than petroleum while copper was most important. Chile 
was producing about one seventh of the world's copper 
during this period. But, incidentally, the Chilean eco-
nomy had been structurally linked with foreign capital. 
Chile, therefore, had a compulsive dependence upon the 
United States in economic matters. The most visible sign 
of dependence was chile's 80 percent dependence on copper 
for foreign exchange, an industry 80 percent owned by the 
U.S. based multinational corporations. The Chilean economy 
was also heavily dependent on imports of foreign goods, 
industrial spare parts, food, and military hardware from 
the United States. She had also to depend on international 
banks and lending institutions, long-tertn investments, end 
debt refinancing; and on the U.S. and Europe for modern 
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technology and the corresponding training and know-how. 
Chilean dependence on the United States was at its 
peak during Frei regime. Chile was considered then the 
showpiece for the Alliance for Progress. Large scale aid 
was poured in Chile. The prosperity of the Frei era depended 
to large extent, on constant flow of foreign capital to balance 
the budget and keep on development programmes. Restriction 
on the free flow of capital could automatically disturb the 
Chilean economy. In other vjords, the infiltration of U.S. 
capital in Chile seriously increased its vulnerability to 
U.S. destabilising tactics -vdiich could be observed during 
the Aiiende years. 
CHILEAN ECONO^K• UNDER STATE CONTROL : 
President Salvador Allende, ignoring the U.S. 
political and economic considerations, sought to form a 
government in order to obtain the pover to carry out the 
revolutionary transformation of his country. He tried, 
after securing power, to break away from dependence upon 
U.S. capital.^ He declared in a message to the Chilean 
1. See, Etebray Reigs, The Chilean Revolution: Conversations 
with Allende, New York, 1971, p. 81. Also see, Richard 
Wigg, "lafflculties Ahead for Chile's Socialist Experi-
ment, " The Times (London), October 29, 1970. 
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Congress that "we want to control Chile's economy so that 
it does'nt continue to be used :;or the benefits of a minority 
of Chileans and of powerful foreign groups." Following 
these objectives, he built the Chilean economy ^pon new 
bases of nationalisation. Allende regime, thus, embarked 
upon expropriating the means of production traditionally 
controlled by the private monopoly houses. The Popular UniCad 
government nationalised 14 textile mills in addition to the 
copper mines.'Ihe matullurgical, steel, and cement factories 
also becare state-owned industries. Meat, fabricating plants 
etc. were nationalised. Almost all private banks, numbering 22, 
vjere the next in nationalisation process. For, Allende govern-
ment believed that bank-serlzices should be put at the disposal 
of the whole country. Allende brought three-fifths of bank 
deposits, and 80 percent of all bank credits under state 
control. Thus, his government established, merely within a 
year, almost complete state control over the key economic 
sectors. 
As a consequence of nationalisation, the U.S. government 
again frantically searched for alternative ways to prevent 
Allende's transition to socialism. The U.S. administration 
launched two comprehensive plans to frustrate Allende's 
2. Sukhbir Chaudhery, The Truth About Chile New Etelhi, 1975, 
p. 19. 
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socialist experiment and, in fact, to get rid of him. 
The first was designed to paralyse the wheels of the 
Chilean economy placing financial strangulation on Chilean 
economy, and the second consisted of underground promotion 
of civil war in Chile through channelising massive financial 
assistance to the rebels which could turn the events into 
a military coup. Following the strategy, the U. S. government 
continued its military aid to Chile and maintained secret 
contacts with her high-ranjcing military officials. 
The first U. 3, plan provided a definite and real 
shape of U, S, _ Chilean economic relations during Allende 
years. The U. S, foreign economic policy, obviously, reveal 
it. 
FORHATIOM, IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF U. S. FOREIGN 
ECONOMIC POLICY 
The U.S. policy-makers were deeply conscious of 
Chilean political development after 1970 Presidential 
elections. They believed that these development might 
affect the whole region. They assumed that Chilean success 
in her socialist exper^'ment would inentably promote similar 
experiments elsev^ere in the region. The Chilean failure 
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on the other hand, would provide good excuse to the United 
States to condemn the new economic experimentations. Washington 
was also conscious of an outside threat. The countries of 
western and eastern Europe, Japan and China, and the Soviet 
Union were emergining competitors in the world market, Ihe 
increasing economic competition attracted them to the whole 
Latin America for investment and for raw material for industries 
at home. 
Thus, growing economic competition in the world forced 
the United States to assume that she might lose her long-
established and generally accepted exclusive economic privilege 
in Latin America, The U.S. policy-makers thought that stringent 
economic relations would not be capable alone to maintain 
American hegemony in the region. Hence, an imperative demand 
of direct political control through established or dependent 
democratic government if polible or military regime if 
necessary in Latin America, appeared feasible to the White 
House. ^  
Obviously, the U.S. endeavours to frustrate Aiiende's 
socialist programmes intensified after expropriation of the 
foreign assets by his government. Though, Aliende was sincerely 
3, The Chapter IV deals with the U.S. - Chilean Military 
Relations, 
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desiring to check Chile's external economic resources 
and to modify economic relations with the United States but 
the U.S. government gradually withdrew its financial assistance 
to his government and thus, adopted the policy of economic 
squeeze against Chile. 
THE U.S. STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC SQUEEZE : 
In response to Allende's Marxist steps the U.S. 
dominated monopolies and the financial oligarchy in Chile 
announced their intentions to punish popular United 
4 
government creating financial chaos in the country. 
Open antagonism and the gradual deterioration of Chilean 
political and economic structure were the two specific 
motivation of the U.S. strategy against Chilean march to 
socialism. 
Thus, the U.S. strategic objectives were originated 
from Salvador Allende' s victory in Chile vA^ iich was consictered 
in Washington the most significant political development in 
the region since Fidel Castio marched triumphantly into 
Havana more than a decade ago, ^  Allende declared just after 
4. Masood Aii Khan, "Chile: Danger From Right-Wing and 
U.S, Imperialists, "New Age. September 20, 1970. 
5. Newsweek. November 2, 197 0. 
I l l 
the electoral victory that "we have triumphed to definitely 
overthrow imperialist exploitation^ to end the monopolies, 
to carry out a serious and profound agrarian reform, and 
to nationalise banking and credit operations - And in doing 
so, chile will open a path that other people of America 
and the world can follow,"^ Thus, the election of Marxist 
government in Santiago and its left oriented model brought 
country's political and economic interests under the U.S. 
"attack." 
The U.S. devices to put Chilean economy out of gear 
through economic squeeze, were essentially threefold, (l) an 
international Credit squeeze via mobilisation of support 
for the U.S. position within the international financial 
institutions and amongst Chile's international creditors; 
(2) the elaboration of an ideology of "lack of creditwor-
hiness" based on conditions (inflation, disinvestment etc.) 
created in large part, by the U.S. credit blockade; and 
(3) the identification of gradual economic deterioration 
with internal government policy, thus creating the eeconomic 
basis for polarizing Chilean society in a manner favoxirable 
7 to the groups of the owners of large properties, 
6. Quoted in Newsweek, September, 21,1971-.Also see, Chaddi 
Jagan, "The Chilean Revolution: A New Bra, "New World Review. 
Vol.39, No.l, Winter 1971, p. 16. 
7. James Petras and Morris Morley, The United States and 
Chile: Imperialism and the overthrow of the Allende 
Government, Monthly Review Press, New York, 197 5,p.81. 
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Significantly, the U.S. government exhibited that 
it Was keen to negotiate the differences with Chile. The 
U.S. pollcy-makers appeared as moderate and desirous to 
"avoid a direct confrontation, " therefore, showed their 
8 
trust in negotiations. While it vjas only a tactical element 
in the overall U.S. strategy. In fact, it was designed to 
allow time for the economic squeeze of Chile so that Chilean 
economy could further deteriorate and direct military Q 
intervention become inevitable. For instance, tJie U.S. 
Ambassador in Chile Mr. Mathamiel Davis in a secret memorandum 
to the State Department in early 1971, laid stress on the 
fact that a military coup would only take place vihen public 
opposition to the Allende government became "so overwhelming 
and discontent so great, that military intervention is 
overv/helmingly invited, 
The U.S. Strategic conceptions were intended to boost 
the U.S. economic interests by all efforts in competition 
with the economically sound outside nations. The U.S. policy-
makers anticipated similar threats from the western 
hemisphere v«rfiich ultimately led the establishment of the 
8. Ibid, p. 81. 
9. Ibid., p. 81. 
10. Quoted in Jack Anderson, "ITT Hope of ousting Allende 
Remote, "Washington Post, March 28, 197 2, p, Bll, Also 
see, "A Hint Not Taken: Nixon Avoids Allende," Vfashinaton 
Post. Eecember 10, 197 2, p. C7. 
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Council on International Economic Policy(CIEP) in January 
1971. The CIEP organisation came into existence, in addition 
to the Treasury Etepartment, to satisfy President Nixon's 
keen desire for a coherent and rational U.S. rational U.S. 
foreign policy approach based on prolonged and long-range 
structural developments in the region. It 'played quite 
significant role in the making of the U.S. strategy against 
Ailende government. 
THE ROLE OF CEIP AND THE TREASURY DEPART^1ENT IN THE MAICENG OF 
U. S. POLICY : 
The Council on International Economic Policy was 
expected to provide expert analysis on international issues 
so that a consistency between international and domestic 
economic policy could be achieved. President Nixon looked 
the advantages of the Council in "protecting and improving 
the earnings of foreign investments."^^ Mr. Peter G. Peterson, 
the Cyirector of CEIP, presenting a sketch of the new U.S. 
foreign economic policy in a study requested by the President, 
11. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Subcommittee on International Trade, "To Establish a 
Council on International Economic Policy, " 9 2nd Cong., 
2nd session. May 31, 197 2, Washington! U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 197 2, p. 3. 
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sugrested that "in the wake of rapidly developing and 
competitive economic potentiality in the world, it has 
become essential to realise that political, economic and 
security questions are inseparable in long-range policy 
planning, and that it is the global relationships v^ iich in 
12 the end must be protected and nurtured," 
The Treasury Efepartment had equal involvement in the 
formulation and implementation of the U. S. foreign economic 
policy. John Connally, Secretary of the Treasury Etepartment 
was the key figure in the implementation of the U.S. foreign 
economic policy which imerged entirely in a new shape after 
Aliende accession. His influence empowered him to reclaim 
Treasury's pre-eminence in the making of the U.S. policy 
towards Chile. He also utilised his position as Chairman 
of National Advisory Council on International Monetary and 
Financial policies, which had the responsibility to recommend 
the frame work of possible strategy of the U.S. government 
in response to loan requests from the internatio-^al financial 
institutions, and to obtain substantial strength of votes 
13 in these institutions. Notably the U.S. executive directors 
12. Peter G, Peterson, "The United States in the Changing 
World Economy, "Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1971. 
13. Chadwin, "Foreign Policy Report: Nixon Administration 
Etebates New Position Paper on Latin America, "National 
Journal, January 15, 197 2, p. 10 3. Sited in James Petras 
& Morris Morley, op. cit, p. 187. 
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in the boards of the World Bank, Inter-American Envelopment 
Bank, and the International Efevelopment Association were 
Treasury Officials, and were immediately responsible to 
the Secretary of Treasury. 
Both the CIEP and the Treasury Itepartment gazed 
upon the adverse Chilean affairs in a global perspective. 
Their officials perceived that the U.S. interests, with 
the emergence of a socialist government in Chile, would 
not only suffer in that country but might experience 
similar threats of nationalisations from other parts of 
the region. The American apprehensions soon became verifiers, 
when the government of Ecuador and Guyana made various 
contemporary attempts to nationalise the U.S. assets. 
The U.S. government proceeded with "hard-hearted" pSlicy 
to deal with the emerging nationalist overtones in 
Ecuador and Guyana. The Ecuadorian and the Guyanese state 
of affair provided a pre-understanding of U.S. global 
policy which could be adopted in dealing with expropriation 
attempts of the U.S. property in the region. 
THE U.S. GL 'BAL POLICY HINTS AGAINST NATIONALISATIONS IN 
ECUADOR AND GUYANA : 
The U.S. policy of economic offensive against 
Chile was, regional in nature. It was aimed to neutralise 
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the attempts of autonomous nacional economic development 
in any part of her "sphere of influence". President Nixon's 
thesis was that "so long as security of American invest-
ments (was) secured, Washington will smile on Latin 
Americans. This close convergence of the U.S. policy 
and the business interests of the U.S. Corporations, 
manifested in White House response to expropriation of 
All American Cables and Radio, a subsidiary of ITT by 
Ecuadorian regime. Ecuador offered ITT $ 57 5.000 in 
compensation as against the latter's demand for $ 600.000. 
The Corporation sought the U.S. assistance to invoke 
sanctions and refusal of all economic assistance to 
Ecuador in future until the ITT demand had been met the 
ITT was determined to teach the Ecudorians a lesson as a 
matter of principle. They \-iere trying to teach all of tatin 
America a lesson. 
The ITT's actions proved productive manily due to 
the uncretical support it received from the Treasury 
tfepartment. Ihe U.S. government restrained from sanctioning 
14. See, Link, June 28, 1970,p. 27. 
Also see, •^''=ville Brown, "Underdevelopment As A Threat 
to World Peace," International Affairs Vol.47, April, 
1971. 
15. Qouted in Michael C. Jensen, "U.S. Reportedly Withheld 
Ecuador Aid on ITT Plea, " New York Times. August 10, 
1973, p.37. • 
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any new loan to Ecuador during 1971, and a ^15,8 million 
AID authorisation was put off until a settlement was reachdd 
with the ITT. Ihe United State's effective position in 
the Inter American Development Bank successfully prevented 
the approval of three loans to Ecuador totalling $ 21.5 
million until the controversy solved in favour of ITT. 
The Ecuador case, significantly, warned the ^atin Americans 
that the United States would invoke sanctions even ^len 
16 
a token sum of money was involved. In June 1971, the 
U.S. executive director to the World Bank, Robert E. 
Wieczorowiski, refrained from voting on a $ 6 million loan 
to Guyana for flood control, maintaining that it was too 
early to assess the progress of compensation negotiations 
between the Guyanese government and a recently nationalised 
Canadian Bauxite Corporation (ALCAN), with substantial 
U.S. ownership, A Treasury official, explain the U.S. 
decision remarked, "When we directed an abstention or 
negative vote on Guyana, we were concerned that if Guyana 
followed through on its bauxite nationalisation, there 17 would be a wave of nationalisations sweeping the Caribbean. 
16, Dan Morgan, "Officials Say Aid to Ecuador Halted as 
ITT Bargained" Washington Post, August 10, 1973, p,A2. 
17, Quoted in James Petras & Morris ^^orley, 
op. cit., p, 86, 
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In addition, John R. f'etty. Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury for International Affairs, argued before the 
House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, tliat the 
U.S. approach to the question of compensation payments 
for expropriated U.S.-owned properties was consistent 
with long-standing. World Bank policy. In his words, the 
l8 
U.S. vote on the Guyanese case was a "signal to the 
maagement of the World Bank that we thought that adminis-
tration of the policy was not quite the way, v^e read the 
Cards." He indicated that there were "economic Costs 
involved in expropriation for the host country, and that 
if they seek to pursue their policy, the costs will be 
19 
incurred." Thus, the U.S. government seemed hostile 
not only to expropriation without adequate compensation, 
but to the very principle of nationalisation itself. Significantly, when Allende assumed office more 
than one hundred U.S. corporation had compfortably 
20 established themselves in Chile. Obviously, the U.S. 
18. The U.S. government had the control of approximately 
one-quarter of the votes on the World Bank board, 
giving it a virtual veto power over loan decisions. 
19. U. S., Congress, House, "New Directives for the 1970s, 
Part 2i I^velopment Assistance options for Latin 
America. " pp. 113-118. 
20. India Quarterly, Vol.30, January-March 197 4, pp. 31-3 2. 
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had doep economic interests in Chile, and therefore, 
natioaalisation of the U.S. Corporations and denial 
of prompt and adequate compensation to them by the 
Allende regime immediately irritated the U.S. government. 
The U.S. economic pressure on the Allende government began 
to mount fromthe very beginning. The U.S. aggressive postures 
towards the Allende government on compensation controversy, 
therefore, became the centre point of the U.S. _ Chilean 
economic relations, 
FORTHCOMING U.S. AGGRESSIVE POSTURES REGARDING COMPENSATION 
DEAL : 
The U.S. policy-makers were severely annoyed and 
excited over the Chilean attempt to expropriate the U.S. 
21 
Copper Companies. It was obvious that forthcoming U.S. 
policy postures would be offensive in dealing with the 
foreign governments who nationalised U.S. investment proper-
ties without adequate compensation. One U.S. official 
stated, "obviously in some cases our interests may out-
weigh the effects of expropriation. But generally, 
countries that expropriate our assets will be on notice 
that this will generate a fresh policy review at very 
21. The Copper resources in Chile have been traditionally 
exnloited by two U.S. Corporations, Anaconda copper Co, 
through its subsidiaries the Andes Copper Mining Co. 
and Chile Exploration Co.; and the ^nnecott Copper 
Corp, through its subsidiary the Braden Copper Co. 
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2'' high levels of government," ^ 
The United States denounced the Allende Doctriwe 
which permitted Chilean government to unilaterally deter-
mine v^ether a given company has made excessprofits in the 
post and deduct according to these profits from the value 
of the nationalised property. The U.S. government regarded 
it as an extreme departure from the traditional course 
with various implications around the world. The U.S. 
Secretary of State, Willian Rogers threatened, in an 
official statement, to reduce the general level of U.S. 
aid to the underdeveloped world in case of nationalisation 
of the U.S. assets. He observed that Chilean "course of 
action could have adverse effect on the international 
23 development process. " 
It is important here to remember that Allende's 
steps against the so-called U.S. economic interest were 
a part of his general offensive against private Chilean 
24 
interests. Allende created a new hope among Chileans. 
The U.S. administration in the beginning, could not mobilise 22. Quoted in Benjamin Vfelles, "Chile's Move Spurs U.S. 
to 'Get Tough'" New York Times.' September 30, 1971, p. 3. 
23. U.S. Responds to Chilean Efecision on Compensation for 
Expropriation, "Efepartrrent of State Bulletin, November 1, 
1971. 
24. See, Manuel Castillo, "Marxism And Democracy in Chile," 
Thought. No. 2, Vol. xxv, January 13, 197 3. 
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the internal groups inside CJiile in its favour, because 
there was flowing a new ze^l of nationalism in Chile 
particularly after expropriation of foreign assets. Sven 
the opposition in Chile was in favour of these nationalist 
sentiments. The Chilean opposition parties, reacting to 
the Roger's statement, publicly declared their full support 
to the government's economic measures. For instance, the 
Christian Etemocratic Party declared, "In matters where the 
national interest is at stake, there is no distinction 
25 
between the Government and the opposition." The Opposition 
stand indirectly helped Allende government in gaining 
effective control over the foreign corporations by means 
of nationalisations. 
The U.S. administration had already taken adventure 
to prevent Allende's take over, but was still not exhausted. 
It formulated a new policy of harsh credit blockade of 
Chile, The U.S. Corporations played a'key role in making 
of the new U.S. policy toward Chile, They suggested various 
policy options to the White House in order to me&t the 
socialist challenge in Chile. Later, the U.S. policy 
25. Quoted in Juan de Onis, "Rogers Stand Spur Unity 
Orive in Chile," New York Times. October 15, 1971,p.3. 
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absorbed these proposals, without any reservations, 
against Chile. 
PROPOSED POLICY OPTIONS BY THE U.S. CORPORATIONS : 
In fact, the large scale support to Allende on 
expropriation of the U.S. assets left no option for the 
U.S. Corporations other than to persuade Washington to 
adopt strong and swift measures against Santiago. In 
October 1971, the executives of the six U.S. Corporations 
with substantial holdings in Chile met William Rogers 
for an "open discussion of their predicament and the possi-
27 
ble response of his government." Rogers stated in the 
meeting that the Nixon administration was a "business 
administration" in favour of business and its mission was 28 to protect business. He warned that Chile's socialist 
steps could have a domine effect throughout Latin America 
29 in the absence of strong U.S. retaliatory action. He 
demanded, therefore, an informal embargo on spare-parts and 
26. The six were. Anaconda, Ford ^otor Company, First City 
Bank, Bank of America, Ralston Purina, and ITT. 
27. See, Benjamin Wells, "Rogers Threatens Chilean Aid Cut 
off in Expropriation," New York Times, October 25,, 
1971, p.l. 
28. U.S. Congress, Senate, "Multinational Corporations and 
United States Foreign Policy, " Part 2, pp. 97 5-979. 
29. The similar argument was expressed by the U.S. government 
in dealing with SI Salvador and Nicaragua. 
123 
material being shipped to Chile and stop all aid to Chile 
unless the expropriated copper Companies received swift 
and adequate compensation. 
The ITT also proposed policy options in a memorandum 
during September and October 1971, , It suggested the 
formation of a special NSC task force to put pressure on 
Chile. It suggested following actions : 
1. Continue loan restrictions in the International banks, 
such as those the Export-Import Bank has already 
exhibited. 
2. U.S. private banks must follow the same way. 
3. Confer with foreign banking sources with the same 
thing in mind. 
4. Delay buying (copper) from Chile over the next six 
months. 
5. Bring about a scarcity of U.S. dollars in Chile. 
6. Discuss with CIA, how it can assist the six month 
squeeze. 
7. Come to have the reliable sources within Chilean 
military,^^ 
30. Ibid., p. 940. 
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In a revise?d version of the ITT's "White Paper" 
(1970) " on Chile, following possible State Department 
actions were discussedJ among the U.S. policy : 
1. Exercise the U.S. veto in the Inter-American Developmefxt 
Bank against various Chilean requests of loans. 
2. Through exercise of U.S. veto or pressure, close the 
flow of any pending or future World Bank loans to Chile. 
3. Maintain the refusal of the U.S. Export-Import Bank 
to grant any loans to Chile. 
4. Make known the State Itepartment' s deep concern and 
anger with Chile's flagrant negligence of norms of 
international law in nationalisation without adequate 
compensation; and impel the U.S. banking community to 
refrain from extending any further credits to Chile. 
If possible, extend this to international banking 
circles. 
5. Stop all aid projects that are still in the government 
con si deration s. 
31 6. Embargo imports from Chile into the United States. 
31. Ibid., p. 971. Value of Jhile exports to the United 
States at that time was about >^154 million. 
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The discussions between the Assistant Secretary 
of Treasury for International Affairs, John ^ennessy, and 
the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational 
Corporations, Frank Curch, during the hearings on the ITT 
efforts to overthrow the Aiiende regime in 1970 and 1971, 
protrayed the politico-economic nature of the U. S. credit 
blockade of Chile during Allende administration. Questioned 
on the immediate termination of credits by the U.S. govern-
mental agencies and the multilateral development institutions 
to the new Chilean government, Hennessy revealed that 
these decisions were discussed when Aiiende came into 
32 
office with the radical economic programmes. The U.S. 
administration adopted the proposed course of actions by 
the U.S. corpor^ons and immediately implemented credit 
blockade of Chile. 
IMPLEMENT ATI OK OF CREDIT BLOCKADE : 
Actually, as Allende was sworn in as President, 
Chile began to experience oppressive behaviour of the 
U.S. government, and the U.S. influenced private and 
international banks. Notably, almost 80 percent of all 
32. U. S., Congress, ^nate, "Multinational Corporations 
and United States Foreign Policy, " Part 1, pp. 3 28-3 29. 
Also se^, Laurance Stern, "Aid Used As Choke On 
Allende, "Washington Post. September 19, 1973, p. A14. 
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short-,term credits to Chile came from U.S. suppliers 
and the U.S. banks, tXiring Allende's tenure, aid disturse-
ments to Chile from the U.S., the AID^ the Export-Import 
Bank, the World Bank (IBRD), and the Inter-Ameri can Envelop-
ment Bank (IDB), remained negligible, while short-term 
line of credits from the U.S. private banks declined around 
& 30 million.^^ While, over one billion economic assistance 
to Chile had been granted during the Frei regime from the 
U.S. Agency for international Development, the U.S. Export-
Import Bank, the World Bank, and the IDB. His government 
constaintly received $ 200 million to 4 300 million in 
short-term lines of commercial credits from the U.S. private 
banks. 
The virtual eliminationa: of long-term development 
loans from AID, IDB, and IBRD, and increasing demands for 
the immediate repayment of debt obligations incured by the 
Allende predecessors paralysed the Chilean economy. In 
addition, the gradual loss of short-term credits seriously 
restricted Chile's opportunity to import adequate quantities 
of essential goods of daily use. It severely affected the 
standard of living and economic productivity of the country^ 
33. New Times. April 15, 1973, pp. 12-13. 
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The Sxport-Import Bank made it clear to Chile that 
any loans or guarantees from the Bank would only be reopened 
after the settlement of the copper conflict. The Bank also 
terminated all loan guarantees to the U.S. commercial 
banks and exporters engaged in business activities in 
Chile, even the "disbursements of direct loans that had 
been previously negotiated the Frei government 
In addition, Eximbank Chairman Henry Kgarns announced 
in June 1971 that a pending loan application by Chile to 
finance the purchase of three U.S. Boeing passanger jets 
had been put into the shelf in the absence of proper 
assurances on compensation for the expropriated U.S. Copper 
3 5 
Companies. Significantly, oa the one side, John H, 
Crimmins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State justified 
the bank decision before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and on the other, spoke in favour of an already 
recommended ^ 6 million increase in U.S. military credits 
to Chile. 
The United State 'heavy-handed' policy^^ and its 
contradictory nature particulary in military aspect received 
34. Laurance Stern, "Aid Used As Choke on Allende, " 
Washington Post. September 19, 1973 p. A14. 
3 5. Marilyn Berger, "Chile Seeks to Acquire Jets," 
Washington Post. June 4, 1971, p. AlO. 
36. See, "Building Chile," Washington Post. September 14, 
1971, p. A18. 
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widespread criticism. The Washington Post regarded it 
"a major failure of American policy", and commented that 
"no self-respecting government, Marxist or otherwise, can 
37 be expected to dance a jog for Henry Kearns. " 
Nevertheless, the U.S. government also sabotaged 
the loans tunnels of the multilateral aid institutions to 
Chile, specifically belonging to the Inter-American Envelop-
ment Bank and the World Bank. Before Allende came into 
power, the IDB and the IBRD credits to chile were totalled 
38 
S 80 million. The IDE granted no long-term development 
loan to the Allende government except two educational 
loans totaling S 11.6 million to the Austral and Catholic 
Universities, citadel institutions of the Chilean opposition, 
Further, a loan request from Chile, for the construction 
of a petrochemical complex totaling S 30 million, was 
repudiated because the U.S. executive director expressed his displeasure about a bank plan to send a technical 
39 
mission to Chile to evaluate the request. Besides, 
various Chilean projects enumerated in detail, were 
37. Ibid. 
38. See, Link. April 15, 1973, p. 34. 
39. Stern, "Aid Used as Choke on Allende. " op. cit.. 
p. A14, 
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submitted to the World Bank for consideration but the 
Bank did'nt award a single loan to Chile. For instance 
The U.S. State Efepartment turned down Chilean request to 
senti an appraisal - mission to Chile to evaluate a fruit -
processing plant project under Allende's agrarian reform 
programme which was considered crucial in improving Chile's 
balance of payments sj tuation, ' Notwlthstanding, Chile 
maintained its debt service obligations to the bank. At the 
1972 annual meeting of the Board of Governor of the Vforld 
Bank, Alfonso Inostroza, the Chilean representative, per-
ceived that disbursements from loans approved in the pre-
Allende period were approximately equalto Chile's payments 
to the bank.He -remarked, "If no fresh credits are granted 
to us, the tirre will come when Chile's debt service payments 
to the Bank exceed the sums which it received from it. 
The paradox would then come to pass of Chile becoming a net 
exporter of capital to the World Bank instead of the Bank 
assisting Chilei''^ ^ 
Significantly, Mr. VJalker, the under secretary of 
the Treasury Itepartment, explained before a Congressidmal 
Subcommittee who did seek information in October 1971 about 
40. Ibid. 
41. Quoted in James Petras & Morris Morley op. cit. 
pp. 94-95. 
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the possible position of the United States within the 
World Batik or the Inter-American Envelopment Bank'^^ in 
response to a loan request from Allende government^ to quote 
him : 
"I would put it within the context of an expropriation 
of property in which there has been absolutely no indication 
up to this time that the compensation will be adequate and 
timely. On that basis st if a loan to Chile were to come ^P 
today in the Inter-American Envelopment Bank or the World 
Bank-the World Bank has a rule and they would not lend to 
43 Chile under these circumstances." 
The attitude of the International Monetary Fund 
towards the Allende government appeared to be much ambiguous. 
Although, Pierre Paul Schweitzer, Pre si dent of the IMF 
frankly admitted that "its economic demands often were 
pplltical''y unacceptable to government caught in the 
exigencies of development."^'^ However, the IMF assisted 
42. U.S. Nationals comprised only 18 percent of the total 
staff of the Inter-American Envelopment Bank and approxi-
mately 27 percent of the total staff of the World Bank/ 
International Envelopment Associatio-i, in both Institutions, 
U.S. officials occupy about 42 percent of the top 
management positions. 
43. Mew York Times, October 10, 1971, p.ES. 
44. Lewis H. Eduguid, "Schweitzer Gains Backers for IMF 
in Latin America" Washington Post, October 29, 197 2, p. Fl. 
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Chile's debt renegotiation and strived against the U.S. 
demand that Chile must accept a standby agreement. The 
IMF loans to Chile of S 39.5 million and ?5 42.8 million 
from the export compensation fund in 1971 and 197 2 reflected 
the fact to some degree that the IMF, unlike a bank, is a 
"mechanism to assist member countries with foreign exchange 
difficulties, moreover, since the IMF had clear authority 
to makp compensatory loans for this type of foreign exchange 
shortfall, the U.S. did'nt object. 
The role of the IMF concerning Chile, as quite 
expected, was not pleasing to the White House. It was exposed 
when the United States attempted to replace Schweitzer, 
However, the U.S. attempt was strongly and successfully opposed 
by the Latin American and European members of the fund. 
In fact, European members of the IMF had greater impact 
on IMF policies in Comparison of the American influence 
within the World Bank, It is also significant to note here 
that the IMF granted loans to chile for very specific and 
limited purposes. Long-term development assistance credits 
remained dependent on the acceptance of austerity IMF 
standby agreements, which would have limited the Allende 
45. Paul E. Sigmund, "The 'Invincible Blockade' and the 
Overthrow of Allende," Foreign Affairs. January 1974, p. 329, 
By January 197 3, the Allende government had drawn 
B 187.8 million in credits "Prom the IMF. 
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government's internal economic autonomy and had a negative 
impact on the standard of living of the working class, the 
46 major social basis of the support for the Allende regime. 
Thus, the United States government was trying with 
all means to suffocate Chilean economy. The increasing 
impact of U.S. economic embargo on the Chilean economy 
resulted in a rigorous deterioration of Chilean economy 
by early 1973. 
Her economy thus shattered and adduced adequate 
grounds for the U.S. to continue credit squeeze on the 
basis of Chile's supposed lack of creditworthiness. It 
was the U.S. efforts that Chile became disastrously isolated 
47 in the world money market. A former Nixon Administration 
official stated, "The only thing we did was to cause problems 
48 
for them when they tried to borrow money. " Factually, 
the U.S. government converted the economic blockade of 
Chile into reality, for the U.S. policy-maker were capable 
to exert influence upon the international financial insti-
tutions. Besides, the proximity of interests between the 
46. See, James Petras op. cit., pp. 96-97. 
47. Newsweek. September 24, 1Q7 3, p. 16. 
48. Ibid., p. 20. 
134 
U.S. and the multilateral banks also assisted U.S. assault 
on Chilean economy. 
PROXIMITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN TfE WHITE HOUSE AND THE 
MULTILATERAL BANKS ; 
There were close understanjQing between the U.S. 
Corporate interests and the White House policy. Both posse-
ssed and pursued common purposes and strategies. This 
proximity of relations was enlarged to embrace the main 
international institutions, which strongly and directly 
influence the international credit to a country, A study 
conducted for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, carefully 
worked out in detail the U.S. role, its nature and advantages, 
within the multijbateral development banks : 
while the United States is not the majority 
stockholder in any of the banks, it is the major stocWiolder 
in the World Bank Group and in the IDB, and one of the major 
stockholders in the ADB(Asian envelopment Bank). The analogy 
suggested is that the banks, like any corporations, have an 
obligation to look to the interests of their principal 
stockholders and cannot afford any prolonged erosion of 
political and econorric support from these members 
135 
In most instances, strongly voiced U.S. concern 
about an aspect of a loan appears to be sufficient to bring 
about a reexamination of the policy in question, D;J.sing 
the analogy of "losing the battle to win the war," the U.S. 
approve a loan about which it has voiced criticisms if the 
loan is generally acceptable in other respects, anticipating 
that U.S. influence is great enough to bring pressure on 
the bank not to continue that policy without sufficient 
49 justification." Therefore, "the banks have channelled 
I 
funds to countries in which the United States had strategic 
and diplomatic interests and have refrained from lending 
to countries with which the United States has had investment 
disputes. In conclusion, the study remarked that "parti-
cipation in the banks serves two general foreign policy 
interests of the United States, First, the banks assist in 
pursuit of general goals involving the structure of inter-
national affairs and the prestige and influence of the 
United States, Second, they serve as vehicles for assisting 
countries favoured by the United States and for influencing 
economic affairs of countries with which the U, S, government 
has international disagreements. 
49. U.S., Congress, House, "The United States and the 
Multilateral Itevelopment banks, " pp. 112-114. 
50. Ibid., p. 5. 
51. Ibid,, p. 131. 
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Thus, joined hands of the U, S. corporations, the 
government agencies and the international banks adversely 
affected the marketing, trade, investment, and credit 
opportunities to Chile in the international market. It 
also exposed the fact that a strong Octopus of international 
power bloc had emerged, which practically occupied the 
surj^ace of the world market, anc" hence was quite susceptible 
to world's trade and credit of considerable amount. Chilean 
economy was totally surrounded by this U.S. _ backed ^ctopus. 
However, Allende tried his best to escape from its injury which 
pushed him to socialist bloc. His government asked for 
financial assistance from the prominent countries of the 
socialist bloc, the mere alternative before Allende, The 
Soviet Camp and China provided all possible financial and 
technological help, in response, to Allende regime. Allende 
government wholeheartedly recognised socialist countries 
and favoured their domestic and international ideals. 
CHILEAN APPROACH TO SOCIALIST BLOC : 
The Allende government established diplomatic 
relations with China, Cuba, North Vietnam,. North Korea, and 
East Germany - all belonging to the Soviet Camp except China. 
Chile became the tl-iird country dri Latin America after Cuba 
137 
and Canada which recognised China. She was the second 
state in Latin America which recognised Castro's Cuba 
(The first was Mexico). In 1964, the Latin America States 
with the exception of ffexico had broken off with Havana. 
Allende also declared to join the campzsof non-aligned 
5? countries of the Third World. 
Chilean endeavour to face economic adversity 
springing up due to U.S. pressures, led her in the direction 
of the Soviet orbit. Chile attempted to rescue her economy 
from the U.S. economic aggression and searched alternative 
sources of financing and new trading partners outside the 
western hemisphere. She successfully renegotiated $ 300 
million in debts to foreign governments and private 
creditors, and obtained ^ 600 million in credits and loans 
from countries of the socialist bloc and western sources 
in 197 2. Loans up to $ 395 million were contracted from the 
Communist countries including China. 
Thus, as the United states swiftly turned unfriendly 
towards Chile, other countries like Peru, I^xico, the 
Soviet Union, Cuba and China increased their support of the 
Allende government. Significantly, Allende paid a convenient, 
fruitful and friendly visit to ^fexico, Cuba and the Soviet 
52. See, New York Times. 25 January, 1971. Also see, William 
R. Lux, "Is Chile Red?" The Political Chi^rterlv. July-
Ssptember, 1971, No. 3, Vol. 42, p. 287. 
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Union in 1972. At the end of his visit to Mexico, a joint 
comrrunique Condemning U.S. imperialism, released on 
4 Itecember, 1972, stated that "some international business 
houses were violating the principle of non-intervention 
in the internal affairs of developing countries. The 
commercial giants were going against the sovereign rights 
of developing countries in assuming control of their 
own natural resources in keeping with their own legis-
lation, and in developing these resources in accordance 
53 with realities of the existing national situation." 
Allende takeover in Chile was welcomed with great 
enthusiasm in the Soviet Union with these words, "It has 
not been the gun but the actions of the revolutionary 
class whLch have enabled the people to take over political 
power, Allende was assured, during his visit, by the 
Societ Union of approximately $ 500 million in hard 
currency loans to cover Chile's rapidly mounting import 
bill. ^ ^ The Soviet leaders also promised massive technical 
assistance, to faster the development of copper, chemical, 
53. Quoted in The Times of India. Efecember 9, 1972. 
54. The Call, Vol. XXIII, No 2, August 1971. 
55. See, the text of the press release issued by the Tass 
at New Delhi on 11 December 1972, pp. 1-9. 
57 
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mining and fishing inc3ustries in Chile. Soviet credits 
made available to Chile around March 197 3 were about 
56 
S 260 million. The Soviet Union also concluded an 
agreement with Chile in 1973 to deliver - 5,000 tractors. 
However, most significantly, the Soviet Union experienced 
massive agricultural failures in 70s, therefore, could'nt 
afford or rescue another Cuba in the western hemisphere 
CO from the U, S. assault. 
Thus, the U.S. enimity and its unprovoked attack 
on the Chilean economy, prinarily designed to contain 
socialist influence into Chile, were responsible enough to 
Chile's move nearer to the socialist bloc countries in 
order to protect her national economic interests. Vhile, 
on the other, the experience of the Cuban Missile Crises 
in 1962 had already conveyed a message to the whole Latin 
America that the Soviet presence in a-~y part of the region 
would certainly agitate the U.S. security considerations 
56. Y. Godunsky, "U. S. S. R.-C^iie: Friendship and Co-opera-
tion, " International Affairs. March 3, 1973, p. 76; 
Also see. Fundamentals of ^%rxi st-Lenini st Theory and 
Tactics of Revolutionary Parties, Institute of Social 
Sciences, Progress Publisheris, 198 5, pp. 300-301. 
57. Ibid. 
58. Internatio-'al Journal. ^ol.XXIX, No. 3/Summer 197 4. 
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and thus endanger global peace. However, Allende had stated 
many' times that Chile will not provide any place for the 
military base to the Soviet Union. But, fear-psycho sis of 
Cuban and Soviet infiltration was prevailing on the U.S. 
minds. The U.S. policy, makers, therefore, could'nt trust 
Allende's assurances. In fact, after burning fingers in 
Cuba, the U.S. was smarting under the mortification of 
59 
Chile following the socialist path. The U.S. government, 
for this reason, cashed its capital monopoly in Chile 
in a calculated manner and gradually stifled Chilean economy. 
The assistance from the Soviet Union and its satellite 
governments coilld'nt defend Chilean economy from U.S. 
strokes. The overall health-chart of Chilean economy during 
Allende years itself revealed it. 
A COMPREHENSIVE PORTRAIT OF CHILEAN ECONOMY : 
During 1971 and 1972, before the prints of U.S. 
credit squeeze became visible, the economic policies 
of the Allende government were proved to be more fruitful 
than those of the reformist Frei administration. In the first 
two years, production was raised twice in comparison of 
59. See, "Allende Efefeats Another Attack, " Link, ^uly 8, 
1973, p. 32. 
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preceeding Frei government. The wages fund constituting 
51 percent gross national income in 19 65-70, went up to 
52,8 percent. ^ ^ A study conducted by the Inter-American 
Committee on the Alliance for Progress, after analysing 
Allende's policies through 197 2, confirmed a great attainment 
of the Allende government i.e. the elimination of economic 
stagnation and the achievement of "a more equitable 
distribution of the benefits of economic growth. The 
study concluded that "in 197 2, the country's economy 
is in a situation of almost full utilization of its 
productive capacity, following a year marked by high 
growth levels. Unemployment has been reduced markedly and 
a broad process of redistribution of income, and accelerated 
6 2 agrarian reform has been carried out." Unemployment was 
brought to an all time low, from 8.3 percent to '3 percent 
in Etecember 197 2. In the sphere of Agrarian reforms in 
the first two years. Popular Unity government had expropriated 
3, 278 landholdings comprising 52i 
benefit 40,000 peasant families.' 
28, 000 hectares, v^ich 
64 
60. F. Sergeyev, "Chile: CIA Big Business, " Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, 1981, p. 11. 
61. OAS, Inter-American Social and Economic Council, Inter 
American Committee on tfie Alliance for Progress, p. 12. 
62. Ibid., p. 148. 
63. See Efebray, Regis, The Chil'^an Revolution:Conversations 
with A] lends. New York, 197 1, p.94. 
64. Ibid.; Also see. Fundamentals of Marxist l^eninst Theory 
and Tactics of Revolutionary Parties, " Institute of 
Social Sciences, Progress Publishers, 19B5, p. 299. 
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Taking into account all aspects of the Chilean 
economic environment, we can draw the fact that it was 
first touched by the precipitous decline in country's 
foreign exchange reserves. In September 197 2, foreign 
exchange reserves had declined ffrom almost $ 300 million 
to around $ 40 million within the period of just over a 
year. When Allende took office, Chile had $ 345 million 
foreign reserves but by the end of 1972, it had disappeared 
and Chile was forced to plead for rescheduling of more 
than $2.5 billion in international debts. ^ ^ Nearly one-
third of the Chile's total export earnings in 1970, 1971, 
and 197 2 were absorbed by the foreign debt, following 
rising import prices and thus remained primarily responsible 
for such sharp decline in foreign exchange reserves. The 
cost of Chile's major import-food, rose sharply from $ 170 
million in 1970 to ^ 444 million in 1972.^^ Expanded con-
sumer demand stimulated by redistribution of income (real 
wages went up 30 percent in 197 2), and declining agricultural 
production in 197 2 in Chile led both to a vast increase in 
costly food imports and an escalating rate of inflation 
67 that rose by 164 percent in the same year. Her industrial 
65. Also see, Newsweek. September 24, 1973. 
66. International Journal. Vol. XXIX, No 3/Summer 197 4, p. 397. 
67. See, Ian, Lumsden, "Ctependency, Revolution, and Envelop-
ment in Latin America," International Journal. Vol.XXVIII, 
No. 4/Autumn 1973, p. 543. 
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production and agricultural prcduction between 1970-73 
as a whole, declined by 12 percent and 30 percent respe-
ctively.^® In addition, the increasing domestic demand 
and the declining world price of copper further weakened 
the Chilean economy. Due to precipitous drop in the price 
of copper, the copper income of Chile declined by 16.2 
69 
percent in 1971, despite increased production. Besides, 
disappearance of U.S. credits, and the U.S. rejection 
to compromise Chile's public debt shattered the economic 
structure of Chile. Finally, peremptory claim of the U.S. 
suppliers for cash in advance for essential raw materials 
and spare parts sales to Chile proved to be grievously 
disastrous to the Chilean economy. Bu late 197 2, the 
Chilean Ministry of Economy estimated that almost one-third 
of the diesel trucks at Chuqicamate copper mine, 30 percent 
of the privately owned city-buses, 21 percent of all taxis, 
and 33 percent of State-owned buses in Chile could'nt 
operate because of the lack of spare-parts or tyres. In 
overall terms, the value of machinery and transport 
equipment exported to Chile by the U.S. Firms declined 
from $ 152.6 million in 1970 to ^ 110 million in 1971, 
68. Suzanne, Labin, "Chile: The Crime of Resistence, "Foreign 
Affairs Publishing Co. Ltd., HJngland, 1982. 
69. Ian, Lumsden, "Itependencv. Revolution, and envelopment 
in Latin America, " op. cit., p. 543, 
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The Allende government's budget in 197 3 ran a 
53 percent d e f i c i t , I n 1973, Chile's economy was in 
increasingly desperate straits. Allende's attempts to turn 
the country into a socialist paradise had left the Chilean 
economy in shambles, Chile faced skyrocketing inflation, 
consumer goods shortages and constant political unrest. 
Labour strike at the El Teniente copper mine in 197 3 
which was producing one-third of Chile's copper, truckers' 
strike in the same year, supported by the strike of nearly 
half a million shopkeepers, doctors, bus-drivers, and 
taxi-driverss, the strike of the pilots of LAN-Chile the 
71 national airline, stormed the Chilean normal life. 
Ultimately chile, thus facing severe internal 
political confrontation could'nt meet defiantly and 
sufficiently the villainous assaults of the United States 
on her economy, 3^e could'nt face, at last in 1973, the 
past external obligations and current economic pressures 
simultaneously, and therefore, failed to maintain her 
progress. Thus, the U.S. foreign economic policy, delibe-
rately planned to frustrate Allende's dreams of socialism. 
70. For a detailed study of Chilean political affairs 
during Allende period. See, Paul, E, Sigmund, "Allende 
and the myth makers in the wake of Chile's Coup," 
International Perspective, March/April ,197 4. 
71. See, ^^ewsweek, September 3, 197 3, 
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perfectly dictated the U.S. - Chilean economic relations 
in a manner consistent with the U.S. global economic 
interests. The entire structure of Chilean economy received 
severe implications of shrewdly designed economic offensive 
of the U.S. In fact, the copper dispute and heavy debt burden 
on Allende government greatly increased the gravity of 
the U.S. assault on Chilean economy. The copper entangle-
ment between the elder and younger brothers and debt squeeze 
by the former produced calamitous consequences for Chilean 
economic life, and therefore, needs distinct discussion. 
THE COPPER CRISIS AND U.S. EMBARGO : 
Chile historic dependent economy and accompanying 
decapitisation of her economy were the prime causes of her 
slow progress, and proved responsible to develop the 
vulnerable structure of her economy. The U.S.-based 
multinational corporations had been in a advantageous 
position in the Chilean economy. These defects of the 
Chilean economy equipped the U.S. multilateral Corporations 
7 2 
which controlled approximately 80 percent Chilean production, 
with political and economic tools which confined Allende's 
aspirations of autonomous economic development of Chilean 
economy. 
72. See, Unk. Ju]y 25, 1971, p.35. 
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If we trace the history then we find that during 
the first quarter of the 20th Century, the Chilean Copper 
industry had been transformed by the intrusion of few large 
foreign corporations mainly belong to the United States. 
These Corporations swallowed the small producers and proceeded 
to "organise technology and capital for the purpose of working 
low-grade deposits by large-scale capital-intensive methods, 
7 3 
for the growing mass-market." Upto 50s and 60s, the U.S. 
copper companies had consolidated their influence over the 
Chilean copper industry. But, during the 60s, the demands 
for the nationalisation of the copper industry in Chile 
substantially increased. The then Prei administration made 
it clear to the copper companies that it would be unable 
to control the demands of expropriation in the present 
political climate. He proposed "chileanisation" policy and 
claimed that it was the only alternative to neutralise 
nationalisation demands. But the "Chileanisation" programme 
experienced serious economic losses. 
PERFORMANCE OF "CPilL^ANISATIO^'" PROGRAMME: ITS 
IMPLICATIO S ON ALLENDE MOVES : 
The major purpose of "Chileanisation" was to increase 
benefits to Chile by increasing production. The copper 
7 3. Norman Girvan, "Copper in Chile," Mona, Jamaica: 
University of the West Indies, Institute of Social and 
Economic Research, 1972, p. 59. 
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companies were encouraged to double output by 197 2 in 
return for decreased taxation and other advantages, including 
new investment capital provided by Chilean stock purchases 
of 25 percent to 51 percent of the various mines, government 
loans, and government guaranteed loans negotiated with the 
Export Import Bank and the other U.S. financial institutions. 
But significantly, an amount of $ 579 million new investments 
of borrowed capital between 1966 and 1970 failed to increase 
copper production. While the copper corporation accumulated 
SS 63 2 million in debts without investing any of their own 
7 4 
capi tal. It means their profits increased substantially 
due to the "Chileanisation" programme. The copper companies, 
in addition, entered into contracts of big loans with the 
guarantee of the Chilean government but even then, copper 
production in Chile stagnated between 19 66 and 1970, as 
the following table shows J 
Chile : Copper Production 1966-l97o'^^ 
(thousands of metric tons) 
Larg. scale ^ 1^69 
mining 536 520 540 541 571 
operations 
74. Cited in James Petras & Morris Morley, .... op. cit. ,p, 107, 
OAS, Inter-American Economic ijnd Social Council, 
7 5. Intpr-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, 
p. 127. 
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Table A-1 (i) 
CHILE 
ANACONDA AND KENNECOTT : PROFITABILITY AND INVESTMENTS, 1969 
Investments 
worldwide 
Investments 
in Chile 
% investments 
in Chile 
Anaconda 
Kennecott 
Anaconda 
Kennecott 
$1,116,170,000 $199,030,000 
1,108,155,000 145,877,000 
Profits 
worldwide 
Profits 
in Chile 
$99,313,000 $78,692,000 
165,395,000 35,338,000 
16.64% 
13.16 
% profits 
in Chile 
79.24% 
21.37 
Rate of return 
worldwide 
Rate of return 
in Chile 
Anaconda 
Kennecott 
8.5% 
15.0% 
39.5% 
24.1% 
SOURCE : Chilean government advertisement in New York Times, 
January 25, 1931. 
Besides, the Frei government proposed new twenty-
year tax agreement characterised by crudity and had the 
7 6 
element v^ich were favourable to copper companies. Actually, 
Frei's 'Chilean!sation' programme favoured the foreign 
companies at every point in the policy negotiations. For 
instance, the terms, under which El Teniente, the world's 
largest underground copper mine of the Kennecott, was 
partially nationalised, were so generous that Kennecott 
ended the process of negotiation with a higher benefit cost 
ratio than the other companies involved in the negotiation 
and the Chilean government was left with practically no 77 net benefits at all. Notably, the profits of Anaconda, and 
Kennecott between 1965 and 1971, were amounted to S 426 
78 million and $ 198 million respectively. 
Thus, Frei's "Chileanisation" experienced enormous 
foreign debts, stagnent production, and huge repatriated 
profit margins. After Frei, government Allende's endeavour 
to neutralise these terrifying aetriments and redress the 
76. Norman Girvan, "Copper in Chile,"....op. cit., p. 6l. 
77. Keith Griffin, Underdevelopment in Spanish America, 
London, 1971, p. 17 2. 
78. See, Unk, April 15, 1973, p. 34. 
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balance between the national and the multinational corporations 
through nationalisations and its compensation based on 
retroactive excess profits tax, served as the ideological 
pretext for the U.S. credit and financial restrictions, 
79 as well as, triggering the embargo by the U.S. Corporations. 
President Allende declared in 1971 that "we shall have 
real power when copper and steel are under our control, when 
saltpetre is genuinely under our control when we control 
imports and exports through the state, when we have collectivised 
a major portion of our national production Hence, our 
basic, most vital, principle is one to nationalise copper, 
80 
Chile's fundamental source of wealth." Consequently, the 
Allende government made copper mines a national assets. It 
was severe blow to U.S. monopoly in Copper production in 
Chile. The dispute over the compensation to be paid to the 
U.S. owned copper mines intensifxed further the copper crisis 
between the U.S. and Chile. 
COMPHTNSATIOM CONTROVERSY AND EARNED PROFITS OF THE COPPER 
MINES : 
Allende proposed a formula for compensation, payments" 
to the copper companies, as already described, which comprised 
79. See, James Petras & Morris Morley, op. cit. ,p.l0 5. 
80. Seg, Chaudhary, Sukhbir, The Truth About Chile, New Delhi, 
1975,p. 21. 
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deductions for capital remittances abroad, excess profits, 
and mine depletion. However, an analysis of coppf^r invest-
ment and earned profits in Chilean economy by th«=>se 
companies before and during Allende period provide better 
background of understanding of Allende's proposed formula 
regarding compensation payments to nationalised the U.S. 
copper mine s. 
Anaconda and Kennecott's combined net profits and 
depreciation allowances from Chile, between 1915 and 19 68, 
totalled $ 2,011 millioo. Only $ 378 million of this 
81 
amount was reinvested in the incastry. Significantly, 
during 1930-70, the investors in copper mines had been able 
to extract ^ 4, 500 million, 50 percent of the total national 
wealth, in profits on an original investment of a more 
$ 30 million,®^ Between 19 53 and 19 68, the U.S. mining 
and smelting operations, approximately 90 percent copper, 
earned profits of jP 1, 036 million but reinvestments and new 8 3 
investments totalled a meagre $ 71 million. The extent 
of exploitation may be more distinctly marked if we locate 
the Anaconda and ^nnecott's profits from their Chilean 
subsidiaries within a comparative context. Since 1915, tJhe 
81. See, Norman Girvan, op. cit., p.60. 
8 2. See, Salvador Allende, Chile Road to Socialism, 
England, 1973, pp. 79-80. 83; James Petras & Nforris Mor ley.,,,,,,,,,, op. cit., p. 108. 
152 
average doller of revenue from their Chilean operations 
consistently yielded a greater surplus then that of their 
domestic operations, except for a few years in the early 
8 4 
1950s." Besides, if we compare the worldwide profitability 
levels of Anaconda and Kennecott with the rate of return 
on their Chilean investments, the results are noticeable. 
Between 19 55 and 1970, Anaconda showed an annual rate of 
return on its entire global investments of 7.18 percent, 8 5 
but only 3.49 percent if Chile is excluded. The rate 
of return on its Chilean operations alone, during the same 
period, was 20.19 percent while Kennecott's global rate 
of return was 11.63 percent, and 10 percent excluding Chile. 
Shockingly; Kennecott's Chilean operations amount was 34.84 
87 
percent. Specifically, during the "Chileanisation" period, 
the high rate of profits continued. The rate of return on all U.S. investments in the Chilean copper industry in 19 67 
88 89 was 27 percent. In 1968, it was 26 percent. The figure 
for Anaconda in 19 69 was 39. 5 percent, while for Kennecott, 
84. Norman Girvan, op. cit., p. 60. 8 5. See, Jarr«5s Petras & Morris Morley, op. cit, pp. 109-201, 
86. Ibid. 
87. Ibid. 
88. Ibid. 
89. Ibid. 
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it was 24.1 percent.^^ According to an another statistics. 
Anaconda and Kennecott earned 21.5 percent and 52.8 percent 
91 
profits respectively between 19 55-1970 in Chile. While 
on September 29, 1971, Aiiende government proclaimed that 
$ 77 4 million would be deducted as excess profits from any 
compensation due to Anaconda and Kennecott copper mines 9 2 
for the nationalisation of their Chilean assets." Ttms, 
Kennecott and Anaconda* s huge profits from their Chilean 
operations around the world was the basic consideration 
of the Allende government regarding compensation decision. 
COMPENSATION POLICY AND ITS OUTCOME : 
In response to nationalisation policy, the U.S. 
government warned Allende that his intentions would seriously 
affect bilateral relations at the government to government 
93 
level. The Allende government ignored the U.S. Vfernings, 
and the Chilean Congress unanimously passed a constitutional 
acnendment in July 1971, which grated power to the Controller 
General to fix the compensation to the nationalised foreign 
assets within 90 days. 
In October, 1971, the Chilean Controller General, 
following the Allende formula of excess profits, concluded 
New ^ork Times. 29 May, 1970. Also see, Richard Wigg, 
"Left-Wing Trends Put Chile at Cross-roads. "The Times 
(london), 14 July, 1969; "Chile Blocks Subversive U.S. 
U.S. Mores," Link. April 15, 197 3, p. 34. 
92. Sse, Thought, Vol. XXV, No. 3, January 20, 1973. 
93. See, Juan de Oni s, "U.S. Warns Chile Her Plan To Take 
Over Copper Holdings Could Hurt Relations," New York 
Times, February 1971, p. 2. 
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that no compensation should be paid to Anaconda company 
and Kennecott Copper Corporation for their nationalised 
mines because they had already earned huge profits tor more 
than their capital investments. 
Obviously, both the mines sharply reacted. The 
Kennecott President, Frank R. Milliken declared that the 
Corporation was determined to obtain immediate and adequate 
compensation for its 49 percent interest in its El Teniente 
9 4 mine. Anaconda Vice-Chairman, William E. Quigley also 
asserted that the company would take legal help and defend 
its interest against Chilean government's arbitsary 
9 5 compensation. The President of Kennecott mine stated bt 
that his Corporation would "pursue in other nations its 
96 
remedies for the confiscated assets." The El Teniente 
Company sent a letter to all Chilean copper importers 
and urged them to take all essential steps" in order to 
protect our rights, with regard to such copper and other 97 metals or products, and with regard to their proceeds." 
94. Kennecott had S 9 2.7 million in F1 Tiniente notes. 
95. See, "The Kennecott's Whilte Paper on Chile on Chile's 
Expropriation of the El Teniente Copper Mine," Inter-
American Economic Affairs. No. 4, Vol. XXV, Spring 197 2, p. 25. 
9 6. Quoted in Gred Wilcke, "Kennecott To Write off Chile 
'ilquity Invenstment, " New York Times. September 8, 197 2, p. 45 
97. See, James J. Nagle, "Kennecott Acts on Chile's Copper," 
New York Times. October 5, 197 2, p. 67. Also seg, "Freeze 
is Lifted on Chile's Copper," New York Tjmes. November 
30, 1972, p. 63. 
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In fact, Kennecott's strategy outside Chile was 
designed to blocjc'the payments to Chilean Copper Corporatio-i 
(CODEICO) . In this regard. West Germany, Chile's biggest 
copper customer received Kennecott's request for embargo 
on a ^12.5 million shipment to West Germany. It remained 
98 
in affect for sometime. Seizing payments. The various 
legal actions, seized payments for Chilean copper shipments 
to Sweden, Britain, Italy, Holland, and other European 
countries which however proved partially successful but 99 
certainly influential. The strategy of the U.S. copper 
companies was to pressurize the overall direction of Chilean 
copper exports in Western Europe. In 1971, approximately, 
66 percent of Chile's total copp-^r exports went to six 
Western European Countries Belgium, France, Vfest Germany, 
Italy, Britain and Sweden-while the U.S. market absorbed 
only 8.5 percent copper e x p o r t s . I n addition, Kennecott's 
legal actions had been "timed for vhat was known in the 
trade as 'the mating season' when buyers and sellers get 
tog-^ther to make their contracts for the following year. 
98. "West German Court Embargoes Shipment of Cooper from 
Chile," New York Times. January 10, 1973, p. 51. 
99. David Binder, "Chi le -riticises Kennecott's Move," New 
York Times, January 13, 1973, p. 37. 
100. See James Petras, op. cit., p. 111. 
101. Clyde H. Farnswork, "Chile Assailed by Kennecott, Se^ks 
Support," Wa sing ton Post. October 17, 197 2, p. 55. 
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Furthermore, as an outcome of Kennecott's global offensive, 
the loans previously negotiated by Chile with Canadian and 
10 2 Du.tch banks were suspended. 
Anaconda, however, continued to follow the Chilean 
legal process to obtain its compensation claim and attempted 
to seek more alternative possible actions "in jurisdiction 
outside Chile. 
Thus, Anaconda and Kennecott formed their respective 
designs to pressurise Allende goverment for the favourable 
settlement of copper dispute Wiile the gradual decline of 
copper prices in international market further deteriorated 
the copper crisis in Chile. Notably, Chile was totally dependent 
on Copper revenues for its foreign exchange v^ iich had dropped 
by S 200 million in 1971 as a result of declining international 
market prices. 
DECLINE OF COPPER PRICES IN WORLD MARKET : 
During 1^68 to 1970, the last two years of the Frei 
regime, the international market price for copper exceeded 
any other year of the 1960s by at least 10 cents a pomnd. 
102. "Chile: War of Nerves", Latin America. October 20, 1972, 
p. 334. 
103. See, Gene Smith, "Copper Bedeviled by Politics," New 
York Times. November 5, 197 2, p.l. 
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In 1969, copper sold for 66.56 cents a pound in the world 
market. But in 1970, there was a slight decrease to 64. 20 
cents a pound. However, during 1970 to 197 2, the first two 
years of the Allende government, the international market 
price of copper sharply declined, 49. 27 cents a pound in 
1971 and 48, 20 cents a nound in 1972. As a return to a 
previous state, the world price of copper was estimated 
66 cents a pound in 1973. The Chilean government mining 
agency, CODBLCO, has estimated that for every one cent decline 
in the international price of copper, brought ^ IS million 
loss per year to the copper exporter state, comparison 
between the last two years of the Frei government and the 
three year® of the Allende government, manifests that the 
average annual price for copper on the international market 
was 65.38 cents a pound for 19 69-1970 as compared to 54.49 
cents a pound during 1971-1973, The above average yearly 
price for copper from 1969 to 1973, 65. 38 ents a pound 
meant that the Allende government would have received an 
extra $ 490 million. 
Thus, the declining copper prices in the international 
market, and the firm intentions of the U.S. government and 
104, The Whole data are quoted in the "Economist Intelligence 
Unit, " Quarterly Sconomic Review of Chile. No, 1, March 
1973, p,16, and No, 2, May 1973, p, 14, Cited in James 
Petras op, cit. pp. 109, 110, 
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the U.S. corporations to impose economic embargo on Chile, 
threatened the entire Chilean economic structure with 
grave consequences. There was a great deal of interaction 
during embargo period between the executives of the U.S. 
Corporations and the U.S. administrative officials specially 
within the NSC State Department and Treasury Efepartment 
which were the key policy making bodies of the U.S. government. 
Allende severely criticised U.S. political and 
econdmic offences and misdemeanours by the multinational 
U.S. corporations against his government in the General 
Assembly of the UN on Etecember A, 1972. He expressed his 
belief that these aggressions could'nt be severed from a 
particular situation created ard exiited by the policies of the 
U.S. government. Efescribing his country "a victim of serious 
U.S. aggression," he drew Assembly's attention to U.S. covert 
activities which were designed to topple his government. 
He asserted that "we are confronted by the forces operating 
in the shadow, having no flag, and possessing powerful 
weapons located in most diverse vantage points There 
is external pressure on Chile designed to cut her off 
from the rest of the world, strangle our economy, paralyse 
our trade and to deprive us of the access to sources of 
159 
international financing, 
Ai lends's fierced criticism of the U.S. political 
and economic aggressions, significantly, took place at a 
time when hig government itself was passing through vehement 
social and political confrontations inside Chile. The 
organised opposition, backed by the CIA and the U.S. govern-
ment, was also attempting to create economic chaos to 
destabilise Allende regime. Ihey were also encouraging a 
civilian military coup in Chile. The U.S. Corporations 
harassment and legal efforts against the Allende government 
was actually motivated to overthrow his Marxist government. 
Their hostility increased when the Chilean special Copper 
Tribunal refused to review its "no compensation" policy, 
later, the aggrieved copper companies appealed the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to provide economic 
assistance.^ 
The OPIC was established by the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1^59 as a successor to AID's investment guarantee 
programme for the U.S. Corporations, operating in developing 
countries. The pumose of OPIC was to s^ c^ure U.S. investments 
105. For a detailed analysis of Allende's Speech in U.K. 
General Assembly, see , The New York Times. September 
8, 1974, p. 26; Newsweek, July 2, 1973, p. 60; Link. 
February 25, 197 3, pp. 24-2 5; and The St?^tesman. 
December 6, 1972. 
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from losses i.e., "loss of investment due to expropriation, 
1 06 
nationalisation, or confiscation by foreign government. 
The OPIC was regarded in political terms as backing force 
of the global expansion of the U.S. multilateral Corporations 
and to provide a solid support to them in confrontation 
with foreign governments. 
Factually, OPIC's activities had impressive impacts 
108 
on U.S. government policy. The OPIC intervened, without 
hesitation, in negotiations between the Allende government 
and the particular U.S. Corporations for the settlement 
of compensation claims. In its memorandum, OPIC favoured 
full payment of $ 11.89 million to Anaconda, and $ 66.9 
million out of a requested $ 74.4 million by Kennecott. ^ ^^ 
Thus,the private embargo initiated by the Copper 
Corporations Complemented the economic pressure generated 
by the U.S. officials. The close ties between the Corporations 
and the U.S. government reflected the common purposes pursued 
106. See, James Petras, op. cit., p. 113. 
107. Morilyn Berger, "ITT Refused Chile Offer for Holidays," 
Washington Post. April 10, 197 2, pp.Al,A4. 
108. See, U.S., Congress, Senate, Corarittee on Foreign 
Relations, Subcomrittee on Multinational Corporations, 
"Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign 
Policy," Part 3, 93rd Congress, 1st session, July 13, 
19, 20, 30, 31, August 1, 1973 (Washington: U.S. Governmer 
Printing office, 1973), p.l4l. 
109. See, U.S. Concress, House," The Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation," p. 100. 
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within different spheres of competence. Through corporate 
contacts in markets and political ties with U.S. officials, 
the economic embargo became one more ingredient incorporate 
contacts in markets and political ties with U.S. officials, 
the economic embargo became one more ingredient incorporated 
in the formula to overthrow the Allende government.^^'^The 
copper dispute severely stimulated U.S. activities against 
Santiago regime and the heavy debt : burden on Chile, in 
addition, and subsequent debt squeeze of the couiatry 
buried all the future prospects of survival of the Allende's 
socialist government. The heavy debt obligations on Chile 
during Allende presidency suffc::ated Chilean economy in a 
distinct way. 
DEBT BURDEN ON C HELE AND THE U.S. DEBT SQUEEZE 
The foreign debt on Chile was like an albatross 
111 
around the neck of the Allende government. Financial 
trade, and credit squeeze already denied new economic 
resources to Chile. In addition, the U.S. began to pressurise 
Allende government to make payments on schedule. Obviously, 
the U.S. debt squeeze was tended to extract financial 
resources from Chile. Regarding payments, the U.S. admini-
tration perceived a no loss strategy. In other words, 
110. James Petras and Morris Morley, op. cit. ,p.ll4. 
111. Ibid., p.114. 
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if Chile paid up, it would have to divert scarce funds 
from popular programmes and development projects, thus 
generating political opposition; and if Chile did'nt pay, 
its international credit rating would decline, new loans 
from non-U.S. sources would not be forthcoming, and loss 
of financing of imports would cause an economic decline 
112 
generating political di scontent. Even then, Anende 
searched for financial assistance inEurope and tried to 
settle the debt issue with the U.S. government. 
DEBT NEGOTIATIONS : 
In November 1971, Allende declared that Chile would 
try to renegotiate with her Western European creditors and 
the U.S. on debt payment. It is here important to remember 
that debts on Chile were accumulated mostly by the previous 
Allessandri and Frei governments. Etebt on Chile in 19 69 
was & 2, 08 4 million. While, more than half of the 
approximately $ 3.8 3 billion public and private debt as 
of Efecember 197 0 was '^ wed to the U.S. government agencies 
and U.S. private lenders. The external public debt was 
put at $ 3.17 billion and the external private debt at 
112. Ibid., pp. 114-115. 
113. Current History, Vol.60, -^^ ebruary 1971. 
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$ 659.000. The estimated total debt for 1971 was approxi-
mately $ 3.26 billion. Ihe World Bank figure for Chile's 
external public debt as of Etecember 31, 1970. approxlrrately 
S 2. 5 billion, seriously understates the extent of Chile's 
indebtedness under the Frei government. In March 1973, 
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs John H. Crimmins estirated that the United States 
held 55 percent of Chile's debt to public agencies and 36 
114 percent of the debt to private lenders. 
The copper issue and matter of 3 billion foreign debt 
on Chile did arise as subject of attention at the "Paris 
115 
Club" talks. The Treasury Efepartment suddenly cropoed 
out as a main leading U.S. government ag§ncy in the tradi-
tional place of the State Efepartment, in the U.S. delegation 
at the Paris talks. The U.S. policy-makers deemed that the 
Treasury would possibly be able to "keap Chile's feet to 116 the fire" over the copper expropriations. 
114. S^e, U.S., Congress, House, "United States Chilean 
Relations," p. 4. Also sre, James Petras, ....op.cit., 
PD.115, 116, 204. 
115. Sep, Juan de Onis, "Chi le. Re serve s Low, Will seek 
Renegotiation of Payments on Her $ 3 billion Foreign 
•^bt" New York Times. November 10, 1971, p. 12. 
Also s-^ -^ , Juan de Onis, "Chile, # 3 billion in Debt.Asks 
creditor to Accept Morotorium on Payments," New York 
Times. January 20, 197 2, p. 4. 
115. (juoted in Rowland Svans & Robert Novak, "Rocky May 
Get State Itepartment, " Washington Post. February, 7, 
197 2, p.Al9. 
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All ef'orts for renegotiation on Chile's external 
debt could not obtain sw^cess, to some extent because of 
Chile's refusal to accept an IxMF standby agreement as a 
requirement for venegotiation. Chile did'nt favour the 
agreement because she considered it as an hinderance in 
future in the fulfilment of her ambition of autonomy in 
internal economic policy. Chilean officials believed that 
the agreement would formulate "norms concerning wages and 
prices policy, fiscal and monetary policy, and trade and 
exchange policy. And this would almost certainly mean an end 
to the present domestic expansion in Chile, a curbing of 
government expenditure and credit, and an insistence upon 
movement towards the trade liberalisation and devaluation! ^  
Even then, in April 197 2, an agreement in principle 
to renegotiate Chile's debt schedule on a bilateral basis 
with each creditor nation was concluded. In return, Chile 
agre'^d, of course in ambiguous manner, for "just compensatio!" 
for all nationalizations, " in cdmnliance with Chilean and 
118 
internatio-'-al law. The creditor partners prepared to 
reschedule 70 percent of the interest and major payments 
payable from November 1971 through December 197 2, denying a 
117. See James Petras, .... op. cit., p. 116. 
118. John L. Hess, "U.S. Joins in Credit Accord with Chile," 
New York Times, April 20, 1972, p. 3, The U.S. government 
had initially desired the phrase "prompt, adequate, 
and effective" compensation. 
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Chilean request for an extension until Eecamber 197 4. Almost 
three quarters of the ^ 97 million eligible for rescheduling 
was owed to the U.S. government, which carried on for "just 
compensation" for nationalised U.S. properties a precondition 
for bilateral U.S. Chilean negotiations. 
Thus, Chile, successfully arranged debt agreements 
with its Vfestern European creditors denying IMF standby 
loan as demanded by the United States, But, chile could'nt 
moderate the rigid U.S. position on renegotiation, and hence 
bilateral agreement could'nt be signed. 
Thus was the time as already described, when Chile 
was experiencing an intense internal social and political 
struggle particularly in the late 197 2. At that time, Chile 
seemed strongly desirous to clear up problems with the 
119 
United States. Discussions were resumed on the debt issue 
but without any perceptible alteration in U.S. stand. In 
addition, the U.S. attached the proposed rescheduling with 1 20 
a nodus vivendi on expropriated U.S. assets. Interestingly, 
the CIA was now represented on the U.S. delegation, at a time 
when the CIA was actively involved to promote anti-government 
119. See, Szulc. "The View from Lanaley. " p.C5, Szulc quoted 
secret testimony of CIA director, William E. Colby, and 
a senior official in the CIA's office of Current Intelli-
gence, before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American 
Affairs on ^cto'ier 11, 1973. 
120. See "U.S. and Chile Begins Talks on Rifts," New York 
Times. Cfecember 21, 197 2, p. 4. Also see, Terri Shaw, 
"U.S.-Chile Discussions Adjourned After 3 Days." 
Washington Post, Etecembor 23, 197 2, p.A16. 
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demonstrations in Chile. In other \JordSf the ynited States 
was clearly intended to accelerate pressures on the Chilean 
econ-^my to topp^le Salvador Ailende. However, Ailende repeate-
dly alleged that huge amounts of dollars were entering into 
Chile to organise strikes and anti-Ailende campaigns and on 
the other,, infiltrating their influence in the Chilean armed 
forces to overthrow the Ailende regime by military means if 
1 21 
necessary. Thus, the extreme polarisation of political 
forces in Chile before the military copu on 11 September^ 
197 3 aggravated the regimes economic difficulties and -"ereby 
made confrontation unavoidable. The fact remained that the 
U.S. government's hardened attitude towards Santiago made 
any compromise impossible. 
To sum up, the United States always refused every 
proposa"" of bilateral agreement with Chile and appeared to 
believe that any compromise with her would weaken American 
moves, and demoralise the internal political opposition 
against Ailende's socialist regime. Factually, Ailende 
failed to understand the U.S. tactics. He was looking to a 
settlement with the United States on mutual differences and 
could not properly anticipate U.S. tactics. He. also failed 
121. World Marxist R?>vi°w. Eferemi^ er 197 0, ^ol.l3. No. 12, 
p. 2. 
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to understand the U.S. bargaining strength. While, the 
rnomentum and opposition strength in Chile, and irritation 
within the Aiiende coalition had gradually gained striking 
roots in Chile. Consequently, the United States cherished 
these hostile sentiments in Chile, In such a hostile 
environment, "there was no discrete set of issues that 
could have been negotiated and settled. " The prolonged and 
ineffectual negotiations over the copper compensation dispute 
were put forward by the U.S. p9licy-makers mere to conceal 
their real objectives against the proposed socialist political 
system in Chile. The U.S. encumbrance over debt payments 
permitted them to harass the Chilean government. In consequence 
Allende regime could not achieve the economic resources due 
to debt pressure. Thus, deliberated negotiations, heavy debt 
weight, and failure in settlement with the U.S. copper 
mines provided an opportunity to the U.S. government to 
maintain pressure on Chile without appearing to do so. 
POLITI.JAL COI^SIESRATIONS IN THE FORMULATION OF U. S. POLICY 
IN LATIN AMERICA : 
Mainly the four political considerations during 
the 7 0s could be characterised as playing vital role in 
the formulation of U.S. policy in Latin America in general 
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and affecting economic r^ations with Chile in particular: 
1, In the spirit of Monroe Doctrine, the United States 
believed herself as the defender of the common good 
in the region and as the promoter of the Latin 
American interests. 
2, Simultaneously, the U.S. had been determined after advent 
of Castro in Cuba and "Vietnam Syndrome", to prevent 
any repetition of another "Cuba" or "Vietnam" in 
X 22 • Latin America, 
3, After the second world war, the United States had 
become the centre of the international economic system 
and also directly J.inked with the international political 
status-quo of power balance with which, the U. S, believed, 
a "stable" and "peaceful" Latin America could play 
an important supportive role. Ihe U.S. policy-makers 
visualised that they could dedicate their energies to 
more important and vtrgent areas of U.S. concern 
outside the western hemisphere if the region remained 
secure, peaceful and stable according to their own 
terms. That's why, the U.S. administrations have been 
concerned with any anti U.S. real of imagined threat 
emerged in the region. Factually, the whole region had 
122. See, a Report on Chilean Affairs from V.R. Blatt in 
The Hindustan Times. September 15, 1973,p.7. 
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become a part of the cold war framework. Any communist 
or leftist's movement, therefore, Mas firmly believed as a 
threat to U.S. regional and global interests. 
In Latin America dominated by the U.S, fiat everyone was 
regarded as an enemy of Washington who did wish to restore 
1 23 
natural resources to the ownership of the nation. 
Obviously, U.S, policy in Latin America always favoured 
Strongest and most effective anti-communist organisations 
and tactics as well. 
The pQlitical considerations which played vital role 
in the formulation of the U.S. policy towards Allende's 
movement of socialism could also be well observed in 
President Nixon's foreign policy sketch in his statement 
issued in January 197 2. 
NIXON'S STUBBORN FOREIGN POLICY POSTURES _ AN ANALYSIS : 
President Nixon's statement primarily contained 
main contours of stringent U.S. position on expropriation 
in respect of Chile and Latin America as a whole : 
" When a country expropriates a significant 
U.S. interest without making • reasonable provision for 
123. See, New Statesman, August 17, 197 3. 
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such compensation to U.S. citizens, we will presume that 
the United States will not extend new bilateral economic 
benefits to the expropriating country unless and until it 
is determined that the country is taking reasonable steps 
to|iprovide adequate compensation or that there are major 
factors affecting the U.S. interests which require continuance 
of all or part of these benefits. 
On the face of the expropriatory circumstances 
just described, we will presume that the United States 
Government will withhold its support from loans under 
consideration in multilateral development banks" 
Nixon's policy statement provided the legal justi-
fication for the Treasury Department's activities in Chile 
since 1969 in pursuit of larger U.S. policy goals. Thus, the 
statement exposed that the Treasury Department re-emerged 
as a central and opn directing force in U. S, international 
economic policy. Nixon's firmly state that the U.S. investors 
would be protected if expropriations took place anywhere 
in the region. The ^residential assistant and Executive 
Director of CIEP, Peter Peterson also stated that this 
hardline policy was designed to provide "investment security 
for U.S. investment capital in the underdeveloped worldl'^^^ 
124. "President Nixon Issues Policy Statement on Economic 
Assistance and Investment Security in Enveloping Nations, " 
Etepartment of State Bulletin. February 7, 1972, pp.153-154. 
Also see, Richard Nixon,U.S, Foreign Policy for the 1070s, 
A Report to the Congress, February 9, 197 2 (Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing office, 1972),pp.990-991. 
125. Quoted in James Petras op. cit.,p. 100. 
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However, Nixon's policy statement received criticism from 
various sides. Few sectors of the U.S. business community 
were of the opinion that the policy was short-sighted and 
potentially counterproductive, A former N3C policy adviser 
raised doubts that this tactics might affect long-term U.S. 
economic interests in Latin America We quote -
" In 197 2 approach places great emphasis upon the 
issue of compensation. In fact, the position is that no 
expropriation is legal, but negative, and something which 
affects our aid policy, and our actions in the internatioaal 
agencies. Ihis is a short-sighted point of view This 
type of policy may be creating harm Antagonistic 
response being applied in cases of expropriation reinforces 
attitudes, and therefore, affects attitudes on a whole range 
126 of other issues important to the United States," 
Majority of U, S, businessmen argued that the expropri-
ation tangle or threat was indispensably confined to chile 
which had been already answered by the United States 
denying all economic as si stance. The U.S. business community 
considered fertile to generalise whole Latin America with 
126, Qouted in James Petras op,cit,,p. 198, 
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Chile for the reason that U.S. relations were affected 
merely with Chile, However, the main thrust of the Nixon 
policy was to form designs of the external pressures on 
the Allende governtnent for the purpose of aggravating Chilean 
internal economic tumult and to fade the shineness and 
attractiveness of the Chilean socialist model in the western 
hemisphere. Allende* s Chile was considered as the linchpin 
in Latin American struggle to redefine its political and 
127 
economic relationships with the United States^ Significantlj^, 
the approaches of the above criticisms were not in ppposition 
to the principles enunciated by Nixon but to their capability 
of being applied to Latin America, because the whole region, 
in their views, was porous and well allowing the U.S. access 
and wealth. 
About one month before the military coup of September 
197 3, in which Allende government was overthrown and Allende 
was killed or committeed suicide, Nixon's policy geared for 
a major confrontation with Anende's chile. Accepting 
hostile state of mind of the U.S. policy-makers, a former 
NSC staff member, with the charge of Latin America, made 
comments: 
127, James Petras & Morris Morley op, cit,, 
p.lOl, 
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"^t would be difficult for us to isolate investment -
expropriation issues from political issues I think it 
is very difficult for Allende to work out a solution which 
128 the U.S. government could ever consider a reasonable one. 
In support of Nixon's "high profile" statement on 
expropriations, the U. S, administration immutably supported 
passage of the Gonzalez Amend^nt by the U.S. Congress. The 
amendment demanded the President to direct the U.S. execu-
tive directors engaged in the different multilateral aid 
institutions to try to deny the loans or financial assistance 
to any country which nationalised or expropriated U. S.-
owned properties; declared invalid the existing agreements 
with U.S. Corporations; or applied discriminatory taxes or 
restrictions in the way of expropriation, In addition, the 
implementation of this policy could be prevented only if 
the president came to the conclusion that a substantial 
compensation has been arranged or the dispute has been 
referred to the rules of the convention for the settlement 
of investment Edsputes for arbitration, or "good faith 
negotiations are in progress aimed at providing prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation under the applicable 
129 principles of international law," 
T^ GUcoA^ ' ^  /o/. 
129, U,S., Congress, S-^nate, Committee on Foreign Relations; 
House, committee on Foreign Affairs, "Legislation on 
Foreign Relations, " Joint Committee Print, March 197 3 
(Washington U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 
pp.990-991. 
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Thus, the Nixon Policy was a ruthless warfare 
against the restrictions on investments, nationalisation 
of foreign owned enterprises and other measures by Latin 
American governments against the depredations of U.S. 
monopoly capital^^^ in order to maintain its hegemony 
over Latin America, originally claimed in the I^nroe 
Doctrine. 
Thus, the general deterioration of the international 
position of U.S. monopoly capital by the increased competition 
for markets from emerging industrialised nations of the 
world, and by the weakening of the dollar in the 60s exagg-
erated the significance of Latin America for the Americans. 
CONCLUSION : 
The whole discussion of the U.S. Chilean economic 
relations and particularly the U.S. policy towards socialist 
Chile during Allende presidency, could be summerised with 
four main features which broadly determined the economic 
relationship between Chile and the United States and provided 
a definite shape to American strategy against Allende regime: 
1. The economic relationship was highly unbalanced in 
favour of the United States. The U.S. foreign trade to 
130. "U.S. Economic Exploitation of Latin America," Lumor, 
Political Affairs^ Journal of Marxist Thought & 
Analysis. October 197 2, p. 25. 
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Chile was a small fraction of the total but for Chile 
it represented a very high percentage in an economy 
whose budget was much more dependent on foreign exchange 
earnings and that was also controlled by the U.S. 
2. The U.S. owned multinational corporations had gradually 
permeated into almost all critical sectors of the Chilean 
economy through massive capital investments and therefore, 
had deep influence on the U.S. foreign economic policy. 
3. The U.S. had highly influential voting power and in few 
cases an effective veto almost in all of the international 
financial institutions upon which Chile was dependent 
for credits and long-term financing. The U.S. government 
fully exploited its influence in these institutions in 
order to procure strategic advantages in Chile. 
4. Chile had become the largest per capita recipient of the 
U.S. direct foreign aid in Latin America during the 60s. 
In this period^ Chile received over a billion dollars 
U.S. aid. It constructed the Chilean economic structure 
entirely dependent on the U.S. investments and therefore, 
could' not face financial earthquake caused by the United 
States. 
Chile, thus, was tragically suffering from infection 
of U.S. massive financial influx in 197 0. It had given the 
U.S. foreign economic policy a terrible leverage which could 
deeply influence Chilean external and internal economic 
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structure. Obviously, Chile experienced exteme degree 
of U.S. hostility. The Chilean dependence on the United 
Statf^ always put the ball in U, S, court. The U. S, govern-
ment as an engiroe supplying motive power for economic 
machinery of Chile, actually hallowed out the Chilean 
economic structure. The U.S. government keeping firm Control 
over the steering wheel of Chilean economy, ultimately 
drove bilateral economic relations towards deep depressions 
but^ simulataneously, maintained close links with Chilean 
military. The continuance of military aid to Chile was 
also a supplementary part of the U.S. plan devised to eradicate 
magnanimity of socialise from Chile, History proves that 
U.S. designs accomplished its objectives by exciting internal 
tumult in Chile and skilfully instigating Chilean military 
to overthrow Allende regime. Chilean military once regarded 
as custodian of democracy, itself demolished democratic 
institution by a bloody military coup in 1973. The U.S. policy 
in its strange contradictory manner, on the one side imposed 
economic and financial blockade on Allende Ye^rtnci and on the 
other multiplied military aid to Chile. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA -
WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO CIA INVOLVEMENT IN CHILEAN 
MILITARY COUP AND U.S. RELATIONS WITH NEW MILITARY REGIME. 
The U. S, policy with their main objective of 
safeguarding U.S. political and economic interests in Chile 
spared no efforts to make the survival of the nationalist 
socialist Allende government nearly impossible. It v?as 
attempted both directly as well as subversively to desta-
bilise Allende government between 197 0-7 3. During this 
period, they managed to infiltrate their influence in the 
Chilean armed forces through massive military aid as much 
as through close contacts with military officers. This 
phenomenon opens a new chapter to explain the U.S. Military 
Assistance strategy. 
Some high level U.S. military officials anticipated 
that such connections and influence in the Chilean array 
would be conducive to manage the U. S. Chilean affairs, and 
conveniently converted into a powerful political strategy, 
if needed. They were eager to reverse Allende's "socialist 
transformation" in Chile. 
ITtie Nixon administration's policy was stipulated 
to produce dishevelled Chile, internally dominated 
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by the military, pursuing a development policy within 
the market framework embraced by the U.S, administration. 
MILITARISM IN U.S. POLICY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA : 
The United States military assistance to latin 
America between 19 50 and 1969, in the form of equipment, 
training, and services, totalled S 1. 357 billion.^ In this 
decade, l-atin .^ i^iierica experienced covert and overt U.S. 
military intervention in Guatemala (19 54), Cuba (l96l), 
and Dominican Republic (1965). The main thrusts behind these 
interventions remained common, i.e. to protect the U.S. 
economic interests threatened by the policies of the nationa-
list political parties emerging in these countries. Besides, 
in early 1960s, the U.S. global strategic conceptions and 
considerations began to take new turn as a result of growing 
trends of nationalism. The end of 19 50s had already diminished 
the probabilities of military intervention by a non-hemispheric 
power. While, attainment of immense power by the United 
States at the end of the second World War, established 
her to the unchallenged power of the hemisphere. In addition, 
gradual process of polarisation of the world due to cold 
war, invisibly exposed Latin ^erica as the shpere of U.S. 
1. Michael T. Klare, War Without find. Vintage Books, 
New York, 197 2, p. 280. 
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influence. But, the U.S. policy-makers, sensed a new 
threat to U.S. political and economic status-quo in the 
region by an internal insurgency growing in ^tin American 
nations through guerilla warfare. This new sensation 
dressed the U.S. regional security considerations in 
new clothes. The Cuban affairs during 19 58-6 3 also 
played a crucial role in the making of new policy consi-
derations in Washington towards latin America, In 1965, 
during Johnson administration. General Robert Wood, the 
director of the Military Assistance Programme, insisted that 
the "primary purpose of thei* Military Assistance 
Programme for latin America is to counter the threat 
to the entire area by providing equipment and training 
which will bolster the internal security capabilities 
of the recipient countries," President Kennedy also 
asseted that "the Free world's security can be endangered 
not only by a nuclear attack but also by being slowly 
nibbled away at the periphery, regardless of our strategic 
power, by forces of subversion, infiltration, intimidation, 
indirect or non-overt aggression, internal revolution, 
lunatic blackmail, guerilla warfare or a series of limited 
wars, 
2. William F, Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal 
^curity and Military Power, Ohio: Ohio University 
t'ress, 1966, p. 3 5. 
3. Ibid, p. 31. 
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U.S. POLICY OP "LOW-PROFIIE" IN LATIN AMERICA : 
Unlike fennedy and Johnson administrations which 
occassionally involved in covert and overt military engage-
ments in Latin America, the Nixon administration seemed 
to realise the consequences of such military interventions, 
and believed that any direct U.S. military involvement 
in Latin America would have a negative impact on the U.S. 
political and economic interests in the region. , 
Significantly, with the decline of Castroist sub-
version and the increase of latin American nationalism, 
U, S. policy-makers have felt it prudent to strive for a 
"low+profile" in the region.^ So that, the United States 
could concentrale her thrusts on burning spots like southe-
ast Asia and the Middle East, The Nixon administration 
was also keen to review U.S. bilateral relations with the 
Soviet Union, China, Europe, and Japan. It believed that 
latin America States have realised that their national 
dignity and development require greater co-operation 
among themselves and with extra-regional developing 
Sties. The administration anticipated that the whole 
region has been ambitious for widening their political 
4. Ronald G. Hellman & H. Jon Rosenbaum, latin ^erl^a; 
The Search for a New International Role Sage Publlegations. 
New York, l97 5,p7T. " ' " 
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and economic ties with outside powers without any imposed 
rigidity in order to accelerate their industrialisation 
process. President Nixon, therefore, laid more stress on 
the establishment of better understanding and good 
relationship with the "equals" and emphasized the need of 
"social and economic reforms, and development goals, and 
a necessary level of internal security and stability, 
The Nixon administrati6n decision to follow a vague 
"Good Partner Policy" derived mainly from its assessment 
that no serious security threat was likely to emanate from 
Latin America. This optimistic assumption rested upon the 
presumed intentions of Moscow and Peking to establish 
"respectable" and "acceptable" links withi Latin American 
nationalist governments rather than to support revolutions,^ 
But, simultaneously, the U.S. policy-makers also sought 
to improve the counterinsurgency capabilities of pro-Wash-
ington governments in the western hemisphere. In March 197 0 
Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird explained U, S, policy 
of consolidating and improving the counterinsurgency 
5. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Meyer, U.S., 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, "United States 
Military Policies and Programmes in Latin America," 
91 St Congress, 1st session, June 24 and JiTly 8,1969, 
(Washington: U, S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 
pp. 58-59. 
6, Ronald G, Hellman & H. Jon Rosenbaum, op. cit,, p. 3. 
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capabilities of U,S,-influenced regimes in the area: 
" direct U.S. military involvement can not 
be successful unless wes provide our friends and allies^ 
whether through grant aid or credit sales, with the material 
assistance necessary to insure the most effective possible 
contribution by the manpower they are willing and able to 
commit to their own and the common defence. Ihe challenging 
objectives of our new policy can, therefore, be best achieved 
when each partner does its "^are and contributes what 
it best can to the common effort. In the majority of cases, 
this means indigenous manpower organized into properly 
equipped and well-trained armed forces with the help of 
material, training, technology and specialized skills punished 
by the United States through the Military Assistance Progra-
7 mme or as Foreign Military Sales. " 
G. Warien Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defence for 
International Security Affairs, in Itecember 197 0 also 
Spoke in the same direction in his concise speech, "our 
ability to.reduce U.S. commitments abroad, and generally to 
lower our profile, will depend upon* the Calibre of training 
7, U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies, 
Appropriations for 1971, Part 1, 91 st Congress, 2nd 
session (Washington U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 
p. 307. 
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g we are able to provide to foreign military personnel," 
• In addition, in early 197 0, a special Congressional 
study mission to Latin America gave its assessment of the 
military assistance training programme in the region. 
The study remarked at a place that "military assistance 
programmes are primarily an instrument of American foreign 
g 
policy" .Ihe U, S, policy-makers always emphasized during 
early halp of the 7 0s, the significance of "maintaining 
Channels of influence and direction with the latin American 
military as one of the major instruments of social control 
and preservation of the dominant political elites and econo-10 
mic x'iling classes in the region, " A high level Itefence 
Ospartment policy-maker outlined the rationale behind U, S, 
military assistance policy toward Latin America in 
these words : 
"We are furnishing assistance in the form of military 
training to almost all of the countries of Latin America.., 
8, U,S, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
^bcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific 
Iteveloprnent, "Military Assistance Training/ 91st Congress, 
2nd session, October 6,7,8, December 8 and 15, 1970 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing office, 197o), p, 
13 2. 
9, U,S,, Congress, House, P^port of the Special Study 
Mission to Latin America on I Military Assistance 
Training and II, Itevelopment Telivision, 0, 21, 
10, James Petras & MDrris Morley, op, cit,,p,123. 
ISo 
we feel it is extremely important to maintain our 
relations with the people who are in positions of influence 
in those countries so wer can help to influence the 
course of events in those countries, 
INFLUX OP U.S. MILITI^A PRIOR TO 197 0 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
IN CPILE : 
Prevailing direction of the U.S, policy towards 
Chile just prior to September 197 0 elections started 
reflecting its essence when the U.S. navy requested Chilean 
visas for eighty seven officers and civilian empliyees 
The Chilean government inquires from the Lfefence Etepartrent 
and the Efepartment of State evoked various contradictions 
and suprising informations. Interestingly, many officers 
among them held academic degree in space, physics, aero-
engineering, computer science, and marine biology. Many 
others were qualified destroyer and submarines commanders. 
The U.S. Etefence Itepartment explained that the visas were 
provided for a goodwill navy land tour. While the State 
jCtepartment informed Chile that forty nine of the visas 
were actually for U.S. personnel involved in the coming 
11. U.S., Congress, Military Asistance Training, p. 145. 
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•w 12 
joint annual anti-sut)]^arine warfare exercises. However, 
Chile kept restrain from these exercises viewing the 
presence of U.S. "warships in Chilean waters would be 
interpreted as a sign of the United States political 
13 
pressure." Further, thirty-eight visas, accsjirding to 
the State Eepartment communique, were requested to U.S. 
Antarctic personnel to visit the U.S. installation at 
Palmer Base, which is supplied through Punta Arenas, 
a Chilean port. It is significant to note that all these 
officers were specified as "unrestricted line officers," 14 Capable of being used for any type of duty. 
U.S. MILITARY AID PRIOR TO 197 3 COUP : 
After Allende's inauguration or in other words, 
after emsuccessful attempt to prevent Allende's confir-
mation, the United States maintained extensive contacts 
among the leaders of the Chilean armed forces. The U.S. 
policy-makers remained keen and ambitious to improve their 
relations with the Chilean army. That's why, the United 
States provided chile a privileged treatment and posted 
three military attaches and half a dozen, assistants 
12. See James Petras & Morris Morley, op cit. , p.126. 
13. Quote^d in ibid., p. 126. 
14. Tad Szulc, Navy's Visa R^cruests Worry Chile, 
New York Times. September 5, 1970, p. 
1S7 
In Santiago. Significantly, in the beginning of 1970, 
there were almost 10,000 military advisers from the United 
States apart from the CIA advisers planted at key points in 
the administration,^^ 
In mid-.l971, in a calculated ambiguity, the U.S. 
administration on the one side formulated aggressive foreign 
economic policy against expropriations of U.S. onwed properties 
in Chile while on the other, the U.S. government in July 1971, 
decided to grant Chile $ 5 million in military credits for 
the purchase of paratroop equipments and a ^ 4 million 
credit for '--ISO military transport planes. It was the 
first military aid since the Allende government caroe to 
16 power. In May 197 2, the U.S. government, as part of its 
'I ^  "pragmatic policy," signed an agreement of a $ 10 million 
credit to Chilean airforce to buy transport planes and other 
18 
equipments. Although, in January 197 2, the United States 
has decided to stop aid to the government expropriating 
U.S. assets without "prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation" but even then the U.S. government assured 
Chile that $ 10 million credit would be granted. ^^ 
15. Link, January 11, 1970, 
16. Time. July 12, 1971, p. 9 
17. See, Saule, Gives Chile Credits for Military 
Purchases*' New '^orK "^fmes> June 30,19^71, pp.I, 10 
18. See, Time. September 24, 197 3^  p.8. 
19. Tad Szule, Is continuina Aid to the Chilean Armed 
F o r c e N e w VoiiiC Times, Eecestober 15, 197 2, p. 12, Also 
see, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act, 93rd.Congress, 
1st session. May 2, 3,4, and 8, 197 3( WashingtonJU. S. 
government Printing Office, 197 3), p.98. 
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In May 197 3, President Nixon decided to exercise 
waiver to allow five Latin Ajneerican countries Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Chile, to purchace F*.5E 
fiigher aircraft. Since April 1970, the U.S. administration 
was considering that waiver authority could be exercised 
or not under section 4 of the Foreign Military Sales Act 
for the purpose of P-5E figher aircraft deal with these 
five nations. Interestingly, the U.S. action came on 
the assumption that it was important to the national 
20 security of the United States, 
However, to recall after the 1960a as an outcome 
of Cuban revolution, U.S. military assistance programmes 
changed clearly from hemispheric security orientation to 
one emphasizing internal security, counter insurgency, 
and civic action. Penetration of Latin militaries by the 
U.S. v/as conducted through contacts, advice, direct 
training and ideology, The United States, thus, was 
suppressing Chilean economy by stopping the aid while, 
continued arms shipment to Chilean military. Significantly, 
U.S. aggressive and interventionist policies and strategies 
were by no means the entire explanation of Chilean affairs 
20. See Itepartment of State Bulletin, July 16, 197 3 
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which led the military coup in 197 3. Severe political 
21 
confrontation tacties, assisted and financed by the 
CIA, were also playing a destructive role since Allende's 
take over inside Chile. It provided a fertile field for U.S. 
Clandestine activities in the Chilean affairs and simul-
taneously increased military participation in Chilean 
domestic affairs. 
INTERNAL POLITICAL CONFRONTATION AND SUBSEQUENT MILITARY 
PARTICIPATION IN CHILE : 
Factually* confrontation within democracy originates 
from the mobilisation and interaction of class based political 
and economic groups. Confrontation politics exists in a 
democracy when mass organisation, i.e. parties, trade 
unions etc., organise or threaten to organise strikes, picket 
lines, lock outs, forcibly occupy farms, and send Youth or 
womens groups out to protest and clash in the streets as the 
primary means of obtaining political results. As long as 
such tactics are essentially non-violent, and are not taken 
with the express purpose of violating the constitutional 
system, they are generally considered legitimate democratic 
tools of political influence. However* the more they grow 
in number, frequency, and strength, the more of a threat 
21. For a detailed Study of Chilean political affairs with 
the political confrontation approach see, Monoograph 
Series in World Affairs, Vol.14, Book '^ree. 
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they become to the survival not only of the present 
government, but of the system itself. They hurt production 
and orderly economic activity and tend to stimulate the 
escalation of political violence. The escalating use 
of these tactics also tends to complicate the preservation 
and the effectiveness of broad multi-party coalitions as 
political mechanisms for producing substantial socio-
economic structural changes within a constitutional system. 
The effects, significantly, would be even more probable in 
a political setting fused with high ideological content, 
22 
such as in Chile, In addition, the political affairs become 
mork complicated when the opposition controlled legislature 
attempts to stalemate government's legislations. Most signifi-
cantly, it has been the bane of Chilean politics that suling 
parties have invariably failed to command a majority in the 
Congress and the opposition parties, who lack generally 
two, thirds majority to prevent a presidential veto, hit, 
back turning down every meaningful government measures in the 
23 
Congress. The same political Climate of confrontation in 
Chile emerged in December 197 2. 
Chilean economy was in increasingly desperate straits 
in the late 197 2 and the tactics of political confrontation 
22. Ibid. 
2 3. See, Link, July 8, 197 3. 
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began to reflect in a series of crippling strikes during 
the last year of Allende which ultimately brought the economy 
to its knees. The month long October 197 2 strike against the 
Allende government led by trucker's in protest against the 
government's inability to provide them spare-parts and 
sympathetically supported by small merchants, businessmen and 
professionals highlighted for the first time the emerging 
patterns of confrontation politics in Chile. The strike was 
countered by a mass mobilisation of the labour unions and 
other government supporting base organisations. The Chilean 
government also closed, in the same month, "Radio Agriculture" 
owned by big landowners for 48 hours for false and alarmist 
reporting of an encounter between soldiers and peasants 
in Southern Chile. During these strikes violence flared up 
24 
in many places. In the consequence of these strikes, Qhilean 
political system wrtnesed a military entry into Allende cabinet. 
Allende included three military officers into his new cabinet. 
However, this provoked protest from within the Popular 
Unity and the Christian ^eft resigned from the Cabinet, In 
addition, in January 197 3, the government announced to 
establish a monopoly control of the distribution of all 
agriculture products. This brought violent reactions from 
24. See, Time, September 3, 197 3, p.6 
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business-class. They resisted with strikes and processions, 
Allende responded by putting Air Force General Bachelet in 
Charge of a new Secretariat of Distribution and Trade, 
In March 197 3, congressional elections were held. 
Significantly, Allende government declared in its political 
programmes to provide a wider role of the military. The 
Allende government increased its performance and obtained 
25 
43,4 percent votes of the total electorate . After the 
Congressional elections, a two month massive strike by 
copper mines began in late April 197 3, It again brought 
confrontation politics to the centre of the political arena 
and again spurred a military reaction this time an unsucce-
ssful violent tank attach on the Presidential Palace on 
June 29/ 197 3, when an attemoted coup was carried out by 
Col, Roberto Couper and his tank regiment, together with 
armed troops. However, the coup was crushed by loyal troops. 
But in the consequence of mutiny, the armed forces decided 
not to join cabinet. In addition, the final series of strikes 
and confrontations by the truckers once again started 
late July, 197 3, Consequently, sabotage activities on power 
lines and railway lines mounted. The Christian Itemocrats dec-
lared their support to the truckers. The strike-born violence 
25. See, "Congressional elections in Chile. "The World Tpdav. 
Vol, 29, No, 4, April 197 3, p. 13 5, 
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cast the Chilean armed forces into the centre of Allende*s 
political strategies. The military returned to the cabinet. 
Later, taxi-drivers, bus-drivers and owners, small shopkeepers, 
and professionals also joined the truckers strike. The army 
used to carry out searches for arms, and in outcome, the 
widespread torture of peasants and brutal natu'-e of the 
Army personnel were reported through out the country. Signi-
ficantly, General Prats and General Ruiz were both forced to 
resign by pressure within the armed forces and were replaced 
by others allegedly less sympathetic to the popular Unity 
government. These final series of strikes, greatly increased 
socio-political tensions to the brink of civil war. It was 
ended only by the violent and costly military coup that 
brought to an tragic end of the Allende government and thus 
27 Chile's parliamentary democracy, 
THE MILITARY COUP AND ITS AFTERMATH : 
Chile had so far been spared the bloody revolutions 
28 which have characterised the history of neighbouring lands 
29 
as Argentina, But, on September 11, 197 3^  a military coup 
overthrew the democratic socialist government of Chile, 
After bloody battles^^ between the armed forces and die 
26. See, .Newsweek, September 3, 197 3. 
27, See "A Kew Account of Allende's i:feath, " The Times of India, 
March 28, 197 4, p, 4, 28, Suiss Review of World Affairs> August 1971, p, 24, 
29, See on coup, the Editorial "Eteath of an Experiment,"of the 
Times of India. Sept, 13, 1973; Also see The Times (London), 
Sept. 13, 197 3, 
30, See, Time, September 24, 197 3, p. 7, 
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hard supporters of President Allende. Chiles long-recorded 
span of democratic rule was brutally snapped,^^ General 
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte^ powerfully built man, an author 
of several books on geography, hence regarded as an intellec-
tual, was sworn in as President of the ruling military junta 
in a hasty ceremany at the Bernardo 0* Higgins Military 
32 
School, named in honour of Chile's founding father, A 
military junta communique declared,"The Chilean armed forces 
and carabineros are united to initiate the historic and 
responsible mission to fight for the liberation of the 
fatherland from the Marxist Yoke."^^ 
The Christian Democratic Party supported the putsch. 
Under the leadership of former President Eduardo Frei, the 
Party asserted in a statement that the Allende government 
was tempted to installed a communist dictatorship by a 
valiant coup "Everything indicates that the armed forces 
did nothing more than to respond to this immediate risk, " 
the Party statement remarked. Eduardo Frei made a comment 
before Mexican journalist on 8 September 197 3 that "if 
a medicine is killing it must be changed. Aspirins won't 
do any good, 
31. Newsweek. September 24, 197 3, 
32. See, Time. September 24, 1973, p, 8. 
33. See, "Can Marxism and Democracy Mix? Newsweek. 
September 24, 197 3, p. 18, 
3 4. The World Today. The Royal Institute of World 
Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 11, April 1973. 
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The coup was, significantly, welcomed within the 
U.S. Department of Etefence, Etepartment of Etefence favoured 
junta's justification for the coup : 
"The Aiiende government has been accused of playing 
footsie with the Cubans and the Cubans of having men in the 
country, and they have certainly displaed arms that they 
say come from Cuba, and they are reportedly still finding 
them, and the idea was that Allende and his backers were 
going to overthrow the military in Chile so they would have 
3 5 complete control." 
Thus, the United States did not protest against the 
violent and unconstitutional overthrow of an elected government. 
The U.S., specially the CIA, considered military junta to be 
the lasser of two evils. ^ ^ The U.S. government received 
advance knowledge of the coup by its strategically located 
agents, officials and by covert operational activities. But 
37 
the U.S. policy-makers maintained a posture of non-involvement, 
and tried toi§ give the impression that they had no prior 
information of the coup. Notably the U.S. government accele-
rate its campaign denying any U.S. involvement in the coup 
3 5. Quoted in James Petras oc Morris Morley op. cit,p, 209, 
36. Time. September 30, 197 4, p, 25. 
37. See, Efen Morgan, ''junta Informed U.S. of its 
Before the Coup,^^ WaKington Post. September 13, 197 3. 
pp. A1,A12. 
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when it became sure th the coup was going to be successful 
and any direct U.S. military intervention or involvement 
38 
would not be necessary. Jack Kubisch, the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Inter-American Affairs, stated in testimony before 
the House Foreigfe Affairs subcommittee on Inter-American 
Affairs that "we did not have advance knowledge of the coup 
that took place on Sept, 11,,,. there was no contact what-
soever by the organizers and leaders of the coup directly 
with us, and we did not have definite knowledge of it in 
39 advanc®i" 
Leaving apart this controversy, it was an unchallenged 
fact that the United States created political and social 
conditions favourable for the coup through economic offensive 
against Ailende government. The divergence between public 
statements and covert activities has been a characteristic 
of the U.S. policy toward the Ailende government from the 
40 
very beginning. The U.S. involvement in the bloody military 
coup revived the old fears of the U.S. meddling in the affairs 
of Latin America, Argentina's President Juan Peron observed, 
"I can not prove it, but firmly believe it was North American 
41 intervention," It is significant to note that on the very 
38, Dan Morgan, '^ -oup P^oort Discounted U».S' Claims^ 
Washington Post, September 14, 1973, pp. Ai, Al3, 
39, See, "Etepartment of State Bulletin," October 8, 197 3, 
p,465. Also see, Terri Shaw, PrerCoup Ar.tivitv Is_Itenied 
by U.S., Washington Post. September 21, 197 3, p,A2b,'" 
40, James Petras & Morris Morley op, cit,, p, 130, 
41, Quoted in Newsweek, September 24, 197 3, p, 16, 
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day of the coup, four U.S. navy vessels were headed for 
Chile to engage in joint hemispheric maneuvers. ^ ^ On the 
day the Cqbp took place, "Exercise-Unit"as" with U.S. 
navy ships and aircraft taking part, was being held off 
43 
the Chilean coast. Many U.S. Navy officers were in Valpa-
raiso and maintained links with the Chilean naval officials 
who participated in the coup. The Etepartment of Itefence 
officials accepted, though in vague terms, their close ties 
with Chilean miljta-ry officials . 
"Our support of the Chilean military has more or less 
continued uninterrupted before, during and after the Allende 
regime because we made a spe'^ific effort to maintain close 
"44 relations with the Chilean military 
Factually, as the economic crisis deepened in Chile, 
the U.S. administration, thrcwgh the CIA, actively supoorted 
and financially assisted massive strikes in the country. For 
instance, truckers during the strike were enjoying a lavish 
meal of steak, vegetables wine and meat pieces, secretly 
42. David Binder, Allende Out, Reported Suicide; Marxist 
Regime in Chile Falls in Armed Forces's Violent Coup; 
U.S. Not Surprl sed,->/ New York Times. Septemberlt, 197 5, 
pp. 1, 17. " 
43. Political Affairs, December 197 3. 
44. Quoted in James Petras & Morris Morley op.cit, ,p.l3l 
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^ 5 supplied by the CIA. ^  Thus, the CIA played a very crucial 
role during the last days of t?ie Allende regime. 
THE U.S. W D THE CIA INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY COUP : 
' ne CIA has remained a significant institution in 
pursui-f . of the U.S. policy goals. It's activities have been 
an in-t igral part of U.S. policy thrusts and efforts to 
under .dne antagonistic governments in the world. The American 
gove nment several times utilized intelligence machinery 
lik the CIA when it thought it necessary to meet the 
cor munist challenge in various parts of the worlds particularly 
ir Latin • America, 
The military coup in Chile was according to some, 
CX 
"conceived in the backrooms of the U.S.-AffiA with ttie direct 
participation of the ITT and Kennecott concerns,However/ 
the role of the CIA throughout the Ailende years remained 
deeply controversial. There were several reports that the 
CIA was playing active and subversive role in the social 
and political struggles in Chile, President Nixon and other 
high ranking U.S. officials including Kissinger, always 
45. See, Time, September 24, 197 3, p, 12. 
46. Excepts from an appeal issued by the Communist Party of 
Chile on October 11/ 197 3/ one month after the coup-
Political Affairs, December 197 3, 
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categorically denied their alleged involvement in the Cov^, 
Kissinger, as Secretary of State, stated during Congressional 
hearings on September 11, 197 3, a few days after the coup 
that "The CIA had nothing to do with the coup to the best 
of my knowledge and belief 
William B. Cotby, the CIA Director, in his secret 
testimony before the ffouse Foreign Affairs Committee, offered 
amazing and striking contrast to the declared U.S. poisition 
regarding the coup, disclosing CIA involvement in the Chilean 
48 affairs which led the military coup, 
COLBY TBSiriMONY : 
Mr. William colby told the House that throughout 
Allende term, the CIA attempted to destablize Allende 
government. The U.S. administration through overt and covert 
means failed to prevent the election and confirmation of 
47. Quoted in James Petras & Morris Morely, ...op cit.,p. 131. 
Also see Slraen G. I^nson, Kissinger on the Chilean Coup, 
Inter-American Economic Affairs, No. 3, Vol, XXVII, Winter 
1973, p. 61, 
48. Indian Newspapers well covered the details of the U,S, 
and the CIA involvement in the Coup, 
See, The Indian Express; September 17, 1974, p, 6; September 
18, 197 4, p,4; September 23, 197 4, p, 4; 
The Sunday Standard: September 15, 197 4, p. 4; September 
22, 1974, p.6; September 29, 1974, p. 4; 
The Times of India; September, 17, 197 4, p.4; 
The Hindustan Times; September 18, 1974, p. 5; September 19, 
197 4, p. 5; September 24, 197 4, p.5; 
The National tibrald: September 19, 1974, p.6; September 24, 
1974, p.5. 
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Allende as President, therefore^ the mere option for them 
left was to maximise economic and political pressure on the 
Chilean government to weaken its roots, and thus to create 
favourable atmosphere for the military coup. This objective 
was clearly reflected in the National Security Efecision 
Memorandum (NSDM) 9 3, issued in early November 197 0,"^ ^ The 
U.S. administration was firm and cautious to keep its investment 
interests in Latin America uninjured. It perceived that Chilean 
socialists experiment might put adverse affect on its global 
political economic interests. The United States basic 
considerations which led her to resort to secret activities 
against the Allende government have been summend up in the 
famous Staff Report of the Senate Committee as follows ; 
"The desire to frustrate Allende's experiment in the 
Western ^femisphere and thus limit its attractiveness as a 
model; the fear that a Chile under Allende might harbour subver-
sives from other Latin American countries; and the determina-
tion to sustain the princxple of compensation for U»S, firms 
nationalised by the Allende Government, 
49, Covert Action in Chile: 196 3-73 op, cit., p. 27, 
50, Ibid,, 
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CIA DIMENSIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE : 
Significantly^ the Nixon administratis^ authorized 
the CIA to wage a ^ 8 million campaign in 197 0-7 3 to aid 
51 * opponents of Chilean President Allende with over p 3 million 
52 s 
during the fiscal year 1972 alone. Over P 5 million were 
spent during the Allende presidency, and 84, 000 expended 
shortly there after for commitments made before the coup. ^ ^ 
The CIA budget for subversive activities in chile was appro-
ximately ^6,5 million. The amount of million was 
financed to anti-Allende candidates of the opposition political 
parties mainly the Christian Etemocratic Party (pDC) and the 
National Party (PN) in the Chilean Congressional elections 
held in 197 3. Notably, the CIA in 1971 also provided financial 
assistance to the PDC and the PN to purchase their own radio 
stations and newspapers. The CIA also utilized the money to 
organise anti government campaigns throughout these years, 
urging citizens to demonstrate their opposition against the 
A]!ende government. In addition, the money was also approved 
51. See Time, September 30, 1974. The CIA spent ^ 1 1 million 
between 1964-197 3 to back political operations against 
the Chilean left-wing forces - information issued by 
Information Department of the USSR Embassy in India, 
New Delhi, 197 5. 
52. Covert Action in Chilp, 1963-1973 op. cit., p. 1. 
53. Ibid, p. 27. 
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to finance mass media including El Ifercurio, Chile's largest 
newspaper and a most important channel for anti-Allende propa-
ganda, El Mercuric received about ^1.5 million from CIA 
for this objective. The funds were also channelled into 
Chile through private sector groups and organizations to use 
them as instruments in creating conditions suitable to the 
military coup,.According to the staff Report of the Senate 
Select Committee, the Forty Committee specially sanctioned 
the funds of ^ 24, 000 in September 1972, ^ 100, 000 in October 
197 2, and ^ one million in August 197 3 for strengthening 
the hands of the anti-Allende private businessmen's organisa-
tions. The CIA provided ' Patria-y-Libertad' (Fatherland and 
liberty), the most prominent right-wing paramilitary group, v/ith 
a sum of § 38,500 in an effort to create tension and a possible 
pretext for intervention by the Chilean Military. Patriya-y-
Libertad' continued and maintained highly provocative activities 
during Ailende years urging insurrection in the armed forces. 
It also assisted 197 2 national trucker's strike, one of 
the worst blows to the Chilean economyPatriya-y-Libertad' 
leader Roberto Thieme, announced that his group would unleash 
54 
a total armed offensive to overthrow the Allende government, 
54. Ibid, p. 31. 
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The funds were also channelled into Chile through 
organisations outside Chile, For instance^ Brazil have been 
involved in the activities which culminated in the coup. 
Brazilians admitted their assistance to employer boycotts, 
5 5 
women's demonstrations and the training of Chilean right-
wing extremists^^. Significantly, one month before the coup 
the CIA increased its budgetory allocation by ^ 1 million 
in August 197 3 "for further political destabilisation acti-
vities. " 
The CIA infiltrated Chilean agents into the upper 
echelons of the Socialist ^arty. Provocateurs were paid to 
make deliberate mistakes in their jobs, this adding to Anende's 
gEoss mismanagement of the economy. The CIA agents organised 
street demonstrations against government policies as the 
economic crisis deepened in Chile, the CIA also supported 
striking shopkeepers, and taxi-drivers. Laundered CIA money 
was even channeled fir'ora Europe, for financing the Chilean 
55. Some of the strongest opposition of Allende came from 
Chilean women, perhaps the most liberated in Latin 
America, As occassional meatless days in Chile became 
. regular meatless weeks, the women organised a famous" 
March of the Empty Pots," in 1971 to dramatise the 
rising costs and increesing shortages of food. Also see. 
Time, September 24, 197 i, p. 12. 
56, See, "Rule by Torture, " Lanky, January 18, 1970, p, 33; 
Link, March, 197 0, p, 31; "Brazil Patronage for Torture", 
Link, June 13, 1971. 
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57 trucker's 45 days long strike, 
CIA POLITICAL LINKS INSIDE CHILE : 
The CIA, obviously, instigated and assisted anti_ 
Allende and anti-social elements in Chile to overthrow 
the Allende government. Thus, it can not be ruled out that 
the U.S. involvement in Chilean affairs during Allende 
administration was "pervasive, continuous, and inserted 
itself is many of the most vital areas of the Chilean 
58 
political process," However, the CIA was not directly 
and openly involved in the military coup. But one can not 
and should not ignore the close United states relations 
with the Chilean military officials specifically daring 
Allende's years. Significantly, between 197 0-7 3, Washington 
provided the Chilean Generals with $ 45 million of direct 
59 
aid , The American military presence consisting military 
attachees in the Embassy, and members of the Military Group 
Who provided training to Chilean armed services in Chile, 
57. For an understanding of economic and administrative 
chaos and its impact on daily life of Chilean people, 
see. Time, July 16, 197 3, p. 8; Time, August 27, 197 3, 
p. 10; Time, September 3, 1Q7 3, p.6; Time, September 24, 
197 3, p. 12; Time, September 30, 1974, p.25; Also see 
Newsweek, July 2, 1973, p. 23; Newsweek, October 1, 1973, 
p. 11; Also see. Link, June 24, 197 3; Link, July 8,1973. 
58. James Petras & Morris Morely, op, cit,, p. 134. 
59. Angelo Colloni, "U.S. Interventions: A Brief History, 
New Delhi, 1984, p. 180. 
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remained substantial during these years. 
The CIA also remained continuously indulged in 
collecting in telligence reports of all kinds of efforts 
to stimulate sedition or a military coup in Chile, According 
to the Staff Report of the Senate Select Committee/ the CIA 
station in Santiago remained busy to collect operational 
intelligence necessary in th.a event of a coup as lists of 
Allende's prominent supporters for their arrest, key civilian 
installations that needed protection, key government installa-
tions which needed to be controlled/ and government contingency 
plans which would be used in case of insurrection in the 
military. The intelligence network of the CIA continued to 
report throughout 197 2 and 197 3 on coup plotting activities, 
touring 197 2, the CIA station ccntinued to monitor a particular 
group which might organize a successful coup. Significantly, 
the CIA devoted comparatively considerable time and effort 
penetrating this group. The CIA continuously received, 
according to the Staff Report, intelligence reports about 
the planning of the coup by this particular group which, 
it was said, carried out the successful coup on 11 September, 
197 3, Views of the Staff Report of Senate Select Committee 
in respect of the CIA involvement in the coup are clearly 
reflected in its following opinion: 
206 
The CIA's information gathering efforts with regard 
to the Chilean military included activity which went beyond 
the mere collection of information. More generally, those 
efforts must be viewed in the context of United States opposit-
ion, overt and covert, to the Allende government. They out the 
United States government in contact with those Chileans who 
sought a military alternative to the Allende presidency, 
Thus the nature of U.S. decision - making remained 
counterrevolutionary. The Etemocratically elected socialist 
government in Chile was tended to establish some structural 
changes in Chilean economy. But the collective interests of 
U,S, capitalism inherently favoured by the U,S. policy-makers 
could not tolerate Allende's steps towards socialism. The 
U.S. policy makers perceived Allende as their "enemy" and as 
a first major challenge after Fidel Castro, to U,S, hegemony 
in the region. The White ^buse did feel fear that Chile 
would serve as a base for South America's revolutionary 
left, as well as, a convenient outpost of the Soviet Union. ^ ^ 
^ correspondent asked the newly made President of the United 
States Gerald Ford, at his Press Conference, in September 
197 4, that "under what International lew do we have a right 
6 0, Covert Action in Chile - 196 3-7 3,,,,, op, cit,, p, 39, 
61, Time. September 30, 197 4, p,25, 
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to attempt to destabilize the constitutionally elected 
government of another country?" Mr. President replied," 
l a m not going to pass judgement on whether it is permitted 
or authorized under international law. It is a recognised 
fact that historically, as well as, presently, such actions 
6 2 
are taken in the best interest of the countries involved." 
In addition, as we already know that William E, Colby, 
disclosed details of the covert action to a closed hearing 
of the HDUse, Foreign Affairs Committee on April 22, 197 4. 
A summary of his testimony was leaked to the Press by a 
congressman, Mr. Ford had no choice but to make an admission, 
first of its kind ever, saying "our ^^overnment, like other 
governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence 
field to help implement foreign policy and protect national 
63 security. 
In fact, U.S. policy toward the Ailende government 
was a policy of unrelenting hmstility designed to make it 
64 
impossible for the Ailende coalition to succeed itself, 
%turally, the U.S. policy-makers were more harmonious with 
new military regime or in other words, with a non-Marxist 
government in Chile. A high-ranking state Eepartment official 
6 2. Ibid. 
63. Ibid,, 
64. See James Petras & Morris Morley, op. cit, p. 137. 
208 
concluded the U.S. consonant position towards new military 
government: 
"Our general view was, quite naturally, that this 
government, any now Marxist government in Chile, in terms 
of immediate, concrete U.S. interests was advantageous.^^ 
Factually, the United States considered Chile under the 
socialist dreams of Allende, an initial meanace to its 
regional interests. The U.S. policy,makers enticed insidiously, 
as mere "viable" alternative, the military coup to strengthen 
the U.S. position in latin America, That's why, the Efepart-
ment of State official happily reacted to the coup : 
"The coup has been helpful from the point of view of a 
couple of countries which no longer have the Chilean Allende 
type I^rxist regime as a worse alternative. It has improved 
the U.S. position in every respect,^^ Senator McGee, Chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Latin 
America, was so impatient to the military coup that he commented, 
"it took so long to remove Allende which is now the reason 
67 why it is all so bloody," 
6 5, Quoted in ibid. 
66, Ibid, p. 138, 
67. Ibid. 
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BLOODSHED IN THE COUP : 
Durinq the bloody coup thousands of people were 
killed.^® Forty-five Professors of Chile's Northern University 
were also brutally killed. According to a delegation of the 
Women's International Efemocratic Federation, which visited 
Chile in January 1974/ 80,000 people were murdered and 18,000 
arrested. Over 30, 000, in addition, children lost their parents^^ 
It followed widespread torture and other repressive methods of 
7 0 the U.S. supported military junta. Junta established a huge 
concentration camp, "Chacalbuco, " in the Atacoma Etesert about 
7 1 
a thousand kilometres to the North of Santiago. Peasants, 
workers, slum-dwellers, particular social groups which 
geographically and socially indentified with the Aiiende regime 
were treated by the military junta with undue harshness. 
68. See, "Thousand Died Dirinq the Coup in Chile, Senator 
Kennedy, Says," Washington Ppst, ftebruary, 4, 197 4, p.A3, 
also see. The Times (London), September 15, 197 3. 
69. "Continuing Terror in Chile, "The Centurv. Ms.rch 16 & 23, 
1974, p. 9 . 
7 0. See, Laurence Stern, Torture Reported Continuing in Chile, 
Washington Post, July 24, 1974, p. A28; Joseph Novitski, 
OAS Group Urges Chile stop Torture, Washincrton Post, August 
4. 197 4.p.A13; '^'he Times CIondonJT September,,18, 197 3; 
Re San Russel, I saw Democracy Murdered in '^hile. New Age, 
October 7, 197 3, p. 12; The Tirres of India, September 18 
and September 24, 197 3; The National t%rald. October 14, 
197 3; T?ie Patriot September 20, 197 3; and also see, Arkady 
Poltorak, The Junta tramples upon International law, 
issued b^ ' the Information I^partment of the USSR Embassy 
in India, New Efelhi, 10 April, 1974. 
11. See The Century, Etecember 15, 197 3, p. 8; Newsweek, October 
8, 1973, pp. 28-29; Newsweek, October 15, 197 3, p. 16. 
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sum up, tte unconstitutional fall of constitutionally 
elected goverment of Salvador Aiiende in Chile gave great 
pleasure to the United States, a recognised guardian of 
democracy in the bipolar world. Certainly, the U.S. sidminis-
tration was covertly involved in the military putsch. They, 
however, denied initially, any direct involvement but tried to 
justify the coup asserting that it was necessary for protection 
of freedom and democracy which was in danger under the Allende 
administration. The new milit-^ry government, dear to 
^shington, promised to build 'new* Chile. Ironically, General 
Pinochet government banned the Marxist and socialist political 
Parties, put the Congress in indefinite recess, and imposed 
press consorship. Junta, in fact, banned all political 
activities in the country. "Chile will be Chile once again" 
the messages were continuously broadcast by radio-stations 
across the nation. Several Allende supporters were brutally 
massacred, fortured and arrested. Several thousand people 
7 
took refuge in Argentina. The Military junta reversed 
Allende's economic policies and strengthened its relations 
with the countries of American bloc. The military regine 
also closed down its diplomatic and economic ties with 
Castro's Cuba.'^^ 
7 2. See, The Patriot, September 22, 197 3; The Statesman, 
October 10, 197 3. 
7 3. See, Time, September 24, 197 3, p. 8. 
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U.S. RELATIONS WITH NSW MILITARY GOVERNMENT : 
New military government elaborated new economic 
policy which obviously indicated that Chilean economy 
once again would be dependent on foreign investment, mostly 
suited to the U.S. A U.S. official concluded the initial 
impression of the military government. 
"Economically, they immediately proceeded to rescind, 
reverse the direction towards nationalisation of private 
enterprise, an imnrediate indication on their part that they 
were going to compensate for what was nationalised. They 
Opened up the economy internally and externally to private 
capital. 
JUNTA'S POLICY TOWARDS FOREIGN ASSETS : 
The military government unLike Allende's nationalist 
policies, designed its new economic policies which were openly 
favourable to the U.S. business expectations and opened 
f!very opportunity for foreign capital investment in Chile. 
Political and 'economic measures of the military regime once 
again set up Chile's international Creditworthiness. The 
A] lende government nationalised 550 mines, hotels, banks, 
74. Quoted in James Petras & Morris Morley, op. cit,p.l39, 
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and other business enterprises which were returned ato 
private ownership by the military regime. 
The Pinochet regime not only announced that a 
big nurrber of foreign porperties would be returned to 
their original owners and agreed in principle to paying 
7 5 
compensation to the expropriated U.S. Copper Companies. 
The military government had already madq an initial payment 
of $ 1.6 million to OPIC to cover compensation payments made 
by OPIC to other U.S. investors and whose assets were 
expropriated by Ai lende government. The regime also provided d* 75 P 321 million compensation payment to Anacondtvand Kennecott. 
Chile's new government also declared to accept private, 
foreign and Chilean investment in the country's big five 
copper mines - Chuquicamata, El Teniente, El Salvador, 
Exotica, and Andina, which were nationalised under Aiiende's 
rule.'^ '^  
TIE U.S. GENSROIS RESPONSE TO THE MEW POLICY OF PINOC ^]2T 
REGIME : 
The U.S. response to the new policies of the anti-
commu-^ist military government was cordial and supportive. 
7 5. See, Jonathan Kandell, ^Private U.S. Loans in Chile up 
Sharply,^^ New York Tim^s, November 12, 1973, pp. 53, 55. 
76. See, The New York Times. April, 1, 1977. 
77. The Economic Times. September 197 3, p.l. 
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The United States decided on September 25, 197 3, to 
restablish diplomatic relations with the new military 
regime and conversation started among the U.S. officials 
to find out "means by which the United States can come 
7 8 
Speedily to the aid of the junta. " Subsequently, the 
U.S. government formally offered Chile ^ 24 million credit 
for the purchase of wheat and a further ^ 28 million credit 79 for the purchase of corm. The wheat credit, significantly, 
was "eight times the total commodity credit offered to 
80 
Chile in the past three years," It should be remember 
and that the U.S. government had refused Chilean request 
for emergency wheat credits prior to the coup exchanged by 
a Chilean agricultural trade delegation. The U.S. renewd 
decision once again revealed that grant of such credits 
was basically dependent on the political posture of the Q -1 White House. 
The U.S. government, therefore, came with large 
scale assistance in the form of easy loans, wheat supplies, 
78. Jeremiah 0' Leary,^United States, Chile Move to Forge 
New Links,^* Washington Post, feptember 25, 197 3. 
79. Terri Shaw, '^'Chile Gets U.S. Loan for WheatWashington 
Post, October 6, 197 3, also see. The Statesman, 
October 7, 197 3, p.6, 
80. Quoted in ibid, p. All. 
81. Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol.]4, Book Three, 
University of E^nver, 1977, p. 121. 
Table - 4 
Breakdown of Foreign Aid to Chile Under Frei, Allende, and 
the yiilitary Junta 
CHILE 
Comparison of Foreign Aid from Selected U.S. Government 
Agencies and International Organisations 
(in millions of U.S. Dollers) 
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U.S. AID (Direct) 
P.L. 480 
U.S. Export-Import 
Bank 
World Bank 
Inter-American 
Development Bank) 
Military Assistance 
Total!for Six Total £or three Total for 
Frei years Allende years first three 
(1964-1970) (1971-1973) Junta years 
(1974-1976) 
397.5 
108.6 
278.0 
131.5 
2 08.7 
52.5 
3.3 41.3 
14.7 122.6 
4.7 79.1 
(to April 30, 1976: 
0.0 66.5 
(to April 23,1976) 
17.3 168.1 
(1974 Sc 1975 only) 
33.0 18.5 
(15.9 in 1974) 
SOURCE : David, P. Cusack, "Revolution and Reaction : The 
Internal Dynamics of Conflict and Confrontation 
in Chile", Monogrape Series in World Affairs, 
Voi. 14, Book Three, University of Denver, 1977, 
p. 114. 
215 
and other consumer goods. Direct U. S. economic aid, grants 
and loans totalled ^ 350. 5 nixllion during the first three 
years of the junta, compared with ff 27.7 million during 
1971-73.^^ The U.S. also provided ^ 63.7 million as economic 
8 3 
assistance for Chile in 197 5 under the U.S. sponsored 
Food for Peace Programme (P.L. 480) loans, in fiscal year 
19 7 5, Chile received $ 57.8 million while the rest of 8 4 
Latin America received only $ 9 million. To recall AHende 
regime received no assistance under P.L. 480. The U.S. 
assistance, factually, signified a crucial support for 
Chile's balance of payments. 
DEBT RSNEGOriATIOKS : 
The U.S. government acquiesced in December 197 3, to 
renegotiate with the Pinochet regime on Chiles' foreign 
debt to the U.S. agencies following the junta's assurance 
to provide compensation for the expropriated U.S. copper 
mines. Prior to a compensation settlement with the U.S. 
copper companies, the government of new chile' agreed to 
82. Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol.14, Book '•^ 'hree, 
Ur.iversity of Denver, 1977, p. 121. 
83. Washington Post, June 2, 1974, p.Nl. 
84. Monograph Seri'^ -s in World Affairs, op. cit, p. 121. 
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pay (?t 60 million over a four year period under the terms of 
the renegotiation and a further ^ 64 million over a six 
85 
year period beginning in January 197 5. Previously the U.S. 
policy-makers as part of their international economic 
policy, have made this a pre-condition for any renego-
tiation with Chile on her foreign debt. But, the U.S. 
behaved in a different manner on terms and conditioas of 
rescheduling with the new regime following its willingness 
to eliminate the Ai lende ' s' of fensive ' steps. As a consequence 
the Export-Import Bank also decided to reconsider its lending 
policy towards Chile. 
INTERNATIONAL CREDIT TO CHILE : 
The U.S. private bankis loass to Chile became availa-
ble immediately after the military take over. In consideration 
of the fact that lines of short-term commercial credit before 
Allende specifically during Aiessandri. Frei years remained 
around $ 300 million, while these lines of credit declined 
after one year of Allende's inauguration to $ 25-30 million. 
It became sure after junta took power that these lines 
80 of credit would eventually rise to the previous levels. 
85. Terri Shaw, ''^ Chileans, U.S. Agree on Cfebt,*^  Washinqton 
Post. Efecember 22, 1973, p. A3. 
86. Terri Shaw, '^ '^ Blockade of Chile diminishing/-^ Washington 
Post, October 28, 197 3, pp. Ai, A17. Also see Table -3 
and Table -4. 
217 
Daring the first month of military rule, approximately 
200 million new lines of short-term commercial crcdit 
were extended to Chile mainly by the U.S. banks. These 
credits were granted enabling the government to meet 
its immediate obligations and to purchase products essential 
87 
to the day-to-day functioning of the Chilean economy. 
International credit, in fact, was then flowing into chile. 
Junta received more than $ 500 million in credits in tte 88 first six months. 
The international banking community turned to be 
moderate regarding financial assistance to Chile for long-
term development projects. Several missions from the World 
Bank, the International Monetory Fund, the Inter-American 
Dsveloplent Bank, and the Inter-American Committee for tie 
Alliance for Progress (CIAp) congregated in Santiago after 
89 
the coup and appeared "well disposed towards new regime, 
willing to provide new financial largesse.The World Bank 
granted a $ 13.0 million tecinical assistance credit to 
Chile and committed to provide ^ 5. 25 million to the 
Chilean Eevelopment Corporation (CDRPO) for studies, before 
87. See, James Petras Sc Morris Morley, op. cit,p.l43 
88. Alan Angel 1, 'I'^ hp Ch-iTpan »nad to .Mil j,tari sm^ '" 
International Journal, Vol.XJciX, No. 3/summer, 197 4. 
89. Commented by General Sduardo Cano, President of Central 
Bank, qi:oted In "Chi V Claims F? Wpst'.s_B$nkers, " 
Washington Post, October 8, 197 3, p. A'32. 
Table - 3 
CHILE 
Foreign Aid from U.S. Government Agencies And Inter-
national Organisations for the Military Regine 
(September 1973 - March 1974) 
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Totals 
of U.S, 
in millions 
Dollars 
GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT L3ANS 
From United States 
Corn Purchases 
Wheat Purchases 
From Brazil 
Free Disposability 
Sugar Purchases 
From Argentina 
Reproductive Cattle 
Agricultural Machinery 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
International Monetary Fund 
(Contingent Gedit-Standly) 
World Bank 
Preinvestment Studies 
Technical Assistance to the Public Sector 
Inter-American Development Bank 
Loan Announced By IDB's President in USA 
For Agriculture 
For Electrification 
146.0 
49.0 
28.0 
21.0 
62.0 
50.0 
12.0 
35.0 
20.0 
15.0 
322.8 
95.0 
18.25 
5.25 
13.0 
201.0 
30.0 
25.0 
70.0 
Contd... 
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Contd,,.Table 3 
Fox Irrigation works 45,7 
For Reforestation 15.C-
For CORFO Projects 10.0 
For Social Development 6,0 
Andean Development Corporation 8,55 
For Aircsaft leasing 8.55 
TOTAL OF FOREIGN LOANS 468.8 
SOURCE : James Petras And Morris Morley, ''The United 
States And Chile : Imperialism and the overthrow 
of the Allende Government'', Monthly Review Press, 
New York, 1975, p. 144, 
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investment, in mining, manufacturing, metallurgy, trans-
portation etc. EXaring Junta's first six months in office, 
the Wor-1 d Bank provided $ 18.5 million in credits. The 
Inter-Amorican Etevelopment Bank agreed to provide a 
$8,5 million loan to CDRFO for a rural electrification 
programme. Significantly the IDB approved $ 201 million 
loans upto March 197 4, $111 million on extremely generous 
terms, a thirty year repaym^ent period with seven year's 
grace, at two percent interest per annum. In May 197 4, the 
IDB also approved two loans totalling li 97.3 million for 
electric power and agricult-ire development. The IMF also 
approved a ^ 95 million stand by agreement in February 197 4. 
The Paris Club countries in May 197 4 also agreed to renegotiate 
Chile's over $ 900 million foreign debt, ffowever, the human 
rights issue was raised by few Paris Club creditors e.g. 
England, during bilateral negotiations on the foreign debt, 
foreign investors were anxious and ea^er to support the 
9 0 economic rehabilitation of a dependent capitalist Chile. 
Thus, new non-xM^rxist Chile received generous 
financial bestov/al during the first six months, from the 
international agencies. The Chilean military government 
received loans and credits of approximately $ 47 0 million 
9 0. See, James Petras & Morris Morley, .... op. cit., p. ] 45. 
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from the United States^ Brazil and Argentina, and the 
Q 1 
international institutions; short-term credits of $ 100 
million from a U.S. banking consortium; and scheduled 
credits of $ 100 million each from the Banco de Colombia 
and a swiss foreign trade financial commission. The military 
regime also received benefits from an extraordinary rise in 
the international price of copper which reached $ 1.0327 
a pound in November 197 3.^^ In April 197 4, 'Enami', Chile's 
mining Corporation, received credits totaling $ 140 million 
from Brazil, France, Finland, Belgium, and East Germany. 
THE U.S. MLITARY AID : 
In addition, Chile received during one year after 
the coup ^ 11 million milita-jry credit from the U.S. gover-
nment. Nixon administration submitted to congress a $ 21.3 
million military aid package for Chile. Thus, military 
assistance and arms sales continued to increase after 
the coup. Chilean orders for U. S. military equipment skyro-
cketed in 197 4, amounted to § 15.0 million.^^ Chilean orde] 
Lor U.S. military equipment totalled $ 27 million for the 
91. See 9htU^  
9 2. See, James Petras & >brris ^brley, ....op. cit. ,p. 143. 
9 3. Monograph Series in Acrld Affairs op. cit., p. 121, 
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period 1950-1969 and $ 127.7 million for the period 1950-197 4.^ '^ 
In spite of huge influx of the U.S. and the inter-
national capital into Chile^ the economic performance of the 
Pinochet regime remained very unproductive. 
ECONOMIC P E R F O R M A N C E O F THE M I L I T A R Y G O V E R N M E N T I 
Chile began to receive massive financial assistance 
from the United States after the coup but the first two 
years of the military regime revealed that Chile could not 
reverse the industrial production which steadily declined. 
Although, the industrial production index rose from 110.9 
in August 197 3 and 9.17 in September 1973 to 138.0 in 
October 197 3 but if we compare Efecember 197 3 with Efecember 
197 2 we find that there was a decline in the index from 132.6 
9 5 
to 125. 2. Industrial production declined by 23 percent in 
197 4-7 5.^^ The econonric policies of the Pinochet government, 
therefore, proved to be partially successful. Inflation 
rose by leaps and bounds. Between January and Ltecember 97 
1975 it rose by 340 percent. The country s economy suffered 
a severe recession in 197 5. The Country's GNP dropped by 
94. Ibid., 
9 5. See, Nader Entessar, Political i^velopment in Chile 
From Ctemocratic Socialism to QL eta tor ship, Calcutta, 1980. 
p.177. 
96. K. Seshadri, Chi lei. Travail and Tregedy, Lblhi, 1979, 
p. 234. 
97. Ibid. 
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about 15 percent, manufacturing production by over 23 
98 
percent and gross fixed investment by 31 percent. It 
created massive unemployment in the country, Une nployment 
reached an alarming 20 percent of the work force, as 
contrasted with the 3 to 4 percent unemployment rate during 99 the Allende years. 
> In addition, the net medium and long term external 
debt on Chile amounted to nearly 47 0 million at the 
end of 197 5.^'^° This figure was 40 percent higher then the 
figure at the end of 197 3,"'^ ^ In 197 5, amortization and 
interest payments on the long-term debt were 59 percent 
higher than in 197 4, and 156 percent higher than in 197 3. 
Between 196 4 and 197 5 the value of total exports of Chile 
102 declined by over 600 million. 
The ten years after the coup could'nt change 
economic performance. The per capita gross domestic product 
upto 1983 dropped by 14.3 percent in Chile. The unemployment 
rate was 30 percent in 1983. The national income also 
dropped by 19.4 percent in 1982 as compared to the 1981. 
98. Sconomic Survey of latin America 197 5,UN Publications, 
Santiago, Chile, 1976. 
99. Nader Entessar, op. cit., p. 177. 
100. Bconorric Survey of letin America 197 5, 
101. Ibid, 
102. Ibid, 
224 
In this period from 1977 to 198 2, the balance of payrrents 
deficit on current transactions reached $ 12.099 million. 
In the period between late 1980 and J-fey 19, 1982 the total 
amount of researves had dropped by more than $2.6 billion 
from § 4, 073.7 to ^ 1, 442.7 million. 
In 198 2, real wages in Chile were 11.9 percent lower 
than the recorded average level in 1971-7 2 during the 
Popular Unity government. If we take the level of wages 
in 197 0 as 100 percent, it grew in 1971-7 2 on the average 
to 109.4 percent while in the period between 197 4 and 
104 198 4 it hardly reached on the average 7 4.8 percent. 
In conclusion, it became apparent till the late 
197 5 that the junta had no intention of relinquishing its 
political power and returning the country to democratically 
elected independent civilian rulers. Notably, after the 
successful 197 3 coup, through imprisonment, execution, 
and exile, the junta substantially managed to weaken 
and neutralise left wing opposition. 
The romonopolisation of the Chilean economy under 
the milits^-y regime by the few foreign multinational 
103. i-Iugo Fazio, Fascism in Chile; Ten Years After, 
International Affairs. October 1983, pr>. 36-38. 
104. Ibid. 
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Corporations reintroduced the dependency syndrome in 
the Chilean society. Significantly, the CIA also partici-
pated in the preparation of the initial over-all economic 
plan and re-established links with governmental intelligence 
agencies which were interrupted during Allende years. 
The Nixon-Ford administrations, therefore rendered 
stronger support to the junta than any other country in 
the West. Nixon's support for the Pinochet regime was 
prompted partly by his deep antipathy towards Allende's 
nationalisation thrust and partly because of his security 
perceptions in the western hemisphere. He remarked after 
the coup that "in terms of our ovm ®lf interest, the right-
105 wing dictatorship is of no security concern to us. " 
In addition, the military regime in Chile was 
considered by the U.S. p61 icy-makers, suitable to the U.S. 
strategy of containment of leftist reformist and communist 
regimes in latin America. Certainly, the United States 
enormous financial and convincing political assistance 
insured the survival of the military regime in Chile, She 
obteiined complete success in inst-ituting a programme of 
substantial aid to Chile. The U.S. miJitary aid, in fact, 
resuscitated the "faltering" economic policies of the 
105. New York Times, May 26, 1C77. 
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Allende government and brought alarming improvements in 
bilateral relations with Chile after the coup. 
Notably^ the military regime has also allowed the 
Reagan administration to built a landing pad for U.S. space 
shuttles on Chile's Easter Island in the Pacific. It is 
believed that it will be turned into a U.S. strategic military 
base. 
In sum^the discussion in the previous chapters has 
exposed that after the establishment of Allende's nationalist 
socialist regime^ the threatened nationalisation of American 
assets in Chile, the need to suffocate Allende regime 
economically and to solve the security problem militarily 
as recognised within the U.S. administration, and the 
continuing use of subversive and strong-arm methods by the 
CIA, all had given indication, from the very beginning, of 
trouble ahead. Factually, the U.S. government and the CIA 
had the firm belief that something more than economic 
sanctions against socialist regime in Chile was necessary, 
in order to achieve tlie U.S. policy objectives. For three 
years during the Allende rogim, the CIA had sought to 
pursue the U.S. policy objectives. With increasing distraction 
The CIA played an active and subversive role in the social 
and political struggles in Chile and thus successfully 
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attempted to destabilize the Allende government. The 
CIA agents channelled financial aid to anti-Allende 
candidates and opposition parties in 1970, i'residential 
elections in Chile, It planted its agents even in the 
Popular Unity Coalition, utilised Radio and newspapers 
for anti-Allende propaganda, financed the mass- media 
through private sector groups, covertly distributed arms 
among the right-wing paramilitary groups, financially 
assisted and instigated anti-Allende demonstrations and 
massive strikes. The U. S, military attachees in the 
Embassy also played crucial supportive role with the 
CIA in these clandestine activities. At this vantage stage 
in I973, the military interierence in Chilean affairs 
began to appear and ultimately through a devious process 
of force, intimidation and assimilation, Chilean armed 
forces took over Chilean political system in their hands. 
The same process of destabilising nationalist 
governments, socialist or otherwise, may be noticed in 
Argentina, Nicaragua and other Latin American countries 
during 7 0s and 80s, The U,S, policy-makers affection for 
the military regimes in order to create a dependency 
Syndrome by a process of development through foreign aid and 
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multilateral collaboration with the help of vested 
interests in the form of pro-U. S, elite may be aptly 
exemplified by discussing Argentine and El Salvadoran 
economic and political conditions during the first and 
second half of 70s respectively. This consistent pattern 
of the U.S. policy in Latin America does not seem to be 
changing with the succeeding administrations in Washington. 
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CHAPTER - V 
SWING OF THE U.S. POLICY PENDJIUM BETWEEN GO-OPERATION 
AND CONFLICT WITH ALTERATION OF POWER IN ARGENTINA. 
Argentina, situated strategically in Plata river 
basin is one of the most iinportant centres of political and 
economic development in Latin America.^ It is one of the 
leading nations of the western hemisphere. Argentina had 
made rapid strides in its industrialisation during the two 
decades after the second world war. Apart from purely local 
industries, whether backed by local or foreign capital, there 
exist a number of large enterprises, various aucidiary factories 
and assembly plants for worldwide industrial concern including 
the American multinational companies. The U.S. has enormous 
investments in Argentina like many other Latin American 
countries. Vast and varied resources of Argentina, including 
agricultural, mineral and uranium resources, constitute the 
foundation of her rich national wealth and international 
importance. 
United Kingdom remained Argentina's principal cus-
tomer and investor upto the 40s. But in tfie post war period, 
the United Sts^ tfes gradually occupied that position comparatively 
1. See, Fred A. Carlson, Geography of Latin America, 
l^ew Jersy, 19 59, p. 152. 
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2 with more dominance. Earing first half of 7 0s the period 
that mainly attracts in th^ ' ot U.S. policy 
in Latin America, the U.S. investments in Argentina mostly 
remained unchanged and its relations with Argentina stood 
status-quo except tor a short duration in 197 3-7 4, Ehring 
this period Argentina experienced, like previous decade, 
great deal of political instability and social crises. Earing 
these five year period Buenos Aires witnessed four governmental 
changes, violence and military coups had become as if an 
integral part of Argentina's politics. In 1970 itself, a 
military coup put up another new military regime succeeded to 
control Argentinian presidency. Fortunately the then military 
regime organised the General Elections in 197 3. Utili^iing 
it as a golden opportunity, Argentinians elected a nationalist 
government led by E>r. ^ctor Campora, a men of t'eron. He 
took over the presidency but within a few months was gripped 
with violence between diverse terrorists groups and subsequently 
desperate economic conditions forced yet another replacement 
of presidency when Juan ^eron, once regarded as the "Bismark" 
of Argentina, reassumed Argentina's highest office after 18 
years in exile. But he expired in 197 4 and his wife Isabel, 
then vice-president, took the responsibility of ruling 
2. See, Peteron Harold, Argentina nad the United States 
a8l0-l960). New York, 1964. 
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Argentina, Not much educated, Isabel and her government 
proved to ioe deplorably weak and, therefore, overthrown 
in 1976 by a military coup. 
Thus, during the first half of 197 0s, Argentina was 
seized by internal political and economic crises. However, 
Washington anticipated a danger to the U.S. interests by 
the reemergence of Juan Peron who had been the strongest 
and most popular figure in Argentine history during 40s and 
50s, Peron encouraged the nationalistic and anti-U.S, 
sentiments in Argentina,^ though not as rigidly as Allende 
did in Chile, and was considerably concerned with rising 
U,S. influence over Argentine economic structure. In about 
one year Oiig his presidency, obviously, the relations between 
the U. S, and Argentina remained under severe strains. Signi-
ficantly, Peron favoured Allende's socialist transformation 
and strongly criticised America's covert involvement in 
Chilean affairs. 
Except -feron in 197 4, the military rulers usually 
determined the fate of Argentina, These rulers provided 
favourable conditions for U.S. investments in Argentina, 
They compromised Argentine economic interests with the 
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interests of the U.S, In other words, Argentina's rich 
natural wealth was in a broader sense, sold out to big U, S» 
business by the military junta who had frequently captured 
power in the country in 60s and 70s through bloody coups,^ 
Significantly, the U.S, companies provided highly paid 
executive posts to Argentine military officials, who enjoyed 
substantial financial advantages, 
A R G E N T I N E M I L I T A R Y R U L E R S A N D C O N S I D E R A B L E U.S. C O M M A N D O V E R 
A R G E N T I N E ECONOMIC I N F R A S T R U C T U R E : 
Since 1968, during Ongania military regime the United 
States petroleum companies Sinclair, Shell, Ohio continental 
oil. Union oil and Tennessee immutably established themselves 
in Argentina, In order to ; facilitate their penetration 
of the country, during 6 0s, the Argentine regimes gradually 
liquidated the State-owned petroleum company Yacimientos 
^etroliferos Piscales, ^  Besides oil, the U.S. monopolies also 
obtained control of Argentina's deposits of lead. Zinc, tin, 
copper, uranium and other minerals. Notably, high-ranking 
Argentine military officers assumed well paid posts in the 
local subsidiaries of the U.S, and foreign monopolies, Signi-
ficantly, during Ongania regime which was overthrown in June 
4. See, Philippe, C. Schmitter ^ed.), Military Rule in Latin 
America* Functions, Consequences, and Perspectives, 
Sage Publieations, vol. ii.L, 197 J. ~ ~ 
5. See, Angelo Colleoni, -U.S. Interventions A brief History, 
New Efelhi, 1984, p, 184, 
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197 0, the Minister of Economy and labour accepted a managerial 
post in National Lead Corporation belonging to the Rockefeller 
group. In addition. Minister of Etefence enjoyed a top manage-
ment post in the firm cristalerias Rigolleau and the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs turned into a manager of the Bromberg 
Corporation,^ The top government officials who became 
corporate officials with IXipont de Nemours, having considerable 
U.S. investments, and other foreign corporations could also 
be included in this list. These corporations siphoned off 
approximately 6, 000 million dollars upto military regime 
of ^anusse in 197 3 from Argentina by establishing and main-
7 
taining collaboration with Argentina's military regime. The 
outcome of this U.S. penetration was a rapid devaluation of 
the Argentine peso, which gifted these supranational corpora-
tions with huge amount of benefit so that they could buy 
stock of Argentine national companies for low prices. In 197 3, 
under the military rule led by Gen. Lamusse, Esso and Shell 
owned 48 percent of Argentina's refineries and oil business. 
A major share of this business was also controlled by Pan 
American Oil and Cities Service. 
In addition, more than half of Argentina's cement 
industry was controlled by the U.S. owned star cement Corporation, 
while 8 5 percent of the country's rubber industry were contro-
lled by Goodyear, Firestone and U.S. Rubber. 95 percent motor 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. 
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car industry were in the hands of General Motors^ Kaiser, 
Ford, Chrysler, and Fiat Concord. 7 0 percent of the cement 
industry were under the control of Aiperial, sulfacid, the 
Ebw Chemical Corporation, W m i a m s , Ferro Enamel and other 
foreign Companies, The Anguilar Company owned the mines in 
Jujuy province, while the Sominar Company was mining wolfram 
and bismuth in San Luis province. In addition, foreign 
corporations, dominated and influenced by the U. S, had 
acquired the control of 40 percent of Argentina's steel industry, 
two thirds of the production of rolled steel, 100 percent of 
the production of non-alcoholic beverages, 9 5 percent of the 
pharmaceutical industry, as well as major shares of the meat-
packing industry, the production of edible oil, rice, dairy 
goods, synthetic fibres, cotton, electrical appliances, the 
g building industry, commerce banking, and insurance companies , 
U.S. DOMINANCE AND PERON_LED NATIONALISTIC SENTIMENTS IN 
ARGENTINA : 
Thus they procured deep-rooted influence almost among 
every segment of Argentine economic structure. This mass 
penetration of the Argentine economy by the U. S. and other 
foreign monopolies was made possible because the military 
rulers, particularly. General Ongania and General ^anusse, 
remained loyal to Washington and wanted to suppress the 
1 4 . I b i d . , 
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nationalist movement of the Argentine people mainly guided 
by ^eron from exile, whose victory could have caused diffi-
culties for the United States. 
Daring 60s and 70s, or in other words, after Peron's 
removal from the office in 19 55 the Argentinians reacted to this 
gradual forcible seizure of power and organised themselves 
under right-wing and left-wing guerilla groups while on the 
other, the terrorist methods used to crush them were also 
further intensified. The guerilla tactics and terrorist 
tendencies made political environment of Argentina extremely 
violent. The prople's opposition to the U, S, dominance and 
their hatrald towards her penetration steadily increased and 
were responsible enough for the re-emergence of Peron rule 
in 197 3, Peron had acquired much affinity with common Argentine 
people due to his own specific personality cult and nationalistic 
tones. 
In spite of U, S, penetration into Argentine economy and 
internal violent political confrontations, there had been a 
significant acceleration in industrialisation in Argentina 
9 
during post second world war years, and Argentina was regarded 
one of the most industrialised of the "dependent" nations in 
9, See, Rock, Eavid, Argentina in the Twentieth Century, 
Pittsburgh, 197 5, 
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the western hemisphere. The dual nature of depenc3ence 
and industrialisation of Argentine economy turned it 
slightly different from the dependent and less industria-
lised nations like Chile, The industrial sector in 
Argentina served a higher proportion of the gross national 
product (GNP), and employed a higher proportion of the 
economically active population than chile. 
Foreign investor, in fact, began to be attracted 
immediately after the second world war, comparatively more 
during 6 0s, toward the large and lucrative Buenes Aires 
consumer market. Foreign investors including Americans, 
initially concentrated on the manufacturing sectors except 
oil exploration field, especially on the production of 
durable consumer goods either by buying into existing 
enterprises, or creating new firms. Thus, within the 
manufacturing sector side by side and in many cases in 
"joint ventures, " there had emerged a strong class of elites 
or executives, in addition to military officials, who 
were equally soft to U.S. investments, 
ATTITUDES O F ARGENTINE INEUSTRIALISTS A N D E a E C U T I V E S 
T O W A R D S u . S. INVESTMENTS : 
The Argentine industrial magnets also remained 
responsive to foreign and U.S. capital infiltration into 
Argentine economy. This attitude had far reaching implica-
tions for the society because the position taken by them 
237 
on any issue such as foreign involvement in Argentine develop-
ment often reflected in national policical policies. 
A sizeable majorxty of the Argentine industrial sector 
always favoured foreign participation including the U.S., 
in Argentine progress. They were also inclined to sucn parti-
cipation in the banKing and the development of technology. 
Significantly, upto tne 60s almost all Argentina owned indus-
trial enterprises were linked to foreign firms through their 
technological dependence. Notably, the U.S. investment and 
participation was heavily dominating among the foreign invest-
ment in Argentina.Argentine executives also supported U.S. 
ownership in economy. They were, therefore, hardly militant 
nationalists and happily tended to favour U.S. involvement 
in Argentine development.They believed, in tact, that 
U.S. capital and technological investment would play a supportive 
role in the development of the Argentine economy.They, therefore, 
also demanded state guarantee to foreign investments. However, 
the Argentine executives were dxvided over the terms of 
dependency one section ot them advocated a ' laissez faire' 
policy that would open the country to unrestrained U.S. 
10. James Petras made a study, on interview basis in 1970, 
of Argentian industrial executives and their attitudes 
towards foreign economic involvement in Argentine economy 
and U.S. policy toward global and regional issues.See, 
James Petras (ed.),' Latin America; From Depedence 
To Revolution, New YorK, i973,p.143. 
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capital influx, and the other sought tolimit and control 
foreign investment competition with national industries and to 
direct U.S. investment toward national development goals. 
Significantly, unity between Argentine industrialists and 
U.S. and international capital did riot mean identity of 
interests, Tnere were, factually, often clashes and irrita-
tion between them. The source of these cynflicts, nowever, 
was not the desire of the industrialists to abolish U.S. and 
foreign control over the Argentine economy, but their desire 
and determination to raise custom barriers against U.S. and 
foreign competition. Their struggle could not go beyond this. 
Tnese industrialists were nourished and felt more happy during 
Campora and Peron regime. 
Thus, the division among the execucives on the role 
and excent of the U.S. and foreign investment reflects the 
two types of dependent outlooks, (1) a section of executives 
vas totally identified with the foreign investor community, 
and (2) otner wisned to regulate the behaviour of U.5. and 
foreign investment in order to integrate it with national 
development. But, signiricancly* both commonly accepted U.S. 
and foreign participation and Argentine dependence on their 
investments. As a result, as /already mentioned, the U.S. 
gradually went far ahead in capital investment in Argentina 
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and acquired a considerable command over Argentina economic 
infras tructure. 
Factually tne most striking change in the field of 
Argentine foreign trade, after 1945, vras the replacement 
of Great Britain by the United States as Argentina's best 
customer. This primacy of the U.S. over Britain very soon 
became permanent.^^ The U.S. also replaced Britain as the 
largest foreign investor in Argentina till 60s, and had 
shown its capicity to absort a large volume of Argentina's 
basic production for export. 
POLITICAL AM) ECONOMIC MAKE-UP : 
In spite of dependency on U.S. investments and internal 
military uprisings, Argentine economy made tremendous 
progress as already described. The country increc^sed her trade 
besides the U.S. with other Latin American countries, parti-
cularly her neighbours in Soutn America including chile. 
Argentina proceeded more rapidly, during 60s, with the formation 
of domestic capital than any other Latin American country. 
Argentina even granted loans and credits to neignbouring 
countries in Latin America. The country produced more petroleum, 
more iron during 6us and in petroleum, she attained self 
surficiency and even managed exports. But during the first 
11. see, Reger Morris, Uncertain Greatiiiess; Henry tCjssinger 
and American Foreign fblicy, London, 1977. 
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half of 70s Argentine economy received severe blows due 
to great political instability^ extremely violent clashes 
between the terrorists of the Rignt and the Loft wings 
and continuance of confrontation among military rulers and 
their rivals. Buenos Aires, therefore, experienced frequent 
cnanges of government during tnis period, 
MILITARY THECAL POWER IN ARGENTINA : 
Factually, Argentine military had been traditionally 
closely affiliated with the politics, therefore, military 
rulers wasted a great deal of their energy on neutralising 
those who attempted to overthrow them or tried to put 
pressure on tnem or to herass and constrain tnera. 
Argentine coups, significantly, had two common stra-
tegies, first was intended to overtnrow the constitutional 
order and the Key element of the second was to pressurise 
the government to prevent the functioning of its administra-
tion. The country's instability slowed down the pace of 
industrialisation on the one hand, and on the other shaped 
the Argentine political atmosphere with violent colours. 
The terrorist organisations of tne Right and the left both 
remained very active during the first six years in 70s, 
particularly between 1972 and 1973 when Peron re-emerged 
in Argentine politics. In addition, tne Argentine military 
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coup makers believed civilian rulers as absurd, and incapable 
12 
to direct che complicated national atf^irs. The military, 
thus, remained the real power in Argentina, The coups, tnere_ 
fore were very familiar phenomena in the Argentine politics. 
During 197U-76, five Presidents ruled the country. The U.S., 
Argentine relations in this period should be studied according 
to tnese frequent changes in tne presidency and due to internal 
political confrontations with their implications on the U.S. 
Argentine relations. The first jerX in Argentine politics 
came wnen tne government of Ongania was overtnrown in 1970. 
OVERTHROW OF ONGANIA'S MILITARY REGIME : 
In June 1970, the government of Juan Carlos Ongania 
was thrown out of office by a military junta. President Ongania, 
a military General, himself captured presidency through a 
bloody coup in 1966. General Alejandro Lanusse, the stolid 
commander and military junta acquired the power after tnis 
coup. Argentine politics had closely acquainted with frequent 
coups-de~tats, tnerefore, ongania's fall was also hardly 
astonishing tor the Americans. Even tnen, the U.S. administra-
tion did feel some irritation, tor, ongania had provided 
fruitful economic collaborations to tne U.S. as already 
dxscussed and remained very loyal to (/Washington tnroughout 
his years in office since 1966. 
12. NewsweeX. janaury 5, 1970. 
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ONGAlvIIA'5 PEKFORiXiANGfi : 
Ongaiiia's downfall had been in tne works for quite 
some time, i^hile ue had made some impressive economic 
strides during his four years in office, such as slowing 
inflation rate from 30 percent to 7.6 percent a year and 
13 
building up Argentina's foreign exchange reserves. But, 
ongania had driven his country into political bankruptcy. 
Ignoring his own pledge to restore democratic institutions, 
Ongania outlawed political parties, dissolved congress and 
suppressed the country s trade unions, for wnich particularly 
the. U.S. was happy with him. Workers, frustrated by low 
wages, and students, suffocating under the government's hdm^ 
landed repression, exploded in violence in 196y, plunging 
the industrial cities of Cordoba and Rosario into cnaos. 
Demonstrations, bombings and bloodshed became indespread. 
Thus, political terror gripped Argentina. Having been 
forced underground, political parties on bOth tne Left and 
the Right turned to guerilla activities to raise tfieir voice. 
In May ly7U, members of a Peronist terror group kidnapped 
Pedre Aramburu, a former Presiaent of Argentina and a former 
coupraaKer was executed by nis captors, Aramburu affair 
surrounded by violence served to undermire ongania's regime 
14 further, 
13. See, Newsweek, June 22, 1970, p. 17. 
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U.S. REACTION : 
In Washington^ the coup was greated with indifference. 
Factually, the question ot denying diplomatic recognition 
to the new regime in Argentina was never seriously debated 
within the U.S. administration, due to constant coups. 
Noting that Argentina had abolished its constitution in the 
coup in 1966 and that the U.S. had recognised the Ongania 
regime then one official observed in response to nis removal, 
that It was just one unconstitutional government replacing 
another, so why the hell not recognise it 
It was considered in Argentine tnat Lanusse regime 
will restrict U.S. influence in country's economy but U.S. 
penitration remained unrestricted even during nis regime. 
But to ais credit, he brought bacK Argentina to a democratic 
cxvilian rule. 
IMILITARY KFLGIME OP LANUSSE : 
iVhen the military strongmcin Alejandro Agustin 
Lanusse was proclaimed by military Generals as new president, 
the . Argentine economy and internal law and order situation 
were a desperate stage. Lanusse, therefore, had a difficult 
tasK anead. Intlatxon in Argentina was a staggerij^g bO percent 
15. Ibid, p.18. 
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in 1912, third highest in the world atter chile and 
1. fe Uruguay. 
A N N O U N C E M E N T OF ELECTIONS BY LANUSSE R E G I M E AND U.S. RESPONSE : 
unexpected by Americans, Lanusse surprisingly decided 
to restore civilian rule in Argentine. He announced in 
1971 the General Elections in Argentina that would be held 
17 
in March 1973, the first in ten years. Wasnington, however, 
welcomed tue decision. In the initial months, tne U.S. 
corporations and the U.S. government' however, were suspicious 
to Lanusse regime to be regarded as an outcome of Ongania's 
regime which provided pleasant facilities to them. Their 
tensions began to increase when thiSy^  sensed the coming 
re-emergence of Peron's leadersnip with more pace after 
tue declaration of the elections. Juan Domingo Peron was 
living in exile. He fled the country in 1955 after being 
ousted from presidency by a military coup. 
aCONOMIC COMPULSIONS BEHlflD TnE ELcJCTIuN DECLARATION AND 
PERON REEMERGENCE : 
In tact, Argentina's economic morass and the 
increasing national disencnentment witn the military junta 
that hdd ruled Argentina since 1966, alongwith the over-
whelming persistance of tne peron mystique forced Lanusse 
16. 3ee,Time, June 4, 1973. 
17. See, Time, April 24, 1972. 
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to declare elections in Argentina. Besides, Lanusse seemed 
willing in himself to return Argentina to constitutional 
government. For tnis ^^urpose, he allowed Peron to come out 
of exile. He did feel, in fact, that without the co-operation 
of the exiled leader's still potent followers tnere was 
no possibility of Argentina's return to constitutional 
18 
government. Again, nearly two decades of weak presidents 
and heavy handed military governments, nine since 1946, 
have ruined the Argentine economy. Argentina h-id then 
chaotic economy saddled with inflation. Inflation for 
the first ten months of 19/1 was staggering 67.3 percent. 
Foreign investors including U.S. multinational corporations 
had pulled about ^ 1 billion in capital out of the country 
19 till 1971. Notably, foreign reserves dropped from S 739 
20 million at the end of 197U to zero . However, the exports 
? 1 
of goods in 1973 were 57 percent higher than that of 1972.-
Gross domestic investment fell by 2.4 percent during his 
regime. Lonj-term indebtedness was $ 635 million in 1973, 
while the rate of unemployment was 6.1 percent in April 
1973 during his last days in office. The deficit of the 
national treasury was 19,100 million pesos in 197i four 22 times the figure of 4,700 million recorded in 1972. 
Id. See Time, November 27, 1972. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Economic Survey of Latin Anerica. 1975,U.N. Publications, 
New YorK, 1976. 
22. All data are available in Ibid. 
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Sesides/ cuaotic economic climate, Lanusse's clearance 
accelerated the clasnes between the supporters of Peron and 
the government. In fact, Peron's return created a new zeal 
among his supporters. The year of 1972 witnessed the scene 
of numerous bombings and fightings between Peron's supporters 
and government troops. Peron declared in Rome, in response 
to trie declaration of the presidential elections in 1973, 
that he would favour a democratic state in Argentina. He 
vowed Civil liberties and assured to allow a plurality 
of political parties. "I am not a dictator, I am a slave of 
2 ? the people," he said in the way of coming home. 
As a matter of fact, the March elections were the 
first tndt the Peronists were ever allowed toE contest since 
tne exit of peron. On three earlier occasions, they had 
been debarred to. set up any candidate and in protest the 
"discamisados" polled bianK: votes. 
Washington was watching with utmost care, the events 
leading to the Peron's re-emergence in Argentine politics. 
Peron, due to. nis socialistic and nationalistic ideals 
was not considered as a ' favourable' ruler, in Washington. 
2 3. Time, November 27, 1972. 
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MARCH 1973 ELECTIONS AND CAMPORA VJC'IORy : 
In an anotner surprising move, Lanusse regime did not 
allow Peron to contest elections. Peron, tnerefore, gave the 
cnarge of ieadersnip of nis Justicialist Liberation Front 
to his very confident supporter and an ex-dentist Dr. Hector 
24 Campora. 
Peroriists fought tne elections in collaboration with 
all and sundry parties representing tne right and tne left 
and the moderate elements. Tne election was contested mainly 
between Hector Campora and the leader of tne Radical Party 
Ricardo Balbin. campora swept the elections with 49 percent 
of the vote. Ricardo Balbin finisned a distant second witn 
21.2 percent. However, Campora failed to get absolute majority 
but tne majority was so impressive that tne Military junta 
waived a run off poll to confirm Dr. campora's victory 
because tne first vote was two percent less than tne majority 
25 
needed for an outsignt win. Therefore, Lanusse pronounced 
him victorious. 
CAMPORA IN GOVERNMENT-PERuN IN PO/vER : 
The vote in 1973 presidential elections was regarded 
as rejection of seven years of inept military rule, Peron's 
24. See, Time. Marcn 26, 1976. 
2 5. 5ee, LinK, June 10, 1973. 
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justicialist Liberation Front or Frejuil as it was popularly-
known, promised a prognamme of land retorrn and declared tnat 
it will nationalise all bank deposits and taxe over all 
foreign trade, Tnere was above fi 4 billion amount of 
bank deposits in Argentina. The new regime usnered in 
signiticant cnanges in tne economic policy particularly 
in the external sector. Above all, the programme of Campora 
government designed to strengthen Stdte participation in 
tne planning and implementation of international trade and 
finance was very dynamic. Tne State was given wider powers 
to intervene in foreign trade under tne new policy. In order 
to enable it to control exports, laws were passed on tne 
trade of meat and grain, which accounted for a substantial 
part of external sales. 
TRADE WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES BY CAMjhOKA RBGljyifi : 
In addition, Campora regime attempted to widen tne 
range of foreign trade, especially tnrough bilateral agree-
ments. Such agreements were signed with socialist countries and 
a trade agreement was concluded witn Libya in 1973.The most 
important was tne agreement reacned with cuba, which involved 
exports to the value of ^ l,2uO million over six-years, 
y5 percent of wnich would consist of motor vehicles and 
railway equipment. The agreement reacned with Libya covered 
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the purcnase of 3 million tons of petroleum from that country, 
while Argentine firms were to negotiate the construction of 
2 6 
factories in I»ibya, In respect of foreign investment, the 
Campora governtnent laid down regulations on tne terras of 
entry of capital, its repatriation, tne transfer of profits, 
reinvestment, and other types of activity. According to the 
new rules, all foreign investors would have to seeK state 
authorisation! The new acts prohibited tne investment of 
foreign capital in activities relating to national security 
and defence, public services, insurance, commercial banks, 
mass communication media, agriculture, stock-raising and 
forestry enterprises - unless tney introduced new technology 
offering special advantages ~ and fisheries, unless this 
provided access to international marKetg tnat were closed 
then. Besides, foreign investors were permicted to remit 
tneir profits abroad in amounts not exceeding an annual rate 
of 12.5 percent, or four points hxgher than the interest paid 
in first line banks for the currency in whicn the repatriable 
capital was registered on fixed-term deposit for a minimum 
27 o± loO days. 
Besides new economic measures, Campora took two 
other radical measures which further antagonised the white 
House, (1) he announced full-scale amnesty to all political 
1 4 . I b i d . , 
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prisoners and guerillas on the very day he took office, and 
C2) removed the banK on the Communxst Party. It added 
strength to the Peronist coalition besides inducting a new 
element of pressure to keep the Peronists to the left. 
Notably, the communist Party, played an important role in 
forcing campora's Peronist Party to adopt a socialist 
programme in line with that of neighbouring Chile. 
In response to the declarations of nationalisation 
of banks and foreign trade by the Campora regime,Washington 
began to consider the regime as hostile to the U.S. interests. 
It became more evident when the regime decided to establish 
28 
relations with Cuba, North Vietnam and North iCorea. Notably, 
several Communist heads of State and their representatives, 
were present at Campora's inaugural, Cuban President was 
one of them. In fact, Peron through Campora regime was 
ambitious to restore Argentina to leadership of Spanish 
speaking Latin America thereby countering the influence 
of both Portuguese speaking Brazil, its traditional rival, 
and the United States. While, to recall, during 60s, the 
U.S. was making consistent efforts to build Brazil as 
a strong base in Latin America to expand and to maintain 
U.S. hegemony in the region. 
2 8. see. Link, June 10, 1973. 
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Thus, Campora made all efforts to establish a 
Peronist social system in his country. But Campora's 
leftist ideals and socialist steps turned Argentine relations 
with the U.S. in opposite direction. Campora, however, was 
just an instrument for converting Peron's ambitious into 
words to be heard at the White House, 
tc^ards 
REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY^ARGENTINA : 
It was at this time that the White House began to 
review its traditional policy towards Argentina. With 
Campora in power, the U.S. could count one more Latin 
American country around to erase the the U.S. colonial 
29 
influence in the region, besides Chile and Cuba. The new 
government* s declaration to open diplomatic missions in 
the socialist countries was a straw in the wind. Pledges to 
nationalise banks, foreign trade and strategic monopoly 
industry were obviously not calculated to win p friends in 
Washington. 
But on the other hand, Campora regime was suffocating 
under desperate economy and deteriorating law and order 
situation in the country. It could not reverse the political 
clxmate of confrontation. Terrorism and guerilla activities 
29. Ibid. 
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increased.Peronist guerillas had developed a high 
morale in his regime, and they chose their targets in 
foreign nationals, diplomats and the businessmen, parti-
cularly belonging to the U.S. /Jhile the right wing terrorist 
groups who however supported Campora in return to power 
were not so hostile to foreign nationals and wanted more 
snare in governmental powers. They also desired to contain 
the regimes shift towards leftism. Peron, of course, once 
had successfully acquired the support of both the diverse 
factions of the terrorist gjC5)ups but their traditional 
rivalry and opposit line of thinking proved be disastrous 
to campora regime and later also to Peron himself, Campora 
regime could not patch up the differences between the 
terrorist groups. 
Ihe Americans too were soon convinced that the govern-
ment was unable or unwilling to control the guerillas. Dozens 
of foreign executives, who had been the favourite targets 
of leftist terrorists, had begun fleeing the country. An 
American businessman remarK^d in June 1973, "We have been 
getting threatening calls for months, now we are listening 
to them."^^ 
30. See, Time, April 9, 1973; April 2 3, 1973; June 4, 
1973. 
31. Time. June 11, 1973. 
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First few months of Campora regime proved that the 
regime could not successfully bring about improvements 
in the internal political situation and economic developments 
of Argentina. The regime's failure left Peron as the 
only alternate hope in Argentina, It was considered in 
political circles that Peron alone could bring back unity 
in the country and discipline among Peronists as well. Peron 
himself intelligently judged the mood of the people and 
considered the time best for substitution in the leadership.^^ 
PERON ASSUMED THE PRESIDENCY : 
Campora remained unable to control Argentina's 
spiraling urban violence which deeply antagonised the U.S. 
government. During 1913, alone there were at least 100 
political assasinations, It became necessary, therefore, 
to transfer the power to Peron, one of history's imponde-
33 rabies. Juan Peron, subsequently, assumed the Presidency 
34 
in July 1973, after staying 18 years in exile. Isabel 
Peron, Peron's third wife, became theVice-Presidend. Thus, 
history in troubled Argentina completed a full circle. 
The situation on Peron's arrival was also so violent 
that just below the dias at Buenos Aires airport where 
32. see. Time, November 20, 1972. 
33. see. International Journal,Vol.XXXI. No.4/Autumn, 
1976; also see. International Journal. Vol.XXIX, 
NQ. 3/Summer, 1974. 
34. See, Time, July 2 3, 1973. 
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Peron was scheduled to speaK, the fighting between the 
Right-wing union leaders and young Leftists scarted,^^ 
just after Peron's arrival in Argentina, a U.5. businessman 
John Thomson was kidnapped and was released later only 
after receiving the record ransom money of 3,000, 000 
^ in 36 dollars. 
PERON ADVOCACY OF INDEPENDENT ARGENTINA AND U.S. RESPONSE : 
Despite widespread ugly violence in Argentina, Peron 
appeared to oe at a peak of political power. He declared 
that the economic policies of the carnpora regime will 
continue. However, he emphasized the need for approachment 
with Latin America and Europe and a cooling off of relations 
with the U.S., which he considered the real danger to the 
continent and the cause of Argentina's economic backward-
37 
ness. Peron moved, on the other hand, against unpopular 
foreign business interests by having the state buy the 
ITT-owned telegraph system in Argentina. Significantly, in 
foreign atfiars, Peron was the lirst post-war advocate 
in Argentina, of non-alignment, urging a "tbird position" 
as an alternative to join the bloc led eitner by the U.S. 
or the soviet Union, He conducted vociferous anti-U.S. 
Campaign, alleging that there was "glgematic North American 
plot" to seize Cuban sugar, Bolivian tea, Chilean copper 
35. See, Time, July 2, 1973. 
36. Time, July 16, 1973. 
37. Link, September 1973,p.27. 
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and central American bananas. Peron, an 88 year old 
general, attempted to democratise Argentina's foreign 
policy, defended his country s national independence, 
and pursued an opendoor policy with respect to the 
socialist countries. After the military putsch in Chile, 
he accepted 70,000 Chilean refugees and thus helped them 
39 
escape from Pinochet's torturers. In March 1974, he 
granted Cuba a loan of 1,2 00 million dollars. Under the 
loan agreement, Cuba was to buy 42,000 passenger cars and 40 
lorries from Argentina. However, the U.S. government 
reacted to this deal by reminding Argentina that the blockade 
of Cuba was still in etfect and that United States firms 
Operating abroad had been porohibited to ^ sell their products 
to Cuba. The Eeron government tersely responded that 
American companies which had their investment in Argentina 
had to respect Argentine laws. Since then, relations bet-
ween the United states and Argentina started deteriorating. 
In fact, Peron was South Americas most famous 
concemporary figure. He held out the perennial promise that 
the feuding priviledged and underprivileged of Argentina 
Would one day coalesce and turn their richly endowed country 
38. See 'rime, July 15, 1974. 
39. see, Angelo Colleoni, op. cit.,p.lS5 
4 2 . I b i d . 
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41 into the leading nation of South America. He ro&e to 
power in Argentina with these ideas, as a champion of 
the exploited urbdn workers, the "shirtless ones" as 
he atfectionately called them. But, Peron actually had 
always been an apostle of more of a personality cult 
them a cohesive political ideology, Peron believed in 
political opportunism, not in the maKing of a new social 
order. But he created an ideological facade that promised 
the people social change, social justice and economic 
independence from foreign powers especially the United 
States. 
Fortunately to the United states, Peron could'nt 
continue much due to his ill-health. He expired on July 1, 
1974 after about one year of presidency. Peron era, once 
the strongest in Argentina, abruptly came to an end. He 
was succeeded in office by his wife Isabel. 
WEA^C ISABEL GOVERNMENT : 
Peron's successor Maria Estela Martinez de Peron 
or Isabel became the first woman cnicf of state in the 
42 
history of Argentina and the Americas. Her ability to 
stand up to the bewildering array of problems facing 
41. See, Time, July 15, 1974. 
4 2 . I b i d . 
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44 
Argentina was widely questioned, she also felt great 
dirficulty in enforcing peace and unity among Peron's 
desperate followers. The first year ot her rule revealed 
that she could not be astute enough to withstand the 
43 divisive forces of Peronism. 
Isabel opened her cerm saying ^what was good 
for General Peron will be good for me. Niether at home 
nor abroad will the national line vary so much as a wnit," 
Isabel, factually, rose on the horizon of Argentine poli-
tics only due to Peron, Eut, Argentine's political turmoil 
continued even after Isabel's succession, and she could'nt 
45 maintain the support of Penonists. The magic of Peron 
was gradually diminishing. The Montoneros, a leftist 
guerilla organisation that helped return of Peron to power 
accused in 1975. Isabel of "harbouring imperialists and 
46 
oligarcns" and declared war on her government. Her weak 
command over Argentine political affairs gradually increased 
interference of the army in civil administration, v/hich 
revealed its disastrous outcome when Isabel government was 
overthrown by a military coup in March 1976, 
4 3 . SQo, L^nk, August 24, 1975, p.24. 
44, Time, July 22, 1974, 
45, See Time, September 30, 1974, Link, October 5, 
. 1975; Link, October 19, 1975. 
46. Ibid, 
258 
SERIES OF NATloiMALIsATIONS BY ISABEL GOVERNMENT AND 
T H E U.S. H O S T I L I T Y : 
The U.S. administration was hostile to the Isabel 
government as it was to Peron. The United States was much 
more annoyed when Isabel government nationalised all 
enterprises engaged in commerce with liquid fuels, which 
47 
dealt a heavy blow to U.S. and foreign corporations. 
In response, the European Economic community, influenced 
by the U.S.,banned all meat imports in September 1974 to 
Argentina. Meat imports constituted one third of total 
Argentine imports. Argentina experienced a sharp drop 
from nearly S 4,000 million in 1974 to 3,000 million 48 
dollars in 1975 in export of goods. This was partly due 
to the above drastic restrictions by the EEc.The value of 
Petroleum imports which had trippled in 1974, fell by 
12 percent in 1975. Thus, Argentina during Isabel rule was 
suffering serious economic setbacics. Inflation reached 49 
in 1975 to an vinprecedented level approximately 40 percent. 
Finally the government could not exist more and was over-
thrown by military up, coup in 1976, 
To sum, the United states gradually penetrated its 
capital and subsequent influence into the Argentine 
47. See, Angelo Golleoni, op. cit., p. 186, 
48. Economic Survey of Latin America 1975, U.N. P,,blications, 
New YorK, 1976. 
49. see. Time, September 30, 1974. 
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economic structure tnrough client military regimes in 
Buenos Aires. Due to her coups Argentina was regarded as 
a land of revolutions. As a consequence of these frequent 
coups, as stable on the one hand, constitutional order in 
Argentina could not emerge and on the other di^Qiider and 
violence seemed to pervade almost all levels of Argentine 
society. In addition, the U.S. policy towards Argentina 
had the objective to seize Argentina's natural wealth. 
American Corporations had invested huge capital in Argentina 
to tap and export raw materials essential for their own 
industry and thereby to conserve their own natural resources. 
While the military regimes of Argentina served U.S. capi-
talists interests, They also remained closely tied with 
U.S. hegemony and her economic imperialism. U.S. penetration 
only suffered some set bacK during the Campora and peron 
regimes and to some slight degree under Isabel's rule. But 
internal political dissensions and early fall of Campora 
and peron regimes vanished nationalistic tnreats to the U.S. 
interests in Argentina. The last days of 1975 signaled that 
U.S. Argentina relations would return to old tracKS once 
again in very near future. In March, 1976 Isabel government 
was overthrown again by a Military coup and the Argentine 
history repeated itself in its "good" old pattern more 
suitable to trje U.S. interests in Latin America. 
5u. See, «<ahl, Joseph A., 'jtodernisation. Exploitation 
and Dependency in Latin America," New jersy, 1976. 
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CHAPTER - VI 
THE CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN - AN "AIRCRAFT-CARRIER" 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
The Central American and the Caribbean has been 
traditionally a region of inter-imperialist rivalry. The 
term 'Central America and the Caribbean', which is a sub-
region of Latin America, is commonly applied to the group of 
nations of Western Hemisphere immediately south of the 
United States. Specifically, the term 'Central America' 
refers to Mexico and the Central American isthmus, i.e. 
Guatemala, El Salvador Belize,^ Honduras, Nicaragua, Casta 
Rica, and Panama, often referred to as the Banana Republics. 
The Caribbean includes the islands in the Caribbean Sea. 
The greatest length of Central America is 1,300 miles. 
Central America is one of the narrowest crossways between 
east and west like the Suez Canal and the Bosporus and 
Dardallas. 
1. After nearly 120 years as a British colony, the little 
Central American State of Belize, a nation of 150,000 
people. Became independent on September, 21, 1981. 
However, Guatemala which has a long-standing territorial 
dispute with the former colony, has refused to accept 
Belize's independence. Belize is the second smallest 
country after El Salvador, on the American continent. 
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The United States always felt invincible necessity that 
it was her 'manifest destiny.' to occupy commanding position 
over the region, and to exercise restraint or direction, 
over the destinies of the Central American States. From the 
very beginning of the century, the stability and security of the 
Central America and the Caribbean for the U.S. was to be 
seen as a condition of U.S. global capabilities. The United 
2 
States, with the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corallary, 
has long heeded it as its natural and legitimate 'sphere of 
influence* referring to it as 'our lake', "our backyard", and 
"third border". This ambitious attitude of the United States 
towards Latin America as a whole led to interventions and 
invasions on several occasions and thus, created distrust 
toward the "Colossus of the North" in Latin America. 
The countries of central America and the Caribbean 
region, despite their heterogeneity, share certain basic 
pecularities^ Most of them belong to the Western Hemisphere 
alliance system, which also includes the United States. Their 
2. Since the declaration of Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the 
United States has conducted more than 70 military operations 
in Central America and the Caribbean without a declaration 
of war. See, War Powers Legislation, 1973. Hearings before 
the committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
Ninety Third Congress, First Session, April 11 and 12, 1973, 
(U.S. Government Printing office, Washington, d . c . 1 9 7 3 ) , 
pp. 126 - 156. 
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geographical position is far from the main theatres of military 
conflicts in the world. This, together with the predominance 
of a common Iberian ancestry, especially on the Central American 
isthmus/ has contributed to a strong regional consciousness. 
However, the presence of the United States in the area creates 
a situation in which a group of week States is associated in an 
alliance system with a major power that is viewed by its 
3 weaker allies as both a protector and a threat. 
U.S. ROU' GH BREATHING ON CENTRAL AMERICA : 
The first alienation with the pattern- of pro-US rule 
in the region was the Cuban revolution in 1959. However, the 
United States successfully contained this challenge. For 
instance, left wing's increasing popularity in the Dominican 
Republic was crushed by U.S. marines in 1965. Besides, left 
wing forces in Dominican Republic which seemed able to win or 
retain power through the ballot box, as in Guatemala in 1954, 
were also thwarted. CIA provided large funds to the opposition 
in Guyana in ; 1964, encouraged a military coup in Chile in 
1973, supported the right wing opposition in Jamaica and El 
Salvador, and began manoeuvring against Marxist-oriented 
Nicaraguan regime in 19 79. 
3. Victor Millan,"Controlling Conflict in the Caribbean 
Basin : National Approaches,' in Michael A Morris and 
Victor Millan (eds.). Controlling Latin American conflicts, 
Westview Press, Colorado 1983, p. 41. 
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Thus the Central American State have long experience 
of U.S. involvement in their internal affairs. The U.S. 
marines, for instance, had occupied i.'IicaragUa on two occasions 
in this century. U.S. forces have been in Panama for nearl/ 
a century, until 1980, based largely in the former Panama 
Canal Zone which surrounded the Panama Canal. 
COLD WAR IMPACTS ON U.S. POLICY : 
In fact, since the onset of the first cold war and 
the policy of containment, U.S. policy makers have viewed 
the complex processes of post war decolonisation and develop-
ment through an anti-Soviet prism. Movements for reforms and 
wars of natioal liberation were not looked at with reference 
to their historical origins and legitimacy. By aligning 
themselves with right wing elements and authoritarian and 
repressive regimes, successive U.S. administrations have been 
providing opportunities to the Soviet Union to side with 
liberation struggles and popular movements. The U.S. adminis-
trations have been playing the role they have been assigned 
in the leftist perception. Thus, while a reject government in 
El Salvador is being propped up, a revolutionary government 
4 in Nicaragua is sought to be toppled. 
4. H.M.L.Beri, Central America, in K. Subrahmanyam(ed.) 
The Second Cold War, ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 
1983, p. 125. 
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Significantly, from President Theodore Roosevelt's 
second term to President, Ronald Reagan, the U.S. adminis-
trations have always tried to convince Central Americans that 
the United sates has not been slightly interested in any 
territorial expansion and wished the friendship of the other 
nation of this region. It has been continuously stated by 
Washington that their policy was to deal justly with them and 
to promote constitutional and democratic liberty in the region. 
CASTO'S CUBA - A THREAT : 
Nevertheless, the Americans believe that Governments in 
Central America with ideological and political loyalties to 
Cuba and the Soviet Union pose a direct challenge to which 
they must respond. The U.S., in fact, has hysterical conmilsions 
in deeming that there is a marginal diminution in American 
security created by the existence of hostile regime of Cuba, 
that may encourages sabotage and other anti-American activities 
elsewhere in Latin America. The U.S. policy makers have been 
obsersed with the fear that Cuba's style of revolution might 
spread. Obviously, any drift to the left was assumed an indica-
tion of the emergence of second Cuba, The major concern of the 
U.S., tlierefore, is to prevent Soviet Union and Cuba from 
gaining foothold in the Western Hemisphere. The history of the 
U.S. policy in Latin America shows that the U.S. can take any 
action to stem hostile influence which may, of course, involve 
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the greatest risks. The U.S., in respoBse, always sought 
pro-Washington governments in central America and the Caribbean, 
Obviously, for establishing such government she may behave 
in extravagant manner. In brief. United States regards Central 
America and the Caribbean as her 'aircraft-carrier'. 
STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE : 
Central America and the Caribbean is the region of vital 
concern to the United States. This is because of the fact of 
geographical proximity. Viewed in geographical terms. Central 
America today is"the soft underbelly " of the United States^. 
Strategic importance of t^e Caribbean and growing unrest in 
central America has placed the whole region in the forefront 
of political and strategic concerns of the United states. So 
much of the U.S. imported oil passes through the Caribbean. 
The region has large vol\ime of oil refined particularly in 
Trinidad, Puerto Rico and the Dutch colony of Curacao: In 
addition, the loss of US control over Panama Canal by the 
signing tteaty with Panama in August 10, 1977,^ which was 
5. This phrase, Churchill referred to Italy in Second World 
War as "the soft underbelly of the Axis. 
6. For study of conclusion and ratification of Panama canal 
treaty by Caster Administration see. International Journal, 
Canadian Institute of Inter-Latin American Affairs, 
Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, Winter 1981-82. 
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expected to provide for a gradual transfer of the Canal to 
7 
Panama by the end of the century, created alarm in Washington, 
just like the panic which was created in Britain and France o by the loss of the Suez canal in 1956. 
Thus, Central America has a widely recognised strategic 
significance, not only for the protection of US mainland, but 
also for the projection of U.S. power. The gradual consolidation 
7. The treaty, reached after 13 years of negotiations, will 
replace the one signed by the two countries in 1903 which 
provided the US control of the canal and the bordering zone 
forever. 
The canal's history is as old as Panama's nationhood. 
In a pre-C.I.A. operation. President Theodore Roosevelt 
despatched the U.S. marines, recognised what was then a 
minor northern province of Columbia as the new state of 
Panama, and proceeded to dig an enormous detch through the 
narrow neck of the centre of the Western Hemisphere which 
would connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and save 
an 8,000 mile, 30 day trip around the cape of Good Hope. 
It look 11 years from 1903 to 1914 to overcome malaria, 
yellow fever, jungles, swamps, and intervening mountains. 
The result was a 50.4 mile passage which includes six sets 
of 1000 foot locks to each ships through the 85 foot difference 
in level between the Atlantic and the Pacific, The engineering 
feat also includes a huge man-made lake and an eight mile 
channel. Transit time varies from 8 to 14 hours and an average 
of 32 ships pass through every day at an average toll of 
$ 7.175. 
Under the terms tentatively worked out the US gradually 
will yeild control of the canal and zone to Panama by 2000, 
but retain the right to defend the area indefinitely so as 
to make sure it remains an internatio al waterway which could 
not be closed by any potentially peevish Panamanian regime. 
8. Fred Holliday,"Cold War Hits The Caribbean," The Times of 
India, August 9, 1985. 
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of us dominance in the region through the decades of interven-
tion and dollar diplomacy had exposed three long standing policy-
thrusts^ of the United States in the region -
- the US would not like to allow any other global 
power to create a significant presence in the . region. 
- the US would like to have no local threat to the 
basis of US power projection, whether to shipping and naval 
power or to the inter-American system; and 
- the US would also be anxious to dilute local 
instabilities by even military means if necessary, which might 
attract other global powers. 
Central America, therefore, has achieved a highr 
priority in U.S. policy. The US hegemony in the region was 
presumed legitimate. That's why the region was considered a 
part of the US historical", even "natural" sphere of influence. 
9. For gradual evaluation of US policy toward central America, 
see: William M. Leogrande and Casla Anne Robbins, Oligarchs 
and officers: The Crisis in El Salvador, Foreign Affairs, 
summer 1980, pp. 1084-1103, Richard E. Feinberg, Central 
America: No easy Answer, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1981, vol.59 
No, 5, pp. 1121-1146; Paul E. Sigmund, 'Latin America: Change 
or Continuity', Foreign Affairs. America and the World 1981, 
Vol. 60, No3, pp. 629-657, Struggle in central America, 
Foreign Policy Svimmer 1981, No. 43, pp. 70-103, and William 
M. Leogrande, 'A splendid Little War", Drawing the Li«e in 
El Salvador,^ Internatio al Security, Summer 1981, pp. 27-52. 
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THE U.S.' OBJECTIVE INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA : 
The region's significance for US national interests 
derived almost exclusively from its relations to broader concerns. 
However the US has no strategic installation in the region but 
massive U.S. investment in Central America, an area bordering 
the Caribbean Sea, and inside the US sphere and inter-American 
system heightened U.S. policy concerns in the region. Moreover, 
the small and week nations of Central America are threatened 
by their own instability and, in fact, can not be themselves 
seriously threaten US national interests. The United States, 
however, tended to be given primarily in terms of possible 
threats to those broader concern, necessarily by unfriendly 
outside powers. International reliability, which included the 
capacity to maintain internal stability, tended to be the ultimate 
criterion in perceptions of local actors. The Cold War and the 
Cuban Revolution only strengthened this tendency to react to 
internal threats to stability in terms of external threats to 
security.^^ 
In addition, central America has a special importance, 
since it dominates the land, sea and aerial electronic lines of 
communication between North and South America, and permits 
access by relatively much secured routes to the raw materials 
10. Edward Best, US Policy and Regional Security in Central 
America, llSS, Gower Publishing Company Ltd., England, 
1987, p.6. 
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of South America.^^ The adninistrations believe that a communist/ 
Marxist - dominated regime in Central America would threaten 
not only these communication links but would encourage its 
ideology in the region with obvious threats to the Panama Canal 
12 and its operations. 
THE PANAMA CANAL : 
The Panama Canal was still important, but rather less 
so both economically and strategically. It retained considerable 
logistic importance for most conventional war contingencies, as 
illustrated by the quadrupling of transmit by US public ve6$els 
during the Vietnam war, but it could'nt handle aircraft carriers 
and thus, would be of reduced significance in the case of global 
nuclear war. It's direct economic importance to the US had been 
falling since at least the 1940s and it could'nt handle the 
supertankers which were beginning to carry much of the worlds's 
oil, whereas the security. Of other trade routes and sea lines 
of communication had the same or increased importance as before. 
11. A substantial portion of world see borne commerce passes 
through the Caribbean, some of it through the Panama Canal. 
Almost 40 percent of the total amount of petroleum imported 
by the U.S. Comes from that region (from Venezuela, Mexico, 
the Bahamas, which is a petroleum Netherlands Antilles, and 
Trinidad and Tobago). Half of the US import of bauxite 
and aliiminium comes from the Caribbean, especially from 
Jamaica and Surinam. Significantly the US imp>^rts about 
90 percent of its industrial requirements of these materials. 
12. See, Don L. Etchison, The United States and Militarism 
in Central America, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975, p.103 
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Access to most of the various strategic minerals imported from 
Caribbean countries, although still not critical except in the 
event of major global conflict, continued to offer 'the cumulative 
"Conveniences" of ready availability and long-standing commercial 
relations.'^^ 
OIL : 
However, in the case of oil, the region's significance 
was increasing. The Basin has become a major refining centre 
in the 1950s. By the end of the 1970s, refiniries located in 
the Caribbean were supplying 50 percent of US petroleum products 
derived from Middle Eastern and African crude. The region's 
own " known oil resources were dramatically increased by the 
discovery of massive, new fields in Mexico and their potential 
importance to the US was to rise with new concern about the 
security of supply from the Middle East. 
In addition to above US strategic considerations, the 
present situation in Central America is much the result of the 
slow disintegration of outdated social and political systems. 
Almost all internal conflicts are between groups seeking to 
change the status-quo while the other groups, fighting to keep 
13. Margaret Daly Hayes, "United States security Interests 
in Central America in Global Perspective" in Richard E. 
Feinberg (Ed.), Central America; International Dimensions 
of the crisis, Holmas and Keier, New York, 1982, p, 91. 
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their position of affairs in these banana republics. 
The emphasis on international reliability, and the 
practical tendency for maintenance of stability to imply 
defence of a status-que, led the US visibly to approve 
or support the continuation of dictatorial and repressive 
14 
regimes , and outmoded and inequitable socio-economic 
structures. 
The origins of the present crisis in Central America, 
therefore, should also be found in the social and economic 
condition in the region. The study of the internal dimensions 
of the crisis in genral, and social and economic condition in 
particular can lead to a better understanding of prevailing 
Central American turmoil. 
THE CRISIS IN CENTRAL AMERICA : ECONOMIC ROOTS AND HISTORICAL 
DIMENSIONS 
The cause of the crisis that are boiling over in much 
of Central America can be traced as far back as the arrival 
of the Spanish conquistadors in the 16th century. One of Hernan 
Cortes commanders from Guatemala in 1524 wrote,"We are in the 
14. See, Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Arnson, "Exporting 
Repression: US Support for Authoritariansm in Latin 
America," in Richard R. Fagen(ed.), Capitalism and the 
State in US-Latin American Relations, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, California, 1979, p. 138. 
15. The main source of this particular discussion is V. Bulmer-
Thomas, The Crisis in Central America: Economic Roots and 
Historical Dimensions,"The World Today, September 1983, 
pp. 328-335. 
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widjifest country and among the wildest people we have ever 
seen." The conquistador subdued the people and established a 
feudal social order, in which native Indians and mixed-blood 
poems were no more than chattel of the colonial Laciendas. 
Aftei the Central American republics gained independence from 
Spain in 1921, the pace of exploitation of the peasantry 
accelerated. By the late 19th century, the demand for export 
crops like coffee and, later, cotton and bananas expanded the 
size of farms, increasing the division between rich and poor. 
Since 1945, the Central American exports have increased 
very rapidly. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in spite of 
the highest population growth, has significantly risen. GDP per 
head from the early 1940s to its peak in the 19 77 to 1980 
period more than doubled in all central American countries except 
Honduras, where the increase was . . 40 percent and trebled in 
the case of Nicaragua.^^ 
The Central Americans, in addition have introduced new 
export crops, i.e. cotton, sugar, beef, together with inten-
sification of traditional production of coffee and banana, since 
the second cold war. This export specialisation and diversification 
have been so successful that export agriculture has steadily 
increased its share of total agricultural output at the expense 
16. See, V. Bulmer Thomas, "Economic Development over the Long-. 
run-Central America since 1970, Journal of Latin American 
Studies, November 1983. 
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17 of agriculture for the home market. This transformation, 
obviously, brought the destruction of small holding agriculture. 
In other words, land devoted to raising crops for the home 
market switched to raising crops for exports. Consequently, 
small formers either became landless or have had to migrate 
in search of addition work. 
18 
Moreover, the rapid population growth aggravated the 
situation. In 1970's, 38 percent of the rural labour force 
in El Salvador was estimated to be landless, while the figure 
is believed to have been even higher in pre-revolutionary 
19 Nicaragua. 
EXPORT-LED MODEL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS: 
It is argued that a switch of employment from low 
productivity activities in agriculture for domestic use of 
relatively high productivity activities in export agriculture could 
result in an increase in real wages and living standards. 
Unfortunately, this has , in general, not happened in central 
America. Instead, a growing proportion of the rural labour 
17. V. Bulmer Thomas, op. cit, p. 330. 
18. Central America is a market of more than 20 million people. 
19. See, R. J^rosterman, "Land Reform and El Salvador, " 
International Security, Sxammer 1981. 
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force has had to trade relatively secure self-employment for 
insecure, seasonal wage employment in export agriculture.^*^ 
In other words, the migration during the harvest season in 
search of wage employment detached male members from their 
families for long periods and it has been a source of great 
social instability. El Salvador is the prime example of it. 
In addition, a price taker on world market remains ambitious 
for keeping down the wage costs. That's why, a high proportion 
21 of the labour force in export agriculture is seasonal. 
In fact, export agriculture is the most dynamic sector 
of the economy and contributed to a rise in GDP but could'nt 
satisfy the demand at requirements of real wages and living 
standards. Thus, economic growth in central America has been 
brought at the expense of a worsening of the distributicn of 
income. 
PRICE RISES AND THE OIL CRISIS : 
However, export led model, in the 1950s and 1960s 
worked so well that there was virtually no inflation in Central 
American. The annual average rate of change of prices between 
22 
1950 and 1970 was below 2 percent in El Salvador. In the early 
19 70s, notably, world prices started to rise rapidly and Central 
20. It is only a slight exaggeration to state that export 
agriculture is large-scale, mechanised, land-extensive making 
use of hired labour, while agriculture for the home market 
is small-scale, non-mechanised, land intensive using family 
labour. 
21. See, V. Bulmer-Thomas, op. cit., pp. 330-331. 
22. Ibid, p. 332. 
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America began to be seriously affected by 1973. The rise 
in inflation reached in double figures especially after the 
23 
first oil crisis. Inflation threat redistributed income 
away from the weaker elements in society towards the stronger 
Inevitably, most of the workers outside the public sector 
suffered a decline in living standards. It also, resulted in 
a very sharp fall in real wages. It, obviously, frustrated 
Nicaraguan society which later led to the revolution. 
The price rises in the 1970s proved responsible for 
public expenditure to increase mainly for two reasons, first, 
wages and salaries in the public sector had to be increased in 
line with inflation, secondly, transfers to autonomous public 
agencies or private firms rose sharply as central American 
24 governments tried to operate a measure of price control. 
IMPACT OF PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICITS AND EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS : 
In the second half of the 1970s, public sector deficits 
began to explode as a result of a combination of expenditure 
driven up by inflation and stagnant or declining government 
23. See, ^edro-Pablo kuczyriski,"The Impact of the Higher oil 
Prices on the LDC's. The Case of Latin America, in Ronald 
G. Hellman and H. Rousenbausna, Latin America; The Search 
for a New International Role, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 
1975,' p. 271. 
2i, V. Bulmer-Thomas, op. cit., p. 333. 
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revenue. However, in mid 70s, the public sector deficits were 
manageable. A large part of the deficit was at first financed 
by external borrowing, pushing up the public external debt 
from very modest levels in 1970 to massive levels in 1980. Thus, 
by the end of the 19 70s, Central America found itself with 
large public sector deficits and high levels of external indeb-
tedness. At this point, however, the world went into recession 
and central America experienced the effects in a classic way - lower 
prices for traditional exports, a decline in export earnings 
and a decline in government revenue. Unable to meet their external 
obligations, each republic was forced to one by one to resort 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although, Nicaragua 
has formally defaulted, OMF support was essential for all because 
25 it is a precondition for further lending by other institutions. 
Thus, the social and economic scenario further exposes 
the key factors which have also exacerbated the Central American 
crisis. In the early 1970s, the pressures from fundamental 
inequities and political exclusion began to rise and the economic 
model available in Central America remained not only incapable 
of meeting basic internal demands but exposed vulnerable to the 
international economic ups and downs of the 1970s, ^t gradually 
brought a new, level and type of political violence in Central 
25. Ibid, p. 333. 
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America. The Cuban Resolution on the one hand and political 
liberalisation on the other brought an increasing element 
of socially-based ideological polarisation which made Central 
American crisis more intractable. 
CUBAN FACTOR IN U.S. POLICY : 
The US seemed to believe that the basic problems behind 
regional instability were the growing demand of individuals 
aroudd the world for the fulfilment of their political, social, 
and economic rights. The US policy-makers were of the view that 
the US should act forcefully when the vital interests of the 
US, its allies audits friends are threatened and assist nations 
2 6 
threatened by external force to defend themselves. The U.S. 
policy-makers seen, therefore, seemed conscious to the fact 
that U.S. longer-range interests would be harmed by continuing 
indifference to the mounting desire in Central America for 
greater social justice and national dignity, as American 
indifference will only make it easier for Castro's Cuba to 
exploit their desire. 
Thus, the Cuban Reovlution of 1959 increased Washington's 
sensitivity to the region's internal problems. It also increased 
26. Cyrus Vance, speech to the American Association of Junior 
and Community College, 1 May 1979, Survival, July-AuguSt 
1979, p. 179. 
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the immediacy of the response to external threat. The White 
House increasingly stressed that it recognised the area's 
extreme strategic importance and that the U.S. did 'nt intend to 
abandon the vital central American region to Cuba and its radical 
Marxist allies. 
U.S. RECOGNITION TO THE ROLE OF ARMY IN POLITICS AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS : 
The U.S. policy, in tesponse, was concerned to avert 
immediate external destabilisation by strengthening the internal 
security of reliable regimes in the area. It could'nt prefer 
to achieve long term stability through promoting social 
28 
reform and overall development of Central American States 
The US. policy, in fact, emphasised on security and recognised 
the role of army in State politics. It seemed to believe that 
the aroned forces are not only "the sole force of stabilisation 
but also promote democratic institutions and progressive 29 
changes of a socio-economic nature." Consequently, the military 
establishments were strangthened which, obviously, did'nt prove 
27. Financial Times, September 16, 1980. 
28. Edward Best, op. cit., p. 8. 
29. The views were held by US Senate Study mission in 1961, and 
quoted in Jenny Pearce, Under the Eagle, Latin American 
Bureau, London, 1982. 
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to be interested in.democratic institutions. 
In fact, the Central American region has flourished 
revolutions, and brutal and stifling dictatorships. Mostly, 
each dictatorship happenes to be completely personalitic. 
It has no ideological base in real sense. It rests on military 
force. The constitution, interestingly, describes the govern-
ment as "civil, republic, democratic, and representative", 
but actually it violates all these principles. Elections are 
peaceful affairs for there is only one party and only one candida-
te. Opponents of the regime are usually labelled "communists". 
Incarnation, assassination, or exile are the rewards for active 
opposition.^'^ 
In this regard, the main difference between Nicaragua 
and El Salvador was that the Nicaraguan regimes were exclusively 
personal and family estates. They used their monopoly of the 
means of violence to promote the interests of their family. 
While, the regime in El Salvador happened to be soldier's 
r'spublia, with nearly exclusive military control of political 
processes. 
Obviously, the wherent and persistent instability of 
most countries in the region, has prompted the establishment 
and constant increase of armed and paramilitary forces to enable 
30. Lieuwen Edwin, Arms and Politics in Latin America, 
Frerderick A. ^raeger. New York, 1960, p.159. 
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their regimes to hold on to power and to defend themselves 
against the competing forces within the countiry. Perceptions 
of actual civil war at home and greater threats from abroad 
lead to an ever increasing share of national budgets to be 
spent on armaments. This fact entails an increased economic 
economic burden, and aggravates the political consequences 
31 of internal upheavals. 
Significantly, the greater the threats to security 
which originate domestically, the greater are the external 
threats faced by that country. Sources of domestic unstability 
are political, economic, social, and even cultural and ideolo-
gical in natmre. The realm of security in the region, therefore, 
involves a wide spectrum of issues and is not solely a military 
matter in the conventional sense. Moreover, the US administra-
tion's deep involvement in internal affairs in the region 
has led to an acttire political sclerosis and uneven economic 
development. Direct involvement such as the provision of mili-
tary assistance and advisers to Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 
and indirect involvement such as the US policy of aggressive 
destabilisation in Nicaragua, the constant threat of US invasion 
against Cuba or economic sanctions against Cuba and Nicaragua, 
31. Victor Millan, op. cit., p. 44. 
2S1 
and their exclusion from the Caribbean Basin Initiative of 
the Reagan acilministration, announced on February 24, 1982, 
have contributed to the fact that the region is now convulsed 
by revolution, civil war, border skirmishes or ever clashes, 
economic disruption, refugee camps and clandestine arms 
networks. In short, the internal conflicts have become increa-
singly internationalised where no external actor has been 
32 more prominent than the United States itself. 
The United States policy gradually came into clash with 
the pressures which were building in Central America for 
deep internal changes. There were also changes in the geo-
strategic profile of the region. However, in the mid-1970s, 
there was global 'detente' and little apparent prospect of 
further Cubas or unmanageable, a growing number of regional 
governments were restoring relations with cuba, and many were 
expanding, diplomatic and.commercial contacts with the Soviet 
Bloc. While, the US administration has always been especially 
concerned with the states which have left wing regimes, 
/ 
particularly to Cuba. 
U.S. MILITARISATION POLICY AND CUBAN RESPONSE : 
During the late 1970s, the United States had stepped 
up th3 military, political, and psychological struggle following 
the discovery of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba in August-
32 . I b i d . 
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October 1979. President Carter issued Presidential Directive 
52, following the reports, ordering the state Department to 
consult with the CIA, DOD, and AID to devise new strategies to 
Curb "Cuban interventionism" and to undermine Havana's influence 
in the Third World. The Directive called for increased economic 
aid and the sale of military equipment to Central American 
and Caribbean governments. 
Later, the Reagan administration authorised the creation 
of a Caribbean joint task force, the increased surveillance of 
Cuba by SR-71 spy aircraft and other devices and the holding 
of military manoeuvres at Guantanamo naval base as well as 
in the Caribbean,. Sea. Between 30 October and 7 December 1981, 
forty one US Navy ships, including two aircraft carriers, 
took part in manoeurres in the Caribbean code named - "Redix 8l", 
with participation of some NATO members. About 40 ships and 
200 aircraft participated in the exercises. At the beginning 
of March 1982, six NATO nations, including the United States, 
participated in a marine exercise, "Safe Pass 82', held in 
the Gulf of Mexico. During the 10 day manoeuvres, nearly 
30 ships, about 80 aircraft and nearly 10,000 men carried out 
operations concerned with maintaining control of the sea lanes 
of communications and ensuring safe passage of alliance shipping 
through the mid Atlantic. 
In addition in a more to reinforce U.S. military power 
near Cuba and the rest of the Caribbean, the US Navy announced 
its intention to re-open the former naval station in key West, 
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3 3 Florida. It was believed that the base would support naval 
operations and exercises in the Florida straits between the 
United States and Cuba, and improve the Navy's response to 
34 possible contigacies in the Caribbean area. 
The U.S. under the Reagan administration is also 
seeking air and ground facilities in Columbia and Haiti.^^ 
Honduras also provided base facilities to the US armed forces 
through an agreement on May,7, 1982. Honduran bases at Puerto 
Lempira, Comayagua and La Ceiba were provided to the United 
States. The U.S. also has air, ground, and naval facilities 
in Antigua,^^ the Bahamas. Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Cuba 
(Guantanamo Bay), Puerto Rico, Turks and Caicos Islands, and 
the Virgin Islands. 
Cuba, in response, has allowed the Soviet Union naval 
facilities at Cienfucgos, for Soviet submarines and surface 
warships, an air base at San Antonio de los Banes for 
reconnaissance aircraft, and an electronic surveillance 
33. Ibid, p. 49. 
34. Washington Post, 10 June, 1982, Latin American Weekly Report, 
23 April, 1982, p. 12. 
35. International Herald Tribune, March 5, 1982. 
36. The tiny dot in the Caribbean, Antigua gained its independence 
from British colony on November 1, 1981, which ended nearly 
350 years of British rule. Since 1974, the Britishers withdrew 
from many mini-states, i.e. Grenada, St. Lucia, Dominica, 
and St. Vincent all islands of 1,20,000 people or fewer. 
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installation south of ^^avana near Lourdes, On the northern 
coast of Cuba, the Soviet Union operates a string of early 
warning radars that can detect aircraft as far away as 300 
miles. The Soviet Union already set up a satellite traching 
station in Jaruco, Havana province in 1973, for recoption and 
37 transmission of signals in the Intersputnik system. 
In fact, Cuba perceived constant threat of US invasion 
and, therefore, justified its militarisation policy. Cuban 
Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez declared at the second 
special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, 
that the country nearly doubled its military capability in 
1981 because the Reagan Administration refused to rule out the 
possibility of a military attack on Cuba. Cuba complained that 
from 1959 to 1970 the US, using the Guantanamo base, has been 
38 
responsible for 12,668 provocations and incidents* Further-
more, Cuba presumes that it has an internationalist duty to 
help liberation movements all over the world, as well as, 
to defend, the security of certain states. Cuban troops, 39 
therefore, are present in Angola and Ethiopia. In Central 
America and the Caribbean, Cuba's influence exist with certain 
confinements. Cuba has categorically stated that it is providing 
37. Victor Millan, op. cit., p.50. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Donald E. Schulz, The strategy of conflict and the politics 
of counter productivity," Orbis, Vol. 25, No. 3, Fa]l 1981, 
p. 700. 
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assistance to guerrillas in El Salvador at a modest level. 
Cuban involvement in Central American affair?, therefore, 
is perceived a threat by the United States. Obviously, the 
US has an important security interest in ensuring that cuba 
does'nt pose a security threat in the region. 
MEXICO'S ATTEMPTS OF PEACE : 
Notably, following Reagan Administration's move towards 
a harder line against Cuba in 1981, Mexico has served as a 
bridge and communicator between the US and Cuba, encouraging 
meetings in Mexico city(198l) and Havana (1982).'^ '^  Mexico has 
41 traditionally shown good will toward movements for social change 
in Latin America. It maintained bilateral links with Harvana 
42 in various fields. 
In fact, after the trauma of Vietnam, the humiliation 
of US interests in Iran, the presence of Soviet troops in 
Afghanistan, the American self-image was at its nadir, t'resident 
40. See, New York Times, March 10, 1982, Newsweek, May 24,1982; 
Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Mexico US Relations: Big Initiatives 
can cause big problems". Foreign Affairs, Winter 1981/82, 
vol 60^ . No 2, pp. 379-392. 
41. Mexico was the only country in Latin America that opposed 
sanctions and a diplomatic break with Cuba in the early 
1960s, and refused to support the OAS on sanctions against 
Cuba. It has maintained both economic and political 
relations with Cuba. 
42. See, New York Times, February 21,1981; Financial Times, 
August 5,1982. 
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Reagan assured that America would be stronger again, stronger 
than anyone else, as it once was. Obiously, his administration 
followed hardline strategy in Central America and the Caribbean, 
UNITED STATES HARDLINE STRATEGY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN : 
The Central American and the carribean problems were 
as important and difficult for the Reagan Administration as 
any problem it had to deal with. There was enormous domestic 
sensibility to the whole problem among Americans. 
The US Republican Platform for the 1980s adopted on 
July 15, 1980 at the party's national convention in Detroit, 
underlines the premises of the "new" policy of the Reagan 
Administration. "We will return to the fundamental principles 
of tteating a friend as a friend and self proclaimed enemies as 
enemies, without apology. We will make it clear to the Soviet 
Union and Cuba that their subversion and their build up of 
43 offensive military forces is unacceptable." 
Significantly, the Reagan Administration's policy 
toward the Caribbean Basin did'nt want any more regional 
regimes regarding which it would have to have any understanding 
43. 1980s Republican Platform Text, Congressional Quarterly, 
Weekly Report, July 19, 1980, p. 2054. 
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44 with the Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration was deeply-
sensitive to the strategic significance of the Caribbean 
and claimed that in early 1942, a handful of Hitler's sub-
marines sank more tonnage there than in all of the Atlantic 
Ocean. They did this without a single naval base anywhere 
in the area. Today, Cuba is host to a Soviet Combat brigade, 
a submarine base capable of servicing Soviet submarines and 
military air bases invited regularly by Soviet military 
aircraft. 
It was believed in Washington, therefore, if another 
regime with Cuban style non-aligment was consolidated in Nicaragua, 
there would be a potentially hostile exis spanning the Cari-
bbean from West to East with access to the Pacific. It was 
therefore, determined not to let the guerrillas even negotiate 
46 their way into power in El Salvador. 
Senator Christopher Dodd, tried to expose Reagan's policy 
in following words: 
44. See, Hearings before the Sub-committee on Inter-American 
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, Ninety seventh Congress, First session, 
July 14, 21 and 28, 1981 ( US Government Printing office, 
Washington, D.C., 1981), p. 21. 
45. President Reagan Address to a joint session of Congress, 
27 April, 1983. 
46. Edward Best, op. cit., p. 34. 
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"Instead of trying to do something about the factors 
which breed revolution this Administration has turned to massive 
military build up at a cost of hundreds of million of dollars. 
It's policy is ever increasing military assistance, endless 
military training, even hiring own para-military guerrillas. 
This is a formula for failure and it is a proven prescription 
for picking a loser. The American people know that we have been 
down this road before and that it only leads to a dark tunnel 
of endless intervention."'^'^ 
The Reagan Administration could'nt make any progress 
towards the goals it had set, namely to destabilise the situation 
in Nicaragua by destroying the revolutionary gains of the 
people of Sandino, defeat the insurgents in El Salvador and 
neutralise the Cuban influence in Central America and in the 
48 adjoining Caribbean area. 
In fact, throughout the isthmus, a fight for power 
evolved between extremists on the far right and on the far 
left. For the Reagan Administration, the whirlwind of revolt 
and repression posed special and hazardous problems as it 
tried to find ways of helping the moderates and of bringing 
49 stability to a region that was in Americas backyard. 
47. Quoted in H.M.C.Beri, op. cit, p. 136. 
48. B. Shchesbakov,"A Big-stick over central AmericaV Interna-
tional Affairs, <-'ctober 1983, p. 96. 
49. Time, March 22, 1982, p. 14. 
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SPREADING POLITICAL TURMOIL IN CENTRAL AMERICA : 
Political unrest continued to number elsewhere in 
Central America. Many Central American nations were facing 
a rising rebellion of dedicated guerrULas. The Guatemala came 
under political turmoil after opposition char-ge of fraud in 
March 1982 presidential elections. In Nicaragua, the sandinista 
guerrillas took power in 1979, and despite their early vows 
to envourage "pluralism", had been moving zealously leftward 
ever since.^^ In Nicaragua, the leftist Sandinista regime 
declared a state of emergency to counter what it called 
"aggressior directed against our country "by the United 
51 
States . Honduras had a moderate government but was fearful 
that it will catch the virus of rebellion from its neighbours. 
Washington increase the number of its military trainers in 
"onduras from 25 to as many as 100 in response to the military 52 
build-up in neighbouring Nicaragua. Even Costa Rica, a 
stable democracy did fear that its economic problems will 
cause social unrest that could lead to trouble. While in 
El Salvador the crisis was the most acute and US policy 
was under the most tension. Guerrillas were increasingly 
challenging the civilian military government headed by President 
50. Time, March 22, 1982, p. 15. 
51. Time, March 29, 1982, p. 28 
52. Ibid. Detailed discussion in this regard in Chapter 7. 
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Jose Napoleon Duarte. That was the time when the US and 
much of the world was focussing its attention on the perilous 
situation in El Salvador. The Reagan Administration, in fact, 
viewed the intricate relationships of power among central 
American nations as a kind of Kaleidoscope that could be 
jarred into a new pattern by any major event.^^ 
CONCLUSION : 
The ideological confrontation between widely differing 
political value systems are the types of conflict which are 
particularly evident in Central America and the Caribbean. 
During the past two decades/ the predominant forms of conflict 
in the region have been border and territorial, while in the 
present situation the dominant scenario lie in ideological, 
resource and influence forms of conflicts. The Central American 
and the Caribbean conflict, therefore, in the short and mid-
term, seem to be more severe and long-lasting, and less suscep-
54 tible to traditional methods of mediation and conciliation. 
In fact, the Reagan Administration had two seemingly 
contradictory views of the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the 
Americans argued that the Soviet Union was an inefficient and 
over stressed society and economy, so that increased inter-
national tension, economic boycott, and an accelerated arms 
53. Time March 22, 1982, p. 16. Detailed discussion is in the next 
Chapter, 
54. Jack Child, Conflicts in Latin America; Present and Potential, 
American University, Washington, ^.C. September 1980, pp. 6-10 
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race might make it nap because, of its internal weaknesses. 
On the other hand, the administration held that the Soviet 
^nion had outstripped the United States in military power and 
was active and successful worldwide in sulveirting the west, 
making endless trouble, its hand in every crisis. The Soviet 
Union underlies all the unrest that is going on, the Americans 
visualised. Obviously, this conception of the world implied 
confrontation with the Soviet Union. Every dispute or disorder 
was interpreted in terms of Soviet manipulations Nicoragua 
was not allowed the dignity of its own revolution. In Reagan 
Administration's eyes, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the 
GuerrHas in El Salvador all merely were figures at the end 
of strings leading to Moscow. This unsustainable reductionism 
is the reason that the United States is now in El Salvador. 
These are accessible to American power and not to the Soviet 
Union. 
The US, therefore, is assuming a bellicose approach to 
foreign problems. In Latin America, this attitude has produced, 
the British-Argentina war over the Malvinas or Falkland Islands, 
While in Central America, the U.S. policy consists of two 
goals - (a) El Salvador must be saved at any cost, and (b) 
the Sandinistas government in Nicaragua should'nt be allowed 
to exist at any cost. 
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The U.S. moderate diplomacy seemed to come out for 
a peaceful settlement" but in reality its 'big-stick' methods 
and 'gunboat-diplomacy' only blocked and torpedoed the search 
for a political solution to the Central American Conflicts. 
A growing number of US military advisers are settling in 
Honduras and El Salvador, weapons are poured into these count-
ries from the US, and the CIA and the Pentagon are turning 
the States bordering on Nicaragua into spring boards of 
aggression. Thus, the US presumption that it can impose poli-
tical stability through use of force appears disastrous. No 
power can promise democracy or peace at the but of a boyonet. 
However, the post-Vietnam foreign policy of the United 
State under carter Administration achieved success in Latin 
America which led to the Panama Canal treaty, the promotion 
of human rights, support for democracy as the antidote to 
communism and a lessening of the intolerable paternalism that 
has traditionally marked America's dealings with its neighbours 
but all these successes were short-lived. Later, the Iranian 
hostage crisis, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and the 
civil war in Nicaragua and El Salvador had reverted to the 
ill fated US attitudes of the Vietnam period. President Reagan, 
however, came to office determined to overcome the Vietnam 
syndrome - an unwillingness by the United States to use its 
military power- But gradually, it seems that the U.S. lost the 
lessons of Vietnam. 
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Tnus/ the US support for undemocratic allies and 
repressive regimes in Central America i.e. in El Salvador, 
in fact, has damaged both the prestige and because of their 
inherent instability, the long-terra interest of the United 
States. The result is that El Salvador lives under an unbearable 
dictatorial oligarchy which is extremely frightening from the 
Stand point of the democratic process in the country. 
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CHAPTER - VII 
US POLICY IN EL SALVADOR-UNDER CARTER AND REAGAN 
ADMINISTRATIONS 
El Salvador a coffee producing country, in her 
history witnessed almost exclusive military control of poli-
tical processes. The armed forces intexmittently took complete 
charge of the nation's politics. The country has tropical 
climate, heterogeneous population, high rates of illeteracy 
(58 percent), one of the lowest per capita income ($ 670 a 
year)^, and primitive agricultural economies. In El Salvador, 
60 percent of population is rural, the top 10 percent land 
owners control 78 percent of the arable land while the lowest 
20 percent own only 0.4 percent, and over 40 percent of rural 
2 
families own no land at all. According to an unofficial 
statistics 40 percent of the country's wealth is owned and 
controlled by a small number (about 15 families) of families. 
El Salvador, thus, is one of the few most backward, 
least developed country in Latin America. Land and other 
forms of wealth and privilege are concentrated in the hands of 
1. Time, February 15, 1982, p. 7. 
2. H.M.L. Beri, "Central America," in K. Subrahmanyam (ed.). 
The Second Cold War, ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983, 
p. 126. 
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the few, the middle group is relatively small and the common 
population have poor subsistence. In 1980, urban unemployment 
was estimated at over 50 percent.^ In such reality, militarism 
thrives and operates, and aggravates the worst economic and 
social problems of the country. 
PAST UPRISINGS : 
The struggle of the Salvaderean people for freedom and 
social justice began back in the 1930s. After the suppression 
of the popular uprisings in 1932 a brutal dictatorship was 
established and maintained for several decades only to bloody 
terror and active U.S. support. Between 20,000 and 30,000 
peasants were massacred. There were again uprisings in 1944, 
1948 and 1961. Under Napoleon Duarte, who came to power following 
the victory of Christian Democrats in the presidential elections 
in 1972, more than 40,000 Salvadoreans were murdered by the 
regime's forces, between october 1979 and December 1982, according 
to a report from the world Front of Solidarity with Salvadorean 
4 
people. El Salvador was again on the verge of a revolutionary 
out burst when the ruling rightwing military once again stages 
a coppd etat on October 15, 1979 and removed the military 
regime of President Carlos Humberto Romero. 
3. Ibid. 
10. Ibid. 
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SUBVERSION OF ROMERO'S MILITARY REGIME : 
The government of President Romero had been locked 
in combat with three well organised bands of leftist terrorists 
One such group, the Armed Forces of National Resistance, had 
raised $ 40 million in the past two years by kidnapping foreign 
executives and holding them for ransom. Even more threatening 
for the government's stand point was the widespread support 
won by the 70,000 member popular Revolutionary Bloc, a broad-
based movement that occupied the Cathedral in San Salvador in 
May 1979. US Assistant Secretary of State Viron Vaky, also paid 
a fact, finding trip to Central America in August 1979 and 
I 
found that Romero had retreated into a defiant "bunker mentality"' 
But Romero regime could'nt long exist and removed by a coup. 
US REACTION : 
The US was not involved in the coup but gave it a 
cautious welcome. The US was aware of the fact that the success 
of Nicaraguan revolution might directly encourage the revolu-
tionary groups in El Salvador. The U.S., therefore, has already 
stepped up efforts in late 1978 -^ o force the El Salvador 
military regime toward various reforms and dialogue with 
the moderate opposition. But Romero regime became more violent 
and indiscriminate particularly toward Left-wing demands. 
The coup was also largely taken over by less reformist officers 
5. Time, August 13, 19 79, p,6. 
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who had opposed any inclusion of the left's organisation. 
POLITICAL TURNIXDIL AND TUMULT IN EL SALVADOR FOLLOWING 
THE COUP : 
The rightist element in the new junta attacked the 
reformist leaders and legan to mobilise their ideological 
base. They also began to re-organise the"death squads." 
Major Roberto D' Abbuisson, an ultra rightist and closely 
linked with violent actions of the National Guard, the 
National Police and the Treasury Police, formed the National 
Broad Front (FAN)^. 
The left was also divided in its attitudes to the 
new Junta. The commumist party welcomed the coup. Notably, 
the party was given posts in the new regime. Another leftist 
organisation - The Armed Forces of National Resistance 
(FARN) proposed dialogue with the reformist civilians and 
officers to create a broad "anti-fascist front." The Popular 
Forces of liberation (FPL), however, demounced the coup as 
a US plot."^ 
6. See, Edward Best, US Policy and Regional Security in 
Central America, IISS, Gower Publishing Company "td., 
England, 1987, p. 22. 
10. Ibid. 
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In such political confrontation and confusion, 
new junta also could'nt exist long. It coi-id'nt handle 
dimensional ideological pressures. The armed forces did*nt 
submit themselves to, in spite of the junta's ultimatum, to 
the authority of the new regime. Consequently, it led to 
junta's collapse in the first days of January 1980. In 
mid-January, the first Co-ordinating body of the popular 
organisations was formed. It showed its strength with 
g 2,00,000 - strong demonstrators in the capital San Salvador . 
Thus, the turn of the year 1979-80 was the crucial 
point for U.S. policy, as El Salvador began to collapse into 
war and political turmoil. The hostage crisis in Iran and 
the Soviet intrusion in Afghanistan sharpened yet further 
American sensitivities about losing anything else, especially 
9 in central America. 
EL SALVADOR CRISIS AND U.S. POLICY OPTION IN 1980 : 
The posibility of any guerrilla triumph, several 
hundreds of whom reportedly earned their combat experience 
8. Ibid, p. 23. In that same month, 309 people died at the 
hands of the army and security forces. 
9. Carter was running for re-election in 1980, therefore, his 
admintration was especially sensitive because of their 
electODal inplications. 
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by joining the anti-Somoza struggle in Nicaragua, raised 
general fears o£ a chain reaction of instability, international 
unreliability and Marxist influence spreading northward. 
Significantly, there was no dynastic US backed dictator in 
El Salvador. There was no symbolic figure who could explain 
revolution as an unavoidable exception. The absence of such 
a figure also seemed to give the Salvadorean Left a more 
clearly ideological commitment to revolution and class-
struggle than the heirs of Sandino.^*^ 
However, the military coup and the general turmoil also 
meant that the US did'nt have the option of simply propping up 
a threatened regime, US involvement in the crisis threatened 
only to associate it with violent repression, ^ne alternative 
was, therefore, simply to stop all assistance on the grounds 
of massive human rights violations by the military and the lack 
of any real government to give it to. That would probably 
have led not to an immediate Left-wing triiimph, but to an 
even greater blood-bath and an even more violent military 
regime facing a broader opposition. The subsequent worst case 
would have been a collapse into regional conflict, with obvious 
risks of broader confrontation. The best that the US could 
hope for would have been a military split and the relatively 
10. Ibid. 
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quick replacement of the repressive regime by a broad 
Coalition government including the Left. But even that would 
effectively have been "another Nicaragua", and it was politically 
impossible at that time for the US to consider standing back 
and hiping. Another alternative was for the US to try actively 
to bring all parties, including the Left, into a transitional 
government of national reconciliation. However, there seemed 
little prospect of power being taken by the revolutionary 
groups, who tended to be seen in the U.S. as dangerous extremists 
lacking in public support. The US Administration, therefore, 
did'nt see negotiations including the left as either necessary 
or desirable. Moreover, the US now had only very limited 
political influence over either, and the necessary combination 
of threats and promises to both simultaneously would have had 
no credibility.^^ However, the US attempted half-heartedly 
to promote negotiations before the coup but that were proved 
fruitless. Significantly, it had brought criticism from the 
12 left who described it as "Yankee interventionism. 
US POLICY UNDER PRESSURE : 
In spite of this criticism, there was strong internal 
pressure for the US to take a more decisive and positive 
policy steps regarding El Salvador. There was, however, broad 
11. Ibid, p. 24. 
12. New York Times, September,17, 1979. 
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support for active US steps to try to strengthen the political 
centre and moderate forces in El Salvador. In the meantime, 
the US Administration was firstly concerned to prevent 
hostile "external exploitation" of the Salvadorean situation. 
Notably, the US then perceived immediate security threat from 
Nicaragua, besides the Soviet Union and Cuba. The Salvadorean 
army, therefore, had to be preserved in order to contain the 
Soviet-cuban backed insurrection. It had therefore, to be 
included in any US-backed government, not only on the internal 
ground that without it there could be no stable government to 
support at all, but also from the external consideration that 
without it the only means to counter communist encroachment 
13 would be direct action by the US itself. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PDC BY US EFFORTS : 
The US maintained that the repression and abuses were 
mainly the work of Right wing extremists associated more 
with the internal security forces than with the Army itself. 
The US in option helped to establish a new military junta-
The Christian Democrat (PDC) which was formed on January 
5, 1980. The PDC, it was assumed, would provide the civilian 
and reformist component necessary to offer a democratic 
alternative to armed revolution in El Salvador and to satisfy 
liberal openion in the US as well. The US Administration also 
13. Edward Best.... op. cit, p. 25. 
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argued that the Salvadoean armed forces, professionalised 
by the US. would provide 'security shield' to contain 
extremists of the Left and the Right, and assist social 
reforms which would be instituted to undermine leftist's 
14 
revolutionary appeal. After the establishment of new infra-
structure of Salvadorean regime, the US stressed the need to 
restore law and order and to combat Marxism in El Salvador. 
PDC SPLIT : 
The US hope received a set-back when the PDC split at 
the beginning of March 1980, over its involvement in the Junta. 
It's left-wing splinter group the Popular Social Christian 
Party, the Social Democrats, the Communist Party, and a trade 
union grouping joined with the popular organisations in April 
1980 to form the Democratic Revolutionary Front9FDR). It 
would be the political wing of an alliance with the Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), created in October 
1980 from the first uion of the five guerrilla groups in 
15 
May 1980 The FMLN, therefore, is considered an umbrella 
organisation for the live guetrilla groups.^^ 
SPLITLED TO CHAOS : 
The PDC split led to Nopolean Quarte's entry, a staunch 
14. See, International Herald Tribune, February,1980. 
15. Irternational Herald Tribiine, March 18, 1980. 
16. Time, March 22, 1982, pp. 20-21. 
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us supporter to the junta, A state of seize was declared, 
and various reforms were simultaneously. However, right-wing 
terror and armed insurrection led by the leftists were 
hindering their implementation. The violence grew further 
drawing international outrage with the murder of the Arohbishop 
of San Salvador by a Right-wing death squad on 23 March, 1980. 
The government was in practice very weak. The left denounced 
Duarte as an ally of repression and as a puppet of US interven-
tion. The PDC had already weakened and was being discredited. 
The chaos tended to drive many towards the social justice or 
order offered by the organised left and the Right. Notably, 
17 
in April, 1980. D' Aubuisson attempted to organise a coup 
but was prevented by troops loyal to the remaining moderate 
military leader and arrested. The PDC threatened to resign if he 
was not tried but pressure from eight of fourteen garrisons 
brought about his release without charge. The PDC, however, 1 fi did'nt resign, and US support continued to El Salvador. 
L CIVIL WAR AND US RESPONSE TO MURDERS OF US NATION^S : 
By late 1980, the situation was seemed to be moving 
towards civil war. The US had made a political commitment, 
but seemed to have insufficient political influence to make 
17. He was described, by the U.C. media, as the "Mad Major," 
and a "pathological murderer He was also allegedly 
involved. 
18. Edward Best, op. cit., p. 27. 
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it e-^fective. The election of Ronal Reagan also exacerbated 
the US problem regarding El Salvador. He signalled that he 
would act much more firmly cine' - itb fewer conditions. Vfhile, 
the violent Right proceeded to kill five FDR leaders, partly 
to counter any possible interest in political negotiations. 
In December, 1980, Natio: al Guardsmen killed three American 
nuns and a Catholic lay worker. On 3 January, 1981, the Head ol 
19 
the Land Reform Agency and two US advisers were murdered. 
In response, the US suspended economic and military aid to El 
Salvador but economic aid was quickly restored after only a 
government reshuffle. This made Duarte President and effectively 
strengthened the political power of the military Right. He 
removed Col. Majono in reshuffle who was inducted after an 
unsuccessful coup attempt by Aubuission. 
Soon the US also restored military aid to El Salvador 
conditional on a reduction of violence by the security forces, 
the transfer of the most brutal commanders and investigation of 
the church women's murder. 
REVOLUTIONARY'S PROFOUND RELIGIOSITY : 
It is important here to know that Salvadoreans sympathy 
for armed insurrection arose directly as a response to repression 
initially directed against the church. Approximately four or 
10. Ibid. 
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five years ago priests began entering the region, preaching 
the new gospel of the " preferential option for the poor". 
The message was - " It is harder for a rich man to go to heaven 
than it is for a Camel to pass through the eye of a needle. Jesus 
Christ was poor, he loves the poor, do something to alleviate 
20 the suffering upon you by the rich." 
In response, the Salvadorean government sent hit 
squards to kill the priests and those who were organising in 
the catechist programme ("delegados de la palaba"). The 
Salvadorean peasants responded with their hunting rifles and 
pistols. After a n\imber of years of this incirpient armed 
resistence and defenses, they organised formal structures of 
the PMLN. Thus, there is a strong messianic bent to the 
philosophy of life and political conceptions held by the 
revolutionary peasants. They articulate their world view in 
terms of the Bible and the homilies of the late Archbishop oscar 
21 Arnulfo Romero. 
FMLN'S FINAL OFFENSIVE AND US RESPONSE : 
In late December 1980, the FMLN announced that it had 
planned a "final offensive" against the Government, with the 
20. Phillip Bourgois, "US Foreign policy in El Salvador," 
Monthly Review, May 1982, p. 22. 
10. Ibid. 
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^ of winning a revolution victory before Reagan took office. 
In response, Pentagon urged a resumption and increase in aid. 
The fear of external exploitation of El Salvador situation 
22 made military assistance almost unavoidable. 
The US Administration was sensitive to Cuban influence 
on the Salvadorean left and its close links with the countries 
of Soviet Bloc. The Administration also claimed that the Salva-
dorean left was receiving some material assistance from Cuba 
and Nicaragua. The US Administration also believed that Honduras 
may be used as a conduit for weapons into El Salvador by 
insurgents with Cuban suppori^ The US also played a key role 
in signing a peace treaty between Honduras and El Salvador in 
1980, which formally ended the H years of hostility between 
24 them^^. 
MILITARISATION OF HONDURAS : 
The fact that Honduras, the second poorest nation in 
Latin America after Haiti, shares borders with Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Nicaragua is the main cause of Honduras 
growing militarisation and provides an almost unmitigated 
panorama of uncertainty obviously, the Honduran military is 
22. See,Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit;US Policy and El 
Salvador, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1985, pp. 222-3. 
23. See, Statements of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence 
Franklin D. Kramer to House Sub-committee or Foreign Appro-
priations, 25 March, 1980. 
24. Most prominent confrontation between El Salvador and Honduras 
was the "Football War", in 1969, following a qualifying match 
for the World Cup between the two. 
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strengthened by massive US aid in hardware. 
Significantly, the US and Honduras concluded an agreement 
on May 1, 1982, as already mentioned briefly in the previous 
chapter, that provided US aircraft access to Honduran airbases 
25 at Puerto Lempiora, Comayagua and La Ceiba. Notably, the 
Reagan Administration requested 21 million for the fiscal year 
2 6 
1983 to improve airfields in Honduras. The US had also already 
reached to an understanding within the Honduran government to 
use its Pacific Ocean naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca, which 
borders on Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua. The Honduran 
government also leased the cisnes Island (Swan Island) in the 
Caribbean Sea for 90 years to the US, enabling the US Navy 
to monitor all shipping coming from the Caribbean Sea to the 27 Gulf of Mexico. 
25. Newsweek, March 22, 1981, International Herald Tribune, 
August 6, 1982, p. 3. 
26. The House and Senate Armed Services Committee approved 
$ 21 million to improve airfields in Honduras to which 
US forces would have access in case of trouble in the 
Caribbean. The proji^ ejct included the lengthening of the 
runways and expansion of the aircraft parking ramps to 
accomodate larger aircraft, and construction of underground 
fuel storage tanks. See, Congressional Quarterly, Weekly 
Report, Vol. 40, No. 25, June 19, 1982, p. 14B5. 
27. Victor Millan,"Controlling conflict in the Caribbean Basin; 
National Approaches," in Michael A. Morris and Victor 
Millan (eds.),Controlling Latin An erican Conflicts, 
Westview Press, 1983, pp. 60-61. 
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FMLN ALLEGEDLY BEGAN TO RECEIVE WEAPONS FROM NICARAGUA AND 
CUBA: 
In September 1980, US intelligence reported that the 
FMLN had begun to receive some of the material support promised 
in the middle of the year 1980 from Soviet Bloc countries, and 
subsequently, Nicaragua was becoming' the centre of the clandestine 
28 arms flow. 
However, Sandinistas assured the US that they would not 
export the material support to the revolutionaries in El Salvador. 
At the same time, they declared their open political and diplomatic 
support to the FDR-FMLN in Ei Salvador. But, the US state 
Department released an special report on communist interference 
29 
in El Salvador on 23 February, 1981. However, the report 
could'nt provide clear evidence that the guerrillas were receiving 
soplkisticated military hardwares from outside. 
Cuba and Nicaragua, of course do extend political support 
to the FMLN and quite likely supply a small amount of arms to 
28. See, Revolution Beyond our Borders: Sandinista Intervention 
in Central America, Special Report No. 132, United States 
Department of State, September 1985, pp. 6-7. 
29. VJhite paper, "Communist Interference in El Salvador, 
"Special Report No. 8, US Department of State, 1981, Bureau 
of Public Affairs, Washington, d.c. 
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it as a taken of their commitment.But, there had been 
no evidence then that they acted as a major conduits for the 
supply of Soviet arras to the El Salvador insurgents. Their 
material support to the FMLN in no way compares to that rendered 
by the US to the ruling military junta.^^ 
US POLICY OPTIONS IN 1981 : 
In spite of fastly deteriorating internal political 
situation in El Salvador, the US, in principle, had much the same 
policy options at the beginning of January 1981 as the previous 
year - assist the El Salvador government, promote negotiations, 
or keep out altogether. A policy of non-intervention had in 
general been predicted on the assumption that other powers 
would also keep out if the US did. The limits beyond which 
Soviet and Cuban activities would be seen by the US as a 
failure on the part to keep out were not high in any region of 
the world. Moreover, US sensitivities and suspicious in this 
respect had been resurging globally in the later years of 
32 
'dentente' over developments in South-East Asia, the Middle 
East, and Africa, and had been brought to a peak with the Soviet 
intrusion in Afghanistan. In addition, the growing evidence 
of guerrilla support from Nicaragua and the Soviet Bloc, even 
30. Achin Vanaik, "Crisis in Central America". The Times of 
India, August 10, 1983. 
31. 
32. Edward Best, op. cit,, p. 29. 
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if it could'nt be expected to militarily decisive, was not 
enough to tilt the balance within the Carter Administration 
in favour of military aird to El Salvador, and of an unequi-
33 vocal commitment to the survival of a US-backed regime. 
The US • restored its military aid to El Salvador in 
January 1981 and $ 5 million package of lethal aid including 
the US military advisers were sent to El Salvador. The 
US Administration believed, in fact, that the evidence of out-
side help to Salvadorean guerrillas has transformed the nature 
34 
of the insurgency movement in the country. The movement was 
in fact, based on such assistance, it believed. The US Admini-
stration claimed that the guerrillas were getting more than 
it was giving the ruling junta'It is unacceptable to the US 
to let El Salvador, fall into the hands of the ^arxist-Leninsts" 
the US government stated.^^ 
Thus, the basic lines of Reagan policy in El Salvador 
were set down by the Carter Administration, Reagan inherited 
much of the policy and many of the problems. 
US POLICY INDICATIONS UNDER REAGAN ADMINISTRATION : 
President Reagan's first comment, after taking office, 
was,"We believe that government of El Salvador is on the frontline 
of the battle that is really aimed at the very heart of V/estern 
33. See, New York Times, January 6, 1979, p. 3:1 
34. Raymond Bonner, op.cit., p. 225. 
35. Guardian, January 16, 1981. 
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3 6 Hemisphere, and eventually at us". 
President Reagan introduced the following policy 
framework for Central America : 
In response to decades of inequity and'indifference, 
the US will support democratic reform and human freedom. 
In response to military challenge from Nicaragua 
and Cuba the US will support security of the region's threatened 
nations. The US does not view security assistance as an end in 
itself, but as a shield for democratisation, economic development 
and diplomacy. 
the US will support dialogue and negotiations. 
If Central America were to fall what would the 
consequences be for US position in Asia and Europe and for 
alliances such as the NATO. If the United States can not respond 
to a threat near its borders, why should Europeans and Asians 
believe that the US is seriously concerned about threat to 
them! If the Soviets can assume that nothing short of an actual 
attack on the United States will provide an American response, 
37 which ally, which friend will trust the US then! 
US POLICY FAVOURED MILITARY AID : 
The Reagan Administration continued military aid to El 
36. H.M.L.Beri, op. cit., p. 123. 
37. Ibid. 
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Salvador against guerrillas However, there seemed no imment 
threat of outright revolutionary victory but it assumed that 
lack of aid and assistance might allow the . leftist guerrillas 
to put the $ 30,000 strong Salvadorean security forces at 
military disadvantage. A lack of U.S. support, it was believed 
in Washington, would demoralise the armed forces and increase 
popular support for the rebels. There was also fear of a 
subsequent blood bath by the far Right which would devastate 
the political centre and strengthen the Left in the long term. 
The dilemma for the US was how to balance the function of aid 
of giving military advantage and external reassurance with that 
of providing sufficient internal political leverage to assure 
38 the promised progress toward moderate democracy. 
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION LIFTED CONDITIONS FOR AID : 
The Reagan Administration, finally, lifted all conditions 
of aid in February 1981. On the grounds that aid was vital 
necessity to save the Government from defeat. The Administration 
further asserted that the problem of security was immediate 
while the process of reform and development was long-term. The 
Reagan Administration identified the FDR-FMLN with a hostile 
external t; reat. The Administration argued that socio-economic 
development required political stability, but political stability 
18. Edward Best, op. cit., p. 27. 
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required socio-economic improvements/ while solution of the 
internal conflict depended upon ending external involvement, 
which depended upon solving the internal problems which attracted 
the military aid. The Administration argued that priority 
defeat of insurgency was not only in US security interests, but 
necessary to restore the conflict si to internal dimensions, 
and to remove a deliberately destabilising political force 
39 which really prevented socio economic development, only then 
the US could "save the economy, stop the violence, have the 
40 elections, and ride into the sunset. 
Thus, the United States was reluctant to assist El Salvador 
regime unconditionally, that was deeply involved in massive 
abuses and murders which were being perpetrated by the Army 
and security forces. It had widely publicised in the US by human 
rights organisations and the cathelic Church. 
HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS EXPOSED EL SALVATOR'S BLOOD-LETTING : 
According to El Salvador's Human Rights Commission, 
El Salvador's notorious death squads had killed an estimated 
40,000 people during 1979 to 1983. According to an enquiry 
by the Amnesty International London hbased human rights group, 
which visited the civil war torn C. American nation in July 1983 
39. Edward Best, op. cit, pp. 38-39. 
40. US Ambassador in El Salvador, Deane Hinton, quoted in 
Raymond Bonner, op. cit. p. 238. 
0 93 
about 4 0 thousand people had been murdered by military and 
security forces and civilian clothes 'death-squads' in the 
41 
past five years in El Salvador. Amnesty, in an international 
press release, said the blatant failure of the authorities to 
investigate the killings and bring these responsible to justice 
was one factor that suggested that "it is the authorities 
themselves who lie behind the wholesale extra-judicial execution 
of people from all sectors of Salvadorean society." The report 
asserted," As a result, the existing system of certifying death 
seems.... to facilitate the murder of individuals on a large 
scale, and it is impossible to establish and make known within 
El Salvador or abroad the number killed or those responsible." 
Mutiliation of corpses made it difficult to identify the victims 
and establish the cause of death and no attempts was made to 
hide the bodies. The corpses were routinely dumped in heavily 42 patrolled areas near military establishments. 
In response to these killings the doubts and opposition 
to an unconditional US commitment in El Salvador began to mount 
even a;nong Congressmen. It was strengthened by doubts about the 
prudence of staking US credibility on the survival of a dubious 
and shaky regime. 
4l.- Trouble on Two Fronts," Time, December 12, '1983, 
42 - Ibid. 
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IN RESPOSE OF KILLINGS, THE CONGRESS PUT LIMITATIONS ON US AID : 
The Congress, therefore, put some limitations on the US 
aid to El Salvador Administration requests were cut in the 
authorising bills and, after stiff resistance in the House 
Appropriations subcommittee on Foreign operations in March 
1981 to the reprogramming of $ 5 million, the President resorted 
more to his emergency drawdown authority. The greater part of the 
military aid, however, sent in the first two years had in fact 
to be sent through this means: $ 25 million in fiscal year 1981 
and $ 55 million in 1982, out of totals of $ 35.492 and $86.5 
million respectively. The result with regard to conditionality 
was an amendment to the 1982 Foreign Aid Bill which became law 
43 
in December 1981 against the Reagan Administration resistance. 
The President was required to certify every six months for the 
following two years, before providing aid, that the Duarte 
Government was making a 'concerted, significant effort' to 
improve the human rights climate and that the Salvadoreans were 
achieving 'continued progress' in implementing political and 
economic reforms. Congress also wanted assurances that the 
Salvadorean government was making "good faith efforts" to 
investigate and prosecute the murders of American Churchwomen 
and two American aid officials a year ago. 
18. Edward Best, op. cit., p. 27. 
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MYTH OF REAGAN CERTIFICATION THAT LAUDED HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS 
IN EL SAVADOR : 
President Reagan initiated a certification, duly signed 
in February 1982, procedure that was needed to unlock $ 26 million 
in military aid and $ 40 million in economic assistance for El 
Salvador in 1982. It was a two page document with a six page 
appendix claiming that "despite formidable obstacles", the 
Duarto government had made a concerted significant and good-
faith efforts to deal with the complex political, social and 
human rights problems it was confronting." The docxament made it 
44 
clear that those problems were by no means solved. Thus, the 
US claimed that "progress was being made." While the fact was 
that as many as 1,000 people were then disappeared or were 
murdered each month in El Salvador by death squads of both the 
^eft and the Right. 
The Reagan certificate noted the October 1980 imposition 
of a new military code of conduct in El Salvador, the removal 
from command of military officers sympathetic to the 'violent 
rignt' and the scheduled elections for a new constituent Assembly 
on March 28, 1982. Reagan also landed the Salvadorean efforts 
at land reform, which so far had taken, with compensation, all 
^ ^ SciXfsdifi-r, 
44. See Warren Hage, "On the Scene and often on^-February 2Q, t-i^tSiQ-fk. 
1982, p. E2. 
45. Time, February 8, 1982, p. 28. 
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farms of 1,235 acres or more/ and redistributed them to tenant 
46 farmers. 
US CERTIFICATION RECEIVED CRITICISM : 
The Administration's report that El Salvador was improving 
its human rights performance arrived amid a barrage of criticism 
claiming just the opposite. The American Civil Liberties Union, 
in Conjunction with the New York-based Americas Watch Committee, 
released a 287 page human rights report on El Salvador in Feb-
ruary 1982. The report, heavily documented with eyewitness 
accounts, held the Duarte, government responsible for "the great 
majority" of some 200 politically motivated murders a weekn the 
use of torture by security forces, and other forms of systematic 
47 repression. It, thus, urged the denial of certification. 
Notably, the US correspondents who had been led by guerrilla 
forces to a village in the remote Salvadorean department of Morazan, 
near the Henduran border, provided reports which proved the most 
devastating for the Reagan Administration. There and in surrounding 
hamlets, the journalists found decomposing bodies and other evidence 
of major massacres of civilians that allegedly took place in 
December 1981. As many as 900 people were killed in the incidents. 
46. Ibid. 
47. Ibid. 
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According to surviving eyewitness, the massacres were carried 
48 out in cold blood by members of the Salvadorean army. 
At is here significant to know that six National Guards, 
believed responsible for the brutal murders of three American 
nuns and a US religions lay worker were appeared in February 
1982 before a Judge for trial. The Judge ruled out that five of 
the men should be charged with homicide, the sixth, he found, 
had not been involved . in the crimes. This, for the first time 
in El Salvador's four year old war against 4,000 to 6,000 Marxist 
guerrillas, that members of the government's security forces 
were being brought to judicial account over the death of non-
combatants. In fact, the court appearance by the former guar-
domen came only after prolonged US pressure on has civilian-
49 
military government to take action against them . That pressure 
had been given additional urgency by the US congress which 
demanded assurances by the Reagan Administration of action on 
the murders before releasing military and economic aid to El O T ^ 50 Salvador. 
SECOND US CERTIFICATION - AN ANALYSIS : 
President Reagan again put certification in August 1982 
to congress that the government of El Salvador was making 
48. Ibid. 
49. Roger Boyer, "Coptering Salvador,"New York Times, 
February 9, 1982 (editorial page). 
45. Time, February 8, 1982, p. 28. 
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"substantial progress in human rights, land reforms, and political 
solution to the civil war." Thomas Enders, Assistant secretary 
of State for Inter-American Affairs put the 48 page certification 
document on El Salvador before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
in support of Reagan's certification. In fact, certification 
was legally necessary in order to keep El-Salvador eligible 
for military aid in 1983. Military victory of El Salvador 
government needed US financial assistance and such assistance 
required the certification. 
Thomas Enders asserted before the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee that the Administration was by no means blind to the 
faults of the San Salvador government. He further insisted,"We 
believe the facts amply justify the certification required by 
law. Progress is marred but real."^^ 
The certification document offered no grounds for unalloyed 
optimism. The report, however, admitted that the overall improve-
ment " has not been as great as hoped" and that "serious problems 
remain." On the human rights, the report claimed that the 
El Salvador government" is making a concerted and significant 
effort" to curb violation. The study presented statistics from 
five sources showing that the numbers of civilian deaths from 
at political violence has dropped considerably. Enders said, "All 
45. Time, February 8, 1982, p. 28. 
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available evidence suggests that the most serious violatioBS 
52 are on a slow, downward curve." 
On the issue of land reforms, the report danced over 
tricky political ground Admitting that the country's newly 
3 3 
elected constituent Assembly in March 28, 1982 elections, 
led by its right-wing President, Roberto d' Aubuisson, has tried 
to undermine the reform laws, the study moretheless contended 
that 10,000 provisional land titles had been handed over to 
former renters and share cropperr in the past six months. 54 President Magana, moreover, has led a compaign to return the 
55 land to farmers illegally evicted from their new holdings. 
SECOND CERTIFICATION TOO RECEIVED BLOW BY DISCLOSURES : 
Even, then, the US certificati.-.n received widespread 
criticism. Abraham Lincoln once asked a friend "How many legs 
will a sheep have if you call the tail a log ?" 
"Five" his friend answered. 
"You were mistaken," Lincoln replied," for calling a 
tail a leg does not make it so." 
52. Ibid. 
53. A detailed discussion regarding March 20, 1982 Presidential 
and constituent Assembly elections is followed later in the 
chapter. 
54. A US educated economist who assumed the role of a political 
broker when he was appointed to the presidency after March 1982 
elections. The nation's three political parties - The National-
ist Republican Alliance, the Christian Democrats, and the 
National Conciliation Party - were working together in his 
pluralist government. 
55. Time, August 7, 1982, p. 20. 
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Similarly, speaking lie like truth can not make it 
truth. The Administration's report x received first blow by 
the disclosure in the first week of August 1982 of the brutal 
torture of a Salvadorean volunteer for the Green Cross, an 
international relief agency. The worker had been arrested by 
Salvadorean security forces on charges of providing supplies to 
guerrillas. Imprisoned for several days in a secret, soundproof 
room at police headquarters in down town San Salvador, he 
was stretched on a rotating wheel, beaten severely and forced 
to swallow lime. The victim was also strung up by his hands 
and feet while his genitals were squeezed in a wire vise.^^ 
The American Civil Liberties Union also declared US 
certification a "sham". The question was how could the US 
certify improvement in the Salvadorean Government without becoming 
an accomplice in that crimes. In El Salvador, in the first four 
months of 1982 year, 2,334 political murders were committed by 
government forces or by right-wing death squads. During 1979 to 
1982, the Salvador State had murdered 35,000 innocent civilians. 
57 Almost 5,000 civilians were \urdered in 1982. Not one officer 
or soldier was brought to trial for any such offence. If torture 
5 8 is criminal, then its certifIcatii^n itself becomes a crime. 
56. Time, August 9, 1982, p. 20. 
57. See, US Heading towards Another Vietnam, Times of India, 
August 10, 1982, published by arrangement with the Los Angles 
Times. 
58. Ibid. 
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President Reagan had the self confidence that happenings in 
El Salvador were bad but getting better. The Reagan Administra-
tion, thus, seemed to win an unwinnable war while the American 
Congress was not in mood to allow the Administration to do 
anything that could lead to a repetition of Vietnam in Central 
America. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops, like 
US Congress, was also sensitive to US aid to El Salvador and 
opposed all forms of military aid to El Salvador. It favoured 
a negotiated settlement between ruling junta and its lift—using 
guerrillas. 
THE AMERICAN BISHOPS CALL FOR AN END TO US MILITARY AID : 
In the first week of March 1982, a group of more than 
350 Church leaders called for an end to US military aid to El 
Salvador. It was also reported that the US Ambassador to El 
Salvador, Deane Hinton, had cited the bishop's position as the 
most serious obstacle to the Administration's efforts to increase 
59 military aid to the Salvadorean government. 
The 372 American bishops were understandably influenced by 
the tragedies that had befallen a number of clergy and Church 
workers in El Salvador, including the slaying of liberal 
Archbishop Oscas Arnulfo Romero in March 1980 and the murders 
59. Time, March 8, 1982, p. 15. 
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of four American women missionaries later that year. Right 
wingers were suspected of killing the missionaries. The bishops 
contended that the US must not become too closely identified 
with the Salvadorean government. Notably, Archbishop James A. 
Hickey of Washington in 1981 told the House Subcommittee on 
Inter-American Affairs, our position is to oppose military aid 
and intervention from all outside powers." The bishops, however, 
favoured diplomatic pressure to "stop the flow of arms from Cuba 
through Nicaragua to El Salvador, but simultaneously stated, 
"that we earnestly and vigorously, oppose the sending of US 
military assistance to El Salvador.^^ 
The bishops believed that the weapons would strengthen 
repressive elements in the security forces and drive more aid 
more people into the hills and into the hands of the guerrillas 
Auxiliary Bishop John E. Mc Carthy of Galveston - Honston said 
that these 22 years old rebels were not risking their lives for 
the good of the Soviet Union or Cuba. They were risking their lives 
because they had seen their father murdered, their sisters raped 
and their home burned. He raised fears that the intensity and 
blindness of American policy would produce the opposite effect 
of what lovers of freedom wanted - a situation leading to a 
Communist take-over. The bishops, therefore, asked Washington to 
60. Ibid. 
326 
refrain from massively increasing the destructive capability 
of the armed forces of El Salvador.^^ 
EXODUS FROM EL SALVADOR : 
It is here significant to note that miserable political 
and economic conditions compelled thousands of Salvadoreans 
to leave their own country, A substantial number of Salvadoreans 
have clandestinely crossed the US border patrol check points 
through Rio Grande Valley. Smugglers paid by Salvadoreans help 
them. However, thousands Salvadoreans were often captured in 
•such risky efforts or found dead or nearly dead, condition. Few 
found in the tank of a petroleum distillate trxick, sometimes 
badly dehydrated bodies crammed into a trailer. Sometimes, they 
became lost in range land near Rio Grande city and died. This 
list of such happenings were increasing. In 1981, more then 
15,000 Salvadoreans were intercepted while attempting to enter 
the US illegally across the Mexican border. Thus, with its economy 
virtually prostrated El Salvador's main export was its peop''e. 
In 1982, oflicially some 600,000 Salvadoreans had left for other 
parts of central America, i'<Lexico, and the U.S. Unofficially, 
another 400,000 were believed to had fled. Notably, the US 
government granted the "external voluntary departure" status 
62 to Nicaraguan refugees, but it was denied to Salvadoreans. 
61. Ibid. 
62. Time, March 8, 1982, p. 14. 
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Thus, despite the Administration's assurances, and a 
clearly articulated US policy toward El Salvador turmoil could'nt 
emerge. Real issues and options often lost in rhetoric. The 
exaggerations/ distortions, and even misrepresentations by 
Administration figures created a clear 'credibility gap with 
many in Congress and the public and helped to provoke a wave of 
Counter-rhetoric.^^ 
ADMINISTRATION REVEALED SLOPPY EVIDENCE OF OUTSIDE ARMS SHIPMENTS : 
Facing a credibility gap at home and aboard, the Reagan 
Administration sought to prove that the five raging in El Salvador 
was prmmarily fueled by Soviet sponsored subversion spread by 
Cuban surrogates and the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, 
producing in March 1982 spy-plane pictures, closed door revelations 
of secret intercepts etc. docviments. It might had been the most 
intense national security information compaign since President 
Kennedy went public with graphic documentation of the Cuban 
64 missible threat twenty years ago. 
However, secretary of state Alexander Haig told a Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee in mid-March 1982 that "this situation 
is global in character. The problem is worldwide Soviet inter-
vention sm that poses an unprecedented challenge to the free 
world. Anyone attempting to debate the prospects for a successful 
outcome in El Salvador who fails to consider the Soviet menace 
is dealing with only leg or the trxink of the elephant.^^ 
63. Edward Best,.... op, cit, pp. 39-40. 
64. Time, March 22, 1982, p. 8 
65. Tbid. 
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Significantly, Haig avoided any discussion of El Salvador 
in the State Department's briefing in March 1982 because there 
were not enough classified data available to make a compelling 
case for the outside link in El Salvador unrest. The Administration 
insisted that its evidence of outside arms shipments to the El 
Salvador rebels was based partly on information gathered by 
undercover agents, and could'nt be discussed without compromising 
confidential sources.^^ 
Administration critics in Congress remained skeptical 
about its evidence of outside arms shipments to the El Salvador 
rebels. Even senate Republicans Ghided Haig for the absence 
of proof when he appeared before the Appropriations subcommittee. 
Wisconsin's Robert Kasten said. Your policy is being questioned 
by the American people, and abandoned by friend and toe alike. 
If you have any evidence of outside interference in El Salvador, 
it is imperative it be brought forward. We want to support 
Administration policy, but we find it difficult to do so." 
However, despite its doubts about Administration policy, a House 
Foreign Affairs subcommittee voted in mid March 19 82 to postpone 
action or a bilt that would have prohibited any military aid for 
67 El Salvador. 
In fact, the skepticism on capital Hill was partly a reaction 
to bhe Administration's overblown talk about outside influences 
66. Ibid. p. 11. 
67. Ibid. 
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threatening El Salvador ^et it was also a cause of such 
rhetoric. With its increased but scatter brained role in 
foreign affairs, congress was gradually tended to became a 
troiible some partner for the White House, undermining the 
ability of any Administration to sustain a wherent progress. 
Haig believed that the only way to avoid a paralysis of policy 
was to persuade congressmen that the fate of the VJestern world 
depends on their action. 
REGIONAL AND OUTSIDE STATES ENCOURAGED PEACE EFFORTS : 
There was massive public support in the western bloc 
for a political solution calling for unconditional discussions 
between the major political factions in El Salvador. The West 
German Government and the Socialist International, and Mexican 
French Declaration of August 1981 had also initiated for a 
negotiated settlement calling for talks to be held with the 
68 FDR-FMLN as a representative political force. 
The Central American and the Caribbean states have also 
been actively participated in attempts to manage international 
conflicts within their own regions. Conflict management has 
traditionally characterised by massive foreign influence, parti-
cularly that of the United States, but recent unrest in Central 
America has tended to involve smaller states more directly in 
conflict. It has led them to become more concerned with conflict 
18. Edward Best, op. cit., p. 27. 
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management. A series of proposals has been promoted by the 
minor s. lepublics of Central America aimed at relaxing tension 
and increasing stability and development in Central America and 
the Caribbean area.^^ 
PANAMA : Panama, for instance, has also attempted to resolve 
the armed conflict in El Salvadork by negotiations. The US 
Bowdler Plan was originated and backed by Panama when represen-
tatives of the US State Department and the Democratic Revolutionary 
Front (FDR) of El Salvador held talks on peace initiatives in Tegu-
ciagalpa in January 1981. The plan contained five main points : 
a) an immediate ceasefire, (b) reorganisation of the Salvadorean 
National Guard and a shake-up in the security forces, (c) reorga-
nisation of the Salvadorean government to bring in FDR representa-
tives, (d) elections to be held at a later date; and (e) a 
programme of economic reforms with US help. The FDR later rejected 
70 the ceasefire proposal as a precondition for further negotiations. 
Panama, however, has not ceased in its efforts to pursue 
a politically negotiated agreement for El Salvador. Actually, 
in July 1982, Panama managed to bring the Salvadorean armed 
forces, the opposition and a personal representative of Castow 
to the same table, for an informal meeting where they sought 
69. Victor Millan, ....op. cit,, p. 54. 
70. Ibid., p. 55. 
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I.^TERNAL PRESSURES FOR PEACE TALKS AND THE PERILS OF NEGOTIATIONS: 
As the civil war did worsen in El Salvador, enthusiasm 
did grow in the US to find some new way out of the bloodshed, 
and undefined "negotiated settlement" in place of the elections 
scheduled for March 28, 1982. The sentiment had spread from die 
hard liberals to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 
and had surged increasingly through capital Hill. The House of 
Representatives in the first week of March 1982 voted 396 yia to 
3 for a carefully ledged resolution that sought "unconditional 
discussions" among the warring factions in El Salvador. In 
addttion, 104 Congressmen, including twelve Republicans, signed 
a letter that in effect urged President Reagan to support Mexico's 
73 President Portillo's offer to inaugurate negotiations. 
In addition. Pope Hojn Paul II in March 1982 told thousands 
gathered in St. •'^ eter's Square in Rome that the sins of the El 
Salvador junta have been "no less harsh and severe," than the 
terriorism of rebels. He called for " a common effort without 
foreign exploitation," and advised plomats privately that be 
74 believed negotiations would achieve peace. 
But the Reagan Administration and Duarte regime in El 
Salvador were st^ ed fastly op..osed to talks that might lead to 
73. Time, March 15, 1982, p. 11 
74. Ibid. 
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voluntary power sharing with the militant Marxists among 
the rebels one to US diplomat said." It would be folly to 
negotiate." Thomas Enders said, "^'Negotiations would give the 
leftist minority a share of power it can not win on the battle 
75 field or earn at the ballot box. 
In fact, the two sides on the issue of negotiations 
started with widely differing assumptions American backers 
of negotiations argued that giving the rebels some share of 
power was the only way to achieve a truce and thus stop the 
killings. The settlement supporters also invoked the American 
traditions of compromise and consensus, and argued that 
negotiations could produce a tolerant, pluralistic government. 
Democrat Congressman Michael Barnes of Marybnd, Chairman of 
the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter. American 
Affairs insisted, "We can go to the table knowing what we 
will not concede - ultimate power. To say the only outcome 
is a Marxist - Lininst Dectatorship is absurd." Senator 
Gary Hart, Democrat from Colorado added, "I am not wildly 
optimistic about negotiations working, but at least we could 
7 6 honest brokers rather than military promoters. 
Many proponents of quick settlement argued that a 
chancy compromise was better than a sure loss - that the longer 
75. Ibid. 
76. Ibid. 
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fighting continues/ the more likely the left is to win. Suppor-
ters further warned that if the militant Right-wingers gain 
power at the polls, they may trigger an even more brutal 
civil war of resistance. Underlying these arguments was a 
widespread liberal presumption that the rebels were the most 
77 representative group in El Salvador. 
Notably, the revolution in Nicoragua was settled by 
negotiations in 1979 in which the Marxist Sandinista guerrilla, 
who had driver dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle into exile, 
agreed to share power with the moderates. However, later 
78 moderates were forced out of office, or quit in frustration. 
Besides, a negotiated settlement, it was hoped that 
elections of 60 seat constituent Assembly in March, 1982 that 
will frame a new constitution, name an interim president and 
prepare for national elections, would put the PDC in power 
which would satisfy domestic critics and appear a plausible 
79 centrist alternative in El Salvador. 
VIOLENCE INCREASED BEFORE MARCH 1982 ELECTIONS : 
Near the ' elections date. Government troops and 
Right-wing death-squads committed intensive brutalities 
77. Ibid. 
78. Detailed discussion is in the next chapter 
79. Edward Best, op. cit., p. 40. 
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particularly in rural area where guerrillas were most active. 
The guerrillas had control on strategic 62 mile stretch 
of Pacific Beach and room freely through most of the country-
side. In such circumstances, the relevance of the election 
8 0 results as a real will of the people might be questioned. 
A Canadian Professor Mr. Alison Acker visited the El 
Salvador before the elections. He received reply by a Salvadorean 
in his inquiry, how he felt about the elections and whether 
Salvadoreans believed elections would help,"If the White House 
told us to have elections next weak, we'd have them. Why should 
we care? It's the Yankees who want them and they'll have them. 
We'll vote as usual^ and as usual, we know that'll be a fraud".^^ 
Thu-s, as the March 82 elections was drawn nearer, it 
was seemed certain that both the violence and the outcry it 
produced could only grow greater in El Salvador Major Aubuisson, 
an ultrarightist, asserted before the elections that it might 
"justifiably" be necessary to kill 1,00,000 to 2,00,000 peoole 
82 to bring "peace" to El Salvador. 
80. Trouble on Two Fronts, Time, December 12, 1983. 
81. El Salvador Now, The Canadian Forum, Vol. LXIII, No. 732, 
October 1983. 
82. Coper Marc and Lover, Ronnie, Election Eve in El Salvador," 
Village Voice, March 30, 1982. p. 119, quoted in Monthly 
Review, May 1982, p. 26. 
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GUERRILLAS CAPABILITY TO STRIKE WAS INCREASING AND US REACTIONS: 
In response of the killings, the guerrillas were fighting 
in their own way Members of the Marxist dominated Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in February 1982 slipped 
under cover of darkness among the open hangers at El Salvador's 
heavily guarded Ilopango military airport. They placed explosive 
charges around some of the country's fleet of venerable fighter 
aircraft and 14 US-built UH-IH "Huey" helicopters and about 
Q -a 28 aircraft. 
The Ilopango bomb blasts had echoes in Washington, where 
the Reagan Administration was the principal backer of El 
Salvador's President Joee Napoleon Duarte. Following the raid, 
the State Department declared that We must be prepared to 
increase our economic and our military assistante to El Salvador 
as necessary. We are presently reassessing needs on an urgent 
, . 84 ba s1s. 
GUERRILLAS STRATEGY : The FMLN, in fact, launched attacks on 
Salvador military positions in various parts of the country. 
The guerrillas were not trying to gain and hold large areas 
of territory. They were not capable of doing so, and in any 
83. Time, February 8, 1982, p. 26. 
R4. Ibid. 
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case their strategy was evidently to kill as many soldiers 
as possible, exploit the army's human rights abuses, and 
disrupt the economy and the upcoming elections. In January 
1982, the insurgents had aimed at destroying or dominating 
transportation and communication links. They had been highly 
successful. In August 1981, up to 75 percent of the country 
was without electricity at one time or another due to guerrilla 
attacks. El Salvador's gross national product, which grew by 
4.4 percent as recently as 1978, shrank by 19.5 percent in 
1981. A decline in world prices for such exports as 6offee, 
cotton and sugar was a factor in the slump, but the war 
had brought new investment to a halt and driven many business-
B5 men to close their doors and flee the country. 
The guerrillas, therefore, were also trying to ruin 
the country's economy in order to cause chaos that they could 
further exploit. They made bridges, power stations, electrical 
pylons their targets. Their strategy was succeeding, between 
$ 700 million cind $ 1 billion in private capital has fled El 
Salvador, another $ 1 billion in commercial credits has been 
8 6 withdrawn by nervous bankers. 
•i-^ espite the guerrilla attacks, the military situation 
in El Salvador was in e f ect a standoff. The guerrillas v/ere 
85. Time, February 15, 1982, pp. 7-8. 
86. Time, March, 15, 1982. 
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Q-j 
running short of military hardware, though the Reagan 
Administration had made frequent accusations that significant 
numbers of weapons were being cladestinely supplied to the 8 8 
guerrillas by Nicaragua. According to some leftist sources, the 
main reason the insurgents failed to launch 4n expected offensive 
in mid-January 1982 was that their ammunition stocks could"nt 89 sustain both a major attack and a longer range war of attrition. 
^^otably, there was initially/ a lack of professionalism 
among the rebels. The FMLN was an irregular peasant army. Many 
of the FMLN fighters were landless labourers who treated them 
them worse than cattle, because they were less "valuable" 
90 than the livestock. 
WEAKNESS OF SALVADOREAN ARMY : The Salvadorean army also was 
plagued by lack of air transport coranunications equipment and 
non-commissed officers. In October 1980, the US sent its 
first military advisers to El Salvador to improve the local 
army's antiguerrilla capabilities. In Janvary 1982, the 
US began a basic training programme for some 1,500 Salvadorean 
troops at Fort Bragg, N.C., and Fort Benning, Ga. ^t w.^ s the 
largest programme of its kind undertaken by the US to train 
91 foreign troops on domestic soil. 
87. See, "US Accused by Salvadoreans," New York Times, 
March 22, 1982, p. 8. 
88. _Tinie, February 15, 1982, p. 8, also see. 
89. US Accused by Salvadoreans,"New York Times. March 22, 
1982, p. 8. 
90. Monthly Review, May 1982, p. 19. 
Time, February 15, 1982, p. 8. 
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THE US MILITARY TRAINING TO SALVADOREAN TROOPS : 
A continent of 900 or so Salvadorean soldiers arrived 
at Fort Bragg in mid-February 1982 to leam the skills of a 
US Army light - infantry battalian. The four month intensive 
course, (the equivalent of almost a full year's training 
for US tropps) was aimed at helping the Salvadoreans operate 
in co-ordinated fashion as a large-scale military unit. Notably, 
some 600 other Salvadorean trainees, who arrived at Fort 
Benning in the first week of February 1982, were given a 
combined 14 week basic training and officer candidate course. 
The aim of this training was to build leadership qualities 
and to learn tactics like military operations in an urban 
terrain," meaning, among other things, the proper techniques 
92 for house to house searches. 
It is significant to note that the leftist guerrillas were 
under the political command of a man know as Federico, who 
had a shrewd assessment of the Salvadorean army's strengths 
and weaknesses. He admitted, "The US had made a significant 
difference. "He added, "The technical abilities of the airmy are 
not great, although the bombs and artillery are really improved. 
The American training is visibly in special units, but on the 
ground the army is still not very good. The basic pcoblem 
with the majority is morale. Vie can move anywhere. We are 
not going to fight a war of positions. There are too many 
92. Tbid. 
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"93 targets of opportunity. 
The US military training was beneficial for El 
Salvador in the medium and long term, but Washington did 
hope for more immediate political benefits from its policies 
regarr''ir.q March 28, 1982 presidential elections. The voting 
results were expected to be contentious, since all left-wing 
parties had announced a boycott of the proceedings in order to 
protest their exclusion from a share in political power 
Thus, there was only eight parties in the fray, most of them 
far to the Right of President Duarte's Christian Democrats. 
It was believed that the guerrilla forces, who had control 
of some 30 Salvadorean municipalities, will do their utmost 
94 to disrupt the roting through intimidation or armed attacks. 
FIGHTING AT GUAZAPA BEFORE THE ELECTIONS : 
It became evident when the harsh fighting between 
El Salvador's army and the insurgents took place at Guazapa few 
days before the March elections, a bort 15 miles from the 
country's capital San Salvador. A guerrilla contingent had 
allegedly turned Guazapa into a formidable stronghold. About 
150C government soldiers swarmed around the rugged, inactive 
valcano of Guazapa. They pounded the area with heavy artillery, 
while support aircraft including the US helicopters rained 
down phosphorous bombs and 100 lb and 500 lb high explosive 
charges. The attack aircraft were hit by heavy ground fire 
93. Time, March 15, 1982, p. 9. 
94. Time, February 15, 1982, p. 8. 
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from machine, guns. In the fighting the army claimed to have 
suffered 16 dead and 31 wounded but casulty toll was substantially 
95 
highly. A TI^ iE photographer Harry Mattison, who witnessed 
the fighting, said that "dead bodies were being stacked like 
logs. The army decided to hit a wasps nest and was heavily 
stungV^^ 
The US political and military analysts were increasingly 
pessimistic about the corrosive psychological effects of the 
drawnout fighting on the armed forces that buttressed the 
civilian-military government of El Salvador. A senior US 
military analysist said that we were trying our dannedest to 
keep this enthusiasm up. Significantly, a high ranking US 
specialist on central America warned, that the momentum has 
gone, and we are within inches of losing control over the 
situation entirely. 
GRIM NATURE OF EVENTS IN EL SALVADOR : 
In fact, in an atmosphere of terror and repression, 
critical Constituent Assembly elections of March 28 were 
going to be s'-^ onsored in El Salvador in order to prove legitimacy 
to the repressive Duarte's regime. The consequences of the 
war showed themselves on the city's dark underside-burglars and 
stick up artists who once carried knives as weapons had 
95. Time, March 8, 1982, p. 14. 
96. See Time, March 15, 1932, p. 10. 
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obtained machine guns and grenades. Every day human rights 
workers used to patrol San Salvador's poorer neighbourhoods 
to look for corpses left in the streets by maruanding death 
squads whose member were often reported to belong to the 
Salvadorean security forces. In addition, the Salvadorean 
middle and upper classes seemingly adopted a totalistic 
97 disregard for the coming elections. 
US FAVOURED DUARTE IN MARCH 82 ELECTIONS-CONSIDERED CRUCIAL 
FOR ESTABLISHING DEMOCRACY : 
The US policy-makers, however, were counting heavily 
on the elections to augment the power and authority of Salva-
98 
dorean civilians, notably President Duarte, in dealing with 
the militant left and the paramilitary Right. A Duarte victory 
in the 1982 elections, the US Administration assumed, would 
give his Christian Democrats a major say in redigning El 
Salvador's political constitution and would also help dispel 
the suspicion that Duarte was critically dependent on the 99 powerful local obligarchy. 
97. Tin e, March 8, 1982, p. 14. 
98. Torecall, Duarte, a longtime opponent of the right-wing 
landowners and military figures, who had dominated El 
Salvador for decades, was installed as Presicent only 
after a "progressive" military coup in October 1979. 
99. Time, February 15, 1982, p. 8. 
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RISING INFLUENCE OF AUBUISSON AND US NERVOUSNESS : 
Thus/ the Christian Democrats were still the favourites 
for Washington in the election but an ominuous dark house 
party was gaining popularity fast. That group was ARENA ( the 
Spanish acronyn for National Republican Alliance)/ an ultra-
rightist organisation headed by suave and ruthless Roberto 
D' Aubuisson, a former Salvadorean national guard intelligence 
officer. 
But, Washington did hope that the March 28 elections 
will produce a solid majority for President Duarte's moderate 
Christian Demorcats. A veteran politician, who returned from 
exile and joined the junta, Duarte's victory was essential 
to the political solution that US policy-rmakers were banking on. 
Roberto d' Aubuisson was assumed capable to sap Duarte's 
strength in the assembly. His victory it was believed in 
Washington, would be a blow to US aims in El Salvador and 
would increase the slaughter that had killed morethan 30,000 
Salvadoreans since 1979. However, Duarte did his best to drum up 
enthusiasm for the election. 
In spite of its high stakes, an important question 
hanging over the Salvadorean election was whether enough 
voters will turn out to give the results any real- legitimacy. 
There was considerable public skepticiBm about the electoral 
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process in a country where the military had stolen or manipulated 
elections since 1931. 
US ROLE AFTER MARCH 82 ELECTIONS RESULTS THAT PROVED 
INCONCLUSIVE : 
The PDC cound'nt win a majority in March 28, 1982 
elections. The constituent Assembly was dominated by the Right, 
and presided over by Aubuisson. However, the prospect of a 
Right-wing coalition government presided over by the in famous 
D' Aubuisson, was averted by a burst of proconsular activity 
by the US Embassy and a letter from Haig threatening to cut 
off aid.lOl 
The members of El Salvador's newly elected Constituent 
102 
Assembly chosen Avaro Alfedo Magana by a rote of 36 to 17 
While his backer portrayed him as a competent moderate, his 
enemies in the ultraright National Republic Alliance denounced 103 him as the bic^gest thief in El Salvador. 
US PRODDING WITH SALVADOREAN ARMY : 
Magana's election was port of a compromise worked out 
by the major political parties after strong prodding from the 
Salvadorean military and the US embassy. The same agreement 
100, Time, March 29, 1982, p. 28 
101. See, Edward Best,.... p. 41. 
102. He studied economics at the University of Chicago from 1915 
to 1955, and Subsequently worked for the 'Washington based 
organisation of American States. 
103, Time, May 10, 1982, p. 22. 
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also led to the election of three Vice Presidents instread 
of one- Representing the largest parties in the Assembly, 
they were Raul Molina Martinez of the rightist National 
Conciliation Party (PCN), Gabriel Mauricio Gutierrez Castro 
of ARENA, and Pablo Mawicio Alvergene of the Centrist 
Christian Democrats. The result gave at least the appearance 
of a political consensus. US Ambassador Deane Hinton declared, 
"A government of natio.ial unity is good news for El Salvador 
104 Democracy is at work. 
But, it was a fragile democracy of by zantine complexity 
that put Magna in the Presidential Palace, The selection of 
a provisional head of state capped a month of cutthroat 
political manoeurring that began with the March 28 election 
for a constituent Assembly. That ballot had given 40 percent 
of the popular vote to the Christian Democrats, let by out-
going junta President Duarte and as already mentioned, 
supported by the US for its progressive land and banking 
reforms. But a right-wing coalition headed by ARENA and the 
PCN won control of 34 of the Assembly's 60 seats and boldly 
moved to seize pov;er. It gave, therefore, the assembly presidency 
to ARENA Leader Rober to D. Aubuinsson, a former major with 
alleged links to the coutitry's notorious death squads. ^ ^^ 
104. Ibid. 
105. Ibid. 
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The right's relentless drive for total control 
of the new government was blocked by the US, as briefly 
mentioned earlier. The US pressure had convinced the country's 
military commanders that a rightist monopoly of the most 
important jobs in the government might cause congress to 
cut off military aid VJithout Washington's largerse, which 
was expected to total $362 million in 1982, the military 
would be homstrung in its fight against the leftist guerrillas 
seeking to topple the government. The Salvodorean Generals, 
therefore, insisted on a respectable moderate as provisional 
President. Their preferred candidate was Magana, who was also 
acceptable to the US and to a faction of the PCN, the old 
political arm of the military regimes that ruled the country 
from 1961 until the October 1979 coup that ultimately brought 
outgoing President Duarte's civilian-military junta to power. 
The Salvadorean army commanders in response to US 
prodding, steeped up their pressure in favour of Magana's 
election. Aubuission and other political leaders were 
summoned to high command headquarters and bluntly warned 
that the military might mount a coup if the Right did'nt 
go alongwith the army's demands Faced with that ultimatum, 
the politicians quickly hammered together the deal that led 
106. Ibid 
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to the election of ^agana, and his three Vice Presidents. 
Notably, Magana's nomination by the army reportedly did 
stem from his practice of givin'j preferential interest 
rates to military offices during his 17 years as President 
107 of El Salvador's Banco Hipotecario. 
But even after the March electioBS, the killings 
of innocent civilians continued. The US tbreat in this * 
regard, in fact, carried only limited weight. 
US POLICY IN DILEMMA : 
The US Administratiop, in fact, followed a low 
enthusiasm for the Salvadoreans reforms. It's vociferous 
108 
commitment to drawing the line, against communism in 
El Salvador had an inevitable political impact in the country's 
politics itself. The credibility of US assertions of the 
need to end abuses, and its pressure on local anti-communists 
was undermined by statements issued by some Administration 
officials about the mistake of excessive conditionality, 109 
the vital importance of aid, and the need to avoid the 
mistake of treating El Salvador in its own local terms and 
to deal with this issue as a global problem of International 
107. Ibid. 
108. See, William M. Leogrande, "A Splendid little War, 
Drawing the Line in El Salvador," International Security, 
Summer 1981, pp. 27-52. 
109. See, Edward Best, op. cit. p. 42. 
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Communism. This w-s tie reason that when the US threatened 
to cut off aid if the abuses do not stiop, even the ultra-
rightists were convinced that there would never be a real 
cutoff of aid,"Reagan will never let the Communists win here 
111 
^t's just a complete bluff. However, the US Ambassador 
declared that if there was no substantial progress in human 
rights situation in El Salvador,"the United States, in spite of 
our other interests, in spite of our commitment in the struggle 
against communism, could be forced to deny assistance to El 
Salvador! 
Thus, the US policy including the Salvadoreans, was in real 
dilemma. Sulvadoreans would seem to be the more likely to 
respond to aid restrictions and threats, the greater the 
insurgent threat, and thereby the greater the importance to 
them of the aid. But the greater the insurgent threat, the 
less likely the US would seem to be cut off aid, and thereby 
the less convincing the pressures.^^^ 
110. Washington Post, March, 14, 1982; also see, Washington 
Post, April 24, 1982. 
111. Washington post, April 24, 1982, 
112. International ^erald Tribune - November 1, 1982. 
113. Ldward Best, op. cit., p. 42. 
114. Ibid. 
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EL SALVADOR RECEIVED MI. ITARY ASSISTANCE OTHER THAN THE 
US : 
However, El Salvador, like most of Latin America, 
had in the 1970s increasingly acquired military equipment 
from sources other than the US. The core of the Air Force 
consisted of old French-manufactured jet aircraft brought from 
Israel, from which El Salvador had purchased some 80 percent 
of its aims imports between 1972 and 1980.^^^ 
§ 
Notedly, in 1981-82, outright military victory by either 
side did'nt appear immenent. The Salvadorean military did'nt 
then believe that the guerrillas pased a threat to their 
survival^^® While the US assumed that if El Salvador falls, 
no country in Central America would be safe and American 
security would be affected. 
US SECURITY AT STAKE : 
The U.S. policy makers presumed that US cculd'nt defend 
her borders and meet her commitments around the world without 
a secure Western Hemisphere. The Reagan Administration warned 
the American people that for the first time in memory, the 
Americans did face real danger on their border and must protect 
117 the safety and security of the country. 
115. Edward Best, op. cit. p. 43. 
116. Ibid. 
117. See, Three Senate Democrats Criticise Briefing by CIA 
on Caribbean,"Washington Post,December,19Rl. 
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118 Thus, President Reagan revived the old domino theory 
in considering El Salvador as a strategic fiDontier for the 
defense of the West. 
The US Administration made it clear that it intended 
to draw a line in El Salvador, as part of its view that Soviet-
Cuban backed subversion lies behind armed insurrection in the 
Western Hemisphere. The US policy-makers raised the question 
that if El Salvador was captured by a violent minority, who 
in Central America would not lisxe in fear? How long would it be 
before strategic US interest were at risks? 
In spite of continuing agony and murder of people in 
El Salvador, therefore, the US continued economic and military 
aid to El Salvador. There was/little doubt that Salvadorean 
security forces were involved in large number of brutal murders. 
However, the Reagan Administration concluded that political 
violence in El Salvador has declined in 1981. The US Admini-
stration began, particularly after March 1982 elections, to 
give more attention to present a convincing appearance of 
progress toward peace and democracy and played a key role in 
signing a pact in August 1982 between the three ruling parties 
the PDC, the National Conciliatit^n Party (PCN) , and Aubuisson's 
ARENA. The seven point agreement established political, human 
rights and peace committees to supervise its execution A new 
118. The Theory, that if, the first in a line of standing 
dominees falls it knocks down all tie others in the row, was 
first implemented by the US government to justify American 
engagement in South East Asia during the Vietnam war. 
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Constitution was to be ready for 1983/ and Presidential elections 
11 Q held in 1984. 
CONCLUSION : 
In El Salvador, the armed forces are in complete charge 
of the nation: politics and administration. The fighting 
between El Salvador's army and some 4,000 to 6,000 Marxist led 
guerrillas is growing bloodies. Neither side could score a 
decisive victory, but the guerrillas were increasingly able to 
launch strikes in the countryside. The slaughter in this civil 
war has killed 4 0 thousand Salvadoreans. 
The endemia- violence in El Salvador,the tiny and heavily 
populated country, mainly attributed to the government's own 
security forces, especially right-wing security forces were 
blamed for many of the country's political killings. Although, 
the rebels too have been responsible for many random shootings 
but most victims of the violence have apparently died at the 
hands of security forces. 
As various human rights organisations began to assail 
the US for supporting the El Salvador governments the Administra-
tion took a tough stand, arguing that El Salvador occppied an 
1 8 . Edward Best, op. cit., p. 27. 
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important place in East-West struggle for dominance in Latin 
America Therefore, it believed that to withhold assistance at 
this point would be to abandon El Salvador. The US Adminis-
tration had fear that any slackening of US support might lead to 
a major opportunity in Central America for Soviet sponsored 
Cuba, abetted by the neighbouring Marxist dominated Sandinista 
regime in Nicaragua US policy was, therefore, to aid and 
encourage the Salvadorean government in its anti-guerrilla 
efforts. The Reagan Administration was sharply critical of 
the Marxist-dominated Nicaragua, which the Administration 
accused of sending army to the Salvadorean guerrillas. 
The Reagan's domino thesis, therefore, that if El 
Salvador falls, central America will collapse under communist 
sway, believe that the US national security is at stake in Cen-
tral America. The US has projected an image that the Americans 
are fighting with the communists and Soviet threat in Central 
America. The US Administration, in this attempt, has identified 
the American interests with the interests of the Salvadorean 
government. 
The Heagan Administration/ however has promised that it 
would never send American troops in El Salvador. But, specially 
since 1980, the US has been drawn steadily into the internal 
affairs of El Salvador. The US military and economic aid has, 
in fact, fostered increasing dependency, and the large scale 
military aid may lead to ti.e Salvador amied forces continuing 
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to ignore political reality. 
However, El Salvadors March 28,1982 constituent 
Assembly elections was seen in Washington as a crucial step 
toward returning the country to full civilian rule. But the 
legitimacy of that elections, in keeping view of El Salvador's 
political environment in mind, was doubtful. Nothing really 
changed, as the elections proved inconclusive. The death till 
continued to mount before and even after the elections. Then 
an average of 200 to 400 people a week were killed in bottle 
or by paramilitary death squads, whose members often came from 
the Salvador's security forces. 
Various outside countries, other than the United 
states/ have been honestly working for a political solution 
of civil war in El Salvador. The leading regional states and 
the Central American States have requested a systematic dialogue 
between the interested parties and a genuine readiness to grant 
mutual concessions without abandoning essential principles 
and legitimate interests W. Germany, Sweden, Mexico, Venezuela, 
costa Rica, Panama, and even Nicaragua, for instance, have 
searched for an acceptable meclanism to initiate the negatiations 
But the US administration has consistently maintaining 
a confrontational por.ture with the leftists. It saw serious 
drawbacks for the US in any negotiated settlement with the 
guerrillas. The US policy-pmakers believed that it would give 
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the guerrillas power that they had won neither on the bottle 
field nor at the ballot box. Negotiations would \indicate 
guerrilla war fare by abandominq the principle that an insur-
gency should'nt be allowed to force a government to the bargaining 
table by means of violence. The talks, the US believed, would 
also be found to increase the momentum for an eventual leftist 
triumph. The US Administration also assumed that a negotiated 
settlement would underciet the US position in the East-West 
struggle with the Soviet Union. It would be a proof that the 
leading power in the West could'nt find a way to protect a 
friendly ally at close hand. 
In addition, the US Administration also believed that 
it would have little chance of persuading right-wing elements 
to agree to a settlement that would include the guerrillas. The 
rightists in El Salvador would certainly see negotiations as 
being a prelude to their political defeat and possible exter-
mination. The US experts who had been studying the increasing 
frustration, belligerence and obstinacy of the right in Central 
America did fear the ultraconservatives might join in an alliance 
against the left, creating an international ideological war 
in Central Americal. The US policy makers, significantly, 
were convinced that El Salvador was by no means a lost cause. 
Thus, the US Administration was, in fact, could'nt believe in 
negotiations. For, it did fear that a negotiated settlement 
would lead inevitably to a Marxist-Leninst takeover in El 
Salvador. 
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Above all, the US policy requires to recognise that 
everything has changed in Central America. The US, of course 
has a vital interest in Central America's future that interest, 
in fact, will ultimately depend on forming a genuine partner-
ship with the countries of the region. 
But, Reaganisation of Central America has resulted in 
the -ultimate importance of a country that is forcedto act 
out somebody's else drama, and hide its own. What is happening 
in El Salvador is now decided by the White House. It is the 
US dollars that pay the army and prop up a bankrupt economy of 
El Salvador. 
Reagan policy has revealed his intentions that United 
states will more readily intervene to prevent hostile government 
in the region'. The political objective of the United States 
is to keep as many as the Central America and the Caribbean 
countries as her client states. 
* * * * * 
^.Railway =Pan-American Highi^ay 
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CHAPTER ~ VIII 
THE U.S. POLICY THRUSTS IN NICARAGUA AFTER THE FALL OF 
SOMOZA'S DYNASTIC RULE 
Nicaragua is the largest of the Central American 
nations with an area of 57,143 square limes. It is stret-
ched froirt the Atlantic to the Pacific and adjoins El 
Salvador. Nicaragua is bordered to the north by Honduras 
and to the South by Costa Rica. 
It is well known that war and revolution are nothing 
new to Central America. On July 19, 1979, the Sandinista 
movement after 19 month old civil war in Nicaragua overthrew 
the entrenched 46-year reign of the Somoza dictatorship and 
established a 'socialist-oriented' revolutionary government 
1 
in Nicaragua, Obviously, the U.S. immediately recognised 
new regime as a left-wing dictatorship. 
1. During civil war, Nicaragua was a country in agony. 
Thousands died in the fierce fighting between Somoza and 
the Sandinistas. The fighting had involved virtually every 
city and town in the country. More than 3,00,000 people 
fled from the fighting. Some escaped into the countryside. 
In course of civil war, out of the total population of 
2.3 million over 40,000 were killed, 80,000 were crippled 
and 40,000 children under 10 were made orphans. Nicaragua 
last a third of its gross product. See, S.I. Semyonor, 
Fundamentals of Marsist-Leninlst Theory and Tactics of 
Revolutionary Parties, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1985, 
p. 301. 
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2 Somoza fled to the U.S. into exile. It was as if 
"a giant weight had been lifted of Nicaragua's back." 
The Somoza family had dominated and exploited Nicaragua 
to promote own family interests. 
SOMOZA'S LEGACY OF GREED : 
Somoza and his men looted $500 million from the country's 
banks, leaving Nicaragua With only $3.5 million in reserves 
and more than $600 million in foreign debt to be paid by the 
4 end of the year 1979. 
Tacho somoza fled Nicaragua for his $1 million home-in-
exile in Miami Beach.^ He had managed $20 million out of his 
$100 million fortune to stash outside the country. Most valuati*-! 
ons of the dynasty's holdings were between $500 million and 
$1 billion, they included Nicaragua's national airline, Lanica, 
it's major shipping company, the Mamenic Line, perhaps 25 percent 
2. The U.S. has often supported right-wing dictatorships. 
In the same year right wing dictator and a friend of 
U.S., Shah Mohammed Raza Pahlavi of Iran was swept into 
exile by largely home grown revolution. 
3. Time, July 30, 1979, p. 20. 
4. Ibid. 
5. However, later he went to Bahamas but after some time 
expelled from there. Then he turned up in Paraguay. In 
the past, Paraguay has provided hospitality to such 
celebrated exiles as Argentina's late dictator. Juan 
peron and Nazi deqth DoctorJosef Mengele. 
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of it's best farmland and an array of other enterprises.^ 
Soraoza empire grew from a modest beginning. When he 
seized power in 1973, Tacho's father Anastasio Somoza Garcia, 
had only a near bankrupt coffee farm to his name. Little by 
little, he added to his holdings. By the time of his assa-
7 ssination in 1956, Somoza Garcia was worth about $150 million. 
Thus, since General Anastasio Somoza, who set up 
a dictatorship in Nicaragua just three years after the 
evaluation of the United States marines in 1933, the family 
had gradually accumulated vast commercial and agricultural 
y 
holdings and consequently made the somozas one of the 
8 wealthiest families in the Americas. 
THE HISTORY OF THE SANDINISTA MOVEMENT : 
The Sandinista movement gradually emerged from the 
social and economic injustice in Nicaraguan society. Nicaragua's 
underprivileged workers and peasants were organised in 1926 
6. Time, August 6, 1979, p. 41. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Theie was striking parallels between the revolution in 
Cuba and in Nicaragua. The FSLN's slogan, FREE THE 
FATHERLAND OR DIE, was the battle cry of Nicaragua's 
legendary re^el leader of the 1930's Augusto Sandino. 
It had inspired the Castroite catch phrase, FATHERLAND 
OR DEATH. See, Time, July 30, 1979, p. 20. 
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under Augusto Cesar Sandino, a legendary nationalist 
guerrilla. Under his assassination in 1934 on the order of 
Somoza's father, Sandino led a great struggle fighting in 
the mountains and occupying several parts of the state, but 
Sandino's movement virtually disappeared after his death. 
The struggle was lifted up again in 1962 by carlos Fonseca 
9 Amador, a Cuban trained guerrilla, who formed the Sandinista 
Liberation Front' (FSLN),^^ with the main object of over-
11 
throwing the Somoza government . This was attained after 
a protracted guerrilla war lasting 18 years. However 
Nicaragua's embattled President General Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle tried hard to get US, support but could'nt sustain it. 
9. He was stain by Somoza's tropps in 1977. 
U 10. Within the FSWN, three main factions emerged from the 
infighting. Of these, two make no apology for being 
unbashedly Marxist, But the third and largest group, 
known as the "Terceristas" (Insurrectionists), is composed 
of socialist, Roman Catholic liberals, trade unionist 
and even a few businessman. 
Financed by socialists in Europe and South America, 
the "Terceristas' staged the most spectacular Sandinista 
operations including brief take over of the National 
Palace in Managua in 1978. The best known 'Tercerista' is 
Eden Pastora, the Commandante Cero (Zero) who led that 
raid. More influential are the ^rtega brothers, Humberto 
and Daniel, who represented the 'Terceristas' on the 
nine-man sandinista National Directorate. Daniel Ortega 
later became the President of Nicaragua, For further 
details, see, "Who Are the Sandinistas,", Time, July 2, 
1979, p. 23, 
11. Since 1934, the Sandinista's ranks had swelled in 1979 
to 3,000 or so battle hardened fighters armed with In 
assortment of modem weapons. 
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SOMOZA LOST US, SUPPORT : 
General Somoza, fighting the last battle with the 
Sandinistas, made appeal for the US to 'pay back the help 
we gave in the cold war," referring to the launching areas 
that Nicaragua provided for the illfated Bay of Pigs invasion 
in 1961. Instead, Secretary of state, Cyrus Vance urged the 
OAS to bring about 'the replacement of the present government 
with a transitional government of national reconciliation 
that would be a clear break with the past." He further 
proposed in his six point plan that the OAS dispatch a peace 
keeping force, which might include some US troops, to restore 
order to the divided country. Vance's plan also included a 
cessation of all arms shipments to both somoza forces and the 
rebels, and a major international relief and reconstruction 
efforts.^^ 
Mr. Vance's plan was aimed in part at preventing the 
creation of a Cuban-style communist government in Nicaragua. 
Mr. Vance even declared,"There is mounting evidence of 
involvement by Cuba and others in the internal problems of 
Nicaragua." In response, Cuba accused the US of "pressuring 
several Latin American diplomatic representatives to come 
to an agreement in the OAS that would facilitate a military 
Time, July 2, 1979, p. 28. 
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intervention in Nicaragua " in order to preserve the 
essence and basis of the bloody and corrupt neocolonial 
13 regime dominated by the US", 
The US plan was attacked by other OAS members. Some 
feared that this might create a precedent for future inter-
14 vention in their own affairs. 
Thus, there was a growing recognition in Washington 
that the civil war in Nicaragua could not be stopped as long 
as Somoza would reign. 
THE SOMOZA REGIME EXPERIENCED GRADUAL DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION : 
Somoza's gradual diplomatic isolation as well as his 
deteriorating military position led his regime to complete 
collapse. The first setback came when the Andean Group - Ecuador, 
Peru, Bolina, Colombia, and Venezuela - abandoned it's efforts 
in July to negotiate a truce in the pre-revolution civil war. 
The : five countries declared that a state of beligerency 
existed in Nicaragua and that they considered the Sandinistas 
to be "a legitimate army". Significantly, the declaration 
_ j_bid. 
14. Nicaraguan past two is the history of US interventions. The 
US Administration consistently regarded its ' legitimate 
right to intervene in Latin America as and when it so desired 
Since 1909, the United States has tried hard to install a 
loyal government in Nicaragua.Tor this purpose,the US 
intervened in 1909 to establish a government of conservative 
oligarchs in the country, following a secret note it sent 
to the Nicaraguan government informing it of the invocation 
of American right to intervene these as and when they so 
desired. In 1914, the US secretary . of state Brian imposed 
the Chomorrow - Brian Treaty which virtually mortgaged 
Nicaraguan sovereignty to the United States. Notably, 
Nicaragua was used by the US to intervene in Costa Rica in 
1948. In 1954, the US mercenaries used Nicaraguan territory ' 
to bring down the government of Jacabo Arbenz of Guatemala. 
Again in 1965, Nicaragua was used as a base to train counter-
revolutionaries to destabilish castro regime in Cuba. 
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was designed to allow the group to supply arms to the rebels 
without violating international laws against intervention 
in the internal affairs of another country. It also brought 
them one step closer toward outright recognition of the five-
member" temporary government' of Sandinistas and moderate 
anti-Somoza leaders named by the rebels in June 1979.^^ 
At first, Somoza stalled apprantly hoping that his 
powerfully armed 12,000 member national guard might still 
severse the tide of battle. He even rejected U.S. attempts 
to persuade him to make modest reforms. But in mid-July, he 
realised that further resistance was futile. He agreed, after 
complicated negotiations between his decaying regime, the US 
and the five men anti-'Somoza junta, to the rebel junta's 
plan for turning over power to the new regime. Thus, ended, 
ingloriously, the 46-year reign of the Somoza dynasty.^^ 
SOMOZA'S OFFICERS PLANNED THEIR GATEWAYS : 
Significantly, Somoza placed all his high ranking 
"Guardia" officers with 30 years or more service on the 
retirement list, particularly anticipating his certain 
downfall. That step allowed them to immediately abandon 
their commands and seek refuge in the U.S. or Elsewhere 
in Latin America. Finally, they were called into a post-
15. Time, July 2, 1979, p. 22. 
16. Time, July 30, 1979, p. 20. 
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midnight session. They unanimously accepted Somoza's 
resignation and conferred the former Health Minister Francisco 
Urc«yo MalianO/ symbolic of the presidence, 
MALIANO'S SHORTLIVED POKER PLAY AND THE US RESPONSE : 
In Managua, Urcuyo started firend and foe alike by 
delivering a belligerent speech in which he rowed to 
complete the remaining two years of Somoza's term. In his 
instructions, newly appointed "Guardia" Commander Frederico 
Mejia Gonzales orderd his troops to "redouble your efforts 
18 in the current fight". 
Urcuyo's unexpected power play set off tremors in 
Washigton.State Department officials feared that the tenuous 
relations they had established with the junta would be 
destroyed if the transition did not take places on schedule. 
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned that 
if Urcv^yo could not be persuaded to step down immediately, 
Somoza would no longer be welcome in the US. Somoza 
telephoned Urcuyo and ordered him to go along with the 
transition plan.. Urcuyo realised that his scheme had been 
a big mistake. Soon, he flew to Guatemala and asked for asylum. 
By the time, the rebel government arrived in Managua, 
17. Ibid, p. 21. 
18. Ibid, pp. 21-22. 
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^^esistance had evaporated. 
US DILEMMA AND THE RIGHT WING DICTATORSHIP : 
The sudden and ignominious Collapse of the Somoza 
dynasty alongwith of Pahlayi's in Iran came as a shock to 
19 
Americans. The spectacles in Nicaragua did not fit the 
pattern that Americans have grown used to in watching the 
rise and fall of client dictators. Far from propping up 
the Somaza as the US had so often been accused of doing, 
the Carter Administration seemed to be helping topple them 
or at least undermining them with criticism of their human 
20 rights abuses. 
KISSINGER CRITICISED THE ADMINISTRATION : 
Henry kissinger viewed that the Administration's 
campaign of proselytzing for democracy in Nicaragua aggravated 
19. The experience for Americans in Iran and Nicaragua raised 
troubling questions. How can the US determine which 
dictatorships are relatively stable and which are unstable 
or transitory, and how should the U.S. deal with them? 
Few Americans have ever felt entirely comfortable 
with their government's support for clearly and often 
cruelly undemocratic regime. When an old Fascist like 
Spain's Francisco Franco died in 1975 or when the junta 
of Greek colonels self-destructed in 1974 by instigating 
an alortive coup in Cyprus, the US reacted with general 
relief. Still the world is full of dictatorships, the US 
has to deal with most of them, and simply condemning them 
on moral grounds is not a policy. 
Since the height of cold war, the US policymakers have 
been saying of one right wing despot or another, as Franklin 
Roosevelt is . supposed to have said of somoza's dictatorial 
father "Tacho" in the late 1930, He may be a son of a bitch, 
but he is our son of a bitch." See, Time, September 24, 1979 
p. 14. 
20. Time, September 24, 1979, p. 14. 
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the crises in the country. In an interview with TIME, he 
told^ "I'm convinced that trying to bludgeon societies into 
behaviour analogous to our own either will lead to a deadlock 
and American irrelevance, or it will lead to the collapse 
of existing authority without a substitute compatible with our 
values and, therefore, the emergence of a radical outcome, as 
in Iran and Nicaragua, When we begin overthrowing a government, 
as indirectly we did in Nicaragua, we should either have an 
idea of what we are going to put in its place, or we should 
think through the foreign policy consequences if the radical 
alternative takes over. If there is no moderate alternative and 
out choice in between the status-quo and the radicals, it is 
a serious question whether the radicals are more in our long-term 
21 interest than the status-quo," 
THE ADMINISTRATION DENIED THE ALLEGATIONS : 
However, Garter Administration officials vehemently 
reject Kissinger's complaint that they overthrew Somoza, They 
claimed that the Sandinistas did that themselves. All the US 
did was to administer coup-de-grace in order to end the civil 
war. To preserve the status-quo in Nicaragua would probably have 
22 
required direct military intervention. Nevertheless, it can be 
safely concluded that the Sandinista revolutionaries left 
American prestige and strategic interests far more badly damaged. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
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In spite of new regime's anti-US Tf-hetoric both the countries 
were conscious enough in formulating their foreign policy 
in order to deal the new era inaugurated by Nicaragua in the 
region. 
MUTUAL PRESUMPTIONS : 
Initially, Nicaragua's new revolutionary government -
the Government of National Reconstruction - believed that a 
cordial relationship with the U.S. might greatly aid the 
rebuilding of his country. Though it frequently indulged in 
anti-American rhetoric, the junta proved flexible enough to 
allay most of Washington's fears. On the other, Washington 
did hope that the new government's need for assistance in 
rebuilding its shattered society will keep the junta on a raode-
23 rate course. 
The Nicaraguan junta appointed a 15 - member cabinet 
dominated by moderates, which satisfied American insistence 
that the new regime should represent all shades of Nicaraguan 
political opinion. The junta also promised elections, and an 
24 
economy based on a mixture of private and government enterprise. 
However, the new regime's programme which included the confi-
scation of Somoza's property and independent foreign policy, 
has also raised American hacXles. 
23. Time, July 30, 1979, p. 20, also see Time, August 6, 
1979, p. 40. 
22. Ibid. 
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NEW REGIME'S FOREIGN POLICY MOVES : 
The junta's foreign policy n moves were also worrisome 
for Washington. In the first official visit by members of the 
junta to another country, Alfonso Robels collejas and Moises 
Hassan led a delegation of 23 guerrillas to Cuba. Fidel Castro 
was celebrating the 26th anniversary of his assault on Havana's 
Moncado barracks. Repaying the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
for the arms and other support it provided during the Sandi-
nistas'final offensive', the new Nicaraguan government announced 
that it would seek a 'close relationship' with Arab countries 
It would also cancel the country's $ 5.1 million debt to Israel 
25 and Argentina for arms purchased by Somoza. 
NEW JUNTA'S INTERNAL AND NATIONALISATION POLICY : 
In addition, the junta decreed that Somoza's name would 
be effaced from public buildings and that a legal campaign to 
extradite him from the US would begin. The government also 
nationalise 51 companies owned by the mustachioed ex-dictator 
or makers of his family. The junta also nationalised Nicaragu4s 
26 
banks and placed limits on the operation of foreign banks. 
The junta also established the peasant - owned agricultural 
collectives on the more than 1 million acres, roughly two -
thirds of the country's best farm land that have been expropriated 
25. Time, August 6, 1979, p. 40. 
26. Time, August 6, 1979, p. 40. 
from Somoza. 
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Nicaragua's new regime lifted censorship and permitted 
long-silenced newspapers like the stridently anti-somoza 
"La Prensa". A 52-article provisional constitution was also 
announced in the last week of August 1979, containing guarantees 
of equal justice under law, the abolition 6f torture and 
capital punishement, and the right to free expression. 
Significantly, the Nicaraguan junta also agreed to 
provide "safe conduct" for any Somoza henchmen who wished to 
leave Nicaragua, only those charged with 'grave crimes' or 
"genocide" would not be covered by that promise. To back up 
that guarantee, the new regime also agreed to a proposal 
originated by Washington's especial envoy, William Bowdler, 
that the organisation of American States would be invited to 
monitor the protection of human rights. Satisfied with the 
junta's promises, the Carter Administration pledged to support 
the new regime. Significantly, President Carter, at his 
Washington press conference, stated that it was a mistake for 
Americans to assume that every abrupt change in the hemisphere 
is somehow the outcome of "secret massive Cuban intervention". 
As for the future, he said, "We will use our efforts in a proper 
fashion without inte^ventionism to let the Nicaraguans let 
28. Time, September 3, 1979, p. 10. 
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their voice be head in shaping their own affairs. The 
Administration also assured to give full and thorough 
consideration' to the Nicaraguan request for acquisition of 
modern US weapons to replace the otttmoded arms the sandinistes 
used to topple Somoza's regime. 
Thus, the Carter Administration began to apply a new 
foreign policy toward Nicaragua, hoping it could prevent another 
Cuba' by accomodating and moderating the new regime. 
OBJECTIVE OF THE CARTER POLICY OF CO-OPERATION AND TOLERANCE : 
The Carter Administration believed that the US could afford 
to be flexible and patient with Nicaragua, given its continued 
predominance in the region, the moderating influence of the 
regional powers and Western European countries, and the inevia-
table Nicaraguan interest in economic relations with the US. 
It decided toaid and abet private enterprise and moderate 
political sectors, and to avoid acting in a manner which would 
strengthen the position of the more radical and anti-American 
elements. 
The US Administration presumed that the US economic 
aid to Nicaragua would encourage the regime not to turn to 
Cuba and the Soviet Bloc, and help to avoid any apparent 
or politically presented need for an explicit choice to be 
29. Time, August 6, 1979, p.40. 
30. Edward Best, US Policy and Regional Security in Central 
America, llSS, Cower Publishing Company Ltd.,England, 
T987, p. 20. 
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made between East and West. At the same time, the Administration 
also pointed out that it would be understanding of the Sandini-
stas revolutionary and anti-imperialistic rhetoric, however 
irritating, and give them both time and incentives to settle 
down. The Administration believed that if successful such a 
policy would have not only preventive but positive benefits 
for the US.^^ Significantly the US Administration agreed, "If 
Nicaragua can make it along democratic lines, other lands needing 
change from right wing tyranny will see that the alternative 
need not be left-wing tyranny.' Any failure to provide the 
promised US assistance would create danger of being 'lost' 
Nicaragua and 'concede the game to the Soviets, the Cubans and 
32 their surrogates. 
Thus, the US and Nicaragua endeavoured to overcome 
suspicious. The US gave $ 62.6 million loans, food aid and 
grants to Nicaragua during the new Government's first year. 
A further shipment of 75 million aid package cleared through 
33 congress in February 1980. But, gradually, the US Adminis-n 
tration tried to utilise the aid package in order to gain 
diplomatic suppoirt from Nicaragua in international affairs. 
U.S. CONDITIONAL AID AND NICARAGUA'S RESPONSE: 
The US administration signalled that the prospects of 
aid would be improved if Nicaraguan voted to censure the 
31.Ibid, p. 20. 
32. New York Times, Editorial, February 15, 1980. 
33. Edward Best, op. cit., p. 20. 
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Soviet Union over Afghanistan. This naturally provoked 
an angry Nicaraguan response. 
It was the time when the Nicaraguan regime was seeking 
new sources so that it could neutralise its dependence on the 
US. In March 1980, Nicaraguan delegation, for instance, wfent to 
the Soviet;. Bloc in search of economic aid. In May 1980, the 
FSLN acknowledged the presence of asmall group of Cuban 
35 military advisers in Nicaragua. 
CARTER CERTIFICATION ON NICARAGUA : 
The Carter Administration, even then, certified in 
September 1980 that Nicaragua was not exporting revolution to 
her neighbours. By January 1981, Nicaragua had received some 
$ 118 million in US aid. However, it was believed that the 
aid's effect was somewhat spoilt by its delay and conditionality, 
The US aid, of course, was clearly intended to prevent increased 
Cuban and the Soviet influence. For most Sandinistas, however, 
relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union were seen ideally less 
as an latemative than as an addition to relations with the US, 
and the West in general,^^ 
NICARAGUA'S THRUST FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIVERSIFICATION : 
Significantly, the March 1980 visit of Nicaraguan 
delegation to Moscow was not only motivated for economic need, 
and a desire to obtain less conditional aid, but positive 
interest in economic and political diversification. Moreover, 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid.,p. 21, 
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given the US long support for Somoza, its final interventionist 
efforts, and the strong opposition in the US to Carter's 
policy, the FSLN never entirely overcome suspicions of the 
US/ nor fears that relations would turn sour, aid be suspended 
37 or their regime eventually be attacked. 
Finally, the Nicaraguan refusal to condemn the Soviet 
'invasion' of Afghanistan upset the US Administration. Signi-
ficantly, many advisers to the FSLN urged Nicaragua to vote 
condemning the soviet presence in Afghanistan in the United 
Nations otherwise it would unnecessarily provoke the US at 
this difficult juncture. Some FSLN leaders, however, in 
any case irked by US suggestions as to how they should vote, 
seem, to have preferred to vote against condemnation, on the 
grounds that they needed to be sure of soviet support in order 
to defend the revolution against any eventual onslaught of 
American imperialism. The result was Nicaraguan absentation 
in UN. The FSLN claims to have adopted a'non-aligned' 
position.^® 
Here it is important to note that the US attitude 
toward Cuban-style non-alignment was hardened by the discovery 
of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba immediately before the 
Non-Aligned meeting in Havana in September 1979. In the same 
37.Ibid. 
38. Of the 112 votes in the 34 the Session of the General 
Assembly in which Nicaragua participated, it voted against 
the USSR on 25 Occasions, but against Cuba on only 4, 
Notably, Cuba was then leader of the Non Aligned Movement. 
See, Edward Best, ... op. cit., p. 21. 
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meeting, the leader of the Nicaraguan Junta Daniel Ortega, made 
39 a speech vehemently denouncing US 'expansionist' policy. 
ALARMING REPUBLICAN'S POSTURE : 
In this course, the coming months added antagonism in the 
relations between Nicaragua and United States. The Nicaraguans 
were alarmed by the statements issued at July 1980 Republican 
40 
Party platform. Nicaragua was equally alarmed by the 
conservative suggestions to the coming Reagan Administration 
that the remnants of Somoza's National Guard in Honduras 
could'be made into a genuine fighting force against the Nica-
ragua's new revolutionary regime as the only viaKLe alternative 41 to achieve US goal in Nicaragua. 
In fact. Republican's rhetoric convinced most Sandinistas 
that the Reagan Administration would be committed to their 
downfall. While the Americans claimed that Nicaragua's own 
anti-US rhetoric, together with various military and diplomatic 
moves, towards the Left, served to provoke and strengthen 
the conviction of the Americas. Almost all the elements for a 
serious escalation of suspicious and tensions were in place 
42 before Reagan's inauguration. Sandinistas fears and suspicious 
39. Edward Best, op. cit, p. 22. 
40. Ibid., p. 51. 
41. Cleto Di Giovanni, Jr. and Alexander Kmuger, 'Central 
America', The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1980, p. 176. 
63. Edward Best,.... op. cit., p. 56. 
from their sanctuaries in Honduras, 
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MILITARY STRENGTH OF REGIONAL STATES : 
Honduras, in early 1981, had regular forces of 11200 
and paramilitaary forces of 300, with about 17 Scorpion 
reconnaissance vehicles equiped with 76 mm guns, and 27 fighter 
planes. Guatemala had total armed forces of some 18000 while 
El Salvador some 17000. Nicaragua's regular army was estimated 
at 6700, with 8000 paramilitary tropps. Nicaragua was believed 
46 to have three PT-26 light Soviet tanks. 
Obiously , Nicaragua's military strength could'nt be 
regarded as a threat to neighbouring states. The military ties, 
therefore, being established with Cuba and the Soviet Bloc 
47 
was largely conceived as a defensive precaution. While, the 
US government believed that Nicaragua was serving as a conduit 
for arms to Salvador insurgents. The US claim was also meant 
to remind the sandinista's past relations with the Salvador 
guerrillas who provided major support to the former when they 
were fighting Somozas. 
NICARAGUAN LINKS WITH SALVADOREAN REBELS : 
The US Administration charged that Nicaraguan government 
provided active assistance to pre-empitive final offensive 
of the FDR-FMLN in El Salvador. However, the Sandinista leaders 
45. Time, August 2, 1982, p. 14. 
46. The Military Balance 1981-82, llSS, London, 1981. 
47. Eward Best, op. cit., p. 52. 
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held the opinion that Reagan Admitiistration was engaged 
in seeking subversion in Nicaragua, therefore/ El Salvador 
issue would not be in fact determinant in the bilateral 
development of relations with the United States, 
Significantly, the El Salvador regime did not then 
enjoy much internal and international legitimacy, while the 
left in El Salvador expected and desired the same broad support 
as the anti-Somoza forces had in Nicaragua, The US Administra-
tion could'nt be convinced by Sandinista's assurances that 
they were not providing material support to Salvadorean rebels. 
The Americans regarded it a breach of promise. For Reagan 
Administration, it was confirmation of the new regime's"unacce-
ptable behaviour", and for some, of its" unacceptable nature,"^® 
SALVADOREAN CONFLICT - MILITARILY AN UNWINNABLE WAR : 
The US government remained firm on the issue of support 
for the FMLN by Nicaragua. Moreover, the continuing failure of 
the Salvadorean rebel's offensive and the hostile attitude of 
the Reagan Administration had led to serious concern among 
the Sandinistas, to the realisation that the Salvadorean 
conflict could'nt be won militarily, and to the desire to 
49 
prevent that conflict from jeopardising their own survival. 
Obviously, Nicaragua has been aware of the US interest in the 
48. Ibid., p, 53. 
49. Ibid. 
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region and seemed prepare to accept legitimate American 
interests in Central America. 
STATE DEPARTMENT CONFIRMED NICARAGUAN RESPONSE TO US CONCERNS : 
The State Department declared that the Nicaraguan 
regime responded to US demands with positive assertions that 
'they understood US concerns about El Salvador, would not 
"risk the revolution for an uncertain victory in El Salvador", 
and had taken a firm decision not to permit Nicaraguan territory 
to be used for transiting arms to El Salvador'. The State 
Department further claimed that intelligence reports showed that 
arms shipment "through established routes, particularly by 
air, from Nicaragua to El Salvador had slowed if not stopped, 
but that other routes were being sought the FSLN was 
engaged in continuing supply efforts as well as accumulating 
in Nicaraguan arms for the FMLN.^*^ 
REMAINING CARTER'S AID PACKAGE SUSPENDED : 
The Reagan Administration, in fact, gradually felt 
that it could no longer certify that Nicaragua was not engaged 
in support for insurrection in the other states^^; disbursement 
of the remaining $ 15 million of Carter's aid package was 
formally suspended on April 1, 1981.^^ 
50. "Revolution Beyond Our Borders; Sandinista Intervention in 
Central America", United States Department of State, 
September, 1985, p.,2 2 » 
51. Ibid. 
52. Edward Best, op. cit,, p. 53. 
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FUNDAMENTAL DIFFE2ENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NICARAGUAN POLICY 
WITH REGARD TO EL SALVAEOR: 
The policy of the United States and Nicaragua had 
fundamental difference with regard to rightist regime and 
its counterpart in El Salvador. The US wanted nothing less 
than the surrender of the guerrillas. The Sandinistas also 
had judged their incapability to win an outright victory, 
but they saw their access to power in El Salvador, through a 
negotiated settlement as being in Nicaragua's inteests.^^ An 
direct defeat of Salvadorean rebels was seen in Managua as a 
positive setback and a potential threat to Nicaraguan borders in 
future. The Nicaraguans were equally certain about the US 
response if they cut their ties with the Salvadorean left. 
Whereas Nicaraguan assistance for Salvadorean insurgents was 
for the US a simple wrong which should ideally be stopped. 
While, the sandinistas regarded their support to the re"bels, 
fighting against a repressive regime in El Salvador, as an 
act of moral rectitude which should be compromised only in 
54 
exchange for some concession by the US . U.S. economic aid 
moreover, did not seem to them so much an act of exceptional 
generosity and political goodwill as the duty of a rich nation 
to a poor one, and a particular moral obligation on the part 
of the country which had given them decades of dictatorship. 
53. ibid. 
49. Ibid. 
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It would also have been politically difficult for the Sandinistas 
fully and openly to divorce themselves from the FDR-FMLN in 
El Salvador in the hope of continuing to receive US aid, 
and thus appear to bow to 'imperialist' demands. Even if they 
had done that/ however, it was/is not certain that alone 
would have led to a continuation of aid, or prevented, 
subsequent tensions.^^ 
Although, the Salvadorean issue was more than a pretext 
for hostility, it was certainly not the only issue on which 
the Administration wanted change before it could live with 
Nicaragua in peace and confidence. To have reached what would 
have constituted a positive agreement with the Sandinistas 
based only on cassation of support for the Salvadorean guerrillas 
would have been to surrender US leverage on other issues such 
as military force levels and ties to Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.^^ 
Moreover, the Reagan Administration had come into office on a 
platform of opposition to aid to Nicaragua and to the Nicaraguan 
regime itself armed criticism that it was formulating a policy 
of unreasoning confrontation. Nevertheless, few crucial oppor-
tunities to avoid confrontation was certainly missed, thus 
increasing mutual distrust, and leaving both sides with the 
feeling that the other side had failed to respond and was not 
interested in serious negotiation. 
55. Ibid. p. 54. 
56. Ibid. 
49. Ibid. 
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ATTEMPTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS : 
The US Assistent Secretary of State, Thomas Enders 
paid a visit to Managua in August 1981/ specifically at the 
request of outgoing Ambassador Pezzullo, and discussed with 
the Sandinistas on a compromise. The following concept was 
agreed in general terms : 
- Managua would stop the flow of arms to El Salvador 
and limit its military build-up; 
- While Washington would not permit training of anti-
Sandinistas in the U.S. and would give assurances that it 
58 would not attempt to overthrow the Nicara^uan regime . Pezzullo 
himself stated "They said they could see our interests. We 
59 could see their concern about security. 
OBSTACLES IN MANAGUA fALKS : 
However, during Managua talks, two sorts of persistent 
obstacles to negatiation were evident- |irst, the Sandinistas 
58. Ibid. 
59. Quoted in Roy Gutman and Susan Page,"A Fumbled Chance 
for Accord," Newsday, August 1983, p. 4. 
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made clear that internal politics were not negotiable. 
Second, Ender's demand for a complete end to Nicaraguan 
support for the Salvadorean rebels was perceived as a 
precondition for sincere dialogue. ,In US perceptions, 
a unilateral end to sud unjustified act did not necessarily 
seem unreasonable. But, the Sandinistas wanted it to be a 
part of a broader bilateral agreement. Moreover, those 
things which the US would agree not to do on its own part 
i.e. particularly to overthrow them and to some extent to 
deprive them of economic aid, could seem to the Sandinistas 
to warrant unilateral ends, as unjustified acts, as much 
as anything they were doing^*^. 
DRAFT DECLARATIONS BY THE U.S. : 
The US Administration sent a draft declaration on 
8 September, 1981, unilaterally promising vigorous enforcement 
of US neutrality laws concerning Nicaraguan exiles.^^ Enders 
also sent a draft, on 16 September 1981, of a proposed joint 
declaration of non-intervention in central America. The content 
of the proposal on security issues was communicated to the 
Nicaraguan Ambassador. In addition, it asked that Nicaragua 
should freeze acquisition of heavy weapons, return to the 
couhtry of origin arms systems not possessed by other countries, 
60. Edward Best, op. cit, p. 55. 
61. Ibid. 
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limit its army to between 15000 and 17000 men and eventually 
reduce it to less than 10000 and put then under international 
. . 62 supervision. 
The Nicaraguan attitude itself was also not encouraging 
regarding a negotiated settlement. The regime sharply reacted 
to a US-Honduran naval exercise designed in early October 
1981. The Nicaragua also raised demands to close down the 
Florida training camps. Consequently, the negotiations were 
over by the end of October 1981. 
'TOTALITARIAN TREND" IN NICARAGUA ? : 
The Reagan Administration paid direct attention to 
Sandinista's material ^ support for Salvadorean rebels, 
the military build-up in Nicaragua itself increasing the 
number of regular army strength upto 50000, the preparation 
and expansion of Existing air fields to receive Soviet MIG 
aircarfts, the training of Nicaraguan pilots in Bulgaria to fly 
MIG planes, the presence of Cuban military advisers estimated 
by the US to number over 1000, and growing political and 
economic ties with the Soviet Bloc.^^ The US Administration 
fiirmly believed that the Sandinistas were unquestionably oriented 
toward Cuba and the Soviet bloc in foreign policy and were 
62. Roy Gutman, 'Americans Diplomatic charade'. Foreign 
Policy, Fall 1984, pp. 7-8. " 
63. Edward Best,.... op. cit., p. 56. 
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heading toward one party, totalitarian rule at home. 
US Secretary of state Haig deploring totalitarian 
trend in Nicaraguan internal affairs, warned that the time 
was running short to prevent'another Cuba' in Central 
America. Significantly he refused to rule out the possibi-
lity of US intervention to overthrow the Sandinistas. He 
indicated such action under the Rio Treaty, to the OAS in 
December 1981. He also reportedly asked the Pentagon to study 
64 
military options in order to safeguard US interests in 
Nicaragu^^^ Haig also exposed that the Reagan Administration 
was placing the renewed attention on its Central American 
policy which was designed to put the current state of play 
into sharper focus. 
US CAUTIOUS PRESSURE ON NICARAGUAN REGIME : 
The US policy was aimed at to pressurise Nicaraguan 
regime but On the other did not seem to be intended to 
64. However, adverse domestic and international opinion, and 
an element of fear as to its possible encouragement of 
direct Soviet action in Poland, rendered almost impossible 
and direct US military Action against the Sandinistas. 
65. Michael Getler and Don Oberdorfer, "Pressure to 'Do Somett-
thing* Grows'*, ^ Washington Post, November 22, 1981, Also 
see,^Washington post, March 17, 1982. 
66. .Time, March 29, 1982, p. 26. 
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provoke great domestic and international opposition. For, 
it could endanger support for policy in El Salvador, on which 
its attention was primarily focussed. A complete economic 
embargo, or anything stronger, would have been hard to justify 
and undeniably have pushed Nicaragua even closer to the Soviet 
Bloc. Instead the US began to work against Nicaraguan access 
67 to loans from international financial bodies. Significantly, 
the US did not break diplomatic relations, but Ambassador 
68 Pezzullo was not replaced for seven months. 
C.I.A. PLANNED COVERT ACTION : 
In addition, the CIA clandestine operation was chalked 
out to destabilise Nicaragua's popular revolutionary government. 
Though, it is not unusual for the CIA to launch covert opera-
tions and make attempts to throw out government that it does not 
like. Notably, the CIA had been pressing for covert activity 
to be stopped up to include support for armed anti-sandinista 
groups being trained by Argentines in Hondurasf^a country 
which is next door to Nicaragua. It was already started organi-
sing lands of mercenaries and guiding them into Nicaragua, 
They were trained in Honduras. At an NSC meeting on November 
16, 1981, President Reagan authorised a $ 19 million dollar 
CIA programme to build a popular opposition front to the 
Sandinistas, and to train a force, initially of 500-men, to 
67. The same policy, the US adopted against Allende in Chile. 
68. Edward Best, 6p. cit, p. 56. 
69. Ibid. 
70 
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carry out political and paramilitary operations against 
the 'Cuban presence and Cuban - Sandinista support infra-
structure in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America. 
PRESIDENTIAL FINDINGS ABOUT CIA PLAN : 
Notably, President Reagan signed his own'findings' 
on Dec. 1,1981, a move considered in the national interest, 
71 
authorising the CIA to contact dissidents in Nicaragua. 
A document known as a "scope paper" outlined permissible 
operations and their estimated cost. About the more in the 
House and the Senate Committees, varied concern were expressed 72 about the possible risks. 
It was believed that the main objective of these moves 
was aimed at the interdiction of the atms flow to El Salvador, 
combined with pressure on the Sandinistas to leak inward' 
rather than continue to 'export revolution' and then, to put 
pressure on them to negotiate seriously on the issues of concern 
73 to the US and Nicaragua's neighbours. 
THE US AND THE ORIGIN OF ANTI-SANDINISTA FORCES : 
However, the U.S. pdlicy alone was not responsible 
for creating anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua. The somoza's 
70. Ibid, 
71. See ibid, p. 57. 
72. Don Oberdorfer and Patrik E. Tyler, 'US Backed Nicaraguan 
Rebel Army Swells to 7,000 Men, Washington Post, May 8, 
1983. 
73. Edward Best, op. cit., p. 57. 
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National Guard had been active since 1979. Notably, they 
were to constitute the core of the military leadership of the 
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FON) formed with a n-umber of 
civilian opposition figures in 1982. Most of the Miskito 
Indians on the Atlantic Coast who joined armed anti-Government 
groups did so because of grievances with the sandinistas. 
MISKITO INDIANS TURNED AGAINST SANDINISTAS : 
The tensions between the Miskitos, peaceful independent 
Indians who only recently were among the Sandinista's friends, 
and the Sandinistas has been growing in the past. After the 
Sandinista came to power in 1979, the initiated ambitious 
reform programmes to improve conditions of health care and 
literacy among the Miskitos, Sandinista volunteers and Cuban 
caares made some headway, but the Indians soon bridled at the 
accompanying ideology and the fact that literacy classes were 
initially held only in Spanish. Disgruntled Miskito leaders 
quickly became nuisance for the Sandinistas. Suspecting growing 
separatist sentiments among them, Sandinista forces began an 
offensive against them. The offensive was the regime's concer-
ted military efSrt.to neutralise the Miskito minority which 
makes up some 4 percent of Nicaragua's population of 2.7 
million and occupies most of the country's vulnerable northeast 
region. The Sandinista has fear that the porous Honduras 
border, and the 336 mile Caribbean Coastline, might eventually 
be used as a staging area for an invasion led by anti-Sandinista 
387 
74 units. The Miskitos were in open revolt, and many battles 
75 took place in July 1982 with the Nicaraguan armed forces. 
CIA-AN INSTRUMENT IN US POLICY : 
However the fact that the US did not entirely create, 
or control the anti-Sandinista forces, the p forces it came 
to support did not i alter the doubtful internal legitimacy 
of those associated with the Somoza regime, which tended 
to be further weakened by CIA support. Moreover, it did not 
make these forces any more appropriate as an instrument in 
US policy. Mr. Stanfie-i-d Turner, former CIA Director, warned 
that 'the people the CIA enlists to do the covert work will 
not always have the same purpose as the United States.... sim 
own purposes change from those originally set.... the CIA 
people operating them can get carried away with their dedica-
76 tion to getting the job done." 
By 1983, President Reagan's argument that the US policy 
was simply intended to prohibit the Nicaraguan action in El 
77 
Salvador was wearing very thin. The anti-Sandinista forces, 
notably could not interdict supply of arms to Salvador 
74. Time, March 1, 1982, p. 18. 
75. Time, August 2, 1982, p. 14. 
76. Stansfield Turner,"From an Ex-CIA Chief Stop the Covert 
operation in Nicaragua," Washington Post, April 24, 1983. 
77. Quoted in Lov Cannon and Patrick E. Tyler, "President 
Admits Aiding Guerrillas Against Nicaragua,",Washington 
Post, April 15, 1983. 
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guerrillas, In additioi?, Enrigue Bermudez, military attache 
to Washington under Somoza and later military head of the 
FDN, had openly, stated in December 1982 that they would 
never accept the role of American mercenary. It is not 
acceptable to us to carryout missions to interdict Cuban and 
Russian supply lines to El Salvador. We are Nicaraguans and 
our objective ife to overthrow the Communists and install a 
78 democratic government in our country." 
Notably, the anti-Sandinista rebels which was originally 
supposed to be only 500, grew rapidly according to CIA figures, 
to 1000 by February, 1982, to 4,000 by December 1982, 5500 
by February 1983, 7000 by May 1983 and 8000 by June 1983."^® 
There was a danger, therefore, that the covert action against 
Sandinista regime might get out of control with jfisks of 
escalation and direct confrontation. 
IN RESPONSE TO US THREAT, NICARAGUA DECLARED STATE OF 
EMERGENCY : 
The Sandinista regime declared a 30-day state of 
emergency in March 1982, in response to what it called US 
threats of "aggression" and "covert plans" to undermine the 
government. The decree suspended most basic civil rights 
78. International Herald Tribune, December 10, 1982. 
63. Edward Best,.... op. cit., p. 56. 
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including treedom of expression, freedom of assembly and the 
right to a judicial heaving before detention. The Sandinista 
government has put the press under strict censorship and 
restricted travel abroad for government officials, military-
personnel and political figures. In addition, a special new 
patriotic defense contribution will be levied to help defray 
80 defense costs. 
EMERGENCY DECLARATION FOLLOWED BY REBEL'S ATTACKS : 
The Sandinista regime's drastic action followed the 
destruction of two bridges near the Honduran border, which 
the Sandinistas blamed on US-backed "counterrevolutionaries". 
The US Administration denied the charge. However, a senior 
state Department offi-cial privately said that he could'nt 
rule out the possibility that some US based exile group 
81 might have been responsible. 
According to a Human Eights Organisation, 3 00 people 
had been arrested till August 1982, for counterrevolutionary 
activities, and some 300 people had been detained and interrogate 
about their political activities. The Sandinistas also increased 
pressure on members of independent H labour unions, the Roman 
82 Catholic Church and opposition political parties. 
80. Time, March, 29, 1982, p, 30, 
81. Ibid. 
82. Time, August 2, 1982, p. 14. 
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Mr. Daniel Ortega Saavedra, a member of the all 
powerful nine-man Sandinista Directorate, speaking at the 
celebration of the third anniversary of Nicaragua's Sandi-
nista revolution at Masaya, a provincial town 18 miles 
southeast of the capital city of Managua, declared, "Nicaragua 
is undergoing a silent, yet bloody invasion. Ortega charged 
that the US Central Intelligence Agency and the Honduran armed 
forces were supporting more than 2,000 rebels who have been 
83 operating along the border with Honduras. 
THE SANDINISTA'S PREOCCUPATION WITH THE CONTRAS : 
The Sandinistas, in fact, have every reason to be 
preoccupied with counterevolutioaaries, or Contras, the 
rebels seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan governmentx For 
the first time since the end of the civil war that toppled 
right wing Dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979, the 
Sandinista are being seriously challenged by armed gropps 
of Nicaragua who originally supported the revolution but 
who have become disillusioned with the regime's striden-t 
Marxism, it disregard for individual rights and its increasing 
dependence on Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Contras say, 
they are fighting to fulfill the revolution's original goals -
83. Ibid. 
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political pluralism, individual liberties and a mixed 
84 economy. 
CONTRA'S RAID : 
The US aided Contras have consistently raided villages 
and committed murders. They have done heavy economic damage 
by bombing and mining ports. The Reagan Administration defends 
all this as realism in a hard world necessary measures to 
weaken a leftist government that makes trouble in Central 
85 America. 
The Administration always defended Us aid to Contras. 
It insisted that the US support for the government of El 
Salvador and support for the "Contras" were aimed at bringing 
about democratic rule. President Reagan has said that the 
Nicaraguan "Contras" are the "moral equal of our Founding 
Fathers. They are "our brother". They are "freedom fighters 
struggling for liberty and democracy". The Reagan Administration 
has urged the Coi:gress, to authorise more aid to the Contras 
so that they can make the Sandinistas cry "uncle". While the 
Contras seemed incapable of overthrowing the government in the 
86 foreseeable future. 
84. Ibid. 
85. Anthony Lewis, "USA'S Dirty War That Could Turn Into 
Disaster, Times of India, April 11, 1981, by arrangement 
with The New York Times, 
86. "US And It's Allies in Nicaragua,"^The Times of India, 
March 14, 1985, by arrangement with the New York Times 
News Service. 
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PASTORA THREAT TO THE SANDINISTAS : 
However, the biggest threat to the Sandinistas 
came from Eden Pastora Gomaz, a flamboyant and popular 
former guerilla leader known as Commander Zero. A hero of 
the Sandinistra revolutionm Pastora fled Nicaragua in i9Sl 
and eventually surfaced on Costa Rica in April 1982. He 
passionately denounced his former Comrades-in-arms as " 
traitors and murderers" and has called on the Nicaraguan 
people to expel them from power, Patora's stragegy was to 
hope that his re-emergence will lead to the defection of other 
unhappy Sandinista supporters, and eventually divide the 
87 army so that he could come to power. 
Significantly to Combat the threat posed by Pastora 
and the other contras, the Sandinista government has increased 
military build-up that has given Nicaragua the largest army 
88 in Central America. Besides, the 'Contras' couid not enjoy 
89 much public support of the issue of American aid to them. 
NICARAGUA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP : 
In the case of Nicaragua's military build-up, the US 
Administration believed that the Sandinistas certainly took 
some unnecessarily provocative steps. However, the Administra-
tion's vehement rhetoric and moves which helped to increase 
87. Time, Atigust 2, 1982, p. 14. 
88. Ibid. 
89. Poll of voters attitudes taken for TIME by Yankelovich, 
Skelly and White Inc. see. Time, July 25, 1983, p. 19. 
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both internal insecurity and tensions with Honduras, such 
as support for arroed attacks from across the border, could 
only encourage the Sandinistas to maintain their military 
build up. Any political incentive to cease the military 
build-up, as suggested even by the friendly Mexican government, 
was outweighed by perceived demands of security. By mid-1982, 
the process of military organisation and equipment had taken 
place at a rate undeniably faster than that of the other 
90 Central American countries. 
NICARAGUA'S FORCES INCREASED : 
With the aid of some 1500 Cuban advisers, and supplied 
with Soviet bli)c equipment, Nicaragua has expanded its 
regular army, which numbered some 8,000 troops in Somoza's 
day, to between 22,000 and 33000. It dwarfs the armies of 
Honduras (12,000), Guatemala (14,000) and El Salvador(15,000). 
Nicaragua also has a well-trained "ready reserve" of some 
28,000 to 50,000. The country eventually intends to increase the 
91 
size of its regular army to 50,000. The inventory had also 
92 expanded. 
90. Edward Best, op. cit., p. 58. 
91. Time, January 18, 1982, p. 6. 
92. See, The Military Balance, 1982-83, llSS, London, 1982. 
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SOVIET ARMS TO NICARAGUA : 
However, the military build-up could be justified 
93 
as giving an appropriate defensive capability. But, the 
US believed that in comparison with the equipment of its 
neighbours, the Nicaraguan arsenal was formidable. The 
Soviet SAMs and anti-aircraft guns, and even the desired 
interceptor aircraft, caused an alarm that was related much 
more to the strategic implications of their origin and the 
political character of their recipients than to any local 94 military threat. 
In additioo, Nicaragua has nearly hundred 122 mm and 
152 mm howitzers, dozens of Soviet BTR-60 armoured personnel 
carriers, and 1,000 East German and Soviet military transport 
95 
trucks. Nicaragua was to receive not only more armoured 
personnel carriers, but main battle tanks, which were not 
possessed by any of its neighbours, not least because of their 
inappropriateness to local conditions. Some 30 T-54 and T-55 
battle tanks^^ had already been received, and more were on 
97 the way. Besides, Nicaragua alreadyka has shoulderfired 
SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles and four barreled ZPU-4 and 
98 37 mm anti-aircraft guns. The US military analysts expected 
93. Edward Best, op. cit., p. 59 
94. Ibid. 
95. Time, January 18, 1982, p. 6. 
96. The same types that are used in Warsaw Pact countries. 
See, Ibid. 
97. Edward Best, op. cit., p. 59. 
98. Time, January 18, 1982, pp. 6-7. 
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that heavier Soviet anti-aircraft missiles will soon appear 
in Nicaragua. 
In addition, the Americans were more concerned to the 
fact that the runways of at least three Nicaraguan airports 
were being extended to a length that could accomodate advanced 
Soviet MIG-21 and MIG-23 fighter aircraft. About 80 Nicaraguans 
had been sent to Bulgaria for pilot training, including the 
handling of MIGs. The MIGs would outperform, the US military 
analysts believed, the most powerful air fleet in the region, 
Honduras' 24 venerable F-86s, A-37s and more sophisticated 
99 French-made Super Mysteres. 
Washington presumed that the consequences of any such 
aerial arms build-up could extend beyond the Central America 
isthmus. So far as some anxious US military officials were 
concerned, access to the new airfields would conceivably allow 
leftist air forces to strike virtually anywhere in the Caribbean 
region, including at the Panama canal. Besides, possession of 
such superior weaponry would give the Nicaraguans a power 
of intimidatio-: unique in the region. Major General William 
Masterson, the Southern Command's deputy Commander-in-Chief, 
said, "A high performance airplane flying over the skies of 
Nicaragua would make a far greater impact psychologically than 
a tank or armoured vehicles or heavy artillary. 
99. Ibid. p.7. 
100. Ibid. 
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Although Nicaragua's military splurge was financed 
largely by the Soviets and their allies, the effort was diver-
ting resources from the task of rebuilding the country after 
the devastating struggle against Somoza. 
The Socialist government of French President Franciis 
Mitterrand had quietly agreed to sell $ 17.5 million worth 
of "non-offensive" military equipment two patrol boats, two 
Alouette III helicopters and 15 trucks to the Marxist - dominated 
Sandinista government of Hicaragua. France also contracted to 
train a dozen Nicaraguan pilots and an equal number of sailors 
in the use of the equipment.^^^ 
There was growing sense of alajrm in Washington over the 
arms build-up in Nicaragua. Washington believed that the 
arsenal was reaching unprecedented proportions for Central 
America, and has already turned Nicaragua into the predominant 
military power of the region. Lieut General Wallace Nutting, 
head of the Panama-based US southern Command said, "All of a 
military base of substantive potential. It is a whole new 
universe.^^^ 
US RESPONSE TO NICARAGUA'S ARMS BUILD-UP : 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig and other top 
VJhite House officials, in a series of increasingly bellicose 
101. Ibid. p. 6. 
100. Ibid. 
370 
statements/ have decried the "drift toward totalitarianism" of 
the Nicaraguan regime and have pointedly refused to rule out 
any US action short of outright military invasion if Nicaragua 
103 does not mend its ways. 
REAGAN APPROVED A SECRET PLAN : 
President Reagan secretly approved a plan calling 
for a substantial increase in US military involvement in 
Central America in the coming years and preparations for 
a possible limited military blockade of Nicaragua. The 
military operation in Central America and the Caribbean were 
designed to lay the groundwork for the expanded US presence 
104 
and the possible guarantine. The exercises were specifically 
designed in part of test and refine planes for imposing a 
military quarantine around Nicaragua and would give Mr. Reagan 
the option of ordering a quarantine into effect in 1983 
or in early 1984 if he decides to step up action against 
105 Nicaragua. 
The Reagan Administration believed that the show of 
US forces would be enough to persuade Nicaragua to stop the 
shipment of arms that Washington has repeatedly said moves 
103. Ibid. 
104. A quarantine which involves the use of naval force to 
isolate a nation, falls short of formal blockade, which 
is considered tantamount to an act of war. In a quarantine, 
there is selective interdiction of ships, in contrast to 
a blockade, in which all shipping is stopped. 
To recall, the Kennedy Administration described its actior 
against Soviet ships in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 
as a quarantine imposed under the terms of the Rio Inter-
American Pact of 1947, a mutual assistence trealy among 
Westeini Hemisphere nations. 
105. Philip Taubaman, "US May Quarantine Nicaragua,"Times of 
India,July 27, 1983, the New York Times .News Service. 
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from Cuba, through Nicaragua to guerrillas in El Salvador. 
The Reagan Administration declared that the United States 
determination to end Soviet and Cuban interference with 
Central American region and, if necessary, to force the 
Nicaraguan Communist government to live in peace with its 
neighbours. A senior National Security Official said, "We 
have developed a programme for a significant and long-lasting 
increase in the US military presence in Central America. 
The officials of the Reagan Administration stated that 
the defense department planned to draw on a number of Pentagon 
accounts, including money allocated to the Joint Chief of Staff 
for military exercises, to limit the number and amount of 
107 additional financing requests to Congress. 
Thus, the policy review emphasized military•options and 
signalled that the US efforts over the short run would concen-
trate on a building up of military presence in Central America. 
Moreover, the US believed that Nicaragua was willing to 
use its force. The US policy makers became suspicious during 
a skirmish in January 1982, in the remote swamp lands of 
eastern Honduras. Some 75 makers of the revolutionary army 
of Nicaragua collided with roughly equal number of Miskito 
Indians. The Honduran government was enraged at a clear 
106. Ibid. 
100. Ibid. 
370 
violation of its borders by the Sandinista forces. The 
ill-equipped Handuran army went on full alert. There was, 
however, no immediate danger of a war between the two countries, 
but the flare-up was yet another sign of the tense atmosphere 
108 in the region. 
US STRENGTHENED HONDURA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY : 
The US Administration argued that the military build-up 
by Nicaragua brought a substantial increase in the number 
109 
of Cuban and Soviet Bloc military personnel in Nicaragua 
which only strengthened strategic and political susp&cious 
in the region. 
, It was generally accepted in the US that if there 
was war oetween Nicaragua and Honduras, the well-trained 
Marxist forces. Of Nicaragua would have an easy walk over 
and once Honduras falls to the Marxist, it will be impossible 
to the pro-US rightist government of neighbouring El Salvador 
to hold ground. American analysts, therefore, saw in the 
CIA covert operations the beginning of a slide towards a 
super-power confrontation inCentral America. 
108. Time, January 18,1982, p. 6. 
109. In March 1982, there were about 6,000 Cubans in Nicaragua, 
including teachers, doctors, technicians and military 
advisers, see. Time, March 22, 1982, p. 21. 
110. The fiasco of Bay of Pigs Comes in mind. The Bay of Pigs 
operation was not only a failure, it had for the Americans 
the contrary effect of consolidating the communist regime 
of Dr. Fidel Castro in Cuba. 
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In response, the Us began in 1982 to further strengthen 
Hondura's military capability, and to increase its military 
presence in Honduras. In May 1982, an agreement was negotiated 
with the Honduran government and $ 21 million military cons-
truction programme approved by Congress. The US decided to 
improve the Palmerola and Goloson airbases in return for US 
access for various contingency uses including transit, search 
and rescue, and reconnaissance.'^^^ In addition, the Reagan 
Administration's plan aimed at positioning of large stocks 
of military equipment in Honduras and the initial phase of 
construction of a planned $ 150 million air and naval base 
112 on the Atlantic coast of Honduras. 
The Sandinista regime insisted that their new armed 
forces were strictly defensive in nature. The Nicaraguans 
charge Honduras with tolerating the presence of as many 
as 2000 supporters of former dictator somoza, who regularly 
launch guerrilla attacks on Nicaragua. In January 19 82, 
Nicaraguan Minister of the Interior. Tonas Borge Martinez 
said that more than 100 Nicaraguan soldiers have been killed 
in clashes with the Somozistas, and he expects the rebels 
campaign to intensify, Nicaraguans claimed that the US was 
trying to undermine their government and cite the fact 
111. "US Military Activities in Hondures," (Mimeo) American 
Embassy, Teguicigalpa, Warch 27, 1985, quoted in Edward 
Best, op. cit., p. 59. 
112. Philip Taubman, op, cit. 
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that ex-Somoza supporters have been getting military training 
in Florida.^^^ 
According to a Honduran who was directly involved in 
planning US covert activities in Nicaragua, the United states 
hds been giving intelligence assistance and military advice 
to forces based in Honduras fighting the Sandinista government. 
The covert US activities included (a) keeping the insurgents 
well informed about the movement of Nicaraguan government 
soldiers and the location of tanks and artillery; (b) training 
and arming the paramilitary forces including the shipment of 
plane - loads of arms and amunition in August 1982 to the 
Miskito Indian community in eastern Honduras. More than 50 US 
military advisers, most of whom were of Hispanic background 
and did'nt wear uniforms trained paramilitary units in 1982; 
(c) providing underwater equipment and explosives to Argentine-
trained sabotage teams that were infiltrated into Nicaragua 
and blew up port installations in Puerto Cobezas in Nicara-
gua.l" 
Now, Honduras and Nicaragua have two of the largest 
and best equipped armed forces in the central America isthmus, 
and both have been moving towards closer identification with 
113. Time, Janaury 18, 1982, p. 7. 
114. Berj, Central America, ed. by K. Subrahmanyam, 
The Second Cold War, ABS, New Delhi, 1983, p. 131. 
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States hostile to each other Honduras with the US, and 
Nicaragua with Cuba. Honduran armed forces have become 
involved in fighting the oppostion movement in El Salvador, 
and have conducted joint military manoeurres with the Salva-
dorean armed forces and with the US.^^^ Such Honduras invol-
ment have raised tensions with Nicaragua, 
Honduras, however, has initiated talks with Nicaragua 
concerning border incidents but these initiatives have been 
jeopardised by Honduras itself allowing its territory to be 
used for US military bases and facilities, receiving an increa-
sing number of US military advisers, and becoming the second 
largest receiver of US military aid in the Western Hemisphere 
after El Salvador.^^^ 
To sum, in the eyes of the Reagan Administration, 
the size of Nicaragua."*s military build-up did'nt square 
with protestations that it was meant to be defensive. The 
Americans assumed that Nicaraguans would like to have an armed 
forces sufficiently strong that they could with impurity 
participate in the subversion of neighbouring states. They 
were, by their own definition, Marxist-Leninst, and it would 
seem fundamental that they would prefer to see their 
115. The New York Times, July 4, 1982. 
116. See, figure 
403 
neighbours in the same bloc, 
LEGACY OF US POLICY : US pressures could not determine the 
fundamental structure of the internal system in Nicaragua, 
although it can be argued that the legacy of past US policy 
in Central America was partly responsible for the widespread 
Sandinista association of US interests and demands with 
domination and social injustice. This strengthened the belief 
in the need for political control against predictable counter-
revolutionary moves/ and the tendency to subordinate tra-
ditional forms of electoral democctracy to structures protecting 
the pursuit of social justice. The Administration's accusations 
of brutal totalitarianism were exaggerated. Despite some 
abuses and bad handling of the ethnic minorities, Nicaragua's 
record on physical human rights abuses remained incomparably 
better than that of El Salvador, In Nicaragua, many officials 
responsible for abuses were judicially punished. The Sandi-
nistas had not done away with political pluralism and the 
mixed economy. Some 55 percent of GNP was still generated 
by the private sector, and the 1981 agrarian reform law 
envisaged considerably less land distribution than the 
117 1980 Salvadorean law. In addition, the literacy rate 
118 in 1982 had risen foom 50 percent to 80 percent. 
117. Edward Best., op, cit,, pp. 61-62. 
118, Time, August 2, 1982, p, 14. 
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CRIPPLED NICARAGUAN ECONOMY : 
Even then, the Nicaraguan economy was crippled. Since 
July 1979, the country's foreign debt had more than doubled 
in 1982, from $ 1.5 billion to $ 3.5 billion, while per-capita 
income had dropped from about $ 800 a year in 1978 to 
119 
estimated $ 650 in 1981. The inflation was high 30 percent. 
Food shortages by the floods, in addition, in August 1982 have 
aggravated the situation. An acute shortage of foreign exchange 
for the private sector has crippled, industrial production and 120 
driven up unemployment. It is here important to remember 
here that the new regime in Nicaragua had the most difficult 
task in 1979 of reviving the couiatry's economy. The factories 
and businesses had been destroyed in Somoza's fierce counter-
attack. Vital crops of cotton had not been sowed, and coffee, 
on which the country depends for 25 percent of its foreign 
earning, had not been harvested. In a final act of pillage 
in the country that his family looted for 46 years, Somoza and 
his cronies had made offja with all but $3.5 million of the 
country's foreign reserves, which stood as high as $ 150 
million in 1977.^^^ 
Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel d' Escoto, an 
an American born Maryknoll missionary, asserted in an interview 
119. Time, March 22, 1982, p. 20. 
120. Time, August 2, 1982, p. 14. 
121. Time, August 6, 1979, p. 41.' 
r 05 
with TIME that we wanted to alter a system of privileges 
to a small minority which looked upon our country as their 
property. And these few got ericher while the masses grew 
poorer. We had a high infant mortality rate. Three huddred 
thousand of our SOOrjiOOO families were living in hovels 
beneath the dignity of human beings. We had the highest 
illiteracy rate in the Southern hemisphere. So, the people 
decided to fight. In 1980, the first year after the revolution, 
Nicaragua showed the highest rate of GNP growth in Latin 
America. We have the smallest rate of inflation in central 
America. Nicaragua was the only one of Central America's 
countries which was considered worthy by the world Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank and the Central American 
„ , 122 Bank. 
REAGAN PLAN AGAINST CUBA, NICARAGUA AND MEXICO : 
The US Administration neglected internal situation 
in i^icaragua, and decided to pressurise Nicaragua and Cuba, 
It also gave green signal to the plans to keep Mexico isolated 
123 
from the Central American issues. In April 1982, President 
Reagan approved several secret and public operations to 
hinder the establishment of popular government in Central 
America. The Reagan Administration drawn plans against Cuba, 
122. Time, February 15, 1982, p. 9. 
123. A policy doc ment titled," United States policy in 
Central America and Cuba through fiscal year 1984," 
see, Annexure II. 
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Nicaragua, and Mexico as well as an operation against 
Guatemala, all conceived to promote the US goals in the 
region. The Administration also approved a policy with the 
goal to avoid "a proliferation of states with Cuban model. • 
MEXICO'S ROLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS : 
Mexico has played an important role for the prospect 
for negotiations between Washington and the left-wing 
Sandinista regime of Nicaragua. Mexican President Jose Lopez 
Portillo recommended such talks as a way to reduce the 
tensions arising out of the US contention that Nicaragua was 
directing the subversion of El Salvador. However, many 
questions were emerging regarding the negotiations, i.e. 
the question of Soviet and Cuban participation in Central 
American negotiations. Haig asserted that the El Salvador 
struggle was port of the global problem of Soviet adventurism, 
and should be treated as such through talks with all 
parties involved. But, Haig clarified, "Salvador is at once 
a global, a regional and a local problem. That does not 
mean, nor did it even mean, that the Soviets, or the Cubans 
125 for that matter, must be iniited to the negotiating table. 
Mexico, thus, has been concerned over the increasingly 
tense relations between the US and both Nicaragua and Cuba. 
124. Beri, op. cit., p. 130. 
125. Time, March 29, 1982, p. 26. 
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'^'^ exican President Lopez Portillo speaking before a mass rally 
of Sandinistas supporters in Managua's Plaza de la Revolution, 
on February 21, 1982, asserted that US hostility toward 
J^icaragua was dangerous, undignified, and unnecessary, ^^ e 
appealed to Reagan to avoid armed intervention in Central 
America and offered his service as a "bridge" between the 
US on the one hand and Cuba, Nicaragua, and the El Salvador 
2 6 guerrillas on the other." 
The Mexican President also called for the disarming 
of bands of anti-Sandinista guerrillas who were launching 
attacks into Nicaragua from neighbouring Honduras. At the 
same time, he suggested that the Nicaraguans cease the alarming 
military build-up that they have carried on since their 
revolutionary victory in 1979. 
PEACE PROPOSAL BY MEXICO : 
The Mexican President, in short, presented at Managua 
mainly a three point strategy - (a) the US should renounce 
any threat or use of force against Nicaragua, (b) the anti-
Sandinista forces training in Honduras and Florida with tacit 
or direct US support should be disbanded and the government of 
Nicaragua should simultaneously renounce the purchase of 
126. Time, March 8, 1982, p. 15. 
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weapons and aircraft and reduce the size of its armed forces, 
finally, (c) Nicaragua should conclude a series of non-
aggression i pacts with its immediate neighbours and the US. 
The Mexican proposals were subsequently approved by the 
Permanent Conference of Latin American Political Parties 
on 
(COPPPAL), which demanded as its first condition a 
lessening of tension, and the starting of dialogue and 
negotiations based on strict respect for the principle of 
non-intervention, free self-determination, and a peaceful 128 solution to conflicts in the region, 
NICARAGUAN PROPOSAL IN RESPONSE : 
Following the Mexican proposal, a member of 
Nicaragua's Sandinista directorate Daniel Ortega Saavedra 
offered Nicaragua's five-point plan for better relations 
with the US and its Central American neighbours, including 
regional non-aggression pacts, joint patrols bythe Hondurans 
127. COPPPAL was set up in October 1979 in 0 exaca, Mexico, 
during a meeting of Latin American political parties 
representing 22 political organisations from 14 nations. 
Convened by Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party. 
It's Constitution was formalised with the purpose of 
contributing to a greater understanding of the serious 
problems of the region. For more details on it, see 
United Nation document S/PV.2335, pp. 28-31; and 
Washington Post, February 24, 1982. 
128. Victor Millan, "Controlling Conflict in the Caribbean 
Basin: National Approaches," cd. by Michael A. Morris and 
Victor Millan, Controlling Latin American Conflicts, 
Westview press, Colorado, 1983, p. 57. 
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and Nicaraguans of their border, and a commitment to free 
elections and political pluralism in Nicaragua. Washington 
responded politely but non committally to the proposals 
of Lopez Portillo, who later called the economic aspects 
of Reagan's Caribbean Plan" a first serious reaction " to the 
129 problems of developing countries. 
A series of propiisals have been promoted by the 
Central American countries appealing to Cuba and the United 
States to improve their relations. These initiatives aimed 
at favouring a negotiated political solution to the Salvadorean 
conflict/ that between the United States and Nicaragua, and 
Nicaragua and its H neighbours by demanding that the government 
of the United States rule out any threat or use of force 
against Nicaragua. The feasibility and desirability of the 
creation of a system of mutual non-aggression pacts between 
Nicaragua and the United States, on the one hand, and between 
Nicaragua and its neighbours, on the other, has also been 
130 considered, 
NICARAGUAN COMPLAINT IN THE UN : 
It is here important of note that the UN Security 
Council considered a complaint by Nicaragua against the 
government of the United States, where the Nicaraguan 
129. See, Victor Millan, op. cit. pp. 58-59. 
130. Victor Millan, op. cit., p. 54. 
131. UN Document, S/14913. 
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representative referred to an imrrdnent invasion of his 
country and warned of the danger that this constituted for 
131 peace in the region and in the world. 
PANAMA'S RESOLUTION : 
In this regard/ Panama presented a draft resolution 
to the Security Council Co-sponsored by Guyana regarding the 
deterioration of the situation in Central America and the 
Caribbean. The Panama resolution enjoins, by means of various 
specific measures, respect for the territorial borders between 
the countries and their respective sovereignties, and avoidance 
in any way of the destabilisation of the region or the internal 
system of any of its components. Permission should not be 
given for the use of territory for launching destabilising 
actions against other countries, for arms trafficking nor the 
training or transit of combatants. The draft resolution 
appeals to all members states to s refcain from direct, 
indirect, overt or covert use of force against any country 
of Central America and the Caribbean, and to the parties 
concerned to have recourse to dialogue and negotiations which 
would lead to the search for a peacefilil solution to the 
problem of Central America and the Caribbean. The resolution 
however, was not adopted because of the US veto in the 
Security Council. Nicaragua called the veto a serious threat 
131. UN Docximent, S/ 14913. 
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to Central America, implicitly confirming its apprehension 
132 about US intentions regarding military aggression. 
US RESPONSE TO MEXICAN PROPOSAL : 
The United States responded to the Mexican peace 
proposal with the eight point plan presented to the Nicaraguan 
government on April 8, 1982, which calls for the following : 
(a) an and to Nicaraguan support for insurgencies in 
neighbouring countries; 
(b) a pSlitical declaration by the United States, whereby 
it would enforce the Neutrality Act, which makes it a crime 
to plan or launch invasions of other countries from US 
territory; 
(c) a joint US-Nicaragua statement pledging net to interfere 
in each other's affairs, nor in the affairs of other in the 
region; 
(d) a limit to the size of military forces inthe region, 
a ban on the import of heavy offensive weapons into the 
region; and a reduction in the number of foreign military 
advisers; 
(e) an international verification process to monitor comp-
liance with these provisions, conducted by outside observer from 
the OAS or the United Nations; 
132. Victor Millan, Op. Cit., p. 56. 
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(f) a resumption of US aid to Nicaragua, including Nicaragua 
in the Administration Caribbean Basin development Plan (CBI); 
(g) a serious of confidence building measures including 
cultural and other exchanges; and 
(h) reaffirmation of Nicaragua's prior commitment to a system 
of political pluralism, a diversified economy and non-allianci^^ 
NICARAGUAN RESPONSE TO US PLAN : 
Nicaragua expressed willingness to discuss the US 
eight-point plan proposal but insisted on the participation 
of Mexico as a mediater. In a letter to the UN Secretary 
General Mr. Vavier Parez de Cueller, Daniel Ortega, Nicaraguan 
President, changed that the Reagan Administration was trying 
to revive "gunboat diplomacy" in the Central American region. 
He strongly criticised the Reagan Administration's inter-
ventionist policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The letter said 
that it was a public matter that the Reagan Administration 
provided the CIA with $ 19.9 million "to finance subversive 
activities in Nicaragua aimed at destabilising and overthrowing" 
the present government "by force'. The letter charged that 
the "unusual display" of naval and air force in Caribbean 
by the United States was intended to "intimidate" the 
134 country of the region. 
133. Ibid. p. 57. 
134. Nicaragua Urges UN meet on US Threat," Times of India, 
March 21, 1982. 
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The Nicaraguan counterproposal to the US plan 
contained several restatements of points made public at the 
United Nation's security Council in March 1982 by the Nicara-
guan Head of State, Daniel Ortega, including the following 
principles: (a) Nicaragua is ready to improve the climate 
of relations with the United States through negotiations; 
(b) Nicaragua can not accept that it or any other country 
in the region should be considered the geopolitical preserve 
of the United States or as a part of its so-called strategic 
frontier, a concept that restricts the exercise of sovereignty 
and independence of the states in the region; (c) Nicaragua 
can, therefore, in no way represent a threat to the security 
of the United states; (d) Nicaragua is ready to subscribe to 
non-aggression pacts with all neighbouring countries of the 
Central American area in order to ensure peace and the 
internal stability of the zone; (e) the USA should put a 
halt to measures and covert plans which have been denounced 
but which have never been officially denied, such as secret 
destabilisation plans and the organisation or financing of 
paramilitary forces, advised and trained by US military 
personnel in Honduras and by active and retired military 
personnel from Argentina and other South American countries. 
In addition, the USA should refrain from using Honduran 
territory as a base for armed aggression and terrorist 
operations against Nicaragua; (f) the presence of US warships 
in the waters of Central America and off the coast of 
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Nicaragua should be stopped, as should the US over-flights 
by spy-aircraft violating the air space of Nicaragua; and 
(g) the United states must explicitly promise not to attack 
Nicaragua, and must renounce any plans for an economic, 
financial or commercial boycott.^^^ 
There was scepticism about the real intentions 
of the US in opening up talks with Nicaragua and both 
parties question the willingness of the other to negotiate 
seriously. Since the two packages of proposal were put forth, 
Nicaragua has pushed, the United states to set a date for 
talks. The Nicaraguan government holds that the eight-point 
US plan was merely a political device aimed at internal 
public opinion in the US and at improving its intentional 
image. Moreover, the Nicaraguan government has indications 
that the US administration has moved further, with the reported 
acceptance by President Reagan of the National Security 
Council budget of $ 19.9 million, to promote destabilizing 
and covert actions against Nicaragua that entail economic 
sabatage, attacks, training and arms shipments to anti-
Nicaraguan forces, and stepped - up presence of US warships 
in surrounding waters and US reconnaissance airplanes 
overhead.^^^ In a turnabout, the US demand that Nicaragua 
halt alleged arms deliveries to the Salvador opposition and the 
use of Nicaraguan territory as a base for subversive operatioAi?' 
135. See, Victor Millan, op cit., pp. 58-59, Also see, 
UN Document S/PV 2335. 
136. See, Ibid, UN Document S/14913. 
137. Victor Millan, op. cit. p. 59
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The United gtates argued that it would restore aid 
and friendly relations with Nicaragua if that country scaled 
down its military build-up and endedarras shipments to the 
Salvadorean rebels. While, true to their Marxist Leninsto 
orientation the Sandinista leaders make no secret of their 
"moral support" for the Salvadorean "leftists" still, they 
adamentaly deny charges that they are channeling arms into 
El Salvador although most objective observers are convinced 
that at least some weaponry is coming through Nicaragua. 
While, the Sandinistas blame many of their problems 
on the US Government, which discontinued most economic aid 
early in 1981 because it was convinced that Nicaragua was 
abetting the leftist insurgency in El Salvador. Washington 
has pressurised international lenders not to loan Nicaragua 
money. The US Administration says its wants to improve 
relations with the Sandinistas, but talks have repeatedly 
foundered over the question of aid to the Salvadorean 
guerrillas. Though State Department officials have denied ^ 
that they are stalling, the US doubts that negotiations with 
the Sandinista would achieve anything. The US might also 
be waiting to see what the 'Contras', who might be receiving 
some of the $ 19 rr.illion in secret funds the Reagan Adminis-
tration had earmarked for anti-Sandinista activities, could 
V . 138 achieve. 
138. Time, August 2, 1982, p. 14. 
370 
Thus, the Reagan Administration viewed the Marxist 
dominated Sandinista regime as the Central American equivalent 
of Fidel Castro's Cuban regime. 
CONCLUSION : 
After 46 years, Latin America's most durable dynasty-
Somoza dynasty-collapsed in 19 79. The new regime needed to • 
help to recover from the suffering inflicted by the corrupt 
Somoza regime. To most Nicaraguans the most pressing concern 
was the need to sweep away the last vestiges of Somoza's 
pro-ms despotic regime and get on with rebuilding the country. 
The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a broadly 
based collection of Marxist and non-Marxist leftists held 
together mainly by hatred for Tado Somoza's regime. Nicaragua 
was the worsening state of the economy which has never 
recovered from the war's devastation. 
Nicaraguan bloody revolution troubled the military 
139 rulers of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Their leaders 
139. Guatemala experienced a CIA-assisted coup in 1953 that 
ousted the leftist government of •'=^ resident Jacobo Arbenz 
Guzman. Between 1966 and 1979 at least 40,000 people had 
been murdered in cliashes between the government and its 
critics. See, Time, August 13, 1979, p. 7. 
A succession of dictators has been ruling in 
Guatemala, a country of rich oil deposits, since 1954 
coup. The coup, which costed the United states less than 
$ 10 million was originated by expropriation conflict of 
178,000 acres owned by the United Fruit Company, The coup 
marked the return of "the big-stick policy" toward Latin 
America. 
Guatemala who borders on four countries - Belize, 
El Salvador, Nicaragua and Mexico-also became a model for 
Contd... Next page 
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feared that a domino effect might engulf them in a wave of 
leftist insurgency inspired by the success of Nicaragua's 
revolt. Though, the new five member junta in Nicaragua has 
denied any plans to "export our revolution," Defense Depart-
ment and intelligence officials are urging that the US 
resume arms shipments to the three nations, which have been 
cut off since the Carter Administrati n began its human 
rights campaign. 
The Carter Administration tried to strengthened the 
tenuous relationship with the new government that developed 
during the logg negotiations that led to Somoza's abdication. 
New Nicaraguan regime saw the U.S. as the biggest source 
of aid. Washington, which had already provided $ 7 million]): 
seemed ready to come up with more, hoping that by generously 
assisting Nicaragua, it could'nt only prevent the new regime 
from falling into the embrace of Fidel Castro, but also foster 
a new partnership with democratic regimes throughout the 
region. But, the US alleged that the junta was courting Castro. 
Contd... 
US response to revolutionary change in Latin America. Being the 
most militerised country of Central America with the largest 
(about 8 million) population in the region, it is now being 
bolstered as a bastion of anti-communism in the region declared 
to be"a sphere of vital interests" for the USA. The latest coup 
in Guatemala occured on March 23, 1982, when the anti-communist 
National Liberation Movement(MLN) seized power and overthrew 
General Guevara who had been elected two weak before. He was 
replaced by General Efrain Rios Montt. Guatemala, experienced 
continuing massacre in 1980-81. The political killings were 
estimated 70-100 a month in 1980,250-300 a month in 1981. 
•^^ otably, the 30,000 political murders have take place in Guate-
mala since 1954. See, The US State Department Report, February 
7, 1982, H. M.L. Beri, op. cit., p. 135. 
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In fact, Nicaragua recognises US interests in the 
region. It has consistently sought US help but been denied it. 
In addition, the sabotage operations of the CIA posed grave 
threat to the existence of Sandinista regime and have been 
primarily responsible to push Nicaragua into the Soviet Camp. 
The United States covert involvement in Nicaragua began 
even before Somoza fled the country. In 1978, with the Somoza 
dynasty nearing collapse, Jimmy Carter authorised under cover 
CIA support "for democratic elements" in Nicaraguan society. 
American financial support for Nicaragua's opposition forces 
has continued, and it remains on of the many items on the 
CIA's yearly "classified schedilile of authorisation." 
The Reagan Administration claims that the Sandinista 
government ultimately threatens aggressive, Moscow-backed 
communism throughout central America, it has failed to yet 
to convince Americans that Nicaragua is more than a trouble-
some godfly. 
The US Administration believes that a communist central 
America would vastly increase the pott-ntial fcr Soviet naval xi 
add land operations on tVie US doorstep. Conanunist take over 
in Central America would increase the threat to Caribbean 
sealanes ap'^eared inconvincing, which for 20 years have been 
allegedly vulnerable because of Cuba that provide ports to 
Soviet submarines. 
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The US Administration, however stressed that the 
United States could not accept Soviet military engagement 
in Central America and the Caribbean beyond what it reluctantly 
tolerates in Cuba. The US government has said that it feels 
threatened because Nicaragua is arming itself and because 
of the presence of Cuban and Soviet weapons and advisers. 
While Mr. ^rtega said that for our part, we feel that the 
United States threatens our security with its bases in 
Honduras and its growing military presence in Central America, 
The US Administration failed to deny the allegations that it 
was financing if not co-ordiating, military and paramilitary 
actions against i^icaa-agua from Honduran territory and seeking h 
to destabilise the Nicaraguan government by covert actions. 
If the US imposes an economic embargo, it will push, the 
Nicaragua into greater dependence on the USSR and the eastern 
bloc which then would serve as a pretext for Americans to 
further tighten the screws. 
In so far as the US is seen to supporting rightist and 
repressive regimes in other Central American countries then 
such a claim to "restoring" democracy in Nicaragua is uncon-
vincing. This is why the victory of the Duarte regime over the 
extreme right forces of Major D' Aubussion in El Salvador was 
so helpful in terms of polishing up to American image. A 
civilian white washing of the military dictatorships in 
Guatemala and Honduras is similarly underway. 
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The US can not be threatened by Nicaragua, a country 
of fewer than three million puple, desperately poor after 
years of dictatorships and war. It is threatened in its deepest 
nature, by a policy that allies the United States with 
terrorism. 
In fact, the intrusion of military considerations in 
the affairs of Latin American Counties tends to limit and 
distort possible solutioiis to conflicts that are initiated 
through diplomatic routes or negotiation. These solutions 
tend to be replaced by those relying on force or are otherwise 
obstructed by considerations of a military nature. 
There have been increase in military spending and rising 
arms imports. This military medernisation effort has put 
special emphasis on a supposed Cuban threat in Central America 
and the Caribbean by favouring armed opposition to revolutionary 
activity in the area in association with the United States. 
* * * * * * * 
CHAPTER - IX 
C O N C L U S I O N S 
The declaration in 1023 by US President Monroe that 
interference by any European power in the affairs of the newly 
emerging Latin American republics would be considered an 
unfriendly act toward the United States itself, established 
the right for the U.S. to "protect" Latin America, It was 
based on the assumption that the two regions of . north and Latin 
America shared common interests which the northern power had 
the right to interpret. Thereafter, aggressive expansionism 
was added to the defensive paternalism of the Monroe Doctrine, 
The United States emerged a supreme military, economic 
and technological power in the world .after 1945. It haS 
a nuclear monopoly and the only global navy. But, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis exposed that two super powers with awesome 
nuclear Arsenals could not go to war with each other and hope 
to win. Now, the entire international system is a bipolar 
zero-sum-game between the Two.Both had entered into an era 
of duopolistic domination of the world. 
In fact, international politics is essentially 
opportunitisl^c. The Latin American affairs can not be an 
exception. The region which was initially considered outside 
the threater of cold war had started feeling heat of cold war 
after the Cuban tangle. Cuba was the first country in 
Latin America that raised the "triumphant banner of socialism". 
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The bitter experiences in Vietnam also convinced Americans 
not to allow any repetition of Cuba or Vietnam at least in 
their own sphere of influence. 
The U.S. policy toward Latin America, as the presidential 
tenures of Allende in Chile; Campora and Peron in Argentina; 
Ortega in Nicaragua; and Duarte's in El Salvador revealed, 
had, at all times, been designed to protect the interests of 
U.S. monopoly capital. Instead of encouraging the growth 
of democracy and the spirit of constitutionalism in Latin 
America, it had provided substantial financial aid and arms 
to bolster the reactionary regimes offering favourable 
infra-structure for infiltration of U.S. capital. The U.S. 
policy had, at times, supported open dictatorships to capture 
power i.e. Pinochet regime in Chile, and utilised the CIA 
for this purpose to undermin£> . anti-U.S, regimes in the 
area. Covert subversive activities of CIA in regional politics 
as experienced in Chile, one of the last remnants of democracy 
in Latin America, had been a bipartisan tradition in U.S. 
foreign policy. 
The U.S. policy toward Latin America was one of the 
painful warfare againstthe restrictions on investments and 
of 
nationalisation^ foreign-owned enterprises imposed by Latin 
American governments. The U.S. policy-makers interpreted 
nationalisation as purely vindictive. Allende in chile; 
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Campora and Peron regimes in Argentina, military junta in 
P e m , and Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, which had political 
clamour for economic independence against the depredations 
of U.S. monopoly capital, therefore, received severe U.S. 
hostility in their relations with the United states. 
Chile became hostile to U.S. foreign policy interests. 
Washington, in immediate response, withheld substantial 
portions of its contributions to the Chilean economy, thereby 
precipated a grave financial crisis in Chile, Allende visualised 
that Chile's humane and civilised traditions would guard 
against Chilean chronic instability, unlike most of her 
neighbours, Argentina, for instance, where every military 
coup was the mere donation of one more bottle for the same 
old wine. But, at last, U.S. armed Chilean military led by 
General Pinochet butchered the country's democratic and 
constitutional political system in the midst of bloody battles 
in 1973. The actions of the CIA came at a time when the Allende 
government was facing its worst ever economic crisis unrest. 
During the three years of Allende regime, U.S. pressure on 
Chile was relentless. 
The CIA-engineered Chilean coup removed the main threat 
to U.S. hegomony in the western hemisphere. The restablishment 
of a dependent regime in Chile immediately received friendly 
postures of the U.S. The Pinochet regime adopted an open-door 
policy to foreign investment to stimulate foreign loans. 
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credits and investments to regain economic recovery. 
The Latin American politics and its transitional 
colours, from the viewpoint of U.S. hegemonistic aspirations, 
could be epitomised in President Nixon's foreign policy 
statement to Congress on February 28, 1971, in which he 
complained, to quote, " There is a great ferment in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Modernisation brings extensive, 
frequently unsettling change, accompanied by growing nation-
alism In virtually all cases, nationalism seeks greater 
independence from our predominant influence.,.».,a populist 
brand of nationalism has taken anti-U.S, turn."^ 
In addition, after the trauma of Vietnam, the humiliation 
of Iran and the Soviet intrusion into Afghanistan, the American 
self-image was consider at its nadir. In a country where 
conservatism runs strong and deep, a groundswell of reactive 
resentment began to emerge. The Carter presidency, despite 
his strenuous efforts to run a humane administration, only 
aggravated this resentment. Towards the end of his term, he 
however unsuccessfully tried to assume a more aggressive 
stance, i.e. the botched rescue attempt of U,S, embassy 
hostages in Teheran, In contrast, Mr, Reagan exploited his 
predecessor's ease and invoked prelapsarian American bliss 
which he promised to restore, Reagan, during his presidency, 
1. Political Affairs, Vol. 5, October, 1972. 
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refurbished American self-esteem to the point where it's 
more aggressive manifestations jeopardised global stability. 
New cold war era has reached at the doorstep of 
Central American region. The region is in an irreversible 
process of change where tne emergence of opposition movements 
are regarded by the U.S. as part and parcel of Soviet 
expansionism. The Administration belives that the exploitation 
of Central American unrest by the Soviet Union and Cuba threa-
tens US security interests. It broods about the danger to 
Caribbean shipping lanes. The U.S. officials uses the domino 
arg\iment that guerrilla victory in El Salvador would spread 
Soviet influence, through Central America. They believe that 
failure in Central America will damage U.S. "credibility" 
worldwide. The Reagan Administration's determination, therefore, 
to inflate stakes and invest a civil war with global signi-
ficance had made El Salvador a "test" of U.S. resolve. The 
main goal of the large-scale U.S. intervention in El Salvador 
is to prevent the appearance of a "second Nicaragua". However, 
El Salvador is also viewed in Washington as a potential 
bridgehead for an attack on the Sandinista revolution in 
Nicaragua, which, the Reagan Administration believes, is 
exporting revolution to El Salvador. 
In fact, the trend in Central American countries 
have been greatly aggravated by the continuing frustration 
of political aspirations. A lack of participation in decision 
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making by the majority of the population, the fact that all 
did'nt enjoy equal rights, and the absence of a fair 
distribution of income and wealth lead to discontent, provoking, 
impatient groups in society which attempt to seize power. 
Existing socio-political concepts pave the way for a polarisa-
tion of the masses, and this leads in turn to the introduction 
of new revolutionary ideas. Since the resulting fragmentation 
of the social fabric suits the military regime, its hold on 
power poses an increasing danger to the polity. The role 
of military in politics and the degree of acceptance of civilian 
rule by generals have been a subject of a V'igorous debate 
in Latin America. 
The armed forces in El Salvador were constantly told by 
country's civilian-military regime that the anti-government 
movement was based on communist ideals and goals with the sole 
aim of effecting a change in Salvador through violent means, 
and that "subversion" had to be tackled at the military level. 
Added to this interpretation of the issue was the constant 
reminder from the United States that the Number One threat 
to the Salvadoreans came from the "Communists"and that the 
military had to be geared to deal with this firmly. The 
Nicaraguan government assessed the situation differently, 
the root of the revolutionary movement lay in the socio-
economic inequities of the system, compounded by the 
disastrous policies of the earstwhile dictators. Consequently, 
insurgancy, it is argued, can be halted through genuine 
economic reforms and a willingness to talk to the rebels 
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to come to a political understanding. 
The U.S. policy toward regional conflict has been 
determined by fear of the Cuban example rather than the 
realities of the conflicts themselves, which have their 
genesis in decades of economic inequality and political 
oppression. Thus, V/ashigton has lost sight of the regional 
dynamics, focussing only on the East-West dimension of the 
local conflicts. The projection of the East-West conflicts 
pattern on the region by the U.S. administration, particularly 
the presentation of El Salvador as a text book case of 
indirect armed aggression by the communist powers has 
jeopardised the common interests of Latin American nations. 
Thus, the U.S. Administration views the events in 
Central American and the Caribbean as a Soviet Union intrigue 
through their Cuban proxies. The U.S., in response, is 
blundering deeper into an open-ended military commitment 
in the area. Nicaraguan harbour has been mined, reportedly 
by CIA agents. Formulation of a contingency plan to send 
its troops to Central America to dislodge the sandinista 
government and to defeat the Salradorean leftist rebels 
also can not be ruled out. 
The U.S. policy-makers seemed convinced that democratic 
form of government could not be essentially fruitful for 
capitalist development in Latin America. History had proved 
the inability of such governments to offer necessary state 
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security to foreign investment against radicatism and 
nationalism. Military dictators, for instance, in Argentina, 
had more successfully eliminated and suppressed guerrillas, 
trade unions, strikes, wages demands, and thus, presented 
themselves more suitable to create capitalist paradise. In 
Chile also when frei, a strong US supported righjist»j failed 
to win the 1970 presidential elections, the US government 
tempted to design a military coyp. Interestingly even after 
the coup, U.S. policy-makers gradually believed that Frei 
could'nt favourably face and settled Chilean instability 
and prevent resurgence of leftism which was organised after 
the coup, therefore decided to continue the support to 
military regime in Chile. 
In fact, the U.S. has always been anibitious for 
creation of the conditions for economic expansion through 
private accumulation in dependent capitalist societies. 
Economic expansion and accumulation demand two political grounds 
at the same time,(l) there must be a dominant political 
elite in the State, capable to utilise government machinery 
to control the working and peasant classes and thus, minimising 
their political influence, and (2) creating deliberately 
a political environment in which the free flow of foreign 
capital may be regarded logical and essential. In this respect, 
Allende in Chile, Campora and Peron in Argentina,and the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua were an open threat to the U.S. 
capitalism, therefore, they were ranked as U.S.'enemy' 
in the White House, 
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Indubitably, US domination had clearly resulted in a 
tremendous bloodtletting for the Latin American nations. 
That's why, the region though rich in foodstuffs and 
valuable natural resources, has steadily been growing poorer 
and poorer under the impact of foreign exploitation. 
At last, the United States, though always, adhered, 
in principle, to the policy of encouraging democracy and 
constitutional government on international platfarm and in 
theory, it had been said, that the U.S. policy is on the side 
of the angels, factually, foreign policy in practice, rarely 
corresponds fully to its broad statements of aims and 
principles. It is more appropriate to say that it is based on 
calculations and compulsions of the national interests in the 
specific circumstances in which the decisions are made and 
actions are taken. But at the same time the cold war myth 
that anti-Americanism is pro-communism must be resisted. 
The past Latin American affairs reveal that the consummate 
posture of the nationalist leaders in Latin America, like 
Allende and Peron and with some reservations Fidel Castro, 
and their endurance to the presence or entrance of the 
communism seemed more the outcome of their rejection of the 
U.S. hegemony rather than the acceptance of the Soviet 
system. The entire Latin America was and still is desperately 
grop^.ng in the dark for solutions to extremely critical 
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problems of development. Under developed and developing 
Latin American nations, therefore, should be nourished by 
pleasant musical modes and not by death knells. 
The U.S. can win war in El Salvador but only at the 
price of devastating El Salvador, destroy a country in order 
to save it. The only way to eliminate the danger of a 
globalisation of the conflict is to propose a form of inter-
national politics based on dialogue, rapproachment and 
negotiatipns. The sovereignty and inalienable right of Latin 
American states to freely determine their own political, 
economic and social systems must be secured. 
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PROLOGUE 
War has become routine in El Salvador. After nine 
years of battle, more than 70,000 dead, and about 3 billion 
dollars in U.S. economic and military aid, the war between 
the government and leftist rebels grinds on. The U.S. 
congress each year certifies human rights improvements 
and approves the aid outlay, which stands at close to 2 
million dollars a day. El Salvador's 56,000 men armed forces 
has been trained b/ the United States and granted material 
ranging from bullets and bombs to uniforms and planes. 
The Reagan Administration assumed that the military 
aid was vital'so that the people of Central America can 
hold the line against externally supported aggression. However, 
after 1982, both the military and human rights situations has 
continued to deteriorate. The Administration provided $ 81.3 
million military aid in 1983, $ 64.8 million for fiscal year 
1984, to and about $ 400 million for 1984 and 1985, to El 
Salvador. 
CIA FINANCED TWO EL SALVADOR PARTIES : 
Mr. Jose Napolean Duarte elected El Salvador President 
in May 1984, defeating his extreme right wing rival, Mr. Roberto 
d' Aubbuisson. The CIA gave $ 1.4 million to two political 
parties the Christian Democratic Party and the National 
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Conciliation, Party, in El Salvador in an effort to prevent 
the election of Aubmisson to the presidency. 
The regional question for the US in El Salvador is 
whether to give priority to negotiation and conciliation, to 
cantainment and neutralisation of a force considered as 
committed to revolutionary destabilisation. In this perspective, 
notably, the US forces performed the manoeurres, named "Big 
Pinell" in August, 1983 near Honduran border, one of Washington 
closest allies in the region designed to demonstrate U.S. 
ability to quickly deploy forces overseas and as a show of 
strength in Central America, where ^resident Reagan saw a 
spreading Soviet and Cuban influence. The U.S.has also announced 
in March 1988, that it was sending 3,200 tropps to southern 
Honduras on an "emergency deployment readiness excercise" 
to counter an alleged incursion of Nicaraguan forces into that 
country. Honduras had declared that Nicaragua invaded the 
country and the Honduran government had requested US help in 
repelling the drive. Nicaragua denied ^^onduras charges. 
MINING NICARAGUAN WATERS BY CIA : 
The bottom line of US concern in Nicaragua is the 
presence of a regime believed to be sympathetic to the Soviet 
Union. Nicaraguan waters had been mined by the CIA in January 
February 1984 a flagrant violation of the International law. 
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U.S. MILITARY PREPARATIONS : 
The United States has undertaken sincere military 
prparations in Central America. Nicaragua's northern front -
the triangle of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, of which 
Honduras is the key - has been solidified. Honduras has been 
transformed into a permanent US and Contras base. The contras 
force has been beefed up from 20,000 to 35,000. Significantly, 
President Reagan has authorised the CM in January 1988, to 
resume airdrops of weapons to Nicaragua's Contra rebels. 
The Nicaraguan regime has also embarrassed Washington 
accepting the Contadora group's - Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, 
Coloumbia - peace accord. The Foreign Ministers of these countries 
firstly met in January 1983 at the Panamanian island of 
Contadora, from which emerged the Contadora Group, 
Reagan's hardline - strategy in Central America is 
committed to contain leftist influence in the region and 
neutralise any threat to U.S. security. His administration 
indirectly threatened Nicaragua intervening militarily 
the tiny 345 sq. km island of Grenada in 25 October, 1983, 
a member country of the commonwealth. He seemed to show that 
his promises of "rollback", of winning back for the West 
terrain where revolutions had come to power, was feasible. 
Perhaps, he nlso wanted to assert US power, in the runup 
to the next presidential election in the U.S., in such 
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a way as to legitimise his cold war policies. 
To the very extent, his calculations proved to be 
successful. Mr. George Herbert Walker Bush, has become the 
41st president of the United States. The American people 
have obviously voted to carry on the Reagan era. 
/ o c: 
ANNEXURE - 1 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT ON POLICY IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA AND CUBiS 
I, INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES : 
We have an interest in creating and supporting 
democratic states in Central America capable of conducting 
their political and economic affairs free from outside 
interference. Strategically, we have a vital interest in 
not allowing the proliferation of Cube-model states which 
would provide platforms for subversion, compromise vital 
sea lanes and pose a direct military threat at or near our 
borders. This would undercut us globally and create economic 
dislocation and a resultant influx to the U.S. of illegal 
immigrants. In the short run we must work to eliminate 
Cuban/Soviet influence in the region, and in the long run 
we must build politically stable governments able to with-
stand such influences. 
//_THE CURRENT SITUATION : 
The deterioration in our position so evident 6 to 12 
months ago has been halted. Political developments in the 
region have been positive. The elections in Honduras, Costa 
Rica and El Salvador provided a strong contrast to an 
increasingly totalitarian Nicaragua and have stalled the 
public affairs momentum and the political program of the 
extreme left. In Guatemala the recent junior officer coup 
Source : New York Times, April 1, 1983 
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has given us new possibilities for working out an improved 
relationship with that country. The minicoup in Panama has 
brought to power a new, more dynamic and more pro.U.S. 
national guard commander. Regional cooperation among 
N 
democratic states has improved, as is evident by the 
formation of the Central American Democratic Community. 
Militarily, the situation has improved in El Salvador, 
where any prospect of a near-term military victory by the 
F.M.L.N, has been foreclosed and the Salvadoran forces have 
shown improved capabilities. Regional interdiction efforts 
have hampered but not stopped guerrilla resupply efforts. 
The Guatemala coup may cause some erosion in the Government's 
military capabilities but, in the long run, if the Government 
is able to address problems of efficial violence it may 
prove more effective in carrying out an active counter-
insurgency. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas are under increased 
pressure as a result of our covert efforts and because of 
the poor state of their economy. For the first time the 
Sandinistas have cause to doubt whether they can export 
subversion with impunity. 
But serious problems remain : 
- Guerrilla strength in El Salvador and Guatemala remains 
at 4-5,000 in each country. 
- There is a dangerous lack of political consensus in 
both El Salvador and Guatemala, which could lead to political 
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disintegration. Continued political, social and institutional 
reforms must be pursued. 
- We continue to have serious difficulties with U.S. public 
and Congress opinion, which jeopardizes our ability to stay 
the course. International opinion, particularly in Eurppe 
and Mexico, continues to work against our policies. 
- Cuba and Nicaragua retain the ability to continue or 
even increase their support for insurgencies and terrorist 
groups, particularly in Honduras and Costra Rica, where 
their activities are increasing. Panama could become a target. 
- Mexico continues public and covert support for the extreme 
left with propaganda, funds and political support. 
- The P.L.O. and Libya continue their military and financial 
support for the extreme left. 
- The regional economic situation continues to deteriorate, 
causing social and politicui dislocations which impede our 
efforts to stabilize the situation.. 
XNR, THE S T R A T E G Y : 
Our current strategy consists of building a sustained 
and effective commitment to the region by : 
- Improving the military capabilities of the democratic 
states to counter subversion by the extreme left. 
- Improving the economic situation through direct economic 
assistance and the C.B.I, package. 
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- Assisting directly in the regional interdiction and 
intelligence collection effort. 
- Increasing the pressure on Nicaragua and Cuba to increase 
for them the costs of interventionism. 
- Building democratic political institutions capable of 
achieving domestic political support. 
- Pursuing reform programs to correct severe social dislocations 
which foment and aid insurgency. 
- Stimulating regional cooperation among democratic states 
to provide a basis for collective security action through the 
O.A.S,, Rio Treaty and the C.A.D.C. 
- Addressing the public affairs dimension of the Central 
American problem by a concerted public information effort. 
- Co-opting cut- and run negotiation strategies by demonstrating 
a reasonable but firm approach to negotiations and compromise 
on our terms. 
Most, but not all, the elements necessary to implement 
this strategy are in place. 
fy. WHERE WE V/ILL BE IN 1984 : 
V/here we stand by the end of FY 1984 will depend on a 
niomber of assumptions. We have indicated six situations. 
Situation 1 outlined below is deemed to be the most probable 
set of assumptions and outcome. Situations 2 through 6 are 
annexed to this paper. 
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Situation 1 (likely Case) 
ASSUMPTIONS : 
(1) Resource availability at $1 billion of economic and 
military assistance a year for the Caribbean Basin. 
(2) Significant convert effort as approved in N.S.D.D. 17 
and other existing authorities. 
(3) No U.S. troops introduced and no significant increase 
in U.S. trainers. 
(4) Increnental increase in Cuban and Nicaraguan effort. No 
major qualitative changes in types of support. 
(5) Increasing effectiveness of the arms interdiction effort 
but substantial arms continue to get through. 
(6) Gradual upturn in world economy with resulting improvement 
in balance of payments and domestic economies in the basin. 
RESULTS : 
Regional 
-Cuba/Kicaragua influence is slowly reduced. 
-The region strengthens economically. 
-Regional military and intelligence cooperation among the 
democratic countries improves. 
-Democratic structures are strengthened in a number of 
countires. 
-The C.A.D.C. develops as a significant multilateral actor. 
-Swing in regional confidence in our favor. 
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El Salvador-Armed forces improve, putting guerrillas 
increasingly on the defensive, but guerrillas continue to 
have significant capability. Increased friction between 
guerrilla groups and guerrilla supporters. National Assembly 
and Presidential elections in 1983. Slow but finite reduction 
in political and/or indiscriminate violence. U.S. public 
opinion problems continue in cyclical pattern triggered by 
six month certification and by 1984 U.S. elections. 
Nicaragua- Nicaragua's isolation increases. 
Guatemala - Depending on stability of the region, 
situation could improve substantially (see issues for decision). 
Honduras and Costa Rica - Low level insurgency remains 
under control. Serious economic problems create social 
tensions and increased violence. Terrorism increases but does 
not reach levels necessary to cause internal collapse. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS : 
A. Continue pursuit of strategy outlined in Section III above 
Consistency and sticking power are the keys. 
B. Maintain funding levels at $1 billion per year for Basin 
(economic and military). This will require a $250-300 million 
supplemental in F.Y. '83 and active pursuit of the F.Y. '82 
supplementals. 
C. Make major efforts to obtain Congressional approval of 
F.Y. '82 Caribbean Basin and Security Assistance supplementals 
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to help alleviate critical short-term economic problems in 
the region, to prevent military setbacks in El Salvador 
between now and October and to assure continued cooperation 
from Honduras. 
D. If Guatemala situation continues to improve we will need 
some additional resources beyond those levels for economic 
and security and intelligence assistance. 
E. Carry out all N.S.D.D. 17 November 1981 decisions. 
F. Further upgrade U.S. intelligence collection and improve 
internal intelligence capabilities in coutries of the region. 
G. Substantially upgrade quality of political and economic 
understanding of the region through augmentation of personnel 
assigned to those functions. 
H. Improve public information effort using themes outlined in 
State Department paper. Allocate necessary personnel reources. 
I. Adopt more active diplomatic campaign to turn around Mexico 
and Social Democrats in Europe. In the meantime keep them 
isolated on Central American issues and highlight positive 
suoport from Christii^n Democratic Parties ana free trade unions, 
J. Build public pressure against Cuba by highlighting human and 
political rights issue. Use international Cuban community to 
carry the message. 
K. Step up military training efforts in region with emphasis on 
mmltilateralization where posjible and productive. 
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L. Increase economic pressure on Cuba. (Consideration to be 
given to quantum tightening of econor-ic embargo by stronger 
restrictions on Cuban content from third countries). 
M. Step up efforts to co-opt negotiati( ns issue to avoid 
Congressionally mandated negotiations, which would work 
against our interests. 
N. Continue to build C.A.D.C. capabilities. 
0. Initiate efforts to increase factional strife among 
guerrilla groups. 
P. Push for major amnesty program in El Salvador and Guatemala 
and publicized informant programs in Costa Rica and 
Honduras. Make concerted effort to exacerbate factional 
strife in extreme left. 
V. ISSUES FOR DECISION : 
An noted in Section III above, the key elements of our policy 
are in place. However, the following adv. itional issues should 
be addressed. 
A. Resources Levels (P.Y. '82): The Situation 1 scenario outlined 
above is predicated on a resources commitment level of one billion 
dollars per year through (and probably beyond) F.Y. '84. The 
F.Y. '82 prggram to include security and economic assistance, 
C.B.I, and security supplementals and the use of 506 authority 
will total about one billion dollars. If the supplemental 
requests are not approved our programs will be seriously 
jeopardized. 
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Decision L To make a maximum effort under White House 
direction to obtain Congressional approval for these supplemental 
requests. 
B. Resource Levels (F.Y. '83) : Our F.Y. '83 budget request 
will fall about $300 million short of the one billion level 
(in 1982 dollars). 
No decision is needed now but early in F.Y. '83 the 
funding shortfall problem will have to be addressed. 
C. Resource Level (personnel) : Vital political, military and 
economic reporting from Central America has been seriously 
constrained by a lack pf personnel resources. 
Decision : That the global ceiling on personnel strength 
in the State Department be increased by 35 positions (above 
F.Y.'82 supplemental and F.Y. »83 budget levels) to provide 
additional resources to the public information effort and to 
augment polititial and economic reporting in the region. Similarly 
that D.O.D. resources in the area by reviewed for adequacy 
and augmented as necessary. 
D. Resource Levels (Guatemala) : Additional F.Y. '82 and F.Y. 
'83 assiijtance will be needed to demonstrate support for the 
new Government and to assist it in dealing with its insurgency. 
Decision : That up to $50,000 in IMET be reprogramnied to 
Guatemala in F.Y. 1982. That F.M.S. cash slaes to Guatemala 
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be authorized immediately. That up to $10 million in F.M.S. 
credits be reprogrammed to Guatemala in F.Y. '83. 
E. Resources Levels (Guatemala-Interdiction) : Immediate steps 
are needed to implement an jrms interdiction program in Guate-
mala as provided by the 9 March 1981 Presidential Finding on 
Central America. 
Decision : That the Central Intelligence Agency's authority 
under the 9 March 1981 Presidential Finding be increased from 
$19.5 million to $22.0 million in order that an expanded 
program in Guatemala be initiated this fiscal year. These funds 
should be obtained, if possible, from the C.I.A.'s Reserve for 
Contingencies. 
F. Intelligence Efforts : Despite major improvements in collec-
tion, much more needs to be done. 
Decision : That D.O.D. and C.I.A. be tasked with further 
improvements in intelligence collection in the region with an 
emphasis on the development of intelligence capabilities in 
each of the democratic countries of the region. 
G. Public and Congressional information : Further improvements 
are needed. 
i.ecision : That unoer the auspices of the VJhite House, 
the public information effort be augmented and targetted on 
improving communication with the Congress and with opinion 
leaders. 
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H. i^.S.D.D. 17 : Not all provisions of N.S.D.D. 17 have 
been implemented. 
Decision : To reaffirm the continued validity of N.S.D.D. 
17 and taskfull implementation thereof. 
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